I argue that Husserl’s notion of horizon and Searle’s notion of background offer a contextual model of perception that significantly reformulates the debate about the conceptual vs. nonconceptual content of perception. I illustrate the model by using a test case: the perception of an ancient Roman milestone—an example given by Husserl—which both Husserl and Searle consider to be a direct and immediate perception without inferences involved. I further differentiate Husserl’s and Searle’s views, arguing that Husserl’s model has the advantage of (...) accounting for the diachronic aspect of perception. (shrink)

I examine the problem of what Ricœur calls représentance, which is a stand-in narratives offer of what took place (in the case of historical narratives) or actions (in the case of the re-telling of what people did). Ricœur rejects as insufficient two naive options: first, a simple adequacy between what took place and the historical narrative about it and, second, a simple heterogeneity between them so that historical narratives would be mere “possible versions” of what took place. I explore further (...) why Ricœur brought into consideration the attitude of the one offering the narrative, what he calls a “being-in-debt” or “attestation”. I then offer an assessment of Ricœur’s success in still claiming that what actually happened serves as the ultimate referent of the narratives given of the past event or the action. (shrink)

The Task of the Interpreter offers a new approach to what it means to interpret a text, and reconciles the possibility of multiple interpretations with the need to consider the author’s intention. Vandevelde argues that interpretation is both an act and an event: It is an act in that interpreters, through the statements they make, implicitly commit themselves to justifying their positions, if prompted. It is an event in that interpreters are situated in a cultural and historical framework and come (...) to a text with questions, concerns, and methods of which they are not fully conscious. These two aspects make interpretation a negotiation of meaning. The Task of the Interpreter provides an interdisciplinary investigation of textual interpretation including biblical hermeneutics, translation, and literary fictions. Vandevelde’s philosophical discussion will appeal to theorists of both continental and analytical/pragmatic traditions. (shrink)

J’examine pourquoi et dans quel sens l’imagination est présente dans un récit portant sur des faits ou des événements réels. Je présente le problème tel qu’il est énoncé par Paul Ricœur lorsqu’il introduit les trois genres du « Même », de « l’Autre » et de « l’Analogue » afin d’expliquer comment un récit peut rendre des faits et des événements « tels qu’ils se sont réellement passés ». J’en appelle, pour la solution, à la notion de « phantasma » (...) d’Edmund Husserl, qu’il considère comme le support de l’imagination pure, comme lorsque j’imagine un centaure. Le phantasma joue dans l’imagination pure le même rôle que les sensations dans la perception. Je soutiens qu’un récit comporte un phantasma – ce qu’il nous permet de visualiser et d’expérimenter à la lecture d’un récit – et que ce phantasma est analogue aux sensations de perceptions que les premiers observateurs avaient de ces faits et événements. Il n’y a donc pas, premièrement, de différence radicale entre la perception et l’imagination : toutes deux comportent un moment de « simple présentation » par le biais de sensations ou de phantasma, respectivement. Deuxièmement, la partie imaginative d’un récit nous permet de faire de nouveau l’expérience de faits et événements bruts sur le mode du « comme si ». (shrink)

Karl‐Otto Apel entertains a relationship with hermeneutics that is both somewhat marginal, because he does not consider himself part of the movement, and somewhat fundamental, because he has been deeply influenced by it and tries to retain the key acquisitions of hermeneutics while striving toward a transcendental project. While his first important work deals with how language has been treated in the tradition from Dante to Vico, his main work of 1973 involves, as the title states, a “transformation of philosophy” (...) and challenges three language‐centered movements: those of Wittgenstein (language as mirror of the world and the philosophy of language games), Heidegger (philosophical hermeneutics), and Peirce (American pragmatism). The transcendental dimension of language as a corporeal a priori manifests itself in validity claims. The transformation of philosophy Apel initiated was in large part a rethinking of hermeneutic philosophy along the lines of Anglo‐American philosophy. (shrink)

The essay is an examination of two models that have been used to think what “meaning” or “sense” is. Husserl offers the first model in which there is an exchange between the sense that is made in experience and the meaning that is articulated at the linguistic or logical level. The second model is offered by Paul Ricoeur in his theory of narratives. A narrative has a link to what took place that Ricoeur calls “représentance” or “lieutenance”: the narrative configures (...) but at the same time does justice to what took place. The fiction involved in the “as” of “such as it was” is necessary for the “such” that guarantees an adequacy between the narrative and the action or event. I expand on these two models and offer a model of meaning that I call “translatability”. (shrink)

In this article I examine the challenging question concerning whether communal forgiveness is possible. In order to show that it is in principle possible I articulate and then respond to two of the most powerful objections to communal forgiveness that have been formulated to date, namely: the argument that only victims can forgive; and the argument that forgiveness is unconditional and thus outside the scope of such things as communal or political deliberation. I argue that communal forgiveness is a process (...) of transformation that requires at the practical level an institutional framework in which a representative of a community can initiate the process of forgiveness, like Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu did in South Africa. Because forgiveness is a process of transformation, it cannot be assessed at the level of acts or commitments alone, but is a wager on the future that will indeed show whether the communities involved have accepted the transformation. (shrink)

Following some remarks of Jacques Taminiaux on Gadamer, I examine the permeating presence of history and alterity in interpretation by contrasting Gadamer’s views with Davidson’s notion of “radical interpretation.” I start by examining the debate they held with each other on several occasions. I then analyze Gadamer’s understanding of interpretation as a “hermeneutic experience” and Davidson’s method of “triangulation.” They both agree that interpretation should be free from the psychological turmoil of either divining an author’s intent or projecting the reader’s (...) expectations. The fundamental difference is that, for Davidson, interpretation is an ahistorical process taking place in the synchrony of interpreter and observed subjects, whereas for Gadamer interpretation is a historical “event,” in which something “happens” and contributes to the making of history. (shrink)

<P>While there are many books on the romantics, and many books on Heidegger, there has been no book exploring the connection between the two. Pol Vandevelde’s new study forges this important link. </P> <P>Vandevelde begins by analyzing two models that have addressed the interaction between literature and philosophy: early German romanticism (especially Schlegel and Novalis), and Heidegger’s work with poetry in the 1930s. Both models offer an alternative to the paradigm of mimesis, as exemplified by Aristotle’s and Plato’s discussion of (...) poetry, and both German romanticism and Heidegger owe a deep debt to Plato. The study goes on to defend the view that Heidegger was influenced by romanticism. The author’s project is thus both historical, showing the specificity of the romantic and Heideggerean works, and systematic, defending aspects of their alternative mode of thinking while also pointing to their weaknesses. </P>. (shrink)

I defend the view that charity in interpretation is both an epistemic and a moral virtue. In the first part, I examine Donald Davidson’s version of his principle of charity and question his ascription of beliefs by raising a phenomenological objection: beliefs themselves, before being ascribed, need to be interpreted when interpreters and the subjects they try to understand do not share the same cultural and historical background. In the second section, I examine the notion of epistemic virtue as discussed (...) in virtue epistemology and question whether an epistemic virtue can be completely separated from a moral virtue. In the third section, I show how Gregory the Great, Father of the Church and Pope in the 6th century, understands the virtue of charity in interpretation not as a motivation but as an attraction to the good so that the interpreter is not only a technician producing an interpretation but a moral agent acting in a community. (shrink)

I take a pragmatic approach to what interpreters do when they interpret and argue that critical pluralists have focused almost exclusively on one aspect of interpretation: the fact that it is an event taking place in a historical and cultural milieu that influences the many ways interpreters approach a given text. However, there is also in interpretation a pragmatic aspect: the fact that it is an act performed by individuals who, through the utterance of their statements, implicitly make claims, for (...) example, regarding the truth of their interpretation. In the first part I explain what critical pluralists overlook and the consequences of such oversight. In the second part I indicate how the validity of interpretation can be assessed. (shrink)

As a response to the common criticism that phenomenology is handicapped by its descriptive faith, this article outlines a program for showing what a rational justification can be from a phenomenological perspective. The phenomenological position defended here stands between Rorty's thesis of objectivity in solidarity and Habermas's view of rationality through universal claims. In the first part of the article, I show how a justification of a stance, an action, or a behavior can only make appeal to standards and criteria (...) which derive from a culture; in the second part, I argue that, since justification involves the making of claims, a claim makes both its author and its community accountable and liable for what is claimed; the third part shows how the encounter between cultures and communities exerts a greater scrutiny on claims made in one culture or community, thereby leading to progress in the justification process. Key Words: deconstruction • justification • phenomenology • relativism • validity claims. (shrink)

Diuina Eloquia cum Legente Crescunt Does Gregory the Great Mean a Subjective or an Objective Growth? - ABSTRACT: The article offers a new account of the famous statement by Gregory the Great that the text of the Bible grows with the reader. While most commentators understand this as a subjective growth of the reader enriched through reading, few give an account of the objective growth, namely, that the text itself grows. By focusing on the Homilies on Ezekiel and using at (...) times the Morals on the Book of Job, I link the statement diuina eloquia cum legente crescunt to Gregory’s use of the different senses of the Bible and show that the statement means not only a subjective growth of the reader, but also an objective growth of the text. Such a mutual growth takes the form of a cooperation between text and reader. It is from within such cooperation that the senses of the biblical text have to be found and understood. The literal meaning is thus foundational, as the basis for the other senses, but only within the cooperation, since readers must know in advance of what the literal meaning is the foundation. Seen from the perspective of the cooperation, however, the literal meaning is rather what the allegorical understanding takes as its foundation, in which perspective the allegorical understanding comes first. (shrink)

Papers presented at the 38th Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wis., June 26-29, 2008.

As the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl occupies a special place in the development of hermeneutics. He provided many of the concepts hermeneutics later used. The special relation between Husserl and hermeneutics explains why his connections to the movement have to do with how his views have been “interpreted”. Husserl took the discovery of the correlation between consciousness and object to be the breakthrough performed by his phenomenology. Such a correlation avoids the traditional problem of how an external object enters (...) into consciousness or how a mental component (consciousness) can relate to a physical matter (object). Through Husserl's fundamental insights, which gave hermeneutics the means to find its own philosophical foundation and self‐justification, and through his complex conceptual apparatus, philosophical hermeneutics could move beyond a reflection on interpretation and become a full‐fledged discipline that sees human existence as anchored in understanding and interpretation. (shrink)

While there are many books on the romantics, and many books on Heidegger, there has been no book exploring the connection between the two. Pol Vandevelde’s new study forges this important link. Vandevelde begins by analyzing two models that have addressed the interaction between literature and philosophy: early German romanticism, and Heidegger’s work with poetry in the 1930s. Both models offer an alternative to the paradigm of mimesis, as exemplified by Aristotle’s and Plato’s discussion of poetry, and both German romanticism (...) and Heidegger owe a deep debt to Plato. The study goes on to defend the view that Heidegger was influenced by romanticism. The author’s project is thus both historical, showing the specificity of the romantic and Heideggerean works, and systematic, defending aspects of their alternative mode of thinking while also pointing to their weaknesses. (shrink)

Following some remarks of Jacques Taminiaux on Gadamer, I examine the permeating presence of history and alterity in interpretation by contrasting Gadamer’s views with Davidson’s notion of “radical interpretation.” I start by examining the debate they held with each other on several occasions. I then analyze Gadamer’s understanding of interpretation as a “hermeneutic experience” and Davidson’s method of “triangulation.” They both agree that interpretation should be free from the psychological turmoil of either divining an author’s intent or projecting the reader’s (...) expectations. The fundamental difference is that, for Davidson, interpretation is an ahistorical process taking place in the synchrony of interpreter and observed subjects, whereas for Gadamer interpretation is a historical “event,” in which something “happens” and contributes to the making of history. (shrink)

At the core of Heidegger's philosophy, there lies this nagging question: what is the link between language and being? Using a famous formulation by Heidegger as a guide (‘When we go to the well, when we go through the woods, we are always already going through the word “well”, through the word “woods”’), the analysis focuses on the connection Heidegger establishes between being (what woods and well ‘are’), understanding (something is understood ‘as’ woods or well), and temporality (human understanding of (...) woods and well has changed since ancient Greek times, for example). Language is both what grants things their way to matter to us and thus to ‘be’ for us to the extent that we understand them, but language is also linked to a ‘happening’ (Geschehen) or an event so that things are not bound to their Geek being or current being: things ‘become being’ (seiend werden). Language is both the means for things to materialize in historical times: ‘being woods’ or ‘being a well,’ as well as a testimony to their entry into being. This is why language in its poetic use can make beings ‘more being’ (seiender). (shrink)

Dans cette étude je poursuis deux objectifs : d�une part, je tente d�établir d�un point de vue théorique les tenants et aboutissants de la question de savoir si le pardon entre deux communautés est possible ; d�autre part, j�examine les obstacles et les dangers d�un tel pardon. En ce qui concerne le premier objectif, je fais appel à Hannah Arendt qui nous a donné dans La condition de l�homme moderne une définition du pardon que j�applique aux relations entre communautés. Afin (...) d�examiner les problèmes d�un pardon inter-communautaire, je fais usage du roman de J. M. Coetzee, Disgrâce, qui offre à mon sens une illustration de ce qu�un tel pardon entraînerait. La situation que décrit Coetzee, et à laquelle je me réfère egalement, est celle de l�Afrique du Sud après l�apartheid. (shrink)