This paper presents a reflective account of my teaching practice with health practitioners who work as school nurses in the secondary education system in regional Victoria, Australia. It highlights some of the issues and dilemmas that emerged during my experiences, as a social work educator, facilitating workshops about critically reflective learning as a cross-disciplinary enterprise. Using critical reflection, this paper also raises questions regarding how we might respond to some of the challenges to improve future approaches to teaching critical reflection.

The diagnosis of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder is a subject of controversy, for a host of reasons. This paper seeks to explore the manner in which children's interests may be subsumed to those of parents, teachers, and society as a whole in the course of diagnosis, treatment, and labeling, utilizing a framework for children's citizenship proposed by Elizabeth Cohen. Additionally, the paper explores aspects of discipline associated with the diagnosis, as well as distributional pathologies resulting from the application of the diagnosis (...) in potentially biased ways. (shrink)

Healthcare systems across the globe are struggling with increasing costs and worsening outcomes. This presents those responsible for overseeing healthcare with a challenge. Increasingly, policymakers, politicians, clinical entrepreneurs and computer and data scientists argue that a key part of the solution will be ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI) – particularly Machine Learning (ML). This argument stems not from the belief that all healthcare needs will soon be taken care of by “robot doctors.” Instead, it is an argument that rests on the classic (...) counterfactual definition of AI as an umbrella term for a range of techniques that can be used to make machines complete tasks in a way that would be considered intelligent were they to be completed by a human. Automation of this nature could offer great opportunities for the improvement of healthcare services and ultimately patients’ health by significantly improving human clinical capabilities in diagnosis, drug discovery, epidemiology, personalised medicine, and operational efficiency. However, if these AI solutions are to be embedded in clinical practice, then at least three issues need to be considered: the technical possibilities and limitations; the ethical, regulatory and legal framework; and the governance framework. In this article, we report on the results of a systematic analysis designed to provide a clear overview of the second of these elements: the ethical, regulatory and legal framework. We find that ethical issues arise at six levels of abstraction (individual, interpersonal, group, institutional, sectoral, and societal) and can be categorised as epistemic, normative, or overarching. We conclude by stressing how important it is that the ethical challenges raised by implementing AI in healthcare settings are tackled proactively rather than reactively and map the key considerations for policymakers to each of the ethical concerns highlighted. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo evaluate the relationship between recently trained paediatricians' ethics knowledge and exposure to a formal ethics or professionalism curriculum during residency.MethodsWe conducted a cross-sectional survey of recently trained paediatricians which included a validated 23-item instrument called the Test of Residents' Ethics Knowledge for Pediatrics. The sample included paediatricians who completed medical school in 2006–2008, whose primary specialty was paediatrics or a paediatric subspecialty, and who completed paediatric residency training in 2010–2011. This sample was stratified based on residency programme variables: presence (...) of a formal curriculum in ethics or professionalism, programme size and American Board of Pediatrics certifying exam passage rate. Paediatricians were randomly selected from each stratum for survey participation.ResultsAmong the 370 responding paediatricians (55%), the mean knowledge score was 17.3 (SD 2.2) out of a possible 23. Presence of a formal curriculum in ethics and/or professionalism was not significantly associated with knowledge. Knowledge was lowest on items about parental requests for a child to undergo genetic testing (2 items, 44% and 85% incorrect), preserving patient confidentiality over email (55% incorrect), decision-making regarding life-sustaining technologies (61% incorrect), and decision-making principles such as assent and parental permission (2 items, 47% and 49% incorrect).ConclusionsThis study highlights several areas in which paediatricians' knowledge may be low and that are amenable to targeted educational interventions. These findings should prompt discussion and research among ethicists and educators about how ethics and professionalism curricula can more consistently influence paediatricians' knowledge. (shrink)

Health-care professionals in end-of-life care are frequently confronted with patients who seem to be ‘ambivalent’ about treatment decisions, especially if they express a wish to die. This article investigates this phenomenon by analysing two case stories based on narrative interviews with two patients and their caregivers. First, we argue that a respectful approach to patients requires acknowledging that coexistence of opposing wishes can be part of authentic, multi-layered experiences and moral understandings at the end of life. Second, caregivers need to (...) understand when contradictory statements point to tensions in a patient’s moral experience that require support. Third, caregivers should be careful not to negatively label or even pathologize seemingly contradictory patient statements. (shrink)

"Pop'philosophie" : si l'on en croit la morgue méprisante que ce simple mot provoque, il s'agirait du nom d'une étrange maladie. Celle d'une philosophie se prostituant aux industries culturelles ou, pire, aux sirènes du populisme. Avec la pop' philosophie, on assisterait à la ruine de la philosophie tout court, devenue tantôt gadget pédagogique, tantôt tentative pathétique de capitaliser sur le glamour frelaté de la pop culture. Et si c'était faux? Pour Gilles Deleuze, en tout cas, rien n'était plus important que (...) l'invention d'une pop'philosophie qui sauverait la pensée de la correction professorale et de la pontification esthétique. Inventer une pensée véritablement anarchiste, enterrant la philosophie pour l'ouvrir à des devenirs inédits : tel était l'objectif qu'il donna au concept de pop'philosophie. Rien n'était moins simple ni plus ambitieux. Il est temps de comprendre en quoi."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Since 1986 Darwin College, Cambridge has organised a series of annual public lectures built around a single theme approached in a multi-disciplinary way. These essays were developed from the 2008 lectures, which explored the idea of serendipity – the relationship between good fortune and the preparation of the mind to spot and exploit it. Serendipity is an appealing concept, and one which has been surprisingly influential in a great number of areas of human discovery. The essays collected in this volume (...) provide insightful and entertaining accounts of the relationship between serendipity and knowledge, in the human and natural sciences. Written by some of the most eminent thinkers of this generation, Serendipity explores a variety of subjects, including disease, politics, scientific invention and the art of writing. This collection will fascinate and inspire a wide range of readers, highlighting the multifaceted nature of the popular, but elusive, concept of serendipity. -/- Contents: Introduction. Fortune and the prepared mind Iain Morley and Mark de Rond; 1. The stratigraphy of serendipity Susan E. Alcock; 2. Understanding humans - serendipity and anthropology Richard Leakey; 3. HIV and the naked ape Robin Weiss; 4. Cosmological serendipity Simon Singh; 5. Serendipity in astronomy Andrew C. Fabian; 6. Serendipity in physics Richard Friend; 7. Liberalism and uncertainty Oliver Letwin; 8. The unanticipated pleasures of the writing life Simon Winchester. (shrink)

The article explores the underlying reasons for patients’ self‐perception of being a burden (SPB) in family settings, including its impact on relationships when wishes to die (WTD) are expressed. In a prospective, interview‐based study of WTD in patients with advanced cancer and non‐cancer disease (organ failure, degenerative neurological disease, and frailty) SPB was an important emerging theme. In a sub‐analysis we examined (a) the facets of SPB, (b) correlations between SPB and WTD, and (c) SPB as a relational phenomenon. We (...) analyzed 248 interviews with 62 patients, their family caregivers, and professionals using grounded theory and interpretive phenomenological analysis. SPB appeared as important empathic concern in care situations. Patients expressed many sorts of concerns for others, but also perceived an altered self‐understanding that did not meet mutual expectations within relationships. In SPB associated with WTD three constellations were found: (a) WTD to unburden others; (b) patients decided against hastening death to prevent being a further burden to others (in these cases, the SPB counteracted the wish to die); and (c) both wishes for and against dying were sustained by SPB. These patients often felt paralyzed and suffered deeply. Family caregivers felt emotionally touched by SPB and tried to unburden patients by caring and compassion. We concluded that the impact of SPB on a WTD and the various meanings the facets of SPB have in balancing relationships need to be worked out individually. An early palliative and narrative approach is warranted. (shrink)

We show that if T is a trivial uncountably categorical theory of Morley Rank 1 then T is model complete after naming constants for a model.

In light of scientific advances such as genomics, predictive diagnostics, genetically engineered agriculture, nuclear transfer cloning, and the manipulation of stem cells, the idea that genes carry predetermined molecular programs or blueprints is pervasive. Yet new scientific discoveries—such as rna transcripts of single genes that can lead to the production of different compounds from the same pieces of dna—challenge the concept of the gene alone as the dominant factor in biological development. Increasingly aware of the tension between certain empirical results (...) and interpretations of those results based on the orthodox view of genetic determinism, a growing number of scientists urge a rethinking of what a gene is and how it works. In this collection, a group of internationally renowned scientists present some prominent alternative approaches to understanding the role of dna in the construction and function of biological organisms. Contributors discuss alternatives to the programmatic view of dna, including the developmental systems approach, methodical culturalism, the molecular process concept of the gene, the hermeneutic theory of description, and process structuralist biology. None of the approaches cast doubt on the notion that dna is tremendously important to biological life on earth; rather, contributors examine different ideas of how dna should be represented, evaluated, and explained. Just as ideas about genetic codes have reached far beyond the realm of science, the reconceptualizations of genetic theory in this volume have broad implications for ethics, philosophy, and the social sciences. Contributors. Thomas Bürglin, Brian C. Goodwin, James Griesemer, Paul Griffiths, Jesper Hoffmeyer, Evelyn Fox Keller, Gerd B. Müller, Eva M. Neumann-Held, Stuart A. Newman, Susan Oyama, Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, Sahotra Sarkar, Jackie Leach Scully, Gerry Webster, Ulrich Wolf. (shrink)

Experiments with the simple pendulum are easy, but its motion is nevertheless confounded with simple harmonic motion. However, refined theoretical models of the pendulum can, today, be easily taught using software like CALCODE. Similarly, the cycloidal pendulum is isochronous only in simplified theory. But what are theoretically equal intervals of time? Newton accepted Barrow’s even tenor hypothesis, but conceded that ‘equal motions’ did not exist – the refutability of Newtonian physics is independent of time measurement. However, time measurement was the (...) key difficulty in reconciling Newtonian physics with electrodynamics. On Poincaré’s criterion of convenience, equal intervals of time ought be so defined as to make the enunciation of physics simple. Hence he postulated constancy of the speed of light. (The Michelson–Morley experiment was not critical.) The theory of relativity followed. But does there exist a proper clock? (shrink)

Fifty or sixty years ago anyone fluttering the pages of one of the many magazines which then catered for the cultivated and intelligent English reader would have been fairly certain to come upon an article bearing somewhat the same title as that of the present paper. The author would probably be an eminent scientist, such as Huxley or Clifford; a distinguished scholar, such as Frederic Harrison or Edmund Gurney; or a politician of cabinet rank, such as Gladstone or Morley. (...) Whichever side he might take, he would write with the moral fervour of which Englishmen at that time had an inexhaustible supply. Nowadays the so-called “conflict between Religion and Science,” which was then appetizingly hot from the oven, has acquired something of the repulsiveness of half-cold mutton in halfcongealed gravy. There seems to be a widespread opinion that Sir Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans, with some highly technical and not readily intelligible assistance from Professor Whitehead, have enabled the lion to lie down with the lamb. Well, I have no wish to pipe a discordant note in this scene of Messianic harmony. But I cannot help reflecting that psychology, anthropology, and psychical research have made considerable advances as well as mathematical physics; and that they seem prima facie much more likely to be relevant to religion. Even the ordinary common sense of the lawyer and the historian may still have something useful to say on such topics. (shrink)

A sequel to Nineteenth Century Studies, this book is a series of well-documented studies of several Victorian religious liberals--among them Tennyson, John Morley, and Francis Newman. Willey's theme is the religious disillusionment suffered by Victorian intellectuals; he sees as its cause the application of the techniques of historical scholarship to religion. Since the book is largely biographical, there is little consideration of the issues involved on their own accounts; but as a gallery of intellectual portraits, it is first-rate--sympathetic, sensitive, (...) perceptive.--A. C. P. (shrink)

Sir—In their editorial, Hall, Carter & Morley [1] present an incorrect interpretation of my central argument. The point of my paper [2] is that there are solid reasons to suspect that the capacity of heroin addicts to consent to heroin therapy is compromised because of their addiction. As one medical commentator on my paper states, if active heroin addicts can give voluntary and competent consent to heroin therapy without any problems, then we need a new conceptualization of addiction: they (...) are not addicted, almost by definition [3]. Yet obviously there are problems and grey zones. The solution is to investigate the issue empirically in order to determine the extent of the problem. (As we have done for consent to research on depression and other mental illnesses.) Ultimately, the question can only be solved on a case by case basis, using standardized assessment tools adapted for this purpose. The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool (MaCAT‐T) is the particular assessment tool I chose to discuss. [4] It is the most promising candidate available, and it has proved its merits in the areas of depression and schizophrenia. -/- At no point do I condemn heroin therapy and endorse an abstinence model of treatment, as the authors state. On the contrary, I note the success of heroin therapy and make suggestions about how to facilitate the consent process. Ironically, it may be Hall et al . who have oversimplified the issues. What we need here are empirical studies on the decisional capacity of heroin addicts to consent to heroin therapy. Only then will we be able to refute the naive view they have no ‘free will’, or say how much they have; but really my paper is not about ‘free will’ at all. This is a philosophical concept. The topic I chose to discuss is ‘decisional capacity’, also called ‘mental competence’. This is a clinical concept with complex legal and ethical associations that often vary across jurisdictions. My point was that although the Swiss Heroin Trials were approved in Europe, they probably would not be approved in Canada or the United States under existing regulations. Interested readers might want to consider the wide variety of reactions to my paper, published in the same issue [5]. Unfortunately, the editorial by Hall et al . does little to advance this debate. (shrink)

In scientific explanations, the explanans theory is sometimes incommensurable with the explanandum empirical data. How is this possible, especially when the explanation is deductive in nature? This paper attempts to solve the puzzle without relying on any particular theory of reference. For us, it is rather obvious that the geometric idea of projection plays a key role in Keplers explanation of Tycho Brahes empirical data. We discover that a similar mechanism operates in theoretic explanations in general. In short, all theoretic (...) explanations are projective explanations. If so, there should be no logical reason why explanans theories cannot be incommensurable with explanandum data. For illustration, we analyse Einsteins explanation of the results of the Michelson–Morley experiment in some detail. (shrink)

We know quite a lot about the general structure of ω-stable solvable centerless groups of finite Morley rank. Abelian groups of finite Morley rank are also well-understood. By comparison, nonabelian nilpotent groups are a mystery except for the following general results:• An ω1-categorical torsion-free nonabelian nilpotent group is an algebraic group over an algebraically closed field of characteristic 0 [Z3].• A nilpotent group of finite Morley rank is the central product of a definable subgroup of finite exponent (...) and of a definable divisible subgroup [N3].• A divisible nilpotent group of finite Morley rank is the direct product of its torsion part (which is central) and of a torsion-free subgroup [N3].However, we do not understand nilpotent groups of bounded exponent. It seems that the classification of nilpotent (but nonabelian)p-groups of finite Morley rank is impossible. Even the nilpotent groups of Morley rank 2 contain insurmountable difficulties [C], [T]. At first glance, this may seem to be an obstacle to proving the Cherlin-Zil'ber conjecture (“simple groups of finite Morley rank are algebraic groups”). Our purpose in this article is to show that if such a group is a definable subgroup of a nonnilpotent group, then it is possible to obtain a classification within the boundaries of our present knowledge. In this respect, our article may be considered as a relief to those who are trying to classify simple groups of finite Morley rank.Before explicitly stating our result, we need the following definition. (shrink)

The Alperin-Goldschmidt Fusion Theorem [1, 5], when combined with pushing up [7], was a useful tool in the classification of the finite simple groups. Similar theorems are needed in the study of simple groups of finite Morley rank, in the even type case (that is, when the Sylow 2-subgroups are of bounded exponent, as in algebraic groups over fields of characteristic 2). In that context a body of results relating to fusion of 2-elements and the structure of 2-local subgroups (...) is needed: pushing up, and the classification of groups with strongly or weakly embedded subgroups, or have strongly closed abelian subgroups (c.f, [2]). Two theorems of Alperin-Goldschmidt type are proved here. Both are needed in applications.The following is an exact analog of the Alperin-Goldschmidt Fusion Theorem for groups of finite Morley rank, in the case of 2-elements:Theorem 1.1.Let G be a group of finite Morley rank, and P a Sylow2-subgroup of G.If A, B⊆P are conjugate in G, then there are subgroups Hi≤Pand elementsxi∈N(Hi)for1 ≤i≤n,and an elementy∈N(P),such that for all i:1.Hiis a tame intersection of two Sylow2-subgroups;2.CP(Hi) ≤Hi;3.N(Hi)/Hiis2-isolatedand(a)(b). (shrink)

Tim Blanning & Hagen Schulze: IntroductionJames Sheehan: Art and its Publics, c. 1800Silke Leopold: The Idea of National Opera around 1800John Deathridge: The Invention of German Music, c. 1800Peter Alter: Playing with the Nation: Napoleon and the Culture of NationalismSiegfried Weichlein: Cosmopolitanism, Patriotism, NationalismPeter Mandler: Art in a Cool Climate: The Cultural Policy of the British State in European Context, c. 1780- c. 1850Otto Dann: The Invention of National LanguagesHans-Erich Bödeker: The Debates about Universal History and National History around 1800: (...) A Problem-oriented Historical AttemptVincent Morley: Views of the Past in Irish Vernacular Literature, 1650-1850. (shrink)

We prove the following extension of a result of Keisler and Morley. Suppose U is a countable model of ZFC and c is an uncountable regular cardinal in U. Then there exists an elementary extension of U which fixes all ordinals below c, enlarges c, and either (i) contains or (ii) does not contain a least new ordinal. Related results are discussed.

The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes a robust (...) argument for scientific realism akin to the argument that convinced twentieth-century physical scientists of the existence of atoms and molecules. To do justice to such notions as irreducibly statistical laws and statistical explanation, he offers a novel account of physical randomness. The transition from the "reviewed view" of scientific explanation to the causal/mechanical model requires fundamental rethinking of basic explanatory concepts. (shrink)

In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his theory in such (...) a way that it will fit in the modern biology and psychology, which are becoming increasingly physicalistic. (shrink)

In this paper we construct a non-CM-trivial stable theory in which no infinite field is interpretable. In fact our theory will also be trivial and ω-stable, but of infinite Morley rank. A long term aim would be to find a nonCM-trivial theory which has finite Morley rank (or is even strongly minimal) and does not interpret a field. The construction in this paper is direct, and is a “3-dimensional” version of the free pseudoplane. In a sense we are (...) cheating: the original point of the notion ofCM-triviality was to describe the geometry of a strongly minimal set, or even of a regular type. In our example, non-CM-triviality will come from the behaviour of three orthogonal regular types.A stable theory is said to beCM-trivial if wheneverA⊆Band acl(Ac) ∩ acl(B) = acl(A) inTeq, then Cb(stp(c/A)) ⊆ Cb(stp(c/B)). ( An infinite stable field will not beCM-trivial.) The notion is due to Hrushovski [3], where he gave several equivalent definitions, as well as showing that his new strongly minimal sets constructed “ab ovo” wereCM-trivial. The notion was studied further in [6] where it was shown thatCM-trivial groups of finite Morley rank are nilpotent-by-finite. These results were generalized in various ways to the superstable case in [8]. (shrink)

We propose a new picture of nature in which there are only two fundamental universal constantsè ē (≡e/c) andh(≡ħ/c). Our theory is developed within the framework of a new four-dimensional symmetry which is constructed on the basis of the Poincaré-Einstein principle of relativity for the laws of physics and the Newtonian concept of time. We obtain a new space-light transformation law, a velocity-addition law, and so on. In this symmetry scheme, the speed of light is constant and is completely relative. (...) The new theory is logically self-consistent, and it moreover is in agreement with all previously established experimental facts, such as the “lifetime dilatation” of unstable particles, the Michelson-Morley experiment, etc. There is a difference relative to the usual theory, though, in that our theory predicts a new law for the Dopplerfrequency shift, which can be tested experimentally by measuring the second-order frequency shift. (shrink)

Let D be a strongly minimal set in the language L, and $D' \supset D$ an elementary extension with infinite dimension over D. Add to L a unary predicate symbol D and let T' be the theory of the structure (D', D), where D interprets the predicate D. It is known that T' is ω-stable. We prove Theorem A. If D is not locally modular, then T' has Morley rank ω. We say that a strongly minimal set D is (...) pseudoprojective if it is nontrivial and there is a $k < \omega$ such that, for all a, b ∈ D and closed $X \subset D, a \in \mathrm{cl}(Xb) \Rightarrow$ there is a $Y \subset X$ with a ∈ cl(Yb) and |Y| ≤ k. Using Theorem A, we prove Theorem B. If a strongly minimal set D is pseudoprojective, then D is locally projective. The following result of Hrushovski's (proved in $\S4$ ) plays a part in the proof of Theorem B. Theorem C. Suppose that D is strongly minimal, and there is some proper elementary extension D1 of D such that the theory of the pair (D1, D) is ω1-categorical. Then D is locally modular. (shrink)

Summary This paper analyses documents from several US archives in order to examine the controversy that raged within the US scientific community over Dayton C. Miller's ether-drift experiments. In 1925, Miller announced that his repetitions of the famous Michelson-Morley experiment had shown a slight but positive result: an ether-drift of about 10 kilometres per second. Miller's discovery triggered a long debate in the US scientific community about the validity of Einstein's relativity theories. Between 1926 and 1930 some researchers repeated (...) the Michelson-Morley experiment, but no one found the same effect as Miller had. The inability to confirm Miller's result, paired with the fact that no other ether theory existed that could compete with special relativity theory, made his result an enigmatic one. It thus remained of little interest to the scientific community until 1954, when Robert S. Shankland and three colleagues reanalysed the data and proposed that Miller's periodic fringe shift could be attributed to temperature effects. Whereas most of the scientific community readily accepted this explanation as the conclusion of the matter, some contemporary anti-relativists have contested Shankland's methodology up to now. The historical accounts of Miller's experiments provide contradictory reports of the reaction of the US scientific community and do not analyse the mechanisms of the controversy. I will address this shortcoming with an examination of private correspondence of several actors involved in these experiments between 1921 and 1955. A complex interconnection of epistemic elements, sociological factors, and personal interests played a fundamental role in the closure of this experimental controversy in the early 1930s, as well as in the reception of Shankland's reanalysis in the 1950s. (shrink)

What is post-truth? -- Science denial as a road map for understanding post-truth -- The roots of cognitive bias -- The decline of traditional media -- The rise of social media and the problem of fake news -- Did post-modernism lead to post-truth? -- Fighting post-truth.

_Rhetoric_ is the sixth volume in The New Hackett Aristotle series, a series featuring translations, with Introductions and Notes, by C. D. C. Reeve, Delta Kappa Epsilon Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The series will eventually include all of Aristotle's works.

After reviewing the foundations of special relativity and the room left for rival theories, a set of nonrelativistic para-Lorentzian transformations is derived uniquely, based on (a) a weaker first principle, (b) the requirement that the transformations sought do not give rise to the clock “paradox” (in a refined version), and (c) the compliance of the transformations with the classical experiments of Michelson-Morley, Kennedy-Thorndike, and Ives-Stilwell. The corresponding dynamics is developed. Most of the experimental support of special relativity is reconsidered (...) in the light of the new theory. It is concluded that the relativity of simultaneity has so far not been tested. (shrink)

In our papers on the rationality of magic, we distinghuished, for purposes of analysis, three levels of rationality. First and lowest (rationalitYl) the goal directed action of an agent with given aims and circumstances, where among his circumstances we included his knowledge and opinions. On this level the magician's treatment of illness by incantation is as rational as any traditional doctor's blood-letting or any modern one's use of anti-biotics. At the second level (rationalitY2) we add the element of rational thinking (...) or thinking which obeys some set of explicit rules, a level which is not found in magic in general, though it is sometimes given to specific details of magical thinking within the magical thought-system. It was the late Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard who observed that when considering magic in detail the magician may be as consistent or critical as anyone else; but when considering magic in general, or any system of thought in general, the magician could not be critical or even comprehend the criticism. Evans-Pritchard went even further: he was sceptical as to whether it could be done in a truly consistent manner: one cannot be critical of one's own system, he thought. On this level (rationalitY2) of discussion we have explained (earlier) why we prefer to wed Evans Pritchard's view of the magician's capacity for piece-meal rationality to Sir James Frazer's view that magic in general is pseudo-rational because it lacks standards of rational thinking. (shrink)

Borovik proposed an axiomatic treatment of Morley rank in groups, later modified by Poizat, who showed that in the context of groups the resulting notion of rank provides a characterization of groups of finite Morley rank [2]. (This result makes use of ideas of Lascar, which it encapsulates in a neat way.) These axioms form the basis of the algebraic treatment of groups of finite Morley rank undertaken in [1].There are, however, ranked structures, i.e., structures on which (...) a Borovik-Poizat rank function is defined, which are not ℵ0-stable [1, p. 376]. In [2, p. 9] Poizat raised the issue of the relationship between this notion of rank and stability theory in the following terms: “… ungroupede Borovik est une structure stable, alors qu'un univers rangé n'a aucune raison de l'être …” (emphasis added). Nonetheless, we will prove the following:Theorem 1.1.A ranked structure is superstable.An example of a non-ℵ0-stable structure with Borovik-Poizat rank 2 is given in [1, p. 376]. Furthermore, it appears that this example can be modified in a straightforward way to give ℵ0-stable structures of Borovik-Poizat rank 2 in which the Morley rank is any countable ordinal (which would refute a claim of [1, p. 373, proof of C.4]). We have not checked the details. This does not leave much room for strenghthenings of our theorem. On the other hand, the proof of Theorem 1.1 does give a finite bound for the heights of certain trees of definable sets related to unsuperstability, as we will see in Section 5. (shrink)

The flowering of creative and speculative philosophy that emerged in modern Europe--particularly in Germany--is a thrilling adventure story as well as an essential chapter in the history of philosophy. In this integrative narrative, Solomon provides an accessible introduction to the major authors and movements of modern European philosophy, including the Enlightenment and Romanticism, Rousseau, German Idealism, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and the Romantics, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Max Brentano, Meinong, Frege, Dilthey, Bergson, Nietzsche, Husserl, Freud, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, hermeneutics, Sartre, Postmodernism, Structuralism, (...) Foucault, and Derrida. (shrink)