Hume: Moral Relativism

This paper argues that Hume was first and foremost a moral psychologist and a determinist, not a moralist. When confronting the fact of moral disagreement, notably in "A Dialogue" affixed to his moral enquiry, he maintained that it is not psychologically possible to approve of the conflicting norms of other cultures, except in the case of sometimes approving of individuals in other cultures for abiding by those objectionable norms rather than fomenting cultural upheaval. All cultures should nonetheless agree on the (...) most general and fundamental moral principles as well as on most specifics. But there are non-trivial specific cases on which there will be irreconcilable disagreements, based on conflicting beliefs concerning utilities, finer matters of taste, and uncertainties over how best to maximize conflicts between the useful/agreeable and the personal/social. In these cases, we would be wise to consider whether tolerating the conflicting views of others would be more useful and agreeable than attempting to enforce conformity. Toleration is among the less obvious virtues, but it is one that experience has by now taught us to adopt, at least in certain cases. (shrink)

ResumenEn este trabajo tratamos de esclarecer en qué sentido Hume es relativista con relación a la ética y a la estética. El sentimentalismo inherente a su ética y estética hace que, desde el punto de vista de algunos intérpretes, Hume sea un relativista radical con respecto a dichos ámbitos. Sin embargo, tanto el innegable sentimentalismo de Hume como su supuesto relativismo requieren un profundo estudio. Nos valdremos del concepto de regla general para analizar las relaciones entre sentimentalismo y relativismo, y (...) finalmente argumentaremos que si bien tiene sentido calificar a Hume como relativista, su relativismo es moderado y sensato.Palabras claveRelativismo, Hume, regla general, Ética, EstéticaAbstractIn this paper we will try to elucidate in what sense Hume is a relativist concerning ethics and aesthetics. According to some interpreters’ views, Hume’s sentimentalism with respect to ethics and aesthetics implies that Hume is what we could call a radical relativist. However, both Hume’s sentimentalism and his alleged relativism need a deep analysis. We will analyze the relationship between sentimentalism and relativism based on the concept of general rule. Finally we will argue that, even though Hume may be labelled as a relativist, his relativism is moderate and sensible.Keywords Relativism, Hume, general rule, Ethics, Aesthetics. (shrink)

An interpretation and critical re-construction is offered of David Hume's argument on cultural relativism in the essay ‘A Dialogue’. For any issue of moral disagreement, Hume contends, either one side can be shown right and the other wrong, or imprecision in moral principles leaves room for more than one reasonable view, or the disagreement concerns a morally indifferent aesthetic matter, or it is caused by ‘artificial’ moral sentiments. In each case, relativism is the wrong view. Following an analysis of each (...) disagreement type, and the crucial notion of ‘artificial’ views, it is concluded that Hume's anti-relativist argument is sound. (shrink)

In ‘A Dialogue’, Hume offers an important reply to the moral skeptic. Skeptics traditionally point to instances of moral diversity in support of the claim that our core values are fixed by enculturation. Hume argues that the skeptic exaggerates the amount of variation in moral codes, however, and fails to adopt an indulgent stance toward attitudes different from ours. Hume proposes a charitable interpretation of moral disagreement, moreover, which traces it back to shared principles of human nature. Contemporary philosophers attempt (...) to locate examples of moral variability that cannot be accommodated in this way. But they are no more successful than their predecessors. Moral skeptics have not found a single case of moral diversity that is resistant to the Humean strategy. (shrink)

O texto é uma defesa, inspirada em Hume, da naturalização de valores morais, especificamente da universalidade e da igualdade. Tomo a posição de Tugendhat a respeito da relação entre afetos e julgamentos morais como o ponto de partida para explicitar o problema central da naturalização na moralidade, que é a naturalização dos valores. Mostro, então, que a assunção de uma assimetria entre afetos e razão, em favor desta última, é a nota característica da tradição kantiana, cujo núcleo é uma teoria (...) antinaturalista de valor. Discuto, em seguida, em favor de naturalismo moral de Hume, mas indico suas limitações em esclarecer distinções morais a respeito das virtudes artificiais. Por fim, concluo apresentando uma análise naturalizada do universalismo e do igualitarismo baseada na assimetria entre a culpa e a indignação. (shrink)

My focus is Hume's advertised attempt to establish foundationally a science of man. Though it is not his sole motivation, central to this effort is his intention to undermine the credibility of superstitious, supernatural accounts of what makes humans and their social life function. The argument of this paper is that attempts to downplay Hume's universalism and, in virtue of his recognition of diversity, to identify him as subscribing to some form of historicism or relativism, are mistaken or at best (...) fail to apprehend the centrality of his assault on unscientific accounts of human nature. (shrink)

The book has two aims. First, to examine the extent and significance of the connection between Hume's aesthetics and his moral philosophy; and, second, to consider how, in light of the connection, his moral philosophy answers central questions in ethics. The first aim is realized in chapters 1-4. Chapter 1 examines Hume's essay "Of the Standard of Taste" to understand his search for a "standard" and how this affects the scope of his aesthetics. Chapter 2 establishes that he treats beauty (...) in nature and art and moral beauty as similar in kind, and applies the conclusions about his aesthetics to his moral thought. Chapter 3 solves a puzzle to which this gives rise, namely, how individuals both accept general standards that they also contravene in the course of aesthetic and moral activity. Chapter 4 takes up the normative aspect of Hume's approach by understanding moral character through his view of moral beauty. The second aim of the book is realized in chapters 5-7 by entertaining three objections against Hume's moral philosophy. First, if morality is an immediate reaction to the beauty of vice and the deformity of virtue, why is perfect virtue not the general condition of every human individual? Second, if morality consists of sentiments that arise in the subject, how can moral judgments be objective and claim universal validity? And third, if one can talk of "general standards" governing conduct, how does one account for the diversity of moral systems and their change over time? The first is answered by showing that like good taste in aesthetics, 'right taste' in morals requires that the sentiments are educated; the second, by arguing against the view that Hume is a subjectivist and a relativist, and the third, by showing that his approach contains a view of progress left untouched by any personal prejudices Hume himself might harbor. The book concludes in chapter 7 by showing how Hume's view of philosophy affects the scope of any normative ethics. (shrink)

A intenção do presente artigo é essencialmente responder à pergunta por que é que Hume constitui um claro representante do construtivismo ético. Nesse sentido, o autor começa por demonstrar até que ponto a gnoseologia de Hume determina em grande medida o conteúdo da sua teoria moral. Aquela, bem como a sua aplicação ao campo da moral, origina-se na sua aceitação do nominalismo, tanto em epistemologia como em metafísica. Com efeito, mediante a teoria associacionista das ideias, é possível inferir noções prováveis, (...) pois a repetição de acontecimentos gera o costume e o costume provoca uma crença. Tal como ocorre com os factos comuns, segundo o filósofo escocês, assim também acontece com o mundo das valorações éticas. Assim sendo, afirma Hume, não há demonstração possível de que um facto seja bom ou mau, dado que não se trata de um assunto que se possa dirimir racionalmente. /// What is it that makes David Hume a clear representative ofethical constructivism? His gnoseology outlines most ofthe content of his moral theory, that together with its application to moral, are based in the acceptance of nominalism, both in its epistemology and metaphysics. By analyzing his association theory of ideas, it becomes possible to infer probable notions, since from repetition of events customs are produced, and a custom produces a belief. According to this Scottish philosopher, the some that happens with ordinary actions happens in the world of ethical appreciation. Thus, he states, there is no possible demostration of an action as neither good nor bad, since it is something that cannot be rationally assessed. (shrink)

This dissertation investigates the role of beauty in the moral philosophies of Hume and Kant. It interprets Hume's thought by showing how he applies "beauty" to conduct and character as well as nature and art; how his "critique" of philosophical reason informs his view of morality; and how his approach compares and contrasts to that of Kant. ;Chapter one examines Hume's concept of "general rules," concluding that philosophy involves reflecting upon ordinary life and formulating "principles" to explain it. This clarifies (...) the aim of Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste." Chapter two employs this argument to show that in his moral philosophy Hume conceives "moral beauty" by analogy with natural and artistic beauty. As in his aesthetics, he approaches moral life by discovering principles which explain conduct. This makes his thought "descriptive" rather than "normative." ;Chapter three responds to the charge that Hume "recommends" one sort of conduct over another. By investigating reflection and character, it argues that these "normative" elements are not recommendations of an "ethical" sort, but part of Hume's philosophical explanandum. This conclusion is central to chapter four which compares "Of the Standard of Taste" with Kant's "Antinomy of Taste," and his notion of "sentiment" with Kant's concept of "feeling." Although points of agreement emerge, the two thinkers are seen to have different views of philosophy and the role it plays in human life. This is reflected in the regulative role Kant assigns to reason, the task he delegates to moral philosophy, and his contention that beauty is a "symbol" of the good. ;Chapter five examines Hume's specific contribution to moral philosophy by articulating three objections to his approach, viz., that he fails to explain, first, the existence of moral imperfection; second, why moral judgments are universally valid; and, third, how "general standards" can be reconciled with cultural diversity and moral improvement. Concentrating on taste and education, subjectivism and relativism, and a "progress of sentiments," respectively, a Humean response to each objection is articulated. The study concludes with a consideration of Hume's "critique" of philosophy and emphasizes his suggestion that philosophical inquiry is itself a matter of "taste.". (shrink)

It is commonly held that moral judgements are implicitly general — or universalizable — in that if anyone is morally obligated to perform or refrain from some action, everyone in relevantly similar circumstances is similarly obligated. I undertake here to show that David Hume fully subscribed to this thesis and that because of the way it is related to his conceptions of obligation and what he terms the practicality of morals he is pushed to insist that the moral sentiments of (...) human beings across space and time are much more uniform than he knew them to be. My discussion places Hume in the historical context of the controversy about 'the general foundation of morals' referred to near the beginning of the second Enquiry, and it is part of my thesis that Hume's moral philosophy can be understood only in terms of arguments and counter-arguments developed by other contributors to the controversy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:191 A PERSONAL ELEMENT IN MORALITY In his quest for the truth about moral life, Hume steers between the Scylla of Sentiment and the Charybdis of Reason. Sentiment operating alone, as a basis for morality, would threaten to engulf humanity with as many relativistic moral truths as there are individuals. Reason alone would produce objective, impersonal truths, but these would be powerless to move us. Hume's developed theory ingeniously (...) shows how Reason and Sentiment can operate together, to produce judgments based on feelings which are nonetheless impersonal and objective (T 581-584; E 227-229). Hume is acutely aware (as we shall see below) that there exists a considerable disparity between the impartiality required of us by moral theory and what in practice people think when it comes to moral matters. There would seem to be only two ways of accommodating this fact. One is to regard the disparity as a mark of the moral mediocrity of ordinary people; we are not as objective in our judgments as we could be. The other way is to treat the disparity as a token of failure and inadequacy in the theory; our best philosophical reasoning about morals fails to capture its subject matter without distortion. Our rational powers fall short, not only in Book I of the Treatise, where the task is to explain the foundation of our beliefs, but also in Book III, where Hume attempts to elucidate moral life. Certainly the first way would reduce the gap to some extent; some people, perhaps many, are moral truly low achievers. I want to show that Hume also suggests the second way; he is willing to deflate the 192 pretensions of philosophy, even when it comes to his own state-of-the-art efforts. I. The Objectivity of Certain Feeling-Based Judgments In the moral arena of life we make judgments which are based on feelings, on 'certain sentiments of pleasure or disgust' (T 581). "To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character" (T 471). Of course not just any feeling will do; it must be of a peculiar kind, which we can experience only under specific conditions. At first Hume characterizes the necessary condition as follows: 'Tis only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil (T 472). Later on Hume provides a fuller account. Characteristically he elaborates in response to an anticipated objection. The objection is that our sympathetic feelings of pleasure and pain fluctuate wildly, depending mainly upon our distance, so to speak, from the character we assess, in space, time, and kind of relationship. Our moral judgments do not vary in this way; we give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England (T 581). So (it is concluded) our moral judgments do not rest upon sympathy. Hume's response is that, as a necessary condition for moral judgment and communication, we must "fix on some steady and general points of view" (T 581-2). He proceeds to employ an analogy with our situation regarding perception of (and communication about) the things which make up our common world. 193 Here a man obviously cannot consider things 'only as they appear from his peculiar point of view' (T 581). For instance I cannot describe my desk to a friend by reporting on how I perceive it at this moment — because at this moment the light is dim and I am standing across the room from the desk. If I were to do a painting of the scene before me, the desk would be black, its top a trapezoid shape on the canvas. What I say, however, is that I have a walnut desk of a medium brown color and it has a rectangular top. I say, in effect, how the desk would look under standard conditions of light and perspective. In the Enquiry version Hume spells out his analogy more fully. Again he addresses the case in which our sentiments, e.g., about two men, one distant and... (shrink)

If there is a normative moral theory embedded in Hume's works and if the recent critics of the utilitarian interpretation of Hume are correct in claiming that he was not a utilitarian, then what is the nature of Hume's moral theory? In this paper I hope to provide a plausible answer to that question by examining Hume's contention that the moral sentiment is analogous to a secondary quality. I shall show that his discussions of the moral sentiment provide one with (...) a method for evaluating the moral value of an agent's motive. Turning to Hume's discussions of obligation, I shall show that, for Hume, questions regarding one's obligations are resolved on the basis of societal conventions. Hume's social relativism, however, does not commit him to moral relativism, for questions of moral obligation are to be resolved by considering both whether one is socially obligated to perform a certain kind of action and whether or performing that kind of action in a certain set of circumstances in virtuous or vicious. Granting that there are utilitarian strains in Hume's moral theory, I shall conclude by discussing the role of the principle of utility in Hume's moral theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that a form of moral constructivism inspired by Hume's Enquiry yields a plausible response to the problem of relativity. Though this problem can be stated in many different ways, I argue that a Humean constructivism is far more universal in scope that Hume's positions are often taken to be. In addition, I argue that where Hume's position does imply a limited scope, this limitation is perfectly appropriate. I discuss four iterations of the relativity problem(s) here: (...) the incorrigibility of local practices (local practices relativism), the relativity of fundamental moral principles (local principles relativism), the contingency of moral principles (modal relativism), and, in a short postscript, the limited scope of moral normativity (normative relativism). Humean Constructivism, I argue, delivers the proper verdict for each of these purported problems. (shrink)