The behaviour of autonomous agents may deviate from that deemed to be for the good of the societal systems of which they are a part. Norms have therefore been proposed as a means to regulate agent behaviours in open and dynamic systems, where these norms specify the obliged, permitted and prohibited behaviours of agents. Regulation can effectively be achieved through use of enforcement mechanisms that result in a net loss of utility for an agent in cases where the agent’s behaviour (...) fails to comply with the norms. Recognition of compliance is thus crucial for achieving regulation. In this paper, we propose a general framework for observation of agents’ behaviour, and recognition of this behaviour as constituting, or counting as, compliance or violation. The framework deploys monitors that receive inputs from trusted observers, and processes these inputs together with transition network representations of individual norms. In this way, monitors determine the fulfillment or violation status of norms. The paper also describes a proof of concept implementation of the framework, and its deployment in electronic contracting environments. (shrink)

A gradual semantics takes a weighted argumentation framework as input and outputs a final acceptability degree for each argument, with different semantics performing the computation in different manners. In this work, we consider the problem of attack inference. That is, given a gradual semantics, a set of arguments with associated initial weights, and the final desirable acceptability degrees associated with each argument, we seek to determine whether there is a set of attacks on those arguments such that we can obtain (...) these acceptability degrees. The main contribution of our work is to demonstrate that the associated decision problem, i.e., whether a set of attacks can exist which allows the final acceptability degrees to occur for given initial weights, is NP-complete for the weighted h-categoriser and card-based semantics, and is polynomial for the weighted max-based semantics, even for the complete version of the problem (where all initial weights and final acceptability degrees are known). We then briefly discuss how this decision problem can be modified to find the attacks themselves and conclude by examining the partial problem where not all initial weights or final acceptability degrees may be known. (shrink)

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.