Peacemaking is especially challenging in situations of intractable conflict. Collective narratives in this context contribute to coping with challenges societies face, but also fuel conflict continuation. We introduce the Informative Process Model, proposing that informing individuals about the socio-psychological processes through which conflict-supporting narratives develop, and suggesting that they can change via comparison to similar conflicts resolved peacefully, can facilitate unfreezing and change in attitudes. Study 1 established associations between awareness of conflict costs and conflict-supporting narratives, belief in the possibility (...) of resolving the conflict peacefully and support for pursuing peace among Israeli-Jews and Palestinians. Studies 2 and 3 found that exposure to IPM-based original videos led Israeli-Jews to deliberation of the information presented, predicting acceptance of the IPM-based message, which, in turn, predicted support for negotiations. Study 3 also found similar effects across IPM-based messages focusing on different conflict-supporting themes. We discuss the implications to attitude change in intractable conflicts. (shrink)

Until very recently, there has been no discussion of aesthetic agency. This is likely because aesthetics has traditionally focused not on action, but on appreciation, while the standard approach identifies ‘agency’ with the will, and, more specifically, with the capacity for intentional action. In this paper, I argue, first, that this identification is unfortunate since it fails to do justice to the fact that we standardly attribute beliefs, emotions, desires, and other conative and affective attitudes that aren’t formed ‘at will,’ (...) including aesthetic appreciation, to people’s agency. Fortunately, we need not abide by this Practical Approach, but can develop an alternative: the Authority Approach to rational agency, which does justice to the widespread practice of rationally assessing, reactively responding to, and holding people responsible for non-voluntary attitudes. This is very good news for aesthetics since, I argue additionally, any account of aesthetic agency that accepts the Practical Approach, and focuses on aesthetic actions fails to provide a genuine notion of aesthetic agency. For we have no handle on what counts as aesthetic actions independently of these actions’ relation to appreciation: actions are “aesthetic” only derivatively insofar as they center around those that merit (dis)appreciation. For this reason, we have genuine aesthetic agency only if we can exercise agency in acts of the rational-affective capacity for appreciation, which differs from the will. The Authority Approach allows us to explain how we exercise agency in aesthetic appreciations, thus equipping us with a genuine conception of aesthetic agency. (shrink)

Transplantation programs commonly rely on clinicians’ judgments about patients’ social support (care from friends or family) when deciding whether to list them for organ transplantation. We examine whether using social support to make listing decisions for adults seeking transplantation is morally legitimate, drawing on recent data about the evidence-base, implementation, and potential impacts of the criterion on underserved and diverse populations. We demonstrate that the rationale for the social support criterion, based in the principle of utility, is undermined by its (...) reliance on tenuous evidence. Moreover, social support requirements may reinforce transplant inequities, interfere in patients’ personal relationships, and contribute to biased and inconsistent listing procedures. As such, accommodating the needs of patients with limited social support would better balance ethical commitments to equity, utility, and respect for persons in transplantation. We suggest steps for researchers, transplantation programs, and policymakers to improve fair use of social support in transplantation. (shrink)

What is the source of aesthetic knowledge? Empirical knowledge, it is generally held, bottoms out in perception. Such knowledge can be transmitted to others through testimony, preserved by memory, and amplified via inference. But perception is where the rubber hits the road. What about aesthetic knowledge? Does it too bottom out in perception? Most say “yes”. But this is wrong. When it comes to aesthetic knowledge, it is appreciation, not perception, where the rubber hits the road. The ultimate source of (...) aesthetic knowledge is feeling. In this essay, we articulate and defend the very idea of affective knowledge and reveal aesthetic knowledge to be a species of the genus. We then show how the view resolves a thorny problem that has bedeviled aesthetic epistemologists: how to reconcile the seemingly direct character of aesthetic knowledge with the possibility of acquiring such knowledge from criticism. One learns from criticism, we argue, when it guides one’s engagement with an object so that one can appreciate it in virtue of those of its features that render it worthy of appreciation. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to reassess the prospects of a widely neglected affective conception of the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art. On the proposed picture, the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art are non-contingently constituted by a particular kind of pleasure. Artworks that are valuable qua artworks merit, deserve, and call for a certain pleasure, the same pleasure that reveals (or at least purports to reveal) them to be valuable in the way that they are, and constitutes (...) their aesthetic evaluation and appreciation. This is why and how art is non-contingently related to pleasure. Call this, the Affective View. While I don’t advance conclusive arguments for the Affective View in this paper, I aim to reassess its prospects by (1) undermining central objections against it, (2) dissociating it from hedonism about the value of artworks (the view that this value is grounded in, and explained by, its possessors’ power to please), and (3) introducing some observations on the practice of art in support of it. Given that the objections I discuss miss their target, and given the observations in support of it, I conclude that the Affective View is worth serious reconsideration. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Aristotle's understanding of mathematical continuity constrains the mathematical ontology he can consistently hold. On my reading, Aristotle can only be a mathematical abstractionist of a certain sort. To show this, I first present an analysis of Aristotle's notion of continuity by bringing together texts from his Metaphysica and Physica, to show that continuity is, for Aristotle, a certain kind of per se unity, and that upon this rests his distinction between continuity and contiguity. Next (...) I argue briefly that Aristotle intends for his discussion of continuity to apply to pure mathematical objects such as lines and figures, as well as to extended bodies. I show that this leads him to a difficulty, for it does not at first appear that the distinction between continuity and contiguity can be preserved for abstract mathematicals. Finally, I present a solution according to which Aristotle's understanding of continuity can only be saved if he holds a certain kind of mathematical ontology. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A long debate in aesthetics concerns the reasoned nature of criticism. The main questions in the debate ask whether criticism is based on reasons, whether critics communicate reasons for their audience’s responses, and, if so, how to understand these critical reasons. I argue that a great obstacle to making any progress in this debate is the deeply engrained assumption, shared by all sides of the debate, that reasons can only be either theoretical reasons or practical reasons. My aims are (...) to put pressure on this assumption that, if there are critical reasons, they must be either theoretical or practical, and to suggest that, if there are critical reasons, the most central among them are neither theoretical nor practical. (shrink)

There is a debate about whether particular properties are for Aristotle non-recurrent and trope-like individuals or recurrent universals. I argue that Physics I.7 provides evidence that he took non-substantial particulars to be neither; they are instead non-recurrent modes. Physics I.7 also helps show why this matters. Particular properties must be individual modes in order for Aristotle to preserve three key philosophical commitments: that objects of ordinary experience are primary substances, that primary substances undergo genuine change, and that primary substances are (...) ontologically fundamental. (shrink)

The paper discusses Linda Zagzebski's account of epistemic authority. Building on Joseph Raz's account of political authority, Zagzebski argues that the basic contours of epistemic authority match those Raz ascribes to political authority. This, it is argued, is a mistake. Zagzebski is correct in identifying the pre-emptive nature of reasons provided by an authority as central to our understanding of epistemic authority. However, Zagzebski ignores important differences between practical and epistemic authority. As a result, her attempt to explain the rationality (...) of belief on authority by applying an analogue of Raz's Normal Justification Thesis to the domain of belief fails. A successful explanation of the rationality of belief on authority will need to be attuned to the differences between political and epistemic authorities. (shrink)

One fundamental divide among philosophers studying the nature of trust concerns the relation between trust and belief. According to doxastic accounts of trust, trust entails a belief about the trustee: either the belief that she is trustworthy with respect to what she is trusted to do, or that she will do what she is trusted to do. Non-doxastic accounts deny that trusting entails holding such a belief. The chapter describes and evaluates the main considerations which have been cited for and (...) against doxastic accounts of trust. It argues that a preemptive reasons account of trust neutralizes some of the key objections to doxastic accounts, and that considerations favoring a doxastic account appear to be stronger than those favoring non-doxastic accounts. The chapter also suggests that the debate about the nature of trust, and the mental state required for trusting can benefit from linking it with the debate about the value of trust. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the following threefold question: first, is there a genuine problem of grounding aesthetic judgement in testimony? Second, if there is such a problem, what exactly is its nature? And lastly, can Kant help us get clearer on the problem? Following Kant, I argue that the problem with aesthetic testimony is explained by norms that govern what it takes to judge a beautiful object aesthetically, rather than theoretically or practically, not by norms that govern what it (...) takes to judge aesthetically with a sufficient epistemic basis rather than without it. I thus propose a normative and aesthetic approach to testimony. (shrink)

I present an account of what it is to trust a speaker, and argue that the account can explain the common intuitions which structure the debate about the transmission view of testimony. According to the suggested account, to trust a speaker is to grant her epistemic authority on the asserted proposition, and hence to see her opinion as issuing a second order, preemptive reason for believing the proposition. The account explains the intuitive appeal of the basic principle associated with the (...) transmission view of testimony: the principle according to which, a listener can normally obtain testimonial knowledge that p by believing a speaker who testifies that p only if the speaker knows that p. It also explains a common response to counterexamples to this principle: that these counterexamples do not involve normal cases of testimonial knowledge. (shrink)

Modest pessimism about philosophical progress is the view that while philosophy may sometimes make some progress, philosophy has made, and can be expected to make, only very little progress (where the extent of philosophical progress is typically judged against progress in the hard sciences). The paper argues against recent attempts to defend this view on the basis of the pervasiveness of disagreement within philosophy. The argument from disagreement for modest pessimism assumes a teleological conception of progress, according to which the (...) attainment of true answers to the big philosophical questions, or knowledge of them, is the primary goal of philosophy. The paper argues that this assumption involves a misconception of the goal of philosophy: if philosophy has a primary goal, its goal is the understanding of philosophical problems rather than knowledge of answers to philosophical questions. Moreover, it is argued that if the primary goal of philosophy is such understanding, then widespread disagreement within philosophy does not indicate that philosophy makes little progress. (shrink)

A long debate in aesthetics concerns the reasoned nature of criticism. The main questions in the debate are whether criticism is based on (normative) reasons, whether critics communicate reasons for their audience’s responses, and if so, how to understand these critical reasons. I argue that a great obstacle to making any progress in this debate is the deeply engrained assumption, shared by all sides of the debate, that reasons can only be either theoretical reasons (i.e., those that explain what to (...) believe or what propositions are true) or practical reasons (i.e., those that explain what is to be done or what actions are good/required/called for/otherwise worthy of doing). My aims are (1) to put pressure on this assumption that, if there are critical reasons, they must be either theoretical or practical (the EITHER/OR assumption), and (2) to suggest that, if there are critical reasons, the most central among them are neither theoretical nor practical (NEITHER/NOR). (shrink)

Natural fluctuations in sustained attention can lead to attentional failures in everyday tasks and even dangerous incidences. These fluctuations depend on personal factors, as well as task characteristics. So far, our understanding of sustained attention is partly due to the common usage of laboratory setups and tasks, and the complex interplay between behavior and brain activity. The focus of the current study was thus to test the feasibility of applying a single-channel wireless EEG to monitor patterns of sustained attention during (...) a set of ecological tasks. An EEG marker of attention (BEI—Brain Engagement Index) was continuously recorded from 42 healthy volunteers during auditory and visual tasks from the Test of Everyday Attention (TEA) and Trail Making Test (TMT). We found a descending pattern of both performance and BEI in the auditory tasks as task complexity increases, while the increase in performance and decrease in BEI on the visual task. In addition, patterns of BEI in the complex tasks were used to detect outliers and the optimal range of attention through exploratory models. The current study supports the feasibility of combined electrophysiological and neurocognitive investigation of sustained attention in ecological tasks yielding unique insights on patterns of sustained attention as a function of task modality and task complexity. (shrink)

Our study considers the governance, ethics and operational challenges associated with the acquisition, manipulation and commodification of ‘big data’ in the financial services sector. To the best of our knowledge, there are no published studies describing empirical research undertaken within companies in this sector to understand how they are responding to such challenges: our field-based research is a significant initial contribution in this respect. We describe the results of a micro-ethnographic study undertaken in a small-to-medium-sized company developing disruptive, technology-related platforms (...) and services in the banking and retail sectors based on big data and associated analytics: these are used to derive commercially valuable insights from personal customer data in exchange for cash back and targeted rewards. The company was found to employ a multi-level innovation governance approach, underpinned by an ethical strategy based on a principle of mutual benefit. Opt-in and informed consent for using data for specific purposes was supported by principles of data minimisation and anonymisation, with unrestricted use of secondary, anonymised and aggregated data to develop insights. Governance, which included contextual data protection legislation, payment-card industry data usage standards and internal corporate controls, presented as bespoke organisational practices relating to data security and privacy. These in total set the governance and ethics frame for big data innovation at the company within which it has had to be both adaptive and responsive under conditions of normative and regulatory uncertainty. (shrink)

What must laypersons understand about science to allow them to make sound decisions on science-related issues? Relying on recent developments in social epistemology, this paper argues that scientific education should have the goal not of bringing laypersons' understanding of science closer to that of expert insiders, but rather of cultivating the kind of competence characteristic of “competent outsiders” (Feinstein 2011). Moreover, it argues that philosophers of science have an important role to play in attempts to promote this kind of understanding, (...) but that to successfully fulfill this role, they will have to approach central questions in the field differently. (shrink)

This study discusses the mediating role of statistics anxiety and motivation in the relationship comprising academic dishonesty, personality traits, and previous academic achievements in three different learning environments. Self-determination theory provides a broad psychological framework for these phenomena. Data were collected from 649 bachelor-degree students in the Social Sciences in five Israeli academic institutions. Structural equation modelling was employed to investigate the research variables’ relationships. Findings indicate that statistics anxiety mediates the relationship between personality traits and academic dishonesty in the (...) POE and the ERT learning environments. Findings also indicate the relationship between students’ achievements and academic dishonesty, but only in the ERT learning environment. In contrast, motivation mediates the relationship between students’ achievements and statistics anxiety only in the POE learning environment. This study unveils that learning environments determine the mediating role of statistical anxiety. In digital learning environments, mediation has been found between students’ personality traits and academic dishonesty. No similar parallel mediation could be established in the physical learning environment, F2F. Thus, we conclude that online courses should be designed according to student-centred approaches. (shrink)

This article suggests a rereading of Schelling’s theory of freedom in the through Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. Schelling’s philosophy of freedom manifested a latent essentialism of the idealistic formulation of human freedom. In Schelling’s scheme, free was “what acts only in accord with the laws of its own being.” In practice, Schelling theory of freedom was based on an intelligible act in the “beginning of creation” which set an eternal unreachable essence to the subject. I propose to read “Schelling through Freud” (...) as a way to revisit this theoretical structure. I argue that Freud’s theory of early libido formation should be recognized as a naturalistic formulation of the intelligible unconscious act. This allows Freud to restructure Schelling’s unconscious eternal essence. Freud’s shift from the metaphysical to the metapsychological drama suggests a human intervention in place of divine redemption, and, thus transpires as a modern articulation of German Idealism. (shrink)

Equine-Facilitated Psychotherapy is widely used, and the uses to which it can be put are still being developed. However, existing knowledge about this field is insufficient, and most of the research suffers from methodological problems that compromise its rigor. This review will explore research into the linked fields of Animal-Assisted Therapy and Equine-Assisted Activities/Therapies related to physical health. Existing knowledge of mental, emotional, and social applications of EAA/T is presented. Evaluation studies in the subfield suggest that people benefit from interventions (...) with horses. However, these studies suffer from fundamental problems, such as small sample size and lack of control groups. Naturalistic inquiry about theoretical aspects highlights the fundamental role that human-horse relations play in EAA/T, but these studies exhibit deficiencies in theory development. A multimethod approach could promote knowledge development for EFP. Suggestions for future research concern methodological solutions to improve evaluation studies, use of grounded theory method to develop theory, as well as applying attachment theory to the human-horse context, which may offer insight about the underlying processes for change. (shrink)

We argue that the aesthetic domain falls inside the scope of rationality, but does so in its own way. Aesthetic judgment is a stance neither on whether a proposition is to be believed nor on whether an action is to be done, but on whether an object is to be appreciated. Aesthetic judgment is simply appreciation. Correlatively, reasons supporting theoretical, practical and aesthetic judgments operate in fundamentally different ways. The irreducibility of the aesthetic domain is due to the fact that (...) aesthetic judgment is a sensory-affective disclosure of, and responsiveness to, merit: it is a feeling that presents an object, and is responsive to it, as worthy of being liked. Aesthetic judgment is thus shown to be, on the hand, first personal and non-transferable; and, on the other hand, a presentation of reality. We thereby capture what is right in both subjectivist and objectivist conceptions of aesthetic judgment. (shrink)

According to tradition, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to a certain feeling of liking or pleasure. Is that true? Two answers are on offer in the field of aesthetics today: 1. The Hedonist answers: Yes, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to pleasure insofar as this value is constituted and explained by the power of its possessors to please (under standard conditions). 2. The Non-Affectivist answers: No. At best, pleasure is contingently related to aesthetic value. The aim of this paper is (...) to point to a blind spot in the dialectic between these two standard positions by defending a third neglected answer to the question above, the answer of the Value-Meriting-Pleasure [VMP] advocate. According to this answer, a certain kind of (cognitive and responsive) pleasure is connected to aesthetic value non-contingently, but also non-hedonically. VMP is the view that objects of aesthetic value are non-contingently related to pleasure insofar as they merit a certain kind of pleasure. But, pace the hedonist, those objects are valuable (those that are to be engaged with etc.) neither on account of their capacity to give pleasure nor on account of the hedonic value of the attitude they merit. (shrink)

Engagements with aesthetic value pervade human life. We choose these shoes because they beautifully match the pants; travel to Petra on account of its beauty; o.

A notorious concept in the history of aesthetics, “disinterest,” has begotten a host of myths. This paper explores and challenges “The Myth of the Absent Self ” [MAS], according to which in disinterested experience, “the subject need not do anything other than dispassionately stare at the object, bringing nothing of herself to the table other than awareness” (Riggle 2016, p. 4). I argue that the criticism of disinterest experience grounded in MAS is skewed by two false assumptions: about the nature (...) of the clarifying, evaluative, and transformative self-consciousness (which the disinterest critic takes to be at the heart of the profundity of beauty) and about the nature of the self. By bringing out the falsehood of these two assumptions, and by clarifying the core commitments of disinterest, the paper proves that the disinterest critic is in no superior position to the disinterest advocate regarding the explanation of the profound role of beauty in human life. (shrink)

Aristotle’s concept of subject, or hypokeimenon, has been understudied in scholarship, in part because, since Aristotle associates it with his concept of ousia or substance, discussion of hypokeimenon is often eclipsed by that of substance. It is often thought that Aristotle introduces hypokeimenon as the criterion for being a substance in his Categories. In this essay I argue that he does not, thus calling into question some entrenched views about Aristotelian substance. Divorcing hypokeimenon from substance in this way emphasizes the (...) need for an account of hypokeimenon in its own right. In this essay I also begin this work by using an often overlooked pointer in Categories towards a discussion in An. Po., in whose context Aristotle's logical notion of hypokeimenon begins to become more clear. (shrink)

BackgroundNational guidelines require programmes use subjective assessments of social support when determining transplant suitability, despite limited evidence linking it to outcomes. We examined how transplant providers weigh the importance of social support for kidney transplantation compared with other factors, and variation by clinical role and personal beliefs.MethodsThe National survey of the American Society of Transplant Surgeons and the Society of Transplant Social Work in 2016. Using a discrete choice approach, respondents compared two hypothetical patient profiles and selected one for transplantation. (...) Conditional logistic regression estimated the relative importance of each factor; results were stratified by clinical role and beliefs.ResultsFive hundred and eighy-four transplant providers completed the survey. Social support was the second most influential factor among transplant providers. Providers were most likely to choose a candidate who had social support, always adhered to a medical regimen, and had a 15 years life expectancy with transplant. Psychosocial providers were more influenced by adherence and quality of life compared with medical/surgical providers, who were more influenced by candidates' life expectancy with transplant. For providers concerned with avoiding organ waste, social support was the most influential factor, while it was the least influential for clinicians concerned with fairness.ConclusionsSocial support is highly influential in listing decisions and may exacerbate transplant disparities. Providers’ beliefs and reliance on social support in determining suitability vary considerably, raising concerns about transparency and justice. (shrink)

Languages that are classified as non-Sequence-of-Tense come in more than one variety : some of these languages allow a past tense in before -clauses while others do not. We propose that some languages have quantificational tenses, while others have pronominal tenses. The past tense in before -clauses is ill-formed in a language that has quantificational tenses, because the semantics of before is incompatible with existential quantification over times. A language with pronominal tenses does not have this problem. The pronominal/quantificational tense (...) distinction interacts with the Sequence-of-Tense parameter, providing a general theory of possible and impossible languages. (shrink)

This chapter gives an account of epistemic trust. It argues that trust in general is a matter of declining to take precautions against the trustee’s failing to come through, and that this amounts in the epistemic case to declining to rely on evidence for the testified proposition, instead relying solely on the testifier. But if this is so, how can trust play a positive role in securing knowledge? The key, it is argued, lies in recognizing that trust is preemptive: Trusting (...) someone entails believing that she is trustworthy, and this belief preempts other evidence about whether she will come through. In other words, this belief gives the truster himself a good reason to desist from relying on evidence other than the trustee’s word. But if trust is preemptive, how is it compatible with epistemic responsibility, which seems to involve relying on your own evidence? Because, it is claimed, preempting your own evidence in favor of the testifier’s say-so enables your belief to be supported by her evidence – which, we may assume, is superior to your own. Far from forfeiting epistemic responsibility, then, epistemic trust on the preemptive account gives you justificatory access to a swathe of evidence that you would not otherwise have had. (shrink)

In a recent article, Steel, Buchak and Eyal argue that current levels of uncertainty do not present a good reason to bar controlled human infection trials of COVID-19 vaccines from proceeding. We argue that their argumentation for this conclusion is flawed. SBE are mistaken about the effects which different forms of ignorance have on participants’ ability to provide valid informed consent. Decision-makers considering whether to allow such trials, we argue, must ultimately consider the likelihood that consent to participation in such (...) trials under current conditions would be valid, and whether this likelihood is high enough to permit such trials. This is a question that SBE completely ignore. We conclude that there indeed are valid concerns about conducting CHI trials given the current state of knowledge about COVID-19, concerns which SBE fail to address. (shrink)

Within the contemporary epistemology of testimony, it is widely assumed that testimonial scepticism can be dismissed without engaging with possible reasons or arguments supporting the view. This assumption of dismissibility both underlies the debate between reductionist and non-reductionist views of testimony and is responsible for the neglect of testimonial scepticism within contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that even given liberal assumptions about what may constitute valid grounds for the dismissal of a sceptical view, the assumption that testimonial scepticism is dismissible (...) should be rejected. For even if familiar sceptical positions and scepticism about testimonial justification can be dismissed on such grounds, scepticism about testimonial knowledge cannot. (shrink)

The extent to which English law remedies injury to autonomy as a stand-alone actionable damage in negligence is disputed. In this article I argue that the remedy available is not only partial and inconsistent but also gendered and discriminatory against women. I first situate the argument within the broader feminist critique of tort law as failing to appropriately remedy gendered harms, and of law more broadly as undervaluing women’s interest in reproductive autonomy. I then show by reference to English remedies (...) law’s first principles how imposed motherhood cases—Rees v Darlington and its predecessor McFarlane v Tayside Health Board—result in gender injustice when compared with other autonomy cases such as Chester v Afshar and Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust: A minor gender-neutral ITA is better remedied than the significant gendered harm of imposing motherhood on the claimant; men’s reproductive autonomy is protected to a greater extent than women’s; women’s reproductive autonomy is protected by an exceptional, derisory award. Worst of all, courts refuse to recognise imposed motherhood as detriment; and the deemed, mansplained, nonpecuniary joys of motherhood are used to offset pecuniary upkeep costs, forcing the claimant into a position she sought to avoid and thus further undermining her autonomy. The recent Singaporean case ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd, awarding compensation for undermining the claimant’s genetic affinity in an IVF wrong-sperm-mix-up demonstrates some improvement in comparison to English law, and some shared gender injustices in the context of reproductive autonomy. ACB’s analysis is oblivious to the nature of reproductive autonomy harm as gendered; and prioritises the father’s interest in having genetic affinity with the baby over a woman’s interest in not having motherhood imposed upon her. (shrink)

This paper discusses Hannah Arendt’s model of the Jewish pariah, developed in her study of Jewish assimilation. The argument is that Arendt’s model represents her early efforts to move beyond Martin Heidegger’s philosophy. The paper focuses on Arendt’s concept of a conscious pariah as a model for political resistance, independence, and agency. It shows how Arendt infused elements of Heidegger’s philosophy into her early vision of Jewish politics, while also transcending the limits of Heidegger’s ontological project with her political vision. (...) The paper suggests that Arendt’s book on Rahel Varnhagen shares similarities with Heidegger’s work on Mitsein in Being and Time, while her 1944 model of the conscious pariah, especially the focus on the pariah as a rebel, illustrates her concerns with Heidegger’s work on the Volk. (shrink)

On many science-related policy questions, the public is unable to make informed decisions, because of its inability to make use of knowledge obtained by scientists. Philip Kitcher and James Fishkin have both suggested therefore that on certain science-related issues, public policy should not be decided on by actual democratic vote, but should instead conform to the public’s counterfactual informed democratic decision. Indeed, this suggestion underlies Kitcher’s specification of an ideal of a well-ordered science. This article argues that this suggestion misconstrues (...) the normative significance of CIDDs. At most, CIDDs might have epistemic significance, but no authority or legitimizing force. (shrink)

The two leading theoretical approaches to tort law — economic analysis and corrective justice — are blind to distributive considerations. Moreover, even the main distributive approaches to tort law — loss-spreading and fairness — fail to emphasize egalitarianism as a distributive consideration. This article argues that egalitarianism should influence the normative evaluation of one’s conduct as negligent or not. It first explains why normatively negligence law should be sensitive to the egalitarian concern, suggesting three different accounts for this claim, based (...) on needs, equality, and desert as criteria for distribution. Second, it argues that egalitarianism is commensurate with the basic understanding of negligence law as reflecting corrective justice and notions of fault. The notion of fault is, therefore, reformulated from within, in order to accommodate egalitarianism. Third, I maintain that in order for egalitarianism to accommodate notions of corrective justice, egalitarian concerns should matter also at the stage of the standard of care. While the egalitarian concern can and should be integrated into the duty stage, I argue that such integration is insufficient. A correct and full understanding of the egalitarian concern and the tort of negligence requires a conclusion that the normative evaluation of one’s action as negligent or not cannot be separated from the distributive results that this action entails. The egalitarian concern works at the duty stage as an excuse for not imposing liability for wrongful activity. In contrast, at the standard stage, it works as a justification that turns an otherwise wrongful activity into a legitimate one. My claim is that morally we should usually expect more care from the better-off than from the disadvantaged. Findings of negligence are based on the failure to balance properly between one’s interests and those of another. In deciding to what extent the defendant should burden herself in order to prevent a loss to potential victims, one morally relevant criterion is the relative ability of the injurer and victim to bear precaution costs and expected accident loss, respectively. (shrink)

This study explored attention and interpretation biases in processing facial expressions as correlates of theoretically distinct self-reported anger experience, expression, and control. Non-selected undergraduate students completed cognitive tasks measuring attention bias, interpretation bias, and Spielberger’s State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory. Attention bias toward angry faces was associated with higher trait anger and anger expression and with lower anger control-in and anger control-out. The propensity to quickly interpret ambiguous faces as angry was associated with greater anger expression and its subcomponent of anger (...) expression-out and with lower anger control-out. Interactions between attention and interpretation biases did not contribute to the prediction of any anger component suggesting that attention and interpretation biases may function as distinct mechanisms. Theoretical and possible clinical implications are discussed. (shrink)

What should the goals of scientific inquiry be? What questions should scientists investigate, and how should our resources be distributed between different lines of investigation? Philip Kitcher has suggested that we should answer these questions by appealing to an ideal based on the consideration of hypothetical democratic deliberations under ideal circumstances. The paper argues that we have no reason to adopt this ideal. The paper examines both traditional arguments for democracy and Kitcher's own reasons for adopting this ideal, as presented (...) in Kitcher (2001) and in Kitcher (2011b), and argues that none of these supports adoption of Kitcher's proposed ideal. (shrink)

Using anthropological theory, this paper examines human–android interactions (HAI) as an emerging aspect of android science. These interactions are described in terms of adaptive learning (which is largely subconscious). This article is based on the observations reported and supplementary data from two studies that took place in Japan with a teleoperated android robot called Telenoid in the socialization of school children and older adults. We argue that interacting with androids brings about a special context, an interval, and a space/time for (...) reflection and imagination that was not there before. During the interaction something happens. There is adaptive learning and as a result, both children and older adults accepted Telenoid, and the children and older adults accepted each other. Using frames of play and ritual, we make sense and ‘capture’ moments of adaptive learning, and the feedback that elicits a social response from all study participants that results in self-efficacy and socialization. While “ritual” refers to the application of what has been learned and “play” means that there are no obvious consequences of what has been learned. This analysis illuminates new understanding about the uncanny valley, cultural robotics and the therapeutic potential of HAI. This has implications for the acceptance of androids in ‘socialized roles’ and gives us insight into the subconscious adaptive learning processes that must take place within humans to accept androids into our society. This approach aims to provides a clearer conceptual basis and vocabulary for further research of android and humanoid development. (shrink)

According to doxastic accounts of trust, trusting a person to \(\varPhi \) involves, among other things, holding a belief about the trusted person: either the belief that the trusted person is trustworthy or the belief that she actually will \(\varPhi \) . In recent years, several philosophers have argued against doxastic accounts of trust. They have claimed that the phenomenology of trust suggests that rather than such a belief, trust involves some kind of non-doxastic mental attitude towards the trusted person, (...) or a non-doxastic disposition to rely upon her. This paper offers a new account of reasons for trust and employs the account to defend a doxastic account of trust. The paper argues that reasons for trust are preemptive reasons for action or belief. Thus the Razian concept of preemptive reasons, which arguably plays a key role in our understanding of relations of authority, is also central to our understanding of relations of trust. Furthermore, the paper argues that acceptance of a preemptive account of reasons for trust supports the adoption of a doxastic account of trust, for acceptance of such an account both neutralizes central objections to doxastic accounts of trust and provides independent reasons supporting a doxastic account. (shrink)

A theory of embedded tense that derives SOT effects from an SOT rule is compared with a theory that derives SOT effects without appealing to an SOT rule, and an argument is provided in favor of the former. The argument relies mostly on examples where a tense is embedded under future-in-the-past. Such an argument was originally presented in and later dismissed in Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 17, ENS-Paris, 45–62, 2013a). An additional argument is provided in favor of supplementing the (...) SOT rule with a ‘de re’ mechanism. (shrink)

This paper challenges the traditional Buddhist positioning of the four jhànas under the category of `concentration meditation' and the premise regarding their secondary and superfluous role in the path of liberation. It seeks to show that the common interpretation of the jhànas as absorption-concentration, attainments that have no liberative value, is incompatible with the teachings of the Pàli Nikàyas. The paper argues few things: First, that one attains the jhànas, not by fixating the mind or being absorbed into a meditation (...) object, but by releasing and letting go of the foothold of the unwholesome mind. Second and related, that the entrance into the first jhàna is the actualization and embodiment of insight practice. Third, that jhànic joy and pleasure has significant liberative importance in the path of liberation; they allow the mind to let go of a rooted and basic tendency that causes suffering: the tendency to desire sensual pleasures. (shrink)

Comme c’est le cas de nombreuses histoires, celle du demi-million d’Espagnols arrivés en France en janvier et février 1939, alors que se termine la guerre d’Espagne, a toujours été écrite au masculin sous le couvert du neutre. En s’intéressant aux femmes réfugiées espagnoles en France, Maëlle Maugendre met pour la première fois le genre au cœur de l’analyse. Elle révèle la dimension profondément genrée de la politique de la République, puis de l’État français, et des expériences de cette popu...

Dynamic Repetition proposes a new understanding of modern Jewish theories of messianism across the disciplines of history, theology, and philosophy. This book explores how ideals of repetition, return, and the cyclical occasioned a new messianic impulse across an important swath of late nineteenth and early twentieth century German Jewish thought.