The negative zombie argument concludes that physicalism is false from the premises that p ∧¬q is ideally negatively conceivable and that what is ideally negatively conceivable is possible, where p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and q is a phenomenal truth (Chalmers 2002; 2010). A sentence φ is ideally negatively conceivable iff φ is not ruled out a priori on ideal rational reflection. In this paper, I argue that the negative zombie argument is neither a (...) priori nor conclusive. First, I argue that the premises of the argument are true only if there exists an adequate finite ideal reasoner R that believes ◊(p ∧ ¬q) on the basis of not believing p→q on a priori basis. Roughly, a finite reasoner is a reasoner with cognitive limitations (e.g. finite memory). I argue that R is finite only if R reasons nonmonotonically and only approach ideal reflection at the limit of a reasoning sequence. This would render the argument nonconclusive. Finally, I argue that, for some q, R does not believe ◊(p ∧ ¬q) on the basis of not believing p→q on a priori basis (e.g. for q =‘something is conscious’). This would render the choice of an adequate q dependent on empirical information (and the argument a posteriori). I conclude that the negative zombie argument (and, maybe, all zombie arguments) is neither a priori nor conclusive. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se analizan los conceptos hegelianos de sociedad civil y Estado, ámbitos donde el hombre —burgués y ciudadano— desarrolla los diversos aspectos de su singularidad y su vocación por lo universal. Se tratará de ahondar en la vertiente ética que abarca la vida del hombre como individuo y como ciudadano, y que, dadas las condiciones del mundo moderno, participa de la vida típica de un sujeto que goza de su libertad esencial y originaria en dos esferas complementarias, (...) a la vez que necesarias, para poder desenvolver su libertad en plenitud: las actividades que como particular lleva a cabo en la “sociedad civil” y las que también ejerce como un sujeto comunitario, dotado de capacidades éticas, con participación en la vida política de su Estado. (shrink)

A intenção do presente artigo é essencialmente responder à pergunta por que é que Hume constitui um claro representante do construtivismo ético. Nesse sentido, o autor começa por demonstrar até que ponto a gnoseologia de Hume determina em grande medida o conteúdo da sua teoria moral. Aquela, bem como a sua aplicação ao campo da moral, origina-se na sua aceitação do nominalismo, tanto em epistemologia como em metafísica. Com efeito, mediante a teoria associacionista das ideias, é possível inferir noções prováveis, (...) pois a repetição de acontecimentos gera o costume e o costume provoca uma crença. Tal como ocorre com os factos comuns, segundo o filósofo escocês, assim também acontece com o mundo das valorações éticas. Assim sendo, afirma Hume, não há demonstração possível de que um facto seja bom ou mau, dado que não se trata de um assunto que se possa dirimir racionalmente. /// What is it that makes David Hume a clear representative ofethical constructivism? His gnoseology outlines most ofthe content of his moral theory, that together with its application to moral, are based in the acceptance of nominalism, both in its epistemology and metaphysics. By analyzing his association theory of ideas, it becomes possible to infer probable notions, since from repetition of events customs are produced, and a custom produces a belief. According to this Scottish philosopher, the some that happens with ordinary actions happens in the world of ethical appreciation. Thus, he states, there is no possible demostration of an action as neither good nor bad, since it is something that cannot be rationally assessed. (shrink)

I propose the notion of ‘epistemic sanity’, a property of parsimony between the holding of true but not false beliefs and the consideration of our cognitive limitations. Where ‘alethic value’ is the epistemic value of holding true but not false beliefs, the ‘alethic potential’ of an agent is the amount of extra alethic value that she is expected to achieve, given her current environment, beliefs, and reasoning skills. Epistemic sanity would be related to the holding of (true or false) beliefs (...) that increase the agent's alethic potential (relevant beliefs) but not of beliefs that decrease it (this is related to cognitive parsimony). Suspension of judgment, forgetting, and clutter avoidance are the main contributors to an agent's epistemic sanity, where this paper focuses on suspension. I argue that rational suspension favors the holding of true and relevant beliefs, which is not the case for the extremes of opinionation (no suspension) and skepticism (general suspension). In the absence of evidence, opinionated agents are often forced to rely on principles such as the principle of indifference, but suspension dominates indifference in terms of alethic value in some conditions. A rational agent would only find it beneficial to adopt skepticism if she considers herself to be an anti-expert about her entire agenda, but then ‘flipping’ beliefs maximizes expected alethic value in relation to skepticism. The study of epistemic sanity results in an ‘impure’ veritism, which can deal with some limitations of veritism (e.g., explaining the existence of false but relevant beliefs). (shrink)

This paper is about the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality. The most common approaches to this aspect are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/may believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where the evaluative approaches are usually comparative (one reasoner is assessed compared to another). These approaches often present problems with blindspots. For example, ought a reasoner to believe a currently true blindspot? Is she permitted to? Consequently, these approaches often fail in describing a situation of alethic maximality, (...) where a reasoner fulfills all the alethic norms and could be used as a standard of rationality (as they are, in fact, used in some of these approaches). I propose a function α, which accepts a set of beliefs as inputand returns a numeric alethic value. Then I use this function to define a notion of alethic maximality that is satisfiable by finite reasoners (reasoners with cognitive limitations) and does not present problems with blindspots. Function α may also be used in alethic norms and evaluation methods (comparative and non-comparative) that may be applied to finite reasoners and do not present problems with blindspots. A result of this investigation isthat the project of providing purely alethic norms is defective. The use of function α also sheds light on important epistemological issues, such as the lottery and the preface paradoxes, and the principles of clutter avoidance and reflection. (shrink)

Celso de Souza Machado publicou, em 1987, um artigo intitulado “O ensino da Sociologia na escola secundária brasileira: levantamento preliminar”, escrito quando ainda era aluno do curso de graduação em Ciências Sociais da USP. Esse artigo se tornou referência na área e talvez seja a primeira iniciativa de trabalho científico de que se tem conhecimento sobre o ensino de sociologia no Brasil. Nesta entrevista, o autor relembra o processo de elaboração dessa pesquisa que ganhou projeção por remontar a trajetória histórica (...) da sociologia na educação básica. Além disso, ele recupera a discussão sobre o ensino de sociologia na década de 1980, momento em que o retorno gradual dessa disciplina às escolas pedia um debate sobre programas de ensino, conteúdos e materiais didáticos, do qual Celso Machado participou ativamente. A entrevista foi concedida a Anita Handfas e Alexandre Fraga. (shrink)

An increasing number of studies have addressed the psychological impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the general population. Nevertheless, far less is known about the impact on specific populations such as university students, whose psychological vulnerability has been shown in previous research. This study sought to examine different indicators of mental health in university students during the Spanish lockdown; we also analyzed the main sources of stress perceived by students in relation to the COVID-19 crisis, and the coping strategies adopted (...) when faced with the situation. Data was collected from 932 students through a web-based platform. Measures of anxiety, depression, irritability, and self-perceived change in mental health were administered, as well as ad hoc measures of stressors and coping strategies. Results indicated that students experienced considerable psychological problems during the confinement, with higher rates of emotional difficulties in women and undergraduate students than in men and postgraduates, respectively. Psychological distress was mainly related to several specific domains of stressors, as perceived by the participants: academic future, task overload, worsening of interpersonal conflicts, and restrictions in pleasant social contact; and far less related to the spread of the disease and its consequences for physical health. As regards coping strategies, both reframing skills and daily routines were shown to be the most effective. A path-analysis model integrating stressors, coping, and mental health revealed that coping strategies partially mediated the effect of stressors on psychological health. In general, results suggest that students’ psychological health was substantially affected by the COVID-19 situation and that the academic and relational changes were the most notable sources of stress. This study reinforces the need to monitor and promote mental health in university students to boost resilience in times of crisis. Our results on effective coping strategies may inform preventive programs aimed at helping students to deal with challenges like the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

This article deals with a modern disease of academic science that consists of an enormous increase in the number of scientific publications without a corresponding advance of knowledge. Findings are sliced as thin as salami and submitted to different journals to produce more papers. If we consider academic papers as a kind of scientific ‘currency’ that is backed by gold bullion in the central bank of ‘true’ science, then we are witnessing an article-inflation phenomenon, a scientometric bubble that is most (...) harmful for science and promotes an unethical and antiscientific culture among researchers. The main problem behind the scenes is that the impact factor is used as a proxy for quality. Therefore, not only for convenience, but also based on ethical principles of scientific research, we adhere to the San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment when it emphasizes “the need to eliminate the use of journal-based metrics in funding, appointment and promotion considerations; and the need to assess research on its own merits rather on the journal in which the research is published”. Our message is mainly addressed to the funding agencies and universities that award tenures or grants and manage research programmes, especially in developing countries. The message is also addressed to well-established scientists who have the power to change things when they participate in committees for grants and jobs. (shrink)

All reasoners described in the most widespread models of a rational reasoner exhibit logical omniscience, which is impossible for finite reasoners (real reasoners). The most common strategy for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the models using a notion of beliefs different from explicit beliefs. For example, the models could be interpreted as describing the beliefs that the reasoner would hold if the reasoner were able reason indefinitely (stable beliefs). Then the models would describe maximum rationality, (...) which a finite reasoner can only approach in the limit of a reasoning sequence. This strategy has important consequences for epistemology. If a finite reasoner can only approach maximum rationality in the limit of a reasoning sequence, then the efficiency of reasoning is epistemically (and not only pragmatically) relevant. In this paper, I present an argument to this conclusion and discuss its consequences, as, for example, the vindication of the principle 'no rationality through brute-force'. (shrink)

There is a thesis that assure the computability between externalize about mental content and self-knowledge (BURGE, 1988). However, this theses, that explore the auto-verification property of claims of the type “I think that p”, works only for assertive claims that are express in the simple present tense. Among the problematic cases are the claims in the past tense and claims about specific propositional attitude. This fails about the thesis of the compatibility is pointed by Boghossian (1992) as a prove of (...) the incompatibility between externalism and self-knowledge. There is a wide bibliography that try to manage the claims in past tense. In these articles (BURGE, 1995), It's argued that the preservative function of memory assure the veracity of the claims in past tense (at last in normal situations). However, there isn't a lot of work about the problem of the claims about specific propositional attitude. This article propose a expanse the preservative memory theory, with the purpose that It manages the self-knowledge of past propositional attitudes. We propose some criteria that define when a claim of this type is true, mainly in the cases that the content of the attitude of the past thought is not identical with the actual thought. The criterion about the similarity of content is the Bernecker's one (2009). The criterion about similarity of attitudes is new: the attitude that S thinks in t1 as if he have had in t2 is similar with the attitude that he had in t 1 iff the actual attitude is entailed by the former. (shrink)

The notion of an ideal reasoner has several uses in epistemology. Often, ideal reasoners are used as a parameter of (maximum) rationality for finite reasoners (e.g. humans). However, the notion of an ideal reasoner is normally construed in such a high degree of idealization (e.g. infinite/unbounded memory) that this use is unadvised. In this dissertation, I investigate the conditions under which an ideal reasoner may be used as a parameter of rationality for finite reasoners. In addition, I present and justify (...) the research program of computational epistemology, which investigates the parameter of maximum rationality for finite reasoners using computer simulations. (shrink)

O autor analisa a posição de Antero de Quental perante o movimento iberista do século XIX, destacando a origem peninsular deste e a sua tradição, com raízes no liberalismo. Aponta a influência nesse movimento de um proudhonismo ingénuo, e destaca o papel de José Félix Henriques Nogueira como transmissor de um ideal federativo com base na concepção de uma "pátria espanhola comum", em que a federação tende no limite paraa fusão.A propósito conclui que a formulação dada por Antero a este (...) pensamento, em Portugal perante a Revolução de Espanha não é mais radical que a de Nogueira, antes é uma consequência contida no pensamento deste precursor do republicanismo. Por outro lado, Teófilo Braga, além de partilhar do ideal liberalista, advogou a separação dos Açores do continente português, contrariamente a Antero de Quental, que pensava que os açorianos só podiam ser portugueses, devendo entrar, federados com o Continente, num estado ibérico. /// L'auteur analyse la position de Antero de Quental devant le mouvement ibériste du XlX.e siècle, en mettant en relief son origine péninsulaire et sa tradition enracinée dans le libéralisme portugais. Il remarque l'influence sur ce mouvement d'un proudhonisme naïf et met en relief l'importance de José Félix Henriques Nogueira en tant que diffuseur d'un idéal fédératif basé sur la conception d'une "patrie espagnole commune", dans laquelle la fédération, à la limite, tend vers la fusion. À ce propos il remarque que la formulation donnée à cette pensée par Antero dans Portugal perante a Revolução de Espanha n'est pas plus radicale que celle de Nogueira; elle est plutôt une conclusion contenue dans la pensée de ce précurseur du républicanisme portugais. Par ailleurs, Teófilo Braga non seulement partagea l'idéal ibériste, mais il a été partisant de la séparation des Açores du Portugal continental, contrairement à Antero de Quental, qui jugeait que les Açoréens ne pourraient être que Portugais, et devraient entrer en fédération avec le Portugal ibérique dans un état péninsulaire. /// The author analises the position of Antero de Quental within the Iberist movement of the XlXth century and emphazises its Peninsular origin and its tradition with roots in the Portuguese Liberalism. He points to the influence in this movement of a certain naive proudhonism and the rêle of José Félix Henriques Nogueira as a transmitter of a federative ideal based on the conception of a "common Spanish fatherland" in which the federation tends at the limit towards fusion. In this context he concludes that the formulation given by Antero in the opuscule Portugal perante a Revolução de Espanha is no more radical than that of Nogueira; it is rather a consequence of the thought of that forerunner of the republicanism in Portugal. On the other hand Teófilo Braga not only shared the Iberist ideal, but also defended the separation of the Azores from the Portuguese homeland, contrarily to Antero de Quental, who thought that the Azoreans could only be Portuguese and that they should accede to an Iberian state federated with the mainland. (shrink)

Em trabalhos anteriores, analisamos as formas pelas quais a sociologia vem sendo cobrada nos vestibulares de algumas universidades em diferentes regiões brasileiras e no ENEM. Além do entendimento de que formas são essas, uma das conclusões a que chegamos foi a de que, no ENEM, dificilmente há o acionamento de conhecimento sociológico prévio para a resolução da prova. Entendemos que, por mais que a cobrança na redação e de modo interdisciplinar traga algum reconhecimento ao saber sociológico, a construção de questões (...) que possam ir além da interpretação de texto é fundamental para a consolidação da sociologia no exame. Sendo assim, como continuidade de nossa reflexão, objetivamos, no presente trabalho, discutir, afinal, o que é esse conhecimento prévio, que pode ser entendido como conceitos, temas e teorias sociológicos. Mas quais são eles e como são cobrados na prática? Como sabemos, não há uma definição nacional dos conteúdos da sociologia, mas algumas propostas estaduais. Analisaremos quais são, segundo os editais das universidades, as matérias de sociologia presentes em alguns vestibulares, se é possível chegar a um mapa comum e se esse mapa é compatível ou não com os currículos mínimos estaduais. Para isso, analisaremos editais dos vestibulares em que a sociologia está presente e do ENEM. (shrink)

Backtracking counterfactuals are problem cases for the standard, similarity based, theories of counterfactuals e.g., Lewis. These theories usually need to employ extra-assumptions to deal with those cases. Hiddleston, 632–657, 2005) proposes a causal theory of counterfactuals that, supposedly, deals well with backtracking. The main advantage of the causal theory is that it provides a unified account for backtracking and non-backtracking counterfactuals. In this paper, I present a backtracking counterfactual that is a problem case for Hiddleston’s account. Then I propose an (...) informational theory of counterfactuals, which deals well with this problem case while maintaining the main advantage of Hiddleston’s account. In addition, the informational theory offers a general theory of backtracking that provides clues for the semantics and epistemology of counterfactuals. I propose that backtracking is reasonable when the state of affairs expressed in the antecedent of a counterfactual transmits less information about an event in the past than the actual state of affairs. (shrink)

A teoria minimalista da verdade consiste em todas as instâncias do esquema ‘‘φ’ é verdadeira sse φ’ e na afirmação de que nossa aceitação (primitiva) dessas instâncias é suficiente para explicar nossas atitudes em relação a todas sentenças envolvendo ‘verdade’. Filósofos têm apontado que o minimalismo tem dificuldades em explicar nossas atitudes em relação a generalizações envolvendo ‘verdade’ e em lidar com instanciações contraditórias do esquema para sentenças paradoxais (ex. paradoxo do mentiroso). Proponentes do minimalismo apresentam soluções para esses problemas. (...) Nesse artigo, argumento que essas soluções entram em conflito, analiso algumas estratégias para resolver esse conflito e concluo que o minimalismo não pode evitar conflitos desse tipo mantendo seu caráter minimalista. Abstract:The minimalist theory of truth (minimalism) consists in all instances of the T schema (‘‘φ’ is true iff φ’) along with the claim that our (primitive) acceptance of these instances is sufficient for explaining our attitudes (e.g. acceptance) in relation to all sentences involving ‘truth’ (‘true’, etc). Philosophers argue that minimalism can neither explain our atittudes in relation to truth-generalizations (generalizations involving ‘truth’) nor deal with the fact that instantiations of T to sentences alike the liar paradox entail a contradiction. Paul Horwich proposes solutions to the two problems, but these solutions conflict with each other. In this paper, I show demonstrate this conflict and analise some strategies to solve it. I argue that Horwich’s solution to the liar problem has important limitations. I conclude that the minimalism cannot avoid conflicts of this sort maintaining its minimalistic character. (shrink)

The emotional connotation of words is known to affect word and sentence processing. However, the when and how of the interaction between emotion and grammar are still up for debate. In this behavioural experiment, 35 female university students read noun phrases (NPs) composed by a determiner and a noun in their L1 (Spanish), and were asked to indicate if the NPs were grammatically correct (elmasc camareromasc) or not (*lafem tornillomasc; i.e. a gender agreement task). The type of gender (arbitrary/natural), the (...) emotionality (unpleasant/neutral), and the gender class (feminine/masculine) of the nouns were manipulated. We found an overall grammaticality effect, responses being faster in grammatically correct trials than in incorrect ones. However, the effects of emotionality and gender class varied depending on gender type. For arbitrary gender, the grammaticality effect was greater in feminine nouns than in masculine nouns and independent of emotionality. For natural gender, the grammaticality effect interacted with gender class and emotionality, this effect only emerging in unpleasant stimuli for feminine nouns. Our results reveal that it is possible to find emotional effects at the behavioural level in an intrinsically grammatical task. Yet, these effects depend on gender properties like the type of gender and the gender class. (shrink)

The most widespread models of rational reasoners (the model based on modal epistemic logic and the model based on probability theory) exhibit the problem of logical omniscience. The most common strategy for avoiding this problem is to interpret the models as describing the explicit beliefs of an ideal reasoner, but only the implicit beliefs of a real reasoner. I argue that this strategy faces serious normative issues. In this paper, I present the more fundamental problem of logical omnipotence, which highlights (...) the normative content of the problem of logical omniscience. I introduce two developments of the notion of implicit belief (accessible and stable belief ) and use them in two versions of the most common strategy applied to the problem of logical omnipotence. (shrink)

Este artigo discute o uso de simulações de computador em Epistemologia(Epistemologia Computacional). O objetivo o artigo é fundamentar e discu-tir a ideia de uma Epistemologia Computacional, além de apresentar umexemplo de estudo nesse campo. Na Introdução, discuto as objeções maiscomuns aos métodos da Epistemologia Tradicional e à proposta de Quine deuma Epistemologia Naturalizada. Argumento que a Epistemologia Compu-tacional não está sujeita a nenhuma destas objeções. Na Seção 1, apresentouma revisão bibliográfica dos estudos em Epistemologia Computacional(tanto em Epistemologia individualista quanto em (...) Epistemologia Social) ediscuto a estrutura geral destes estudos. Na Seção 2, apresento alguns resul-tados de um estudo em Epistemologia Computacional que realizei em minha tese de doutorado. -/- ENGLISH: This paper is about the use of computer simulations in Epistemology (Com- putational Epistemology). The goal of the paper is to ground and discuss theidea of a Computational Epistemology, and to present an example of studyin this field. In the Introduction, I discuss the most common objections tothe methods of Traditional Epistemology and to Quine’s Naturalized Episte-mology. I argue that Computation Epistemology is not subject to any of the-se objections. In Section 1, I review the literature on Computational Episte-mology (both in individualistic Epistemology and in Social Epistemology)and discuss the general structure of these studies. In Section 2, I presentsome results of my PhD dissertation on Computational Epistemology. (shrink)

The causal and simulation theories are often presented as very distinct views about declarative memory, their major difference lying on the causal condition. The causal theory states that remembering involves an accurate representation causally connected to an earlier experience. In the simulation theory, remembering involves an accurate representation generated by a reliable memory process. I investigate how to construe detailed versions of these theories that correctly classify memory errors as misremembering or confabulation. Neither causalists nor simulationists have paid attention to (...) memory-conjunction errors, which is unfortunate because both theories have problems with these cases. The source of the difficulty is the background assumption that an act of remembering has one target. I fix these theories for those cases. The resulting versions are closely related when implemented using tools of information theory, differing only on how memory transmits information about the past. The implementation provides us with insights about the distinction between confabulatory and non-confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors have a privileged position. (shrink)

We performed an EEG graph analysis on data from 31 typical readers and 24 dyslexics, recorded while they were engaged in an audiovisual task and during resting-state. The task simulates reading acquisition as participants learned new letter-sound mappings via feedback. EEG data was filtered for the delta, theta, alpha, and beta bands. We computed the Phase Lag Index to provide an estimate of the functional connectivity between all pairs of electrodes per band. Then, networks were constructed using a Minimum Spanning (...) Tree, a unique sub-graph connecting all nodes without loops, aimed at minimizing bias in between groups and conditions comparisons. Both groups showed a comparable accuracy increase during task blocks, indicating that they correctly learned the new associations. The EEG results revealed lower task-specific theta connectivity, and lower theta degree correlation over both rest and task recordings, indicating less network integration in dyslexics compared to typical readers. This pattern suggests a role of theta oscillations in dyslexia and may reflect differences in task engagement between the groups, although robust correlations between MST metrics and performance indices were lacking. (shrink)

Starting from David Hume's analysis on the notion of justice in his main work on the topic, his 'Treatise of Human Nature', the author sets out, firstly, to comment on Hume's explanation on the notion of justice as a nonarbitrary artifice resulting from men's conventions, and then to outline the value system which determines the theory of justice of the Scottish philosopher. Finally, a criticism is presented on Hume's supposedly "nonarbitrary" conception of justice and the existing link between his empirical (...) deduction and the nominalist explanation of justice. (shrink)

Se comprende por "contractualismo" la teona por la cual se explica y justifica el fundamento y la posibilidad de la sociedad a partir de un pacto entre sus miembros y que es desarrollado en toda su expresión en la Modemidad.

Tras una breve semblanza del autor y de su obra, se incluye la traducción de un pasaje del Libro de los animales en el que al-Yâhiz alude a la versión de una lengua a otra y se comentan algunas cuestiones planteadas por la moderna teoría de la traducción en relación al mismo.