Straipsnyje svarstoma galimybė, ar ritmo konceptas, funcionuojantis Gillesio Deleuze’o ir Félixo Guattari tekstuose, negalėtų padėti atsekti minties judėjimo linijų nuo filosofijos link skirtingų meno formų ir atgal. Pradedant nuo dinaminės problemų ir sąvokų kartografijos, kurią kaip tinkamą tokiems minties eksperimentams įžvelgė Anne Sauvagnargues, Jamesas M. Buchananas, Ronaldas Bogue, Stephenas Zepke, šiame tyrime siūloma sąvoka ritmas yra tinkama kaip siejamoji galimų filosofijos ir įvairių menų sankabos jungtis. Ritmas Deleuze’o ir Guattari tekstuose tampa filosofine sąvoka ir įgauna ontologinį statusą, transcenduojantį siauras filosofijos (...) ir meno apibrėžtis. Ji funkcionuoja tarpinėje teritorijoje: tarp minties, garso, žodžio ir vaizdo, meno kūrinio, filosofijos, gyvenimo. Būtent žvelgiant iš tokios ontologinės perspektyvos, ši sąvoka įgauna galią atverti ne horizontaliuosius, o vertikaliuosius, genealoginius meno kaip tapsmo aspektus. (shrink)

Straipsnis skiriamas prancūzų aktoriaus, poeto, scenaristo, žiaurumo teatro idėjos autoriaus Antonino Artaud idėjų pėdsakų šifravimui Gilles’io Deleuze’o kino filosofijoje. Straipsnyje keliami klausimai: kuo Artaud idėjų traktuotė antrajame knygos „Kinas“ tome „Vaizdinys-laikas“ skiriasi nuo čia pat aptariamų rusų režisieriaus Sergejaus Eisensteino idėjų įtakos? Kaip modernaus kino filosofijoje veikia Deleuze’ui svarbi Artaud mintis apie pamatinę minties bejėgystę, įkūnytą pačioje mintyje? Ar iš Artaud pasiskolintas „kūno be organų“ konceptas išveda į kasdienį ir ceremonijų kūną, apie kurį rašo Deleuze’as kaip apie modernaus kino ženklą? (...) Straipsnyje prieinama prie išvados, kad visgi galima išskirti dvi Deleuze’o iš Artaud perimtas kūno traktuotes: iki-šizofrenišką pozų ir gestų kūną, kuris sudaro pamatinę „žiaurumo teatro“ konceptualinę šerdį ir kuria remiasi Deleuze’as, rašydamas apie modernaus kino tapsmą, bei šizofrenišką „kūną be organų“, kuris turėjo įtakos Deleuze’o ir Guattari tyrimams. Pamatinė straipsnyje ginama tezė: tiriant teorines įtakas Deleuze’o modernaus kino filosofijai, neįmanoma apeiti ir nepastebėti Artaud. (shrink)

Šiame straipsnyje siekiama atsakyti į klausimą, kas galėtų susieti filosofiją ir vizualiuosius bei žodinius menus. Ar įmanoma ir jei taip, tai kaip įmanoma reflektuoti visus menus kaip vieno kūrybinio įvykio momentus? Siekiant atsakyti į šį klausimą, pirma, aptariamas logikos ir kūrybiškumo susikertant menui ir filosofijai susidūrimas, antra – žodžio ir vaizdo nebendramatiškumas, surastas / išrastas belgų siurrealisto René Magritte’o ir reflektuotas Michelio Foucault. Čia sugrįžtama prie klasikinio F. Niezsche’s disputo su Sokratu apie logikos ir kūrybiškumo priešpriešą ir siekiama atsakyti į (...) klausimą, kurią pusę – Sokrato ar F. Nietzsche’s – paremia šioje diskusijoje Gilles’is Deleuze’as ir Félixas Guattari. Atrodytų, kad jie suderina logiką ir kūrybiškumą, pastebėdami, kad menas nėra nei mokslinio mąstymo, nei filosofijos koreliatas ar papildas, kad trys minties formos – menas, mokslas ir filosofija – turi po nepriklausomą specifinę kryptį, Kita vertus, interpretuodamas I. Kantą, G. Deleuze’as pastebi disharmoniją tarp vaizduotės, supratimo ir proto, ir, sekdamas Antonino Artaud’o įžvalgomis, jis išskiria naują minties tipą kaip tarpinę teritoriją tarp žodžio ir vaizdo. (shrink)

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama Kanto nužymėtos ir Deleuze’o eksperimentiniame mąstyme rekonstruotos vaizduotės kaip vieno iš trijų proto gebėjimų raiškos lauko alternatyvos. Siekiama atsakyti į paties Deleuze’o išsikeltą kantišką klausimą: kokia yra giliausia paslaptis? Aptinkamos kelios atsakymo alternatyvos. Šiame tyrime paaiškėjo, kad Deleuze’o atsakymai į paties išsikeltą klausimą „kokia yra giliausia vaizduotės paslaptis?“ patiria metamorfozes, kurios apsuka ratą. Nuo pradinės pozicijos, kai vaizduotė veikia tik paklusdama intelektui ar protui, ji juda link laisvo trijų nepriklausomų sugebėjimų – intelekto, proto, vaizduotės atitikimo, paskui – link (...) jų nedarnios dermės, jų kovos, kuri skatina kiekvienos naują atsiskleidimą, galiausiai – prie vaizduotės anihiliacijos, kuri leidžia užgimti naujai minčiai, taigi, ratas apsisuka ir grįžtama prie jų dermės naujame lygmenyje, moderuojant filosofiniam skoniui. Tačiau visas šias metaformorfozes jungia viena bendra Kanto suformuluota prielaida: vaizduotė niekada neišvengia triadinės priklausomybės, ji neveikia viena; ji galima tik santykyje su intelektu ir protu, t. y. kitais trimis jai paraleliais ir simultaniškais sugebėjimais. (shrink)

Ðio straipsnio pavadinime uþkoduota ir tyrimo problema. Èia bus svarstomas filosofijos ir literatûrossuartëjimo prieigø dekonstrukcinis tyrimas Jacques Derrida postfilosofijoje. Kantas simbolizuoja klasikinæ filosofo, Kafka – literato laikysenà. Taèiau tai tik straipsnio autorës iðmonë. Bus atsispirta nuo to,kaip Derrida perskaito Kafkos parabolæ Prieð ástatymà romane Procesas. Autorë pripaþins, kad ið tiesøsodieèio kaip kantininko ir durininko kaip paties Derrida suprieðinimas leidþia geriau suvokti Derridaiðrastos sàvokos différance konotacijas. Kita vertus, taip suprasta skirtis iðveda á singuliarumo, paraðo,paslapties sàvokø judëjimà Derrida tekstuose. Taèiau lieka neaiðku, (...) ar ið tiesø Derrida neprieðtaraujasavo teiginiui, kad raðymas vyksta anapus filosofijos ir literatûros, kai prieina prie iðvados, kad sodietis--kantininkas negalëjo suprasti jam skirto áëjimo singuliarumo, nes turëjo problemø su literatûra. Ar taireiðkia, kad literatûra, skirtingai nei filosofija, lieka atvira paslapèiai ir neþinojimui? O filosofija tampasusijusi su þinojimu ir paslapties áminimu? Autorës nuomone, paties Derrida hermeneutikos dekonstrukcija knygoje Pentinai: Nietzsche’s stiliai tokiai iðvadai prieðtarautø.Pagrindiniai þodþiai: differénce, Derrida, Kafka, sodietis-kantininkas, filosofija ir literatûra. (shrink)

Straipsnyje svarstomas laiko išsišakojimo į tris modusus klausimas, kuris aktualus klasikinėje filosofijoje, fenomenologijoje, literatūroje, struktūruojamas kino mene ir modernaus kino filosofijoje. Straipsnyje tiriamos kelios šio laiko išsišakojimo įvaizdinimo ir jo filosofinio reflektavimo trajektorijos: Tarkovskio įvaizdintas laikas, apokaliptinis laikas bei jo virsmas į laiko kristalus Deleuze’o modernaus kino filosofijoje.

This article concentrates on two main interpreta- tions of Friedrich Nietzshe's philosophy: hermeneuti- cal , originated in Martin Heidegger's book "Nietzsche" and deconstnlctive -, elaborated in Jacques Derrida's book "Esperon: Le Styles de Nietzsche. Spurs. Nietzshe's Styles".and his article "Interpreting Signatures : Two Questions". The author of the article considers that the idea of in- verted platonism as a main paradigm of Nietzsche's thought is original Heidegger's idea, underlying his interpretation of Nietzsche as a last methaphysisian in Western thought. Derrida, (...) interpreting the same one page fragment "History of an Error" from Nietzche's work "Twilight o f the Idols" opposed Heidegger's intention to unite the diversity o f Nietzsche's thought into one paradigmatic schema. Author of the article considers, that his deconstructive efforts clearly exposed, that Heidegger's interpetation neglecting the pliuralistic diversity of Nietzsche's philosophys is influenced more by his longing for axi- omatic unity common to methaphysical thought than by original Nietzsche's thinking. Raktiniai iodiiai: Platonizmas, ~pvertiina.~, pa- skutinis nzetapzikas, Nietzsclze b stilius. (shrink)

Straipsnis skiriamas prancūzų aktoriaus, poeto, scenaristo, žiaurumo teatro idėjos autoriaus Antonino Artaud idėjų pėdsakų šifravimui Gilles’io Deleuze’o kino filosofijoje. Straipsnyje keliami klausimai: kuo Artaud idėjų traktuotė antrajame knygos „Kinas“ tome „Vaizdinys-laikas“ skiriasi nuo čia pat aptariamų rusų režisieriaus Sergejaus Eisensteino idėjų įtakos? Kaip modernaus kino filosofijoje veikia Deleuze’ui svarbi Artaud mintis apie pamatinę minties bejėgystę, įkūnytą pačioje mintyje? Ar iš Artaud pasiskolintas „kūno be organų“ konceptas išveda į kasdienį ir ceremonijų kūną, apie kurį rašo Deleuze’as kaip apie modernaus kino ženklą? (...) Straipsnyje prieinama prie išvados, kad visgi galima išskirti dvi Deleuze’o iš Artaud perimtas kūno traktuotes: iki-šizofrenišką pozų ir gestų kūną, kuris sudaro pamatinę „žiaurumo teatro“ konceptualinę šerdį ir kuria remiasi Deleuze’as, rašydamas apie modernaus kino tapsmą, bei šizofrenišką „kūną be organų“, kuris turėjo įtakos Deleuze’o ir Guattari tyrimams. Pamatinė straipsnyje ginama tezė: tiriant teorines įtakas Deleuze’o modernaus kino filosofijai, neįmanoma apeiti ir nepastebėti Artaud. (shrink)

How is it that we think and refer in the first-person way? For most philosophers in the analytic tradition, the problem is essentially this: how two apparently conflicting kinds of properties can be reconciled and united as properties of the same entity. What is special about the first person has to be reconciled with what is ordinary about it. The range of responses reduces to four basic options. The orthodox view is optimistic: there really is a way of reconciling these (...) apparently contradictory properties as contained within the same thing. The heretical views are pessimistic and content to be so: there is no such way, and that is because there is simply nothing to reconcile – because there is really nothing special about what is in question; or there is really nothing ordinary about it; or there is really nothing …. (shrink)

Philosophical theories of emotions, and to an extent some theories of scientific psychology, represent attempts to capture the essence of emotions basically as they are conceived in common sense psychology. Although there are problems, the success of explanations of our behavior in terms of believes, desires and emotions creates a presumption that, at some level of abstraction, they reflect important elements in our psychological nature. It is incumbent on a theory of emotions to provide an account of two salient facts (...) about emotions as conceived in common sense psychology. As intentional states, emotions have representational and rational properties: emotions represent states of affairs; and they are rationally related to other mental representations, figure in rational explanations of behavior, and are open to rational assessment. Emotions also have a close relationship to a range of non-intentional phenomena: in typical cases, emotions involve physiological changes, usually associated with the activation of the autonomic nervous system, which are proprioceptively experienced; and they often involve behavioral tendencies, as well. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn had little to say about scientific change in biological science, and biologists are ambivalent about how applicable his framework is for their disciplines. We apply Kuhn’s account of paradigm change to evolutionary microbiology, where key Darwinian tenets are being challenged by two decades of findings from molecular phylogenetics. The chief culprit is lateral gene transfer, which undermines the role of vertical descent and the representation of evolutionary history as a tree of life. To assess Kuhn’s relevance to this (...) controversy, we add a social analysis of the scientists involved to the historical and philosophical debates. We conclude that while Kuhn’s account may capture aspects of the pattern of an episode of scientific change, he has little to say about how the process of generating new understandings is occurring in evolutionary microbiology. Once Kuhn’s application is limited to that of an initial investigative probe into how scientific problem-solving occurs, his disciplinary scope becomes broader. (shrink)

This study explores consumer expectations and attitudes related to gender-based price discrimination. Although much research has focused on pay inequalities and gender diversity, considerably less attention has been focused on situations in which men and women are charged different prices based on gender. In two studies, expectations and attitudes toward gender-based price discrimination are examined. In Study 1, two scenarios related to prices at hair salon and dry cleaning services were manipulated to measure expectations and attitudes toward gender-based price discrimination. (...) We found that the nature of the service results in expectations of price differences between men and women. We also found men expect gender-based pricing more than women. In Study 2, qualitative research was conducted to reveal the cognitions that men and women experience when exposed to gender-based price discrimination. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle’s Phantasia in the Rhetoric:Lexis, Appearance, and the Epideictic Function of DiscourseNed O’GormanIntroductionThe well-known opening line of Aristotle's Rhetoric, where he defines rhetoric as a "counterpart" (antistrophos) to dialectic, has spurred many conversations on Aristotelian rhetoric and motivated the widespread interpretation of Aristotle's theory of civic discourse as heavily rationalistic. This study starts from a statement in the Rhetoric less discussed, yet still important, that suggests that a visual (...) aspect inheres in Aristotle's theory of rhetoric. Near the beginning of book 3, which deals with lexis (style, sometimes subsuming delivery1 ), Aristotle conjoins lexis and phantasia with the copula "is" (eimi): "The subject of expression [lexeôs], however, has some small necessary place in all teaching; for to speak in one way rather than another does make some difference in regard to clarity, though not a great difference; but all these things are forms of outward show [phantasia] and intended to affect the audience" (1404a).2 Whereas scholars exploring the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic have compared and contrasted the Rhetoric and the Topics, I explore rhetoric's relationship with phantasia by reading the Rhetoric alongside De Anima. De Anima is Aristotle's seminal account of the senses and their relationship to psychê (often translated "soul"). It addresses topics intimately connected to rhetoric: perception, cognition, deliberation, visualization, imagination, and the image. Phantasia is integral to each of these psychic processes and to Aristotle's understanding of the function of appearance in human experience. Hence, itis a lens suitable for exploring the relationship between Aristotle's conception of civic discourse and his notions of sight and appearances as they relate to perception, interpretation, deliberation, and judgment. I find in Aristotle's phantasia a tie between his art of rhetoric and his psychology and phenomenology (anachronistic though these terms are). Aristotle's psychological works, as Richard McKeon points out, are foundational to Aristotle's philosophy, and thus to his Rhetoric. [End Page 16] "Psychological inquiries occupy an extremely important position in the philosophy of Aristotle, for the conception of the psychê lays the foundation for the continuity of functions in nature" (1947, 142). De Anima, especially, articulates the psychological and phenomenological conceptions often tacitly at work in the Rhetoric.The importance of phantasia for the trajectory of ancient rhetorical and aesthetic theory is seen in the parallels between the visual arts, rhetoric, and poetics in Greek and Roman thought.3 As David Freedberg states (perhaps, slightly overstates), parallels between painting and poetry are "to be found everywhere in classical literature" (1989, 50). With respect to such visual-verbal parallels in Aristotle, D. Thomas Benediktson's reading of Aristotle's psychological, poetic, and rhetorical works concludes that phantasia ties together the visual and the literary. "[Aristotle's passages on phantasia] do help to see why Aristotle took for granted the similarity, almost the identity, of literature and the visual arts. Both types of art are imagistic; they present to the viewer either an image, as in visual art, or as in literature, a set of moving images that the soul then uses as raw data (phantasia) to enable thought to occur" (2000, 170). Phantasia developed a legacy in Hellenistic aesthetics, where it came to designate suprarealism in painting, moving art "beyond imitation" (Fowler 1989, 180–81). In later Greco-Roman works, phantasia was used to designate vivid imagery in written and oral discourse, imagery that could create sights and scenes in the minds of audience members. As Quintilian noted in his discussion of forensic rhetoric, in Latin phantasiai were termed visiones. Here, phantasiabecame a mode of displacing narrative in rhetorical discourse:There are certain experiences which the Greeks call phantasiai, and the Romans visions [visiones], whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes.... From such impressions arises that enargeia which Cicero calls illumination [illustration] and actuality [evidential], which makes us seem not so much to narrate [dicere] as to exhibit [ostendere] the actual scene.(Institutio Oratoria 4.2.29, 32)Quintilian's invocations of phantasia and enargeia can be traced to Aristotle's discussion of rhetorical style in book... (shrink)

Here we prove the existence of sheaf cohomology theory in arbitrary o-minimal structures.

Recent discoveries of geographical patterns in microbial distribution are undermining microbiology’s exclusively ecological explanations of biogeography and their fundamental assumption that ‘everything is everywhere: but the environment selects’. This statement was generally promulgated by Dutch microbiologist Martinus Wilhelm Beijerinck early in the twentieth century and specifically articulated in 1934 by his compatriot, Lourens G. M. Baas Becking. The persistence of this precept throughout twentieth-century microbiology raises a number of issues in relation to its formulation and widespread acceptance. This paper will (...) trace the conceptual history of Beijerinck’s claim that ‘everything is everywhere’ in relation to a more general account of its theoretical, experimental and institutional context. His principle also needs to be situated in relationship to plant and animal biogeography, which, this paper will argue, forms a continuum of thought with microbial biogeography. Finally, a brief overview of the contemporary microbiological research challenging ‘everything is everywhere’ reveals that philosophical issues from Beijerinck’s era of microbiology still provoke intense discussion in twenty-first century investigations of microbial biogeography. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to clarify the role of ‘wonder’ in education. Most of us who work in education want to provide valuable experiences for our students, and we want them to be driven by intrinsic values such as truth and recognition of the dignity of human existence. However, whilst I echo many of the sentiments espoused by advocates of the utility and ethical significance of wonder, I contend that some recent developments—and in particular, Schinkel’s argument that ‘deep’ (‘contemplative’ (...) or ‘cosmic’) wonder has a ‘fundamental’ role in education—are misconceived. This is, I argue, because any concept deployable within educational spaces (whether formal or informal) must pay due regard to the conceptual constraints of the concept of ‘education’; that is, attention must be paid to the role of ‘learning’. Schinkel’s proposals are, I suggest, vulnerable to a critique of sentimentalism and excessive romanticism. As such, they offer little in terms of practical import for educators. As I will propose, if we are to take ‘wonder’ seriously in educational contexts, we must pay attention to the purpose of wonder as an epistemic emotion; namely, aiming for knowledge and understanding, and getting there requires sensitivity to practical know-how and conceptual competence. (shrink)

The need to address our question arises from two sources, one in Kant and the other in a certain type of response to so-called Reformed epistemology. The first source consists in a tendency to distinguish theoretical beliefs from practical beliefs , and to treat theistic belief as mere practical belief. We trace this tendency in Kant's corpus, and compare and contrast it with Aquinas's view and a more conservative Kantian view. We reject the theistic-belief-as-mere-practical-belief view: it is bad descriptive anthropology, (...) it embraces a misguided ideal of a fragmented self unattainable by human beings, and it will deter people from the most desirable sort of faith. The second source consists in the idea that since theistic beliefs function as answers to why-questions, their epistemic status hangs on whether they meet certain distinctively explanatory standards, whatever support they might receive from other sources. We argue that this is a non-sequitur and suggest questions for further research. (shrink)

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can (and often does) assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying (...) 'man's estate'. This does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)