We consider an integrable, nonlocal and nonlinear, Schrödinger equation as a model for building space–time patchings in inhomogeneous loop quantum cosmology. We briefly review exact solutions of the NNSE, specially those obtained through “geometric equivalence” methods. Furthemore, we argue that the integrability of the NNSE could be linked to consistency conditions derived from LQC, under the assumption that the patchwork dynamics behaves as an integrable many-body system.

This paper exploits the modified simple equation and dynamical system schemes to integrate the Klein–Gordon model amid quadratic nonlinearity arising in nonlinear optics, quantum theories, and solid state physics. By implementing the modified simple equation technique, we develop some disguise adaptation of analytical solutions in terms of hyperbolic, exponential, and trigonometric functions with some special parameters. We apply the dynamical system to bifurcate the model and draw distinct phase portraits on unlike parametric constraints. Following each orbit of all (...) phase portraits, we originate bounded and unbounded solitary, periodic, and periodic rogue-type wave solutions of the KG model. These two schemes extract widespread classes of solitary, periodic, and periodic rogue-type wave solutions for the KG model jointly due to restrictions on parameters. We also analyze the effect of parameters on the obtained wave solutions and discuss why and when it changes its nature. We illustrate some dynamical features of the acquired solutions via the 3D, 2D, and contour graphics. (shrink)

We discuss Einstein's ideas on the need for a theory that is both objective and local and also his suggestion for realizing such a theory through nonlinear field equations. We go on to analyze the nonlocality implied by the quantum theory, especially in terms of the experiment of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. We then suggest an objective local field model along Einstein's lines, which might explain quantum nonlocality as a coordination of the properties of pulse-like solutions of the (...) class='Hi'>nonlinear equations that would represent particles. Finally, we discuss the implications of our model for Bell's inequality. (shrink)

Hoover [2] proved a completeness theorem for the logic L[MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A]. The aim of this paper is to prove a similar completeness theorem with respect to product measurable biprobability models for a logic Lmath image with two integral operators. We prove: If T is a ∑1 definable theory on [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A] and consistent with the axioms of Lmath image, then there is an analytic absolutely continuous biprobability model in which every sentence in T is satified.

Peacemaking is especially challenging in situations of intractable conflict. Collective narratives in this context contribute to coping with challenges societies face, but also fuel conflict continuation. We introduce the Informative Process Model, proposing that informing individuals about the socio-psychological processes through which conflict-supporting narratives develop, and suggesting that they can change via comparison to similar conflicts resolved peacefully, can facilitate unfreezing and change in attitudes. Study 1 established associations between awareness of conflict costs and conflict-supporting narratives, belief in the possibility (...) of resolving the conflict peacefully and support for pursuing peace among Israeli-Jews and Palestinians. Studies 2 and 3 found that exposure to IPM-based original videos led Israeli-Jews to deliberation of the information presented, predicting acceptance of the IPM-based message, which, in turn, predicted support for negotiations. Study 3 also found similar effects across IPM-based messages focusing on different conflict-supporting themes. We discuss the implications to attitude change in intractable conflicts. (shrink)

It is shown that any hidden variable model that reproduces quantum mechanics for a single particle must either be nonlocal or violate conservation of momentum. This is established by deriving an inequality which must hold in any local, momentum-conserving hidden variable model for a modified form of the double-slit experiment. It is then shown that any hidden variable model that reproduces quantum mechanics must violate the inequality. The inconsistency between the classical and quantum views of the world is therefore (...) demonstrated in a new way. (shrink)

We discuss a recent proposal by Albert (1994a; 1994b; 2000, ch. 7) to recover thermodynamics on a purely dynamical basis, using the quantum theory of the collapse of the wave function by Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (1986). We propose an alternative way to explain thermodynamics within no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics. Our approach relies on the standard quantum mechanical models of environmental decoherence of open systems (e.g., Joos and Zeh 1985; Zurek and Paz 1994). This paper presents the two (...) approaches and discusses their advantages. The problems faced by both approaches will be discussed in a sequel (Hemmo and Shenker 2003). (shrink)

We discuss a recent proposal by Albert to recover thermodynamics on a purely dynamical basis, using the quantum theory of the collapse of the wave function of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber. We propose an alternative way to explain thermodynamics within no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics. Our approach relies on the standard quantum mechanical models of environmental decoherence of open systems, \eg Joos and Zeh and Zurek and Paz. This paper presents the two approaches and discusses their advantages. The problems (...) they face will be discussed in a sequel. (shrink)

Can we explain the laws of thermodynamics, in particular the irreversible increase of entropy, from the underlying quantum mechanical dynamics? Attempts based on classical dynamics have all failed. Albert (1994a,b; 2000) proposed a way to recover thermodynamics on a purely dynamical basis, using the quantum theory of the collapse of the wavefunction of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986). In this paper we propose an alternative way to explain thermodynamics within no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics. Our approach relies on the standard (...) quantum mechanical models of environmental decoherence of open systems, e.g. Joos and Zeh (1985) and Zurek and Paz (1994). (shrink)

Is freedom compatible with determinism? Davidson famously rephrased this question by replacing “freedom” with “anomaly of the mental”, that is, failure to fall under a law. In order to prove that the anomaly of the mental is compatible with other conjectures he makes, in particular that: there is psycho-physical causation; “where there is causality, there must be a law” ; and the mental supervenes on the physical, Davidson proposed a model, that came to be known as anomalous monism. Accepting all (...) of Davidson’s conjectures, we compare the structure of Davidson’s argument with that of Einstein’s argument for the special theory of relativity. This leads us to an exposition of Davidson’s ontology in terms that are inspired by recent results in the philosophy of physics, that is, in terms of fundamental ontology and high-level coarse-grained descriptions. We explain in what sense Davidson’s model is a principle theory and discuss some requirements that the constructive theory underlying Davidson's principle approach must satisfy. We propose two constructive theories of description that may underlie Davidson's approach and this deeper structure leads us to formulating a dilemma according to which Davidson's approach entails either a non-physicalist type-identity reductive and monistic structure of events; or else it entails a structure of events that requires what we call token-substance dualism. We consider some issues which seem to suggest that the first horn of this dilemma collapses into a reductive type-identity physicalist theory, contrary to Davidson's intent. Finally, we show how Davidson's achievement of accounting for some freedom of the mental from the physical and the anomaly of the mental within anomalous monism can be achieved in a fully reductive type-identity physicalist theory. (shrink)

A previous model for treating electromagnetic nonlinear wave systems is examined in the context of wave mechanics. It is shown that nonlinear wave mechanics implies harmonic generation of new quasiparticle wave functions, which are absent in linear systems. The phenomenon is interpreted in terms of pair (and higher order ensembles) coherence of the interacting particles. The implications are far-reaching, and the present approach might contribute toward a common basis for diverse physical phenomena involving nonlinearity. An intimate relationship connecting (...) coherence, nonlocal interaction, and nonlinearity has been previously noticed in the physics of superconductivity. It is shown here that all these ingredients are consistently contained in the present formalism. The present theory may contribute to elucidate a controversial theory proposed by Panarella, who claims to have measured high-energy photons due to high-intensity laser radiation, which cannot be predicted on the basis of linear quantum theory. Panarella explains the new phenomena by stipulating a nonlinear intensity-dependent photon energy. It is argued here that nonlinearity, manifested in the presence of high intensity, may give rise to high- and low-energy photons, the so-called “effective” and “tired” photons, respectively. However, the present explanation does not involve ad hoc assumptions regarding the foundations of quantum theory. In analogy with the electrodynamic model, the present theory leads to particulate self-focusing in high-density streams of particles. Since such particulate beams are currently under consideration in connection with fusion reactions, this might be of future interest. (shrink)

Contents: PART 1. MODELS IN SCIENTIFIC PROCESSES. Joseph AGASSI: Why there is no theory of models. Ma??l??gorzata CZARNOCKA: Models and symbolic nature of knowledge. Adam GROBLER: The representational and the non-representational in models of scientific theories. Stephan HARTMANN: Models as a tool for the theory construction; some strategies of preliminary physics. William HERFEL: Nonlinear dynamical models as concrete construction. Elzbieta KA??L??USZY??N??SKA: Styles of thinking. Stathis PSILLOS: The cognitive interplay between theories and (...) models: the case of 19th century optics. PART 2. TOOLS OF SCIENCE. Nancy D. CARTWRIGHT, Towfic SHOMAR, Maricio SUAREZ: The tool-box of science. Javier ECHEVERRIA: The four contexts of scientific activity. Katline HAVAS: Continuity and change; kinds of negation in scientific progress. Matthias KAISER: The independence of scientific phenomena. W??l??adys??l??aw KRAJEWSKI: Scientific meta-philosophy. Ilkka NIINILUOTO: The emergence if scientific specialities: six models. Leszek NOWAK: Antirealism, realism and idealization. Rinat M. NUGAYEV: Classic, modern and postmodern scientific unification. Veikko RANTALA: Translation and scientific change. Gerhard SCHURZ: Theories and their applications - a case of nonmonotonic reasoning. Witold STRAWI??N??SKI: The unity of science today. Vardan TOROSIAN: Are the ethic and logic of science compatible. PART 3. UNSHARP APPROACHES IN SCIENCE. Ernest W. ADAMS: Problems and prospects in a theory of inexact first-order theories. Wolfgang BALZER and Gerhard ZOUBEK: On the comparison of approximative empirical claims. Gianpierro CATTANEO, Maria Luisa DALLA CHIARA, Roberto GIUNTINI: The unsharp approaches to quantum theory. Theo A.F. KUIPERS: Falsification versus efficient truth approximation. Bernhard LAUTH: Limiting decidability and probability. Jaros??l??aw PYKACZ: Many-valued logics in foundations of quantum mechanics. Roman R. ZAPATRIN: Logico-algebraic approach to spacetime quantization. (shrink)

Philosophy and model theory frequently meet one another. Philosophy and Model Theory aims to understand their interactions -/- Model theory is used in every ‘theoretical’ branch of analytic philosophy: in philosophy of mathematics, in philosophy of science, in philosophy of language, in philosophical logic, and in metaphysics. But these wide-ranging appeals to model theory have created a highly fragmented literature. On the one hand, many philosophically significant mathematical results are found only in mathematics textbooks: these are aimed squarely at mathematicians; (...) they typically presuppose that the reader has a significant background in mathematics; and little clue is given as to their philosophical significance. On the other hand, the philosophical applications of these results are then scattered across disconnected pockets of papers, separated by decades or more. -/- The first aim of Philosophy and Model Theory, then, is to consider the philosophical uses of model theory. On a technical level, we try to show how philosophically significant results connect to one another, and also to state the best version of a result for philosophical purposes. On a philosophical level, we show how similar dialectical situations arise repeatedly, across fragmented debates in varied philosophical areas. -/- The second aim of Philosophy and Model Theory, though, is to consider the philosophy of model theory. Model theory itself is rarely taken as the subject matter of philosophising (contrast this, say, with the philosophy of biology, or the philosophy of set theory). But model theory is a beautiful part of pure mathematics, and worthy of philosophical study in its own right. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the numerical solution of the coupled fractional massive Thirring equation with the aid of He’s fractional complex transform. This study plays a significant aspect in the field of quantum physics, weakly nonlinear thrilling waves, and nonlinear optics. The main advantage of FCT is that it converts the fractional differential equation into its traditional parts and is also capable to handle the fractional order, whereas the homotopy perturbation method is employed to tackle the (...) class='Hi'>nonlinear terms in the coupled fractional massive Thirring equation. An example is illustrated to present the efficiency and validity of the two-scale theory. The solutions are obtained in the form of series with simple and easy computations which confirm that the present approach is good in agreement and is easy to implement for such type of complex systems in science and engineering. (shrink)

The need for better incorporation of the construct emotional intelligence (EI) into counterproductive work behavior (CWB) research may be achieved via a unified conceptual framework. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to use the Profile Analysis via Multidimensional Scaling (PAMS) approach, a conceptual framework that unifies motivational process with antecedents and outcomes, to assess differences in EI concerning a variety of constructs: organizational justice, CWB, emotional exhaustion, job satisfaction, and intrinsic motivation. Employing established scales within a framework unifying CWB, (...) intrinsic motivation, EI, organizational justice, and outcome constructs, two EI-based profiles displayed associations with CWB based on responses from 3,293 employees. Both the first core profile, high overall justice and low emotional intelligence, and the second core profile, high emotional intelligence and low work motivation, displayed associations with interpersonal deviance and organizational deviance, as well as emotional exhaustion and job satisfaction. The results are discussed with respect to possible underlying theory and an overarching unified motivation framework that incorporates goal choice, intrinsic motivation, antecedents, and outcomes. We also provide directions for future research and implications for managers in the workplace based on heuristic conceptual frameworks that combine multiple motivational perspectives into a unified model. (shrink)

According to republican theory, we are free persons to the extent that we are protected and secured in the same fundamental choices, on the same public basis, as one another. But there is no public protection or security without a coercive state. Does this mean that any freedom we enjoy is a superficial good that presupposes a deeper, political form of subjection? Philip Pettit addresses this crucial question in On the People's Terms. He argues that state coercion will not involve (...) individual subjection or domination insofar as we enjoy an equally shared form of control over those in power. This claim may seem utopian but it is supported by a realistic model of the institutions that might establish such democratic control. Beginning with a fresh articulation of republican ideas, Pettit develops a highly original account of the rationale of democracy, breathing new life into democratic theory. (shrink)

Recently, Luk tried to establish a model and a theory of scientific studies. He focused on articulating the theory and the model, but he did not emphasize relating them to some issues in philosophy of science. In addition, they might explain some of the issues in philosophy of science, but such explanation is not articulated in his papers. This paper explores the implications and extensions of Luk’s work in philosophy of science or science in general.

Thirty years after the conference that gave rise to The Structure of Scientific Theories, there is renewed interest in the nature of theories and models. However, certain crucial issues from thirty years ago are reprised in current discussions; specifically: whether the diversity of models in the science can be captured by some unitary account; and whether the temporal dimension of scientific practice can be represented by such an account. After reviewing recent developments we suggest that these (...) issues can be accommodated within the partial structures formulation of the semantic or model-theoretic approach. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.3 (2005) 239-242 [Access article in PDF] The Uses of Borrowed Knowledge: Chaos Theory and Antidepressants Stephen H. Kellert Keywords chaos, metaphor, rhetoric, values Ever since the popularization of chaos the-ory in the 1980s, there has been an explo-sion of interest in work in nonlinear dynamics generally and the study of strange attractors in particular. From law to economics to theology, researchers in the (...) social sciences and the humanities have sought to make use of the concepts, methods, and results of chaos theory. Previous generations have seen similar attempts to explore the consequences of relativity theory or quantum mechanics for their own areas of inquiry. In examining the implications of chaos for the treatment of mental illness, Douglas Heinrichs provides an example of this phenomenon, which I call "borrowed knowledge." Lacking expertise in the areas of psychotherapy or psychopharmacology, I view his suggestions as a case study in the ways that knowledge gets used across disciplinary boundaries. In these remarks, I examine some of the different functions that borrowed knowledge can serve in order to argue that although cross-disciplinary borrowing can be a fruitful source of new insights, it is not without its dangers. I look at the persuasive function that borrowed knowledge can serve in making one's ideas plausible candidates for further exploration, as well as in motivating methodological change. I look at the conceptual work performed by metaphors, paying special attention to the question of how we can judge whether or not a nonliteral use of knowledge from the natural sciences is fruitful. And finally, I look at the ways in which borrowed knowledge can be used to address evaluative questions—in this case, questions about autonomy and appropriate therapeutic practice. I do not mean for these various functions to be thought of as exclusive categories. Instead, they overlap, interact, and combine in various ways. Rhetorical Functions, Disciplinary Prestige, and Methodologic Change In examining the persuasive uses of chaos theory, I should make it clear that by "persuasive" I do not mean illegitimate or deceptive. When Heinrichs points out that what he calls the traditional model of brain function is used to [End Page 239] present and explain the use of antidepressants (ADs) to clinicians and the general public, it becomes clear that he believes an alternative model can be useful for explicating and justifying the use of ADs for clinicians and patients. This descriptive function of the metaphorical appeal to a chaotic "attractor landscape" shows up where Heinrichs discusses the use of the chaotic model for patient education and the "rationale for pharmacotherapy," giving patients "appropriate expectations."But the rhetorical functions of chaos theory also come into play with audiences other than patients; they apply to the audience for the scholarly article itself, perhaps attracting attention because of the novelty or promise of a new field of research, but also harnessing the considerable disciplinary prestige that the natural sciences wield in our culture. All of these functions are useful in directing attention to the author's suggestions for further research, especially where he suggests that it would provide the clinician with guidance in working with an individual patient. Here I take it that Heinrichs has made fruitful use of the work of Thelen and others on the variability of individual developmental trajectories. This proposal for methodological change suggests that focusing on the dynamics of system and its evolution through time may be important in addition to focusing on equilibrium states. The disciplinary prestige of the natural sciences can provide a valuable and legitimate resource for the persuasive task of encouraging one's colleagues to explore a new methodological approach.A further rhetorical use is found in the appeal to the unpredictability of chaotic systems to account for the variability of results in the application of ADs. We see this where Heinrichs says, "a meaningful science of persons is possible even in the face of their ultimate unpredictability" (2005, 221). The disciplinary prestige of the natural sciences, which in studying chaotic systems are able to achieve genuinely "scientific" status without being able... (shrink)

An interesting link between two very different physical aspects of quantum mechanics is revealed; these are the absence of third-order interference and Tsirelson’s bound for the nonlocal correlations. Considering multiple-slit experiments—not only the traditional configuration with two slits, but also configurations with three and more slits—Sorkin detected that third-order (and higher-order) interference is not possible in quantum mechanics. The EPR experiments show that quantum mechanics involves nonlocal correlations which are demonstrated in a violation of the Bell or CHSH (...) inequality, but are still limited by a bound discovered by Tsirelson. It now turns out that Tsirelson’s bound holds in a broad class of probabilistic theories provided that they rule out third-order interference. A major characteristic of this class is the existence of a reasonable calculus of conditional probability or, phrased more physically, of a reasonable model for the quantum measurement process. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate a number of analytical solutions to the polynomial class of nonlinear Klein-Gordon equations in multidimensional spacetime. This is done in the context of classical φ4 and φ6 field theory, the former with and without the inclusion of an external force field conjugate to φ. Both massive (m≠0) and massless (m=0) cases are considered, as well as tachyonic solutions allowed (v>c). We first present a complete set of translationally invariant solutions for the φ4 model and (...) demonstrate the role of external force fields in altering the form of these solutions. Next, spherically symmetric solutions are discussed in both φ4 and φ6 cases since they provide the most realistic models of elementary particles. (shrink)

Analogue Gravity Phenomenology is a collection of contributions that cover a vast range of areas in physics, ranging from surface wave propagation in fluids to nonlinear optics. The underlying common aspect of all these topics, and hence the main focus and perspective from which they are explained here, is the attempt to develop analogue models for gravitational systems. The original and main motivation of the field is the verification and study of Hawking radiation from a horizon: the enabling (...) feature is the possibility to generate horizons in the laboratory with a wide range of physical systems that involve a flow of one kind or another. The years around 2010 and onwards witnessed a sudden surge of experimental activity in this expanding field of research. However, building an expertise in analogue gravity requires the researcher to be equipped with a rather broad range of knowledge and interests. The aim of this book is to bring the reader up to date with the latest developments and provide the basic background required in order to appreciate the goals, difficulties and success stories in the field of analogue gravity. Each chapter of the book treats a different topic explained in detail by the major experts for each specific discipline. The first chapters give an overview of black hole spacetimes and Hawking radiation before moving on to describe the large variety of analogue spacetimes that have been proposed and are currently under investigation. This introductory part is then followed by an in-depth description of what are currently the three most promising analogue spacetime settings, namely surface waves in flowing fluids, acoustic oscillations in Bose-Einstein condensates and electromagnetic waves in nonlinear optics. Both theory and experimental endeavours are explained in detail. The final chapters refer to other aspects of analogue gravity beyond the study of Hawking radiation, such as Lorentz invariance violations and Brownian motion in curved spacetimes, before concluding with a return to the origins of the field and a description of the available observational evidence for horizons in astrophysical black holes. (shrink)

A large number of definitions of the concept “model” have been given by various authors in recent years. Thirty-seven definitions are listed by A. I. Uyemov in a recent monograph. This list is somewhat one-sided since it contains a disproportionate number of references to the work of Soviet authors. However, most of the important definitions given by Western writers are included. I shall give three definitions, all of great generality, so that various types of models, replicas, maps, theories (...) and, most importantly, cybernetic models, are included. The advantage of this high degree of generality, or all-inclusiveness, is that the task of the investigator of uses of models in science, is reduced to classifying the various types of models, their construction, function, and structure, thus avoiding indecisive arguments such as the Duhem–Campbell controversy, so perceptively discussed by Mary Hesse. (shrink)

A form of context-appropriate verificationism is proposed that distinguishes between scientific theories as evolving systems of ideas and operationally-specified, testable formal-empirical models. Theories undergo three stages : a formative, exploratory, heuristic phase of theory conception, a developmental phase of theory-pruning and refinement, and a mature, rigorous phase of testing specific, explicit models. The first phase depends on Feyerabendian open possibility, the second on theoretical plausibility and internal coherence, and the third on testability. Multiple perspectives produce variety (...) necessary for theory formation, whereas explicit agreement on evaluative criteria is essential for testing. Hertzian observer-mechanics of empirical-deductive scientific models are outlined that use semiotic operations of measurement/evaluation, computation, and physical action/construction. If models can be fully operationalized, then they can be intersubjectively verified irrespective of metaphysical, theoretical, value-, or culture-based disagreements. Verificationism can be expanded beyond simple predictive efficacy to incorporate testing for pragmatic, functional efficacy in engineering, medicine, and design contexts. Such a more open, pragmatist, operationalist, epistemically-constructivist perspective is suggested in which verification is contingent on the type of assertion, its intended purpose, degree and reliability of model-based evidence, and existence of alternate, competing predictive models. Suggestions for epistemological hygiene amidst the world-wide pandemic of misinformation and propaganda are offered. (shrink)

The primary aim of this paper is to critically evaluate the deductive model of ethical applications, which is based on normative ethical theories like deontology and consequentialism, and to show why a number of models have failed to furnish appropriate resolutions to practical moral problems. Here, for the deductive model, I want to call it a “Linear Mechanical Model” because the basic assumption of this model is that if a normative theory is sacrosanct, then the case is as (...) it is. The conclusion derived from the case will also be correct, true and acceptable. However, traditional ethicists used to apply their ethical theories, but they did not know which moral theory was effective on the ground level of reality. The study will show readers how ethical theories are in conflict with each other in the case of euthanasia. In more precise words, “which ethical theories are said to be applied, meta-ethical or normative, or both for the resolution of ethical problems? If normative theories are said to be applied, how the application can take place when it is contrary to our experience, that (then) in a situation of moral crises, no one really applies a theory?” For that, my argument is the linear model has failed because it is rigid, often ignores the agents’ intrinsic values, and has no space to amend it, no matter how bizarre the consequence is. Its alternative is the Inductive model. For that, the paper will take three moral principles (autonomy, beneficence including maleficence, and justice) of Beauchamp & Childress. This suggests us for resolving value-laden moral problems, we should consider some steps such as a) recognising moral issues to start with; b) developing the moral imagination; c) sharpening analytical/critical skills; d) testing out disagreements; e) effecting decisions and behavior; and f) implementation, closure, and process are of vital importance, in other words, it starts with the free and informed consensus of all interested parties, but this model also has been failed because the model could not give a systematic organization to their way of resolution. Here, my argument is that the inductive model provides resolution of the practical problem but ignores what is ethically obligatory, permissible, or wrong in that situation, and there are no appropriate suggestions in the case of a moral crisis. (shrink)

I first give a brief summary of a critique of the traditional theories of approximation and idealization; and after identifying one of the major roles of idealization as detaching component processes or systems from their joints, a detailed analysis is given of idealized laws – which are discoverable and/or applicable – in such processes and systems (i.e., idealized model systems). Then, I argue that dispositional properties should be regarded as admissible properties for laws and that such an inclusion supplies (...) the much needed connection between idealized models and the laws they `produce'' or `accommodate''. And I then argue that idealized law-statements so produced or accommodated in the models may be either true simpliciter or true approximately, but the latter is not because of the idealizations involved. I argue that the kind of limiting-case idealizations that produce approximate truth is best regarded as approximation; and finally I compare my theory with some existing theories of laws of nature.We seem to trace [in KingLear] ... the tendency of imagination toanalyse and abstract, to decomposehuman nature into its constituentfactors, and then to construct beings in whomone or more of these factors isabsent or atrophied or only incipient. (shrink)

This article argues that the process of development as such explains a great deal of the forms and properties of individual developmental trajectories, without the necessity of having to rely on either external or internal factors or causes. Both the problem of developmental change and invariance can be explained by employing a dynamic systems conceptualization of development. It is shown that dynamic systems models on the one hand and those of the genuine developmental models in psychology on the (...) other, share a set of important general properties that are able to explain both the universal and the idiosyncratic aspects of developmental processes. The concept of mental and behavioral ecology, which may serve as a starting point for specific theories of development of cognition, social behavior, personality and so forth, is discussed. It is concluded that both long-term and short-term developmental patterns will be shown to follow similar abstract dynamical principles. (shrink)

The theoretical framework adopted in the exact sciences, for constructing and testing deterministic theories on the one hand, and modelling and analysis of observed phenomena on the other, is often implicitly assumed to be that of structural stability. In view of recent developments in nonlinear dynamics, it is argued here that in general it may not be possible to assume strict determinism and structural stability simultaneously; either strict determinism holds, in which case the fragility framework may turn out (...) to be the appropriate framework for the study of certain phenomena in the exact sciences, or ‘structural stability’ is restored at the expense of introducing stochasticity. In this sense a certain degree of indeterminacy may be unavoidable even at the classical level. (shrink)

In this part we will consider recent attempts to get a relativistic CSL theory. The problem of getting such a generalization, or at least of making plausible that it exists, is of great interest. J. Bell (1990), after having expressed his dissatisfaction with the fundamental lack of precision of the standard formulation of quantum mechanics and the opinion that the only available acceptable alternatives are the Pilot Wave and the Spontaneous Localization schemes has stated: The big question, in my opinion, (...) is which, if either, of these two precise pictures can be redeveloped in a Lorentz invariant way. The point of view of this paper is that what is most interesting is not a detailed exposition of the formal aspects of the generalization, but some crucial conceptual points which have come into focus in this attempt. (shrink)

In this article, I outline a framework for the sociological study of culture that connects three intertwined elements of human culture and demonstrates the concrete contexts under which each most critically influences actions and their subsequent outcomes. In contrast to models that cast motivations, resources, and meanings as competing explanations of how culture affects action, I argue that these are fundamental constituent elements of culture that are inseparable, interdependent, and simultaneously operative. Which element provides the strongest link to action, (...) and how this link operates, must be understood as a function of the actor's position within wider social contexts. I argue that on average motivations have the most discernable link to action within a social strata, cultural resources provide the strongest link across strata, and meanings have the greatest direct influence when codified and sanctioned. I then offer a reframing and synthesis that reintegrates previously “competing” theories of culture into a more holistic context-dependent model of culture in action. Finally, I use evidence from prior empirical research, as well as new data from an ongoing ethnographic study of health behaviors among the aged, to show how various elements of culture are concretely linked to action in eight different social contexts. In doing so, I provide a roadmap for the transition out of the “either-or” logic underlying much of cultural theory and reemphasize the importance of the classical sociological concern for “when” and “how” various aspects of culture influence action and outcomes in concrete social contexts. (shrink)

Despite the fact that attention is a core property of all perceptual and cognitive operations, our understanding of its neurophysiological mechanisms is far from complete. There are many theoretical models that try to fill this gap in knowledge, though practically all of them concentrate only on either involuntary (bottom-up) or voluntarily (top-down) aspect of attention. At the same time, both aspects of attention are rather integrated in the living brain. In this chapter we attempt to conceptualise both aspects of (...) attentional state within the theory of Operational Architectonics of brain and mind functioning, which provides a plausible theoretical basis for neurophysiological understanding of how attention is brought to existence in the living brain. (shrink)

In historical discussions of twentieth-century logic, it is typically assumed that model theory emerged within the tradition that adopted first-order logic as the standard framework. Work within the type-theoretic tradition, in the style ofPrincipia Mathematica, tends to be downplayed or ignored in this connection. Indeed, the shift from type theory to first-order logic is sometimes seen as involving a radical break that first made possible the rise of modern model theory. While comparing several early attempts to develop the semantics of (...) axiomatic theories in the 1930s, by two proponents of the type-theoretic tradition and two proponents of the first-order tradition, we argue that, instead, the move from type theory to first-order logic is better understood as a gradual transformation, and further, that the contributions to semantics made in the type-theoretic tradition should be seen as central to the evolution of model theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.3 (2005) 229-234 [Access article in PDF] Nonlinear Dynamics at the Cutting Edge of Modernity: A Postmodern View Gordon Globus Keywords nonlinear dynamics, modernity, postmodernity, quantum brain theory, free will, self-organization, autopoiesis, autorhoesis Although nonlinear dynamical conceptu-alizations have been applied to psychia-try for over 20 years,1 they have not had significant impact on the field. Unfortunately Heinrichs' very thoughtful contribution to the (...) discussion is unlikely to move such disinterest. Pragmatically successful paradigms in the phase of Kuhnian "normal science" are highly resistant to change. There is no crisis that besets triumphalist biological psychiatry that might lead to clinical or scientific revolution. At the same time, as I suggest at the end of this commentary, the ideas of nonlinear dynamics may not be revolutionary enough, remaining staunchly within the framework of modernity.In what follows I discuss four issues related to Heinrichs' article. First, I try to enrich his presentation of nonlinear dynamics by bringing in the role of self-organization in the evolution of nonlinear dynamical brain systems and by making the nonlinear dynamics "tunable." Second, I discuss whether Heinrichs succeeds in avoiding the dualism of the biopsychosocial model that he criticizes. Third, I look at the issue of "free will," which Heinrichs would understandably like to avoid. Finally, I mention a new form of dynamics, namely thermofield dynamics, which I think is more promising than nonlinear dynamics. Self-Organizing Self-Tuning Nonlinear Dynamical Systems In the case of psychiatry, we are not considering nonlinear dynamical systems like the weather or an ecosystem, but the brain's neural networks in terms of nonlinear dynamics with all its chaos. There is a principle of such systems of neural networks that Heinrichs does not bring out, although it is extremely important for them. These systems are self-organizing under a Hamiltonian principle of "least energy." To use Hopfield and Tank's (1986) terms, nonlinear dynamical neural networks self-organize toward attractors that minimize the "computational energy" of the system, or for Smolensky (1988), self-organize toward "harmony," or for Globus (1995, 2003), in a Heideggerian vein, self-organize to maximize "belonging-together." In this elaborated framework, rational deliberation is one constraint among many on a self-organizing nonlinear dynamical process. [End Page 229]Heinrichs brings out beautifully the nonlinear dynamical way of thinking clinically. This is not the dynamics of mechanistic psychodynamics, which features psychological forces in vectorial conflict—id versus superego and their compromises—but a flowing evolution of states in which small changes in initial state may have large effects (nonlinearity) on the state trajectory. To live a life is often to feel surprise, which nonlinear dynamics with its chaotic regimes well portrays.But there is a way that classical Freud and nonlinear dynamical neural networks do come together—in the "economics," discharges and conservations of libidinal energy, expenditures and credits in Derrida's (1978) accounting. Heinrichs does not mention this similarity. The economic principles differ between Freud's late nineteenth-century thermodynamics and Heinrichs' late twentieth-century nonlinear dynamics, it is true, but it is all economics.Freud called this economic functioning the "pleasure principle" in which "libido" seeks to discharge its instinctual energy store, reducing the level of instinctual tension. This "primary process" proceeds to an attractor by the quickest, most direct way possible, whereas the "secondary process" defers reduction in instinctual tension, subjecting the primary process to thought. Self-organizing directly to the attractor is the primary process with which the secondary process interferes, introducing deferral.The economy of nonlinear dynamics pictures a "landscape," a variegated topography with peaks and valleys. Each point on the topography represents a state. Peak points are repellors—for example, states in which the phobic object is approached—and the lowest points of the valleys are attractors—for example, obsessions and compulsions. The path of occupied states self-organizes away from repellors and toward attractors. This topography is an energy landscape. Its dynamics spontaneously tends—"self-organizes"—toward least energy/high-constraint satisfaction. Freud's pleasure principle is just the Hamiltonian least energy... (shrink)

It is argued that among possible nonlocal hidden-variable theories a particular class (called here “crypto-nonlocal” or CN) is relatively plausible on physical grounds. CN theories have the property that (for example) the two photons emitted in an atomic cascade process are indistinguishable in their individual statistical properties from photons emitted singly, and that in the latter case the effects of nonlocality are unobservable. It is demonstrated that all CN theories are constrained by inequalities which are (...) violated by the quantum-mechanical predictions; these inequalities bear no simple relation to Bell's inequalities, and an explicit example is constructed of a CN theory which violates the latter. It is also shown that while existing experiments cannot rule out general CN theories, they do rule out (subject to a few caveats such as the usual ones concerning the well-known “loopholes”) the subclass in which the photon polarizations are linear. (shrink)

In historical discussions of twentieth-century logic, it is typically assumed that model theory emerged within the tradition that adopted first-order logic as the standard framework. Work within the type-theoretic tradition, in the style of Principia Mathematica, tends to be downplayed or ignored in this connection. Indeed, the shift from type theory to first-order logic is sometimes seen as involving a radical break that first made possible the rise of modern model theory. While comparing several early attempts to develop the semantics (...) of axiomatic theories in the 1930s, by two proponents of the type-theoretic tradition and two proponents of the first-order tradition, we argue that, instead, the move from type theory to first-order logic is better understood as a gradual transformation, and further, that the contributions to semantics made in the type-theoretic tradition should be seen as central to the evolution of model theory. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss two approaches to the axiomatization of scientific theories in the context of the so called semantic approach, according to which (roughly) a theory can be seen as a class of models. The two approaches are associated respectively to Suppes’ and to da Costa and Chuaqui’s works. We argue that theories can be developed both in a way more akin to the usual mathematical practice (Suppes), in an informal set theoretical environment, writing the (...) set theoretical predicate in the language of set theory itself or, more rigorously (da Costa and Chuaqui), by employing formal languages that help us in writing the postulates to define a class of structures. Both approaches are called internal , for we work within a mathematical framework, here taken to be first-order ZFC. We contrast these approaches with an external one, here discussed briefly. We argue that each one has its strong and weak points, whose discussion is relevant for the philosophical foundations of science. (shrink)

The semantic view of theoriesis one according to which theoriesare construed as models of their linguisticformulations. The implications of thisview for scientific realism have been little discussed. Contraryto the suggestion of various champions of the semantic view,it is argued that this approach does not makesupport for a plausible scientific realism anyless problematic than it might otherwise be.Though a degree of independence of theory fromlanguage may ensure safety frompitfalls associated with logical empiricism, realism cannot be entertained unless models or (...) (abstractedand/or idealized) aspects thereof are spelled out in terms of linguistic formulations (such as mathematical equations),which can be interpreted in terms of correspondencewith the world. The putative advantage of thesemantic approach – its linguistic independence – isthus of no help to the realist. I consider recent treatmentsof the model-theoretic view (Suppe, Giere, Smith), and find that although some of these accounts harbour the promiseof realism, this promise is deceptive. (shrink)

Logical reconstruction is a fundamental philosophical method for achieving clarity concerning the prerequisites, presuppositions and the logical structure of natural language arguments. The scope and limits of this method have become visible not least through its intense application to Anselm of Canterbury’s notorious proofs for the existence of God. This volume collects, on the one hand, reconstructions of Anselmian arguments that take account of the problems of reconstruction and, on the other hand, theoretical reflections on reconstruction with a view to (...) Anselm. We hope that this will allow the reader to critically assess the merits of the theoretical accounts in the light of the reconstructions and the merits of the reconstructions in the light of the theoretical accounts. In general, by considering the example of an outstanding thinker in one or the other way, this volume aims at advancing the methodology and the practice of logical reconstruction. The following remarks explain and motivate this undertaking: What purposes does logical reconstruction serve? What purposes does the reflection on logical reconstruction serve? In which ways can the practice and theory of reconstruction profit particularly from studying Anselm’s reasoning? How can the resulting problems be addressed? – Finally, a short overview over the contributions to this volume is offered. (shrink)

Despite the fact that attention is a core property of all perceptual and cognitive operations, our understanding of its neurophysiological mechanisms is far from complete. There are many theoretical models that try to fill this gap in knowledge, though practically all of them concentrate only on either involuntary (bottom-up) or voluntarily (top-down) aspect of attention. At the same time, both aspects of attention are rather integrated in the living brain. In this chapter we attempt to conceptualise both aspects of (...) attentional state within the theory of Operational Architectonics of brain and mind functioning, which provides a plausible theoretical basis for neurophysiological understanding of how attention is brought to existence in the living brain. (shrink)

Management scholars and social scientists investigate dynamics of subjective fairness perceptions in the workplace under the umbrella term “organizational justice.” Philosophers and ethicists, on the other hand, think of justice as a normative requirement in societal relationships with conflicting interests. Both ways of looking at justice have neither remained fully separated nor been clearly integrated. It seems that much could be gained and learned by more closely integrating the ethical and the empirical fields of justice. On the other hand, it (...) may simply not be possible to bridge the divide between the subjective empirical and the normative prescriptive justice as both fields pose different questions and rely on different assumptions and methods. In this paper, we propose a “reconciliation” model, as a third way of considering justice in the workplace, taking into account normative and psychological issues pertaining to justice. Through applying a reconciliation model, we provide a new way of looking at the interconnections between justice philosophy and organizational justice that could advance future research in both fields. Our model also implies that justice researchers can and should be concerned with the moral implications of their own subject of research. (shrink)

In the philosophical literature on Yang-Mills theories, field formulations are taken to have more structure and to be local, while curve-based formulations are taken to have less structure and to be nonlocal. I formalize the notion of locality at issue and show that theories with less structure are nonlocal. However, the amount of structure had by some formulation is independent of whether it uses fields or curves. The relevant difference in structure is not a difference in (...) set-theoretic structure. Rather, it is a difference in the structure of the category of models of the theory. (shrink)

SummaryThe paper is a critical survey of the semantics and pragmatics of Indexicals. Both the coordinate‐approach due to Lewis and the semantization of pragmatics attempted by Lakoff are shown to be inadequate. Cresswell's more dynamic approach is shown to withstand the objections raised against it. Sophisticated accounts such as a two dimensional tense logic, or a semantics involving pragmatic models and multiple reference models are shown to be necessary to cope with the intricacies of the use of tense (...) in natural language. Benveniste's division of time into physical, chronic and linguistic time is assessed and criticised for missing the phenomenon of tense anaphora. Finally, the problem of the interaction between the utterance's time and the indexicals is analysed. (shrink)

Clinical musings on the nature of reality and "known experience." Therapists must rely on their clients' reporting of experience in order to assess, treat, and offer help. Yet we all experience the world through various filters of one sort or another, and our experiences are transformed through several nonconscious processes before reaching our conscious awareness. Science, philosophy, and wisdom traditions share the belief that our awareness is very restricted. How, then, can anyone accurately report their experience, let alone get help (...) with it? Neuropsychologist Aldrich Chan examines how our experience of reality is assembled and shaped by biological, psychological, sociocultural, and existential processes. Each chapter explores processes within these domains that may act as "veils." Topics in the book include: the default mode network, cognitive distortions, decision-making heuristics, the interconnected mind, memory, and cultural concepts of distress. By understanding the ways in which reality can be distorted, clinicians can more effectively help their clients reach their personal psychotherapeutic goals. (shrink)

The way, in which quantum information can unify quantum mechanics (and therefore the standard model) and general relativity, is investigated. Quantum information is defined as the generalization of the concept of information as to the choice among infinite sets of alternatives. Relevantly, the axiom of choice is necessary in general. The unit of quantum information, a qubit is interpreted as a relevant elementary choice among an infinite set of alternatives generalizing that of a bit. The invariance to the axiom of (...) choice shared by quantum mechanics is introduced: It constitutes quantum information as the relation of any state unorderable in principle (e.g. any coherent quantum state before measurement) and the same state already well-ordered (e.g. the well-ordered statistical ensemble of the measurement of the quantum system at issue). This allows of equating the classical and quantum time correspondingly as the well-ordering of any physical quantity or quantities and their coherent superposition. That equating is interpretable as the isomorphism of Minkowski space and Hilbert space. Quantum information is the structure interpretable in both ways and thus underlying their unification. Its deformation is representable correspondingly as gravitation in the deformed pseudo-Riemannian space of general relativity and the entanglement of two or more quantum systems. The standard model studies a single quantum system and thus privileges a single reference frame turning out to be inertial for the generalized symmetry [U(1)]X[SU(2)]X[SU(3)] “gauging” the standard model. As the standard model refers to a single quantum system, it is necessarily linear and thus the corresponding privileged reference frame is necessary inertial. The Higgs mechanism U(1) → [U(1)]X[SU(2)] confirmed enough already experimentally describes exactly the choice of the initial position of a privileged reference frame as the corresponding breaking of the symmetry. The standard model defines ‘mass at rest’ linearly and absolutely, but general relativity non-linearly and relatively. The “Big Bang” hypothesis is additional interpreting that position as that of the “Big Bang”. It serves also in order to reconcile the linear standard model in the singularity of the “Big Bang” with the observed nonlinearity of the further expansion of the universe described very well by general relativity. Quantum information links the standard model and general relativity in another way by mediation of entanglement. The linearity and absoluteness of the former and the nonlinearity and relativeness of the latter can be considered as the relation of a whole and the same whole divided into parts entangled in general. (shrink)

This essay argues for a new perspective on the analysis and evaluation of middle‐range theory. The commonly used criteria for theory evaluation in nursing are not as useful as they should be, and the root of the problem is an inappropriate understanding of middle‐range theory. In spite of their name, middle‐range theories should not be analysed and evaluated as concrete or limited versions of more general theories. Rather, they are best understood as models. The latter sections of (...) this essay present a new method for analysing middle‐range theories and new criteria for their evaluation. Analysing and evaluating theories relevant to nursing as models has the capacity to increase their scholarly and clinical usefulness. (shrink)

Portraying the firm as a ‘black box’, as traditional conceptions of the firm tend to do, has been strongly criticised by stakeholder theorists. This article claims, however, that the ‘black box problem’ has not been satisfactorily resolved by stakeholder theory itself. The failure to bring clarity to the internal realities of the firm has led to unacceptable conceptions of the firm from a moral agency point of view. For example, stakeholder theory tends to portray the firm as an exchange system (...) with an input-output thought model as a basis. Such a conception does not provide a credible account of moral agency and results in problematic consequences for stakeholder theory, for example when it comes to motivating the existence of corporate moral purposes and ethically acceptable foundations of stakeholder interests. (shrink)

The ontological model framework for an operational theory has generated much interest in recent years. The debate concerning reality of quantum states has been made more precise in this framework. With the introduction of generalized notion of contextuality in this framework, it has been shown that completely mixed state of a qubit is preparation contextual. Interestingly, this new idea of preparation contextuality has been used to demonstrate nonlocality of some \(\psi \) -epistemic models without any use of Bell’s inequality. (...) In particular, nonlocality of a non maximally \(\psi \) -epistemic model has been demonstrated from preparation contextuality of a maximally mixed qubit and Schrödinger’s steerability of the maximally entangled state of two qubits (Leifer and Maroney, Phys Rev Lett 110:120401, 2013). In this paper, we, show that any mixed state is preparation contextual. We, then, show that nonlocality of any bipartite pure entangled state, with Schmidt rank two, follows from preparation contextuality and steerability provided we impose certain condition on the epistemicity of the underlying ontological model. More interestingly, if the pure entangled state is of Schmidt rank greater than two, its nonlocality follows without any further condition on the epistemicity. Thus our result establishes a stronger connection between nonlocality and preparation contextuality by revealing nonlocality of any bipartite pure entangled states without any use of Bell-type inequality. (shrink)

In 1927 Louis de Broglie proposed an alternative approach to standard quantum mechanics known as the double solution program (DSP) where particles are represented as bunched fields or solitons guided by a base (weaker) wave. DSP evolved as the famous de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave interpretation (PWI) also known as Bohmian mechanics but the general idea to use solitons guided by a base wave to reproduce the dynamics of the PWI was abandoned. Here we propose a nonlinear scalar field theory (...) able to reproduce the PWI for the Schrödinger and Klein–Gordon guiding waves. Our model relies on a relativistic ‘phase harmony’ condition locking the phases of the solitonic particle and the guiding wave. We also discuss an extension of the theory for the N particles cases in presence of entanglement and external (classical) electromagnectic fields. (shrink)