This study compares cognitive and emotional responses to 360-degree vs. static (2D) videos in terms of visual attention, brand recognition, engagement of the prefrontal cortex, and emotions. Hypotheses are proposed based on the interactivity literature, cognitive overload, advertising response model and motivation, opportunity, and ability theoretical frameworks, and tested using neurophysiological tools: electroencephalography, eye-tracking, electrodermal activity, and facial coding. The results revealed that gaze view depends on ad content, visual attention paid being lower in 360-degree FMCG ads than in 2D (...) ads. Brand logo recognition is lower in 360-degree ads than in 2D video ads. Overall, 360-degree ads for durable products increase positive emotions, which carries the risk of non-exposure to some of the ad content. In testing four ads for durable goods and fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) this research explains the mechanism through which 360-degree video ads outperform standard versions. (shrink)

What is the meaning of perestrojka? There is no doubt that it led to the end of the Cold War and had a huge impact on the international situation. Nevertheless, there is no consensus as to the outcomes of perestrojka. Perestrojka brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union. This fact might be interpreted positively: it opened the possibility to restore historical truth and to create independent democratic states. From another perspective, it can be conceived negatively as a destruction of (...) the integrity of the Soviet Union and the loss of a part of the territory as well as the economy of Russia (according to the President of the Gorbačev Foundation, Viktor Kuvaldin, during the conference “Revisiting Perestroika—Processes and Alternatives”). Perestrojka has no one definite general meaning, but it has a very specific one for Lithuania. In this paper I ask: What is the meaning of perestrojka for contemporary Lithuania and for post-Soviet life? Was perestrojka a failure or a success? I approach perestrojka from a moral point of view, suggesting that the perestrojka made possible a fundamental choice between several alternatives. Once the choice was made the specificity of future goals and evaluation of the past opened up. I concentrate on the moral value of the act of accommodation (and resistance) to the Soviet regime, on the conflict of values represented by the “nation’s own” and the goodness of the political order, and on the role of freedom and determinism in history. Immanuel Kant’s conception of duty and the categorical imperative is used as a model for the analysis of the situation of choice. (shrink)

What is the meaning of perestrojka? There is no doubt that it led to the end of the Cold War and had a huge impact on the international situation. Nevertheless, there is no consensus as to the outcomes of perestrojka. Perestrojka brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union. This fact might be interpreted positively: it opened the possibility to restore historical truth and to create independent democratic states. From another perspective, it can be conceived negatively as a destruction of (...) the integrity of the Soviet Union and the loss of a part of the territory as well as the economy of Russia · Perestrojka has no one definite general meaning, but it has a very specific one for Lithuania. In this paper I ask: What is the meaning of perestrojka for contemporary Lithuania and for post-Soviet life? Was perestrojka a failure or a success? I approach perestrojka from a moral point of view, suggesting that the perestrojka made possible a fundamental choice between several alternatives. Once the choice was made the specificity of future goals and evaluation of the past opened up. I concentrate on the moral value of the act of accommodation to the Soviet regime, on the conflict of values represented by the "nation's own" and the goodness of the political order, and on the role of freedom and determinism in history. Immanuel Kant's conception of duty and the categorical imperative is used as a model for the analysis of the situation of choice. (shrink)

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics had a profound influence on generations of later philosophers, not only in the ancient era but also in the medieval period and beyond. In this book, Anthony Celano explores how medieval authors recast Aristotle's Ethics according to their own moral ideals. He argues that the moral standard for the Ethics is a human one, which is based upon the ethical tradition and the best practices of a given society. In the Middle Ages, this human standard (...) was replaced by one that is universally applicable, since its foundation is eternal immutable divine law. Celano resolves the conflicting accounts of happiness in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, demonstrates the importance of the virtue of phronesis, and shows how the medieval view of moral reasoning alters Aristotle's concept of moral wisdom. (shrink)

Celano’s book focuses on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and thirteenth-century scholastic appropriations of it. Its objectives are to unravel the inconsistencies in Aristotle’s accounts of eudaimonia, to establish the prominence of phronesis, and to reveal alterations of Aristotle’s phronesis in medieval moral thought. Celano’s textual analyses are laborious, and some features of his story may be considered stimulating insights. His construal of phronesis as primary to Aristotle’s moral conception, his emphasis on Albert’s contribution to medieval moral thought, and (...) his inclusion of the largely uncharted anonymous Erfurt commentary... (shrink)

THE heterogeneity of the good--its division into the moral good, as virtue, and the natural good, as happiness--is central to Kant's philosophy. In order to clarify and sustain this division, Kant was compelled to specify the valuational characteristics of each kind of good and their relation to one another. But in trying to analyze the good in its heterogeneity Kant faced a terminological difficulty. He could no longer speak simply of "the good" without speaking ambiguously. To avoid this ambiguity (...) Kant decided to refer to the moral good by the term "das Gute," and to the natural good by the term "das Wohl," to moral evil by the term "das Böse," and to natural evil by the term "das Übel." This attempt at linguistic reform was not successful, however, for at least two reasons. First, Kant did not carry his reform of the language far enough. And second, Kant seriously underestimated and quickly fell victim to the power of common usage. The force of linguistic habit, both personal and social, and the wisdom inherent in common usage opposed the adoption of his terminology. (shrink)

In this profound and yet accessible book, John Kekes discusses moral wisdom: a virtue essential to living a morally good and personally satisfying life. He advances a broad, nontechnical argument that considers the adversities inherent in the human condition and assists in the achievement of good lives. The possession of moral wisdom, Kekes asserts, is a matter of degree: more of it makes lives better, less makes them worse. Exactly what is moral wisdom, however, (...) and how should it be sought? Ancient Greek and medieval Christian philosophers were centrally concerned with it. By contrast, modern Western sensibility doubts the existence of a moral order in reality; and because we doubt it, and have developed no alternatives, we have grown dubious about the traditional idea of wisdom. Kekes returns to the classical Greek sources of Western philosophy to argue for the contemporary significance of moral wisdom. He develops a proposal that is eudaimonistic—secular, anthropocentric, pluralistic, individualistic, and agonistic. He understands moral wisdom as focusing on the human effort to create many different forms of good lives. Although the approach is Aristotelian, the author concentrates on formulating and defending a contemporary moral ideal. The importance of this ideal, he shows, lies in increasing our ability to cope with life's adversities by improving our judgment. In chapters on moral imagination, self-knowledge, and moral depth, Kekes calls attention to aspects of our inner life that have been neglected because of our cultural inattention to moral wisdom. He discusses these inner processes through the tragedies of Sophocles, which can inspire us with their enduring moral significance and help us to understand the importance of moral wisdom to living a good life. (shrink)

St. Thomas Aquinas has always considered intelligence a potency higher than the will, absolutely speaking. That being said, and in my view, the existential primacy of the will in the act of freedom (particularly in choosing the existential end) is also indisputably Thomistic, as Cornelio Fabro has shown. This paper endeavors to explain Aquinas' doctrine on the absolute primacy of the intellect and thus show that these two primacies can be affirmed coherently, that is, the intellect’s absolute primacy and the (...) will’s existential primacy. Firstly, I will explain the reasoning St. Thomas Aquinas uses in the Summa to justify the absolute primacy of the intellect over the will. Secondly, I will explore some parallel texts, in order to shed light on my interpretation of the Summa and expand our view regarding this and related doctrinal points. Thirdly, I will offer a brief study of Fabro’s position, one in which his concerns regarding the intellect’s absolute primacy are taken into account and carefully considered. (shrink)

David Errington brings the Book of Proverbs into discussion with two significant accounts of the nature and foundation of practical reason in Christian ethics: Thomas Aquinas and Oliver O'Donovan. Aiming to set out a coherent account of the structure of Christian moral reasoning, this book provides the first scholarly engagement with Oliver O'Donovan's moral theology. Errington argues that the way the Book of Proverbs conceives of wisdom presents an important challenge to the way practical reason has been (...) understood in the Western theological and philosophical tradition, and that instead a perfection of speculative knowledge, wisdom in the Book of Proverbs is a practical knowledge of how to act well, grounded in the reality of the world God has made. (shrink)

Being questioned about the nature of Christian faith, Mark Twain famously declared it as 'believing what you know ain't so'. Indeed, the role of reason for faith is a matter of dispute. Jesus, some argue, was not a philosopher or a teacher of wisdom. Rather, he is the saviour because of his unassuming sacrificial death and resurrection. Not reason, but the leap of faith is the ultimate condition of salvation. The Enlightenment however epitomises a Copernican revolution in favour of (...) reason. According to Charles Taylor, the dissemination of Jesus' message into Hellenistic culture contains within itself the risk of a secularisation of the faith. At the same time, voices opposing the overemphasis of reason have also been raised throughout the ages. Paul's speech to the Athenians was one such occasion that deals with the ambiguous relationship between faith and reason. Relying purely on divine grace and the Bible alone, Martin Luther rejected any form of speculative theology. According to the Reformer, it is a type of theology that trusts more in human reason than in God's revelation. In Luther's opinion, it also reverses the moral order because theological speculation justifies evil as good while professing as good what is evil. To such a theology of human glory, Luther prefers a theology of the cross that 'calls the thing what it actually is'. For the former Augustinian monk only God's grace is good beyond reasonable doubt. Hence true theologians are lovers of the cross while theologians of glory misuse their reason for the worst. Luther's theology of the cross, Marco Barone claims, has its root in Augustine. Hence, Luther's Augustinism appears to have decidedly broken with Aristotelian scholasticism. In this context, Thomas Aquinas was criticised for his threefold failure. First, the Dominican friar's speculative theology lacks an experiential human dimension. Secondly, it gives too much credit to Aristotle. Thirdly, Thomas is reprimanded for his serious deficiency of a theology of justification. (shrink)

Aristotle presents his Nicomachean Ethics and Politics as an ordered pair comprising political science (hê politikê epistêmê), suggesting an axiomatic structure of theorems that are demonstratively deduced from first principles. He holds that this systematic knowledge of ethical and legislative matters provides the ‘universals’ essential to phronesis or practical wisdom, and that its acquisition begins in sound habituation. Aristotle thereby assigns habituation an epistemic role that must be understood in light of his account of the nature of a science. (...) This paper argues that what would be inductively established by, or on the basis of, sound habituation is the supposition that the natural kind of activity constitutive of living well exists; it establishes the supposition on which Aristotle’s definition of a eudaimon life rests. Having addressed this central interpretive issue, the paper sketches a psychologically grounded position on the substantive philosophical questions at stake. Are there natural signs of flourishing and failure to flourish present to us in our experience of attempts to live well? If such signs exist but are not sufficient to qualify ethical beliefs as knowledge in their own right, might they play a role in a science of what is good and bad for human beings? (shrink)

A common line of thought in contemporary metaethics is that certain facts about the evolutionary history of humans make moral realism implausible. Two of the most developed evolutionary cases against realism are found in the works of Richard Joyce and Sharon Street. In what follows, I argue that a form of moral realism that I call proper-function moral realism can meet Joyce and Street's challenges. I begin by sketching the basics of proper-function moral realism. I then (...) present what I take to be the essence of Street's and Joyce's objections, and I show how proper-function realism answers them. (shrink)

Wisdom is almost always associated with doing the right thing in the right way under right circumstances in order to achieve the common good. In this paper, however, we propose that wisdom is more associated with deciding between better and worse wrongs; a winless situation we define as tragic. We suggest that addressing the tragic question is something that leaders and managers generally avoid when focusing on business decisions and choices. Yet, raising and confronting the tragic question is (...) important for three main reasons. Firstly, it emphasises that wisdom is about recognising that doing the ethically responsible thing can sometimes lead to acting in ways that violate different ethical norms and values. Secondly, it foregrounds the issue of emotional perception in ethical decision-making. We argue that emotions are salient in directing attention to the tragic question and recognising morally ambiguous situations. Thirdly, the tragic question has important consequences for moral learning, accepting moral culpability for wrongdoing and organisational commitment to righting the wrong. We illustrate our arguments by drawing on three mini-cases: Arjuna’s dilemma in the Mahabharata, Gioia’s deliberations about his role in the Ford Pinto fires and the production of the abortion pill by French company Roussel-Uclaf. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Wisdom Calls: The Moral Story of the Hebrew Bible by Paul LewisTherese LysaughtWisdom Calls: The Moral Story of the Hebrew Bible Paul Lewis MACON, GA: NURTURING FAITH, 2017. 99 pp. $18.00Paul Lewis invites us into a thought experiment: What can we discern about moral development from a "naive" reading of the Hebrew Scriptures as narrative, starting at Genesis and working our way through to (...) Chronicles? If we remove our presuppositions and eisegesis, ossified through centuries of familiarity, and read the stories at face value, what can we discern about character, virtue, and moral development via the human protagonists as well as God? In this book aimed at undergraduates and faith-seeking adults, Lewis provides an accessible introduction to both scripture and ethics, as well as a creative endeavor at the interface.Using an eclectic hermeneutical approach, Lewis offers a fresh reading of the Hebrew Scriptures. Fundamental to his thesis are two points. First, even though the Hebrew Scriptures are made up of a variety of texts in different genres written by different authors over almost a millennium, at some point, they were collated into the canonical, three-part sequence (Law, Prophets, and Writings—the Tanakh, TNK) by redactors who shaped the collection with a particular directionality. Pivotal to this process was the Babylonian Exile, which Lewis considers a crucial lens for reading a narrative arc across the collection. Second, he reminds Christian readers that the structure and sequence of texts in the Christian "Old Testament" differs from that of the Jewish TNK. As a result, "TNK and Old Testament, by the way they order the documents that make them up, thus tell different stories" (9).Lewis walks the reader through a series of ordered reflections on the three main sections of the Hebrew Scriptures. From Genesis to Chronicles, he charts a shift toward increasing moral complexity, finding in this narrative "a story of moral development" that begins with the need for and establishment of rules or laws (Torah—chap. 2), moves to the discernment of principles at the heart of the laws (Prophets—chap. 3), and culminates with a vision of wisdom captured in the multifaceted and sometimes conflicting texts in the Writings (chap. 4), complete with a controversial yet intriguing interpretation of Job. Wisdom, in his reading of these texts, is the practical skill needed to interpret the laws, rules, and principles of the tradition with the nuance necessary for the ever-changing sociocultural context of the "hard, cruel world" in which the Jews of ancient Palestine found themselves. [End Page 204]The book culminates with chapter 5, titled "Wisdom Calls," where he brings the multilayered Wisdom tradition (chochmah, in Hebrew) into conversation with the Aristotelian tradition of virtue and practical wisdom (phronesis), finding the analog for Aristotle's endpoint of eudaimonia in the Hebraic vision of shalom. Shalom is "the goal toward which wisdom strives and the good that it seeks to achieve" (p. 73). In a short appendix, he also brings chochmah into conversation with contemporary developments in the moral psychology of wisdom, drawing on the work of Darcia Narvaez and scholars at the Max Planck Institute, among others.Lewis's reading brings the Hebrew Scriptures alive, reminding us how wonderfully messy, interesting, and complicated its characters and stories are. By way of critique, one might ask: Can one read a scriptural text too naively? At points, this reader wished for a bit more historical-critical interpretation as a way of enhancing the conclusions being drawn. Integration of the material on the moral psychology of wisdom into the final chapter, rather than as an appendix, would also have been welcome. In the end, Wisdom Calls provides an engaging starting point for students and congregations.Therese LysaughtLoyola University ChicagoCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Nearly 30 years ago, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons published a now- popular article that combines Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario with G.E. Moore’s open question argument in an effort to show that moral naturalism – the view that moral facts are at bottom ordinary, natural facts of some sort – is probably false. Responses to Horgan and Timmons’s “revised open question argument” have been legion, but surprisingly, no one has attempted to test the core assumption upon which (...) the argument is based; namely, that competent language users univocally treat natural kind-terms as rigid designators. Here, I present evidence that the intuitions of competent English speakers are not as univocal as Horgan and Timmons need them to be to ground their argument against moral naturalism. I also briefly sketch a way that the moral naturalist can respond even if competent language speakers do treat natural-kind terms in the way that Horgan and Timmons suggest. (shrink)

The thesis provides the first systematic study of Denkungsart as a central conception of Immanuel Kant's philosophy. It argues that this notion, together with the intrinsically related terms, Gesinnung and Vernunftglaube , constitutes the connecting thread of Kant's thought, one that establishes that Kant is first and foremost a moral philosopher. On the grounds of this central problem of the Kantian corpus--the quest for a morally good Denkungsart--Kant is shown to be a moral philosopher in the Socratic sense (...) of asserting the primacy of practical wisdom and a moral philosopher who faces unflinchingly the problem of evil in its most radical sense as one finds it in the Christian tradition. ;The study provides a new perspective for reading and understanding Kant; it articulates the broader moral framework--the form and content of the morally good Denkungsart--in terms of which Kant's pure moral philosophy and what has come to be called his "virtue ethics" are connected. On the basis of this new perspective for reading Kant, the study seeks to disarm and dissolve many of the stereotypical views of Kant found in the scholarship. ;The study begins with a synoptic presentation of the eighteenth century philosophical dialogue in which the term, Denkungsart, first emerges. Defining this context provides the background for appreciating what is at stake in Kant's inquiry into a morally good Denkungsart and for understanding the formulation which Kant gives to his question. Having outlined how Kant's writings constitute a reply to his philosophical milieu, the study investigates three specific issues in his early philosophical reflections--the distinction of laws of nature and moral law, the "problem of nature," and the problem of freedom for moral good--on the basis of which the moral question of Denkungsart arises for Kant. The articulation of the conception of Denkungsart consists of three parts: the form and matter of the morally good Denkungsart and the analysis of Vernunftglaube as the consummation of the morally good Denkungsart. (shrink)

Nearly 30 years ago, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons published a now- popular article that combines Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario with G.E. Moore’s open question argument in an effort to show that moral naturalism – the view that moral facts are at bottom ordinary, natural facts of some sort – is probably false. Responses to Horgan and Timmons’s “revised open question argument” have been legion, but surprisingly, no one has attempted to test the core assumption upon which (...) the argument is based; namely, that competent language users univocally treat natural kind-terms as rigid designators. Here, I present evidence that the intuitions of competent English speakers are not as univocal as Horgan and Timmons need them to be to ground their argument against moral naturalism. I also briefly sketch a way that the moral naturalist can respond even if competent language speakers do treat natural-kind terms in the way that Horgan and Timmons suggest. (shrink)

This paper explored the linkages among moral imagination, systems understanding, and aesthetic sensibility as related to the emergence (eventually) of wisdom. I develop a conceptual framework that links these capacities to wisdom through the capacity to “see” moral and ethical issues, which I argue is related to “the good”, to see a realistic understanding of systems in which the observer is embedded, or “the true”, and to appreciate the aesthetic qualities associated with a system or situation, (...) or “the beautiful”. The relationship between the good, the true, and the beautiful is used to argue that all three types of seeing are building blocks for achievement of wisdom. The paper then briefly explores some of the ways that these capacities can potentially be incorporated into the classroom. (shrink)

For many years, researchers and practitioners have sought out meaningful indicators of sales performance. Yet, as the concept of performance has broadened, the understanding of what makes up a successful seller, has become far more complicated. The complexity of buyer-seller relationships has changed therefore as the definition of sales performance has expanded, cultivating a growing interest in ethical/unethical actions since they could potentially have impacts on sales performance. Given this environment, the purpose of this study is to explore the impact (...) of moral judgment on sales performance and sellers engaging in a customer-oriented selling approach. Specifically, by utilizing a sample of 345 business-to-business salespeople, this study examines the relationships between moral judgment, customer-oriented selling, and outcome and behavior based performance. Results, managerial implications, and opportunities for future research are provided. (shrink)

This paper explored the linkages among moral imagination, systems understanding, and aesthetic sensibility as related to the emergence (eventually) of wisdom. I develop a conceptual framework that links these capacities to wisdom through the capacity to “see” moral and ethical issues, which I argue is related to “the good”, to see a realistic understanding of systems in which the observer is embedded, or “the true”, and to appreciate the aesthetic qualities associated with a system or situation, (...) or “the beautiful”. The relationship between the good, the true, and the beautiful is used to argue that all three types of seeing are building blocks for achievement of wisdom. The paper then briefly explores some of the ways that these capacities can potentially be incorporated into the classroom. (shrink)

The work of the French Lithuanian Jewish philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, describes a perceptive rethinking of the possibility of concrete acts of goodness in the world, a rethinking never more necessary than now, in the wake of the cruel realities of the twentieth century—ten million dead in the First World War, forty million dead in the Second World War, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the Soviet gulags, the grand slaughter of Mao’s “Great Leap Forward,” the pointless and gory Vietnam War, the Cambodian self-genocide (...) and many an attempted extermination from the face of the earth of entire nations of indigenous peoples. The list of horrors goes on and on—daily holocausts that do not distinguish between the civilian and the soldier, the guilty and the innocent, those deserving of life and those less deserving. (shrink)

When making decisions, humans can observe many kinds of information about others' activities, but their effects on performance are not well understood. We investigated social learning strategies using a simple problem-solving task in which participants search a complex space, and each can view and imitate others' solutions. Results showed that participants combined multiple sources of information to guide learning, including payoffs of peers' solutions, popularity of solution elements among peers, similarity of peers' solutions to their own, and relative payoffs from (...) individual exploration. Furthermore, performance was positively associated with imitation rates at both the individual and group levels. When peers' payoffs were hidden, popularity and similarity biases reversed, participants searched more broadly and randomly, and both quality and equity of exploration suffered. We conclude that when peers' solutions can be effectively compared, imitation does not simply permit scrounging, but it can also facilitate propagation of good solutions for further cumulative exploration. (shrink)

Introduction: The purpose, perspective, and method of this volume -- Part 1. Love and sexuality: True and false promises. Ch.1. True and false promises of happiness and freedom ; Ch.2. True and false promises of the homosexual lifestyle, pornography, gender change, and artificial birth control -- Part 2. Matters of life and death. Ch. 3. Abortion, eugenics, invitro fertilization and embryonic stem cells ; Ch. 4. Physician assisted suicide, euthanasia, self-defense and torture -- Part 3. Charity and social ethics. Ch. (...) 5 Honesty, charity, and the need for objective moral norms ; Ch. 6. How Christ and the Catholic Church transformed the world: institutions of charity and principles of social ethics ; Ch. 7. The social teaching of the Catholic Church -- Conclusion to the trilogy: reevangelizing the culture. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Practical Wisdom and Moral Imagination in Sense and SensibilityKaren StohrThere is no single virtue more important to Aristotle's ethical theory than the intellectual virtue of phronesis, or practical wisdom. Yet for all its importance, it is not easy to make sense of this virtue, either in Aristotle's own writings or in virtue ethics more generally. Insofar as Aristotle defines it, he does so opaquely, saying it (...) is "a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being." 1Practical wisdom is a form of knowledge aimed fundamentally at acting well. It requires both a general understanding of what is worthwhile in human life and the ability to act in ways that reflect that understanding. 2 My goal in this paper is to explore the latter aspect of practical wisdom in its application to ordinary social behavior. The circumstances that will interest me here are often thought to be the domain of manners or decorum, rather than morals proper. Although no one who takes Hume seriously can deny the moral significance of manners, the relationship between one's inner state of character and how that character is expressed in seemingly mundane behavior has received insufficient attention from moral philosophers. 3 In such a task, there can be few better places to begin than with Jane Austen, whose novels reveal the intricacies of ordinary moral behavior with extraordinary acumen.I shall use Austen's Sense and Sensibility to examine the skill associated with knowing how to behave rightly in the sense we associate with propriety or decorum. This skill is essential to pleasant social life, and hence, on the Aristotelian view, to human flourishing. Yet it is often lacking, even among those who have sound moral principles and good hearts. Well-meaning people frequently say or do what is inappropriate. [End Page 378] Consider, for instance, how common it is for kindly disposed people to say to bereaved friends things like, "it's all for the best" or "be thankful for your other healthy children" or "you're young, you'll marry again." The intricacies of offering sympathy are hard to get right, and otherwise good people can unwittingly leave behind disasters in their wakes.The skill of acting well in complex social situations has interesting links to the capacity for moral imagination. Engaging in imaginative identification with others is essential to empathy. 4 Without suggesting that empathy is at the root of all fluid social interactions, I shall argue that certain characteristic failures to act well in that sphere are imaginative failures. In other words, insofar as the exercise of practical wisdom is present in the realm of manners, it requires moral imagination.Failures of moral imagination, however, can take different forms and have different social effects. I shall use two of Austen's characters in Sense and Sensibility—Marianne Dashwood and Mrs. Jennings—to illustrate different ways in which inadequate imaginative capacity can impede the exercise of practical wisdom. The contrast I shall draw is with Elinor Dashwood, to whom I ascribe practical wisdom in full. 5 This contrast is especially interesting because it is not always very sharp: all three characters have fundamentally good moral principles and warm hearts. Yet unlike Elinor, Mrs. Jennings and Marianne routinely fail to act well, and in characteristic ways. Despite the differences in their characters, they have in common an inability to use moral imagination appropriately. The moral errors of Marianne and Mrs. Jennings occur in relatively insignificant circumstances, but the errors themselves point to something deeper about how the virtue of practical wisdom functions in ordinary moral practice.In exploring the link between moral imagination and moral practice, it will help to remember Aristotle's emphasis on the reciprocity between practical wisdom and the moral virtues. Aristotle held that that practical wisdom is necessary for the exercise of the moral virtues and that conversely, the moral virtues are necessary for the exercise of practical wisdom. 6 The justification for the first of these two claims is clearest in the context of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Since what counts as a virtuous action depends on features... (shrink)

Practice wisdom is needed because the challenges people face in life, work and society are not simple and require more than knowledge, actions and decision making capabilities. In professional practice wisdom enhances people's capacity to succeed and evolve and to assist their clients in achieving positive, relevant and satisfying outcomes. Practice Wisdom: Values and Interpretations brings diverse views and interpretations to an exploration of what wisdom in professional practice means and can become: academically, practically and inspirationally. (...) The authors reflect on core dimensions of practice wisdom like ethics, mindfulness, moral virtue, particularisation and metacognition. The chapter authors tackle the trials that practice wisdom seekers encounter including the demand for resilience, perseverance, finding credibility and humility in practice wisdom, and linking wisdom into evidence for sound professional decision making. Readers are invited to consider what the place of practice wisdom encompasses in pursuing good practice outcomes amidst the turmoil and pressure of professional practice today. Do the imperatives of evidence-based practice and accountability leave enough space for wise practice or is wisdom seen by modern practice worlds as unnecessary, antiquated, unrealistic and redundant? Without a doubt these questions are answered positively in this book in support of the place and value of practice wisdom in professional practice today. (shrink)

Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently provided an updated presentation and defense of a metaethical view that they call cognitivist expressivism. Expressivists claim that moral judgments express propositional attitudes that do not represent or describe the external world. Horgan and Timmons agree with this claim, but they also deny the traditional expressivist claim that moral judgments do not express beliefs. On their view, moral judgments are genuine, truth-apt beliefs, thus making their form of expressivism a cognitivist (...) one. In this essay, I argue that Horgan and Timmons have failed to demonstrate that moral judgments express sui generis, nondescriptive content by showing that at least some moral content is descriptive. In addition, I show how the descriptivist can account for those properties that Horgan and Timmons consider distinctive of moral belief. In doing so, I remove one of the expressivist's most important lines of motivation for positing nondescriptive moral content in the first place. At the end of the essay, I briefly sketch a view that I call partial or modest moral realism. (shrink)

© The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] Olson's Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence has four aims. First, the book aims to provide a historical background to the development of moral error theory prior to its appearance in Mackie's article, ‘A Refutation of Morals.’ Secondly, it provides a critical look at four different versions of the (...) queerness argument. Olson contends that only one of them, the argument from irreducible normativity, succeeds. Thirdly, the book defends both moral error theory and its epistemic analogue against recent criticisms. Finally, it articulates and defends an approach to moral thought and language that Olson calls moral conservationism. In brief, moral conservationism is the view that one can continue to believe false moral claims because it is useful... (shrink)

Contemporary moral philosophers have produced an enormous amount of rich and varied published work on virtually all the issues falling within the scope of ethics and moral philosophy. Morality and the Good Life is a comprehensive survey of contemporary ethical theory that collects thirty-four selections on morality and the theory of value. Emphasizing value theory, metaethics, and normative ethics, it is non-technical and accessible to a wide range of readers. Selections are organized under six main topics: Concepts of (...) Goodness What Things are Good? Virtues and Ethics Realism vs. Anti-Realism Value and Obligation The Value and Meaning of Life The text includes both a substantial general introduction featuring explanatory summaries of all the selections and an extensive topical bibliography, which enhance the volume's research and pedagogical utility. The most up-to-date and wide-ranging survey of its kind, Morality and the Good Life is ideal for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in contemporary ethical theory, moral philosophy, and theory of value. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy pays little explicit attention to the concept of ‘wisdom’ in its taxonomy of the functions of human reason in its work of rendering intelligible the world and the human place in the world. On the basis of some crucial texts in Kant’s writings, this essay argues that wisdom has a role to play in the task Kant assigns to practical reason; this task is to make the world in which humans dwell intelligible morally, i.e., (...) to make sense of the world as locus in which good and evil take form in function of the exercise of human freedom. In such a world, the function of wisdom is ‘cosmopolitan’ in that it provides a horizon of a social hope that recognizes human solidarity, vulnerability, and otherness, as signal instances of the inclusive moral relationality necessary for sustaining both an ‘outer’ world order for peace and the ‘inner’ dynamic of full moral relationality that Kant terms ‘the ethical commonwealth’. (shrink)

In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic view.

This article attempts to understand and develop the morality of everyday activities in organizations. Aristotle’s concept of phronesis, practical wisdom, is utilized to describe the morality of the everyday work activities at two call centres of an Australian insurance company. The ethnographic data suggests that ethical judgements at the lower level of the organization are practical rather than theoretical; emergent rather than static; ambiguous rather than clear-cut; and particular rather than universal. Ethical codes are of limited value here and (...) it is argued that by developing phronesis members of the organization can improve their capacity to deal with this ethical complexity. (shrink)

In a recent issue of this journal, Jorn Sonderholm presents two main criticisms of my 2008 case for a diachronic view of base property exemplification in metaethics. This essay contends that neither of Sonderholm’s criticisms hit their mark, and that there are additional reasons to adopt a diachronic view of base property exemplification. Thus, the case for a diachronic view of base property exemplification in metaethics is stronger than previously thought.

In this essay, I examine the three theoretical virtues most commonly discussed in relation to the origins debate and propose some difficulties for their application to the issue. I then consider additional conceptual problems which appear to indicate that adjudicating the origins debate involves, among other things, philosophical considerations which are often logically prior to and in some ways more important than an examination of the empirical data per se. Given these and other factors, I conclude that there is no (...) good reason why we should not let relevant considerations from disciplines outside the sciences influence the origin of life debate when appropriate. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a remarkable resurgence of interest in classical conceptions of what it means for human beings to lead a good life. Although the primary focus of the return to classical thought has been Aristotle's account of virtue, the ethics of Aquinas has also received much attention. Our understanding of the integrity of Aquinas's thought has clearly benefited from the recovery of the ethics of virtue.Understood from either a natural or a supernatural perspective, the good life (...) according to Aquinas involves the exercise not just of the moral virtues, but also of the intellectual virtues. Following Aristotle, Aquinas divides the intellectual virtues into the practical, which have either doing (prudence) or making (art) as an end, and the theoretical or speculative, which are ordered to knowing for its own sake (understanding, knowledge, and wisdom). One of the intellectual virtues, namely, prudence has received much recent attention. With few exceptions, however, contemporary discussions of Aquinas ignore the complex and nuanced relationships among, and comparisons between, the different sorts of intellectual virtue. Even more striking is the general neglect of the speculative, intellectual virtues and the role of contemplation in the good life.In Virtue's Splendor Professor Hibbs seeks to overcome this neglect, approaching the ethical thought of Thomas Aquinas in terms of the great debate of antiquity and the Middle Ages concerning the rivalry between the active and the contemplative lives, between prudence and wisdom as virtues perfective of human nature. In doing so, he puts before the reader the breadth of Aquinas's vision of the good life. (shrink)

This paper considers W.E.B. Du Bois’s short story, “Jesus Christ in Texas,” in the perspective of his analysis of the concept of beauty in Darkwater (1920); his exposition of the idea that “all art is propaganda” in “Criteria of Negro Art” (1926); and his moral psychology of white supremacy. On my account, Du Bois holds that beautiful art can help to undermine white supremacy by using representations of moral goodness to expand the white supremacist’s ethical horizons. To (...) defend this thesis, he relies on an image of “the cross and the lynching tree” to revise imagery that he draws from Albrecht Dürer’s 1504 painting, “The Adoration of Kings.”. (shrink)

Vedānta has two meanings. The first is the literal sense – “End of Vedas” – and refers to the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads—the latter part of the Vedas. The second sense of “Vedanta” is a scholastic one, and refers to a philosophical orientation that attempts to explain the cryptic Vedānta Sūtra (Brahma Sūtra) of Bādarāyaṇa, which aims at being a summary of the End of the Vedas. In the previous module, I review the ethics of the End of the Vedas and (...) explicate the Moral Irrealism of Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta, which is articulated as a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra. In this module, I compare Rāmānuja (Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta) and Madhva's (Dvaita Vedānta) account of the Vedānta Sūtra. Both are moral realists. They differ on the room for freedom given the necessity of moral considerations. One value of the Vedānta approach to ethics is that it provides a non-speciesist framework to think about ethics. It allows us to understand ourselves (ātmā) and our interest in Development (Brahman) as conceptually distinct, though identical in some manner. The Advaita view is that this identity is strict. The Dvaita approach is that Development realises the results of choices of individuals, but only some, owing to their good character, are capable of taking advantage of this for their betterment. The Viśiṣṭādvaita approach of Rāmānuja suggests in contrast that each self is a microcosm of reality. Reality is Development – the genus of individual selves. Each self has Development as an essential trait, but owing to past choices (karma), this is poorly understood. Things change when the individual self understands Brahman to be its true self, for then an individual can re-direct their efforts from procuring results to self-governance by treating the personal essence of the Development (the Lord) as the explanation for improvement. (shrink)

Practical wisdom enables moral decision-making and action by aligning one’s apprehension of proximate goods with a distal, socially embedded interpretation of a more ultimate Good. A focus on purpose within the overall process mutually informs human moral psychology and moral AI development in their examinations of practical wisdom. AI practical wisdom could ground an AI system’s apprehension of reality in a sociotechnical moral process committed to orienting AI development and action in light of (...) a pluralistic, diverse interpretation of that Good. Defining AI purpose in terms of the human struggle to determine the moral “ought” (versus the way reality is) can overcome practical and normative limitations of principle-based approaches to AI ethics without requiring idiosyncratic moral reasoning or a premature commitment to a single ethical theory, which could hinder navigating the moral implications of future unknowns. Dividing practical wisdom into proximate, mediating, and distal processes enables each division to incorporate the moral dimensions of the situation, individual AI system, and sociotechnical community, respectively. Drawing upon externalist (4E) and ecological cognitive psychology theories to extend Xavier Zubiri’s sentient intelligence, proximate apprehension of what an object affords the perceiver includes affordances for practical and moral purposes. Those apprehensions are structured by moral and other social-cognitive schemas that mediate moral constructs, the apprehended situation, and individual commitments and other motivating identifications in a process Ignacio Ellacuria calls historical reality. Distally, Josiah Royce’s community of interpretation characterizes one way of organizing a sociotechnical process to synthesize diverse interpretations of the Good, orient AI moral practice, and align AI development with human and AI moral purpose. (shrink)