The point of departure for this article is the observation that, despite his own personal involvement as an engaged intellectual, Pierre Bourdieu offers a very thin account of social movement activism, and one pre-empted by the rather limited concept of ‘crisis’. The aim of the article, however, is to argue that the central concepts of Bourdieu’s theory of practice can be used to provide an effective and interesting basis for the analysis of social movements, protest and contention. To this end (...) the article demonstrates how the concepts of habitus, capital and field, in particular, resonate with important findings from the social movement literature. The focus of the article is limited to an engagement with Bourdieu. It connects with other work by the author, however, in which he has argued that Bourdieu’s framework can be used to address very serious problems in social movement theory. (shrink)

This article aims to do two things. The first of these is to introduce the concept of reflexive body techniques into the debate on body modification/maintenance. The value of the concept in relation to this debate, in part, is that it ensures that we conceive of the body as both a subject and an object, modifier and modified, and that we thereby avoid the trap of conceptualizing modification in dualistic (mind/body or body/society) terms. Second, the article seeks to explore the (...) pattern of distribution of practices of modification (conceived as reflexive body techniques) through society and to reflect upon the potential usefulness of multi-dimensional scaling as a tool for doing this. This aim is related to the first aim as it is argued that the concept of reflexive body techniques serves to identify and anchor practices ofmodification in a way that is amenable to both quantitative and qualitative forms of analysis, as well as theoretical investigation. (shrink)

What are the groundrules in the philosophy of art? What criteria of adequacy should we use for assessing theories of art?

Drawing upon ethnographic data, this article analyses 'vocabularies of motive' amongst individuals who work out at a private health club in the Greater Manchester area (UK). The article draws a distinction between motives for starting at a gym and motives for continuing, and analyses each separately. It also seeks to draw out, in the latter case, the many motives which conflict with a stereotypical view of 'working out' found in some academic accounts. Working out is not only an instrumental means (...) of cultivating valued bodily attributes, it is argued, nor are its attractions necessarily all 'bodily' (at least narrowly defined) in nature. (shrink)

I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my 'simulation argument'. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on 'grue'-like predicates.

In this article I discuss some of the findings of an on-going ethnographic study of two once-weekly circuit training classes held in one of the growing number of private health and fitness clubs. The article has four aims. First, to demonstrate and explore the active role of the body in a central practice of body modification/maintenance: i.e. circuit training. Second, to demonstrate that circuit training is a social structure which both shapes the activity of the agent and is shaped by (...) that (shaped) agent. I aim also to explore this structuration process. Third, to draw out a number of aspects of the sociality of body maintenance/modification. Training, I argue, is a form of symbolic interaction, localized within specific and durable social networks. The final aim of the article is to weave these various claims together into a coherent overall account of circuit training as a form of body modification. As an investigation of the embodied nature of practices of body maintenance and the active role of social agents in relation to these practices the article rejoins an important strand of sociological investigations of ‘the body’. At the same time, however, the article seeks to challenge those approaches, often rooted in Foucauldian analysis, which portray the body as ‘docile’ in relation to body maintenance. Foucauldian inspired studies often reify practices of modification as ‘technologies’ or ‘apparatuses’, ignoring the active role of embodied agents in these practices and eliding the difference between texts which prescribe ways of acting and the more messy and complex reality of those ways of acting. (shrink)

This article seeks to identify, theoretically,some broad ethical issues about the type ofspace which the Internet is becoming, issueswhich are closely linked to developing newagendas for empirical research into Internetuse. It seeks to move away from the concept of''digital divide'' which has dominated debate inthis area while presuming a rather staticnotion of the space which the Internet is, orcould become. Instead, it draws on deliberativedemocracy theory in general and John Dryzek''sconcept of ''discursive design'' in particular toformulate six types of issue (...) (Convergence, WhoConverges?, Deliberation, Public Action,Relations to the State, and Long-term Patternsof Practice) around which both empiricalresearch and ethical debate can focus, andwhich taken together will help answer whetherthe Internet is, or can be, in part a''discursive design'' which contributes to theconditions of democratic public life. (shrink)

The latter part of the twentieth century saw the Chinese economy moving towards a socialist market economy rather than a planned system. Despite growing interest in Chinese business ethics, little work has examined ethical issues concerning the Chinese sales force. This study draws from existing work on Chinese and Western business and sales ethics to develop hypotheses regarding the perceptions of unethical selling behaviour of modern Chinese salespeople. A survey of Chinese sales executives is conducted and statistically analysed. Results are (...) compared with those reported in previous US-based research with regard to differences in perceptions of unethical selling behaviour. The results indicate that contemporary Chinese salespeople were more favourably disposed than expected towards unethical selling behaviour, and also more favourably disposed than previously studied US salespeople. Younger Chinese salespeople evaluated unethical behaviours more favourably than older ones. The results are discussed, along with implications for theory, practice and future work. (shrink)

Prior literature on ethical concerns in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has often concluded that many stakeholders, such as workers and communities, have unjustly suffered as a result of takeovers and associated defences and that their rights as stakeholders have been violated. However, very few papers provide any guidance on how to evaluate a merger or acquisition from an ethical standpoint. This study looks at how ethical frameworks could be used to assess the ethical impact of a merger or acquisition and (...) gives practical guidance. It is proposed that decision makers should consider the impact on four stakeholder groups: shareholders, employees, customers and directors. We call the proposed method for doing this Partial Utilitarian analysis. We suggest two possible ways of applying the Partial Utilitarian analysis. One approach could rely on the evidence from a sample of recent deals. For this, empirical analysis is conducted on a sample of large M&As in the United Kingdom in the period 1993–2003. Alternatively, a better approach, requiring considerable management time, requires forecasting of the economic impact on the four groups of stakeholders. The paper shows how to do this. (shrink)

The adaptive landscape is one of the most widely used metaphors in evolutionary biology. It is created by plotting fitness against phenotypes or genotypes in a given environment. The shape of the landscape is crucial in predicting the outcome of evolution: whether evolution will result in populations reaching predictable end points, or whether multiple evolutionary outcomes are more likely. In a more applied sense, the landscape will determine whether organisms will evolve to lose ‘costly’ resistance to antibiotics, herbicides or pesticides (...) when the use of the control agent is stopped. Laboratory populations of microbes allow evolution to be observed in real time and, as such, provide key insights into the topology of adaptive landscapes. BioEssays 27:1167–1173, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Cummins (this issue) puts the case for an innate module for deontic reasoning. We argue that this case is not persuasive. First, we claim that Cummins’evolutionary arguments are neutral regarding whether deontic reasoning is learned or innate. Second, we argue that task differences between deontic and indicative reasoning explain many of the phenomena that Cummins takes as evidence for a deontic module. Third, we argue against the suggestion that deontic reasoning is superior to indicative reasoning, either in adults or children. (...) Finally, we re‐evaluate Cummins’interpretation of differences in children's performance on deontic and indicative versions of Wason's selection task. (shrink)

Modal statements are about what could have been: Hitler could have won World War II; I could have been a fisherman; The speed of light could have been twice as fast as it actually is; Swans could have been black; It’s impossible for there to be round squares; Necessarily, 2+2=4. Modal statements also include counterfactual statements: Scientific: If the speed of light were faster, atomic explosions would be more deadly; Ethical: If you hadn’t have made the deceased play on the (...) motorway, he would’ve lived; Everyday: If I hadn’t have gone out last I wouldn’t have a hangover. Modal statements can cover a variety of different types of modality: Logical Possibility: It’s logically possible for me to grow wings and fly to New York; Physical Possibility: It’s physically impossible to grow wings and fly to New York; Economic Possibility: It’s impossible for me to fly to New York. (shrink)

La dimension mythique ou simplement rituelle est présente dans le système économique, et ne peut être occultée puisqu'elle fonde sa plausibilité et sa légitimité. Ce court article cherche à expliciter la relation entre deux facteurs : d'une part, un mouvement pressant vers une économie de plus en plus appuyée sur le «travail émotionnel » des salariés, qui, de plus, méprise le statut du travail d'autre part, les performances émotionnelles et les mises en scène rituelles des programmes de téléréalité. Je suggère (...) en effet que de tels programmes, Big Brother ou Loft Story, sont un « théâtre secret» de la sphère économique néolibérale, où des jeux ritualisés normalisent les aptitudes requises dans une économie où le travail est toujours plus flexible: la passion, l'engagement émotionnel, l'adaptabilité individuelle, un mélange de conformité au groupe et d'ambition personnelle...Si la téléréalité cache cette «économie morale» du capitalisme, c'est que ce discours cesserait d'être effectif au moment où il deviendrait apparent.Or simply the mythic ritual is present in the economic system, and can not be ignored since it bases its plausibility and legitimacy. This short article seeks to clarify the relationship between two factors: firstly, a pressing movement to an economy increasingly relied on the "emotional labor" employees, which, moreover, despise the status of work on the other hand, performance and emotional ritual staged reality programs. I indeed suggests that such programs, Big Brother or Big Brother, is a "secret theater" of neoliberal economic sphere, where ritualized games standardize the skills needed in an economy where work is increasingly flexible: passion, 'emotional engagement, individual adaptability, a mixture of group conformity and personal ambition ... If the reality behind this "moral economy" of capitalism is that this speech would cease to be effective when it becomes apparent. (shrink)

This article describes and analyses the social network of key actors involved in the `inner circle' of the early UK punk movement in London. It is argued that the network and its structural properties are important if we wish to explain both the emergence of the movement and certain key conflicts within it. The article is empirically based and utilizes the methods of formal social network analysis. A further argument of the paper is that the concept of networks and these (...) formal methods for analysing them are both important for a sociological analysis of culture and cultural movements in particular. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess Dickie's institutional theory of art. I compare the earlier and later forms of the theory, and I point to various problems of detail with these accounts. I then proceed by arguing that Dickie's definition excludes Krispy Kreme doughnut boxes from possessing the status of being works of art, and it excludes those who made them from possessing the status of being artists. The intention is not to offer a counter example to Dickie's account. Rather, the (...) complaint is that there could be no philosophical point or interest in a concept of art which excludes these doughnut boxes. The best way to see this is by contrast with a concept of art that includes them. Thus I outline what I call a ‘creative’ account. What we want is a concept of art which helps us understand a certain phenomenon in the world – the phenomenon that we call ‘art’. In this light, I argue that Dickie's institutional theory tells us nothing about why people want to make art and nothing about why they want to experience it. By contrast, the creative theory, which embraces both doughnut boxes and things in galleries, is more explanatory. (shrink)

I distinguish two different arguments against cognitivism in Bernard Williams’ writings on moral dilemmas. The first turns on there being a truth of the matter about what we ought to do in moral a dilemma. That argument can be met by appealing to our epistemic shortcomings and to pro tanto obligations. However, those responses make no headway with the second argument which concerns the rationality of the moral regret that we feel in dilemma situations. I show how the rationality of (...) moral regret can be explained on an ‘independent desire’ model. And I show how Williams’ second argument only appears to have force because of a certain faulty way of conceiving of the issue over cognitivism. But Williams’ argument rightly alerts us to the rational role of desire in our moral thought. (shrink)

I ask four questions: (1) Why should we think that our hominid ancestor's predation is not just a causal influence but the main causal factor responsible for human cruelty? (2) Why not think of human cruelty as a necessary part of a syndrome in which other phenomena are necessarily involved? (3) What definitions of cruelty does Nell propose that we operate with? And (4) what about the meaning of cruelty for human beings?

This commentary on Professor Kasher's and General Yadlin's article employs a bit of violence. It transforms and broadens some of the ideas presented in their article. I argue that committing these acts of violence are justified because, if their article is left as written, it is difficult to tell at what point the Kasher/Yadlin (K/Y) theory corresponds with just war theory and at what points it does not. This commentary alters K/Y theory, and alters classical just war theory as well, (...) so as to place the two theories in parallel as much as possible. Once the alterations are complete, it becomes more evident that the two theories share much in common. What also becomes more evident is that the two theories differ in important respects since the one deals with conventional war and the other with unconventional (asymmetric) war. The differences vindicate Kasher's and Yadlin's claim that it is necessary to spend time to re-think just war theory, especially when dealing with terrorism. (shrink)

I develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non-ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non-ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.

Our paradigms of aesthetic value condition the philosophical questions we pose and hope to answer about it. Theories of aesthetic value are typically individualistic, in the sense that the paradigms they are designed to capture, and the questions to which they are offered as answers, center the individual’s engagement with aesthetic value. Here I offer some considerations that suggest that such individualism is a mistake and sketch a communitarian way of posing and answering questions about the nature of aesthetic value.

We begin by showing that every theory of the value of uncertain prospects must have one of three unpalatable properties. _Reckless_ theories recommend giving up a sure thing, no matter how good, for an arbitrarily tiny chance of enormous gain; _timid_ theories permit passing up an arbitrarily large potential gain to prevent a tiny increase in risk; _non-transitive_ theories deny the principle that, if A is better than B and B is better than C, then A must be better than (...) C. Having set up this trilemma, we study its horns. Non-transitivity has been much discussed; we focus on drawing out the costs and benefits of recklessness and timidity when it comes to axiology, decision theory, and normative uncertainty. (shrink)

According to agent-centered virtue ethics, acting well is not a matter of conforming to agent-independent moral standards, like acting so as to respect humanity or maximize utility. Instead, virtuous agents determine what is called for in their circumstances through good practical reason. This is an attractive view, but it requires a plausible account of how good practical reason works. To that end, some theorists invoke the skill model of virtue, according to which virtue involves essentially the same kind of practical (...) reason as ordinary skills. I contend, however, that ordinary skills provide a plausible and informative model of good practical reason only insofar as they are assessed by agent-independent standards. And so virtue, likewise, must be assessed primarily by agent-independent moral standards, if the skill model is to serve its purpose. I consider how agent-centered virtue ethics might avert this dilemma. But I ultimately suggest proceeding a different way. (shrink)

Thinking in Education Research examines the resources available from philosophy and theory that can be practically applied to any educational research project. Nick Peim argues that the current well-established divide between theory and the empirical in research methods is unhelpful to students. Instead, Thinking in Education Research looks at major lines of thinking in modern European philosophy, from Kant to Freud and Derrida to Malabou, and how they provide a rich resource for every stage of conducting research. By getting (...) students engaged in 'how to think' and 'how to do', Peim illustrates that thinking is in fact a vital part of how you do research and is not an aside. Essential aspects of the research endeavour are re-examined in the light of key philosophical positions to offer constructive potential, including: defining the object; giving an account of the field; the relation to truth; the process of writing and constructing a case; and the value attributed to formal knowledge. Thinking in Education Research does not try to resolve the unresolved issues of research thinking but rather encourages readers to productively engage with them so that we can enhance the possibilities of research practice and find opportunities for its expansion and refinement. Throughout the chapters, clear and concise summaries of key philosophical positions and ideas are complemented with boxed accounts of how the philosophical debates discussed can be applied to real research projects. These features encourage the reader to consider how they can develop thinking and apply theory at every stage of their own research. This is essential reading for any educational research methods student or practicing researcher for important ways of thinking afresh about research methodology"--Publisher's description. (shrink)

With very advanced technology, a very large population of people living happy lives could be sustained in the accessible region of the universe. For every year that development of such technologies and colonization of the universe is delayed, there is therefore a corresponding opportunity cost: a potential good, lives worth living, is not being realized. Given some plausible assumptions, this cost is extremely large. However, the lesson for standard utilitarians is not that we ought to maximize the pace of technological (...) development, but rather that we ought to maximize its safety, i.e. the probability that colonization will eventually occur. This goal has such high utility that standard utilitarians ought to focus all their efforts on it. Utilitarians of a ‘person-affecting’ stripe should accept a modified version of this conclusion. Some mixed ethical views, which combine utilitarian considerations with other criteria, will also be committed to a similar bottom line. (shrink)

Accounts of aesthetic valuing emphasize two constraints on the formation of aesthetic belief. We must form our own aesthetic beliefs by engaging with aesthetic value first-hand (the acquaintance principle) and by using our own capacities (the autonomy principle). But why? C. Thi Nguyen’s proposal is that aesthetic valuing has an inverted structure. We often care about inquiry and engagement for the sake of having true beliefs, but in aesthetic engagement this is flipped: we care about arriving at good aesthetic beliefs (...) for the sake of the values that arise in the process of doing so. The engagement is the point, so we must use our own capacities in first-hand encounters. Here I challenge Nguyen’s account. I argue that it misconstrues the value of aesthetic belief; it conflicts with restrictions on aesthetic testimony; and it has trouble harnessing engagement-value for a theory of aesthetic value. A better approach emphasizes the social character of aesthetic valuing. On this view, aesthetic valuing is a social practice structured around the collaborative exercise and improvement of certain special capacities. The autonomy and acquaintance principles tell us to engage these capacities in forming our aesthetic beliefs. Understood aright, and contrary to consensus, these rules are identical. (shrink)

A Global Catastrophic Risk is one that has the potential to inflict serious damage to human well-being on a global scale. This book focuses on such risks arising from natural catastrophes, nuclear war, terrorism, biological weapons, totalitarianism, advanced nanotechnology, artificial intelligence and social collapse.