We argue that in extensive decision problems (extensive games with a single player) with imperfect recall care must be taken in interpreting information sets and strategies. Alternative interpretations allow for different kinds of analysis. We address the following issues: 1. randomization at information sets; 2. consistent beliefs; 3. time consistency of optimal plans; 4. the multiselves approach to decision making. We illustrate our discussion through an example that we call the ‘‘paradox of the absentminded driver.’’ Journal of Economic Literature Classification (...) Numbers: C7, D0. 1997 Academic Press. (shrink)

Ringraziamo Michele Bertolini per averci permesso di riprodurre il suo testo. Esso è sato pubblicato per la prima volta nella rivista De Musica, V, 2001. Introduzione Nell'opera di Raymond Bayer , uno dei protagonisti dell'estetica francese di ispirazione realistico-formale e cofondatore insieme a Lalo e Souriau della Revue d'esthétique nel 1948, la riflessione specifica sulla musica e sul sentimento estetico della natura occupa un posto importante ma certamente non esclusivo - Musique et Musicologie – GALERIE – Nouvel article.

Science and philosophy still lack an overarching theory of consciousness. We suggest that a further step toward it requires going beyond the view of the brain as input-output machine and focusing on its intrinsic activity, which may express itself in two distinct modalities, i.e. aware and unaware. We specifically investigate the predisposition of the brain to evaluate and to model the world. These intrinsic activities of the brain retain a deep relation with consciousness. In fact the ability of the brain (...) to evaluate and model the world can develop in two modalities, implicit or explicit, that correspond to what we usually refer to as the unconscious and consciousness, and both are multilevel configurations of the brain along a continuous and dynamic line. Starting from an empirical understanding of the brain as intrinsically active and plastic, we here distinguish between higher cognitive functions and basic phenomenal consciousness, suggesting that the latter might characterize the brain’s intrinsic activity as such, even if at a very basic level. We proceed to explore possible impacts of the notion of intrinsic cerebral phenomenality on our understanding of consciousness and its disorders, particularly on the diagnosis and management of patients with disorders of consciousness. (shrink)

This essay articulates two heterodox approaches to the political realm: normativity and governmentality, and it applies this theoretical framework to postcolonial societies. Through a close reading of the work of some well-known postcolonial scholars, such as Partha Chatterjee and Ranabir Samaddar, the essay offers a sketch of what it proposes to call the «normativity of the governed». The ethnographic description of both public authorities and social actors in postcolonial contexts sheds light on a peculiar dimension of political negotiation. One that (...) is forged by the “governed” through a strategic use of those very same discourses and practices, mainly legal, that governmental powers use in order to rule. In the end, the coupling of anthropology and normativity allows for a fresh and more comprehensive critique of the political itself. (shrink)

In this paper I take up the question of the nature of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while inquiring into some matter. Relying on a distinction between two stages of open inquiry, I urge to acknowledge the existence of a distinctive attitude of cognitive inclination towards a proposition qua answer to the question one is inquiring into. I call this attitude “hypothesis”. Hypothesis, I argue, is a sui generis doxastic attitude which differs, both functionally and normatively, from suspended judgement, full (...) belief, credences, and acceptance. In closing, I point to the epistemological significance of hypothesis. More specifically, I contend that holding an attitude of hypothesis enables us to respond rationally to peer disagreement, and I suggest that such an attitude offers a suitable articulation of the view, originally put forward by Philip Kitcher, that cognitive diversity in inquiry has epistemic benefits. (shrink)

This project places at its center the urgency for a more responsive organ transplant policy in the United States. It studies how relationships and affinity affiliations motivate intimate exchanges, including human biological markets. Specifically, the article considers whether affinity relationships might serve as a platform in the domain of organ transplantation and if so, whether the law should tolerate discriminatory behavior in the human biologics realm. In defining affinity relationships, the article speaks primarily to race, gender, and sexual orientation. Its (...) theoretical underpinnings, however, could also apply to religion. The theoretical hunch of the article is that affinity relationships could play a role in motivating transplant procurement. (shrink)

Permissivism is the view that, sometimes, there is more than one doxastic attitude that is perfectly rationalised by the evidence. Impermissivism is the denial of Permissivism. Several philosophers, with the aim to defend either Impermissivism or Permissivism, have recently discussed the value of (im)permissive rationality. This paper focuses on one kind of value-conferring considerations, stemming from the so-called “truth-connection” enjoyed by rational doxastic attitudes. The paper vindicates the truth-connected value of permissive rationality by pursuing a novel strategy which rests on (...) two main planks: first, there is a distinction between a fine-grained and a coarse-grained type-individuation of belief-forming methods. Secondly, different kinds of decision-theoretic reasoning, i.e. expected-accuracy reasoning and accuracy-domination reasoning, must be paired with a fine-grained and a coarse-grained type-individuation of methods, respectively. I argue that while the first pair is wholly irrelevant to the question of the truth-connection, the second affords the means to a permissivist explanation of the truth-connected value of rationality. (shrink)

This paper explores the similarities between a crucial passage in Robert Grosseteste’s commentary on Posterior Analytics and the commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 6 written by the Byzantine commentator Eustratius of Nicaea (d. ca. 1120). According to the present author, Eustratius may be the direct source of Grosseteste’s epistemology and concept formation theory in the commentary. A tentative revision of the chronology of Grosseteste’s Greek studies may be necessary to account for the relationship between the two texts.

The article investigates the significance of the so-called phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement for debates about the semantics of taste discourse. Two kinds of description of the phenomenon are proposed. The first ensures that faultless disagreement raises a distinctive philosophical challenge; yet, it is argued that Contextualist, Realist and Relativist semantic theories do not account for this description. The second, by contrast, makes the phenomenon irrelevant for the problem of what the right semantics of taste discourse should be. Lastly, the (...) following dilemma is assessed: either faultless disagreement provides strong evidence against semantic theories; or its significance should be considerably downplayed. (shrink)

In this contribution I will examine Cotnoir’s (2013) solution to the problems that alethic pluralism faces when it comes to logical paradoxes. I will argue that his proposal fails to be a viable option and I will put forward an alternative approach, more Tarskian in spirit, but with the same “pluralist” trait of Cotnoir’s solution. Such an alternative approach is based on the idea that each truth predicate can be associated with an index that fully describes its relation with other (...) truth predicates.I will show how such indexes must be constrained in order to avoid logical paradoxes. (shrink)

In this study, we explore the role of Chief Executive Officers’ incentives, split between monetary and non-monetary, in relation to corporate social responsibility. We base our analysis on a sample of 597 US firms over the period 2005–2009. We find that both monetary and non-monetary incentives have an effect on CSR decisions. Specifically, monetary incentives designed to align the CEO’s and shareholders’ interests have a negative effect on CSR and non-monetary incentives have a positive effect on CSR. The study has (...) important implications for the design of executive remuneration plans, as we show that there are many levers that can affect the CEO’s decisions with regard to CSR. Our evidence also confirms the prominent role of the CEO in relation to CSR decisions, while also recognizing the complexity of factors affecting CSR. Finally, we propose a research design that takes into account endogeneity issues arising when examining compensation variables. (shrink)

The paper proposes an account of the rational response to higher-order evidence whose key claim is that whenever we acquire such evidence we ought to engage in the inquiring activity of double-checking. Combined with a principle that establishes a connection between rational inquiry and rational belief retention, the account offers a novel explanation of the alleged impermissibility of retaining one’s belief in the face of higher-order evidence. It is argued that this explanation is superior to the main competitor view which (...) appeals to the notion of defeat. (shrink)

While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our acknowledged epistemic peers, there are certain disagreements, such as philosophical disagreements, which appear to be permissibly sustainable. These two claims, each independently plausible, are jointly puzzling. This paper argues for a solution to this puzzle. The main tenets of the solution are two. First, the peers ought to engage in a deliberative activity of discovering more about their epistemic position vis-à-vis the issue at stake. Secondly, the (...) peers are permitted to do so while entertaining a sui generis doxastic attitude of hypothesis. (shrink)

From nineteenth-century abolitionism to Black Lives Matter today, progressive social movements have been at the forefront of social change. Yet it is seldom recognized that such movements have not only engaged in political action but also posed crucial philosophical questions about the meaning of justice and about how the demands of justice can be met. -/- Michele Moody-Adams argues that anyone who is concerned with the theory or the practice of justice—or both—must ask what can be learned from social (...) movements. Drawing on a range of compelling examples, she explores what they have shown about the nature of justice as well as what it takes to create space for justice in the world. Moody-Adams considers progressive social movements as wellsprings of moral inquiry and as agents of social change, drawing out key philosophical and practical principles. Social justice demands humane regard for others, combining compassionate concern and robust respect. Successful movements have drawn on the transformative power of imagination, strengthening the motivation to pursue justice and to create the political institutions and social policies that can sustain it by inspiring political hope. -/- Making Space for Justice contends that the insights arising from social movements are critical to bridging the gap between discerning theory and effective practice—and should be transformative for political thought as well as for political activism. (shrink)

Tradition has it that first-person thought is somehow special. It is also commonplace to maintain that the first-person concept obeys a rule of reference to the effect that any token first-person thought is about the thinker of that thought. Following Annalisa Coliva and, more recently, Santiago Echeverri, I take the specialness claim to be the claim that thinking a first-person thought comes with a certain guarantee of its pattern of reference. Echeverri maintains that such a guarantee is explained by a (...) fairly flatfooted interpretation of the thinker-reflexive rule. I argue, however, that the explanatory aspirations of the thinker-reflexive rule are fulfilled only if we accept an epistemically loaded gloss on the notion of a thinker of a thought featuring the rule. That gloss is unpacked in terms of the subject’s ability to be acquainted with the phenomenal character of their thoughts. (shrink)

El presente ensayo examina la relación entre los conceptos de vida y de poder, teniendo presentes posiciones fundamentales en la historia de la filosofía, con particular atención a algunos escritos de Kelsen y Schmitt La finalidad es de evidenciar cómo la fuerza de la vida y el poder sobre la vida exigen ser integrados y complementados en estructuras conceptuales y teóricas más amplias y más orgánicas, para evitar unilateralidades y aporías. Resulta que una posición meramente vitalista corre el riesgo de (...) negarse a sí misma e invoca una norma, que, a su vez, sea capaz de reclamar un orden constitutivo, no fruto exclusivo del arbitrio, sino dotado de una intrínseca inteligibilidad, en modo de actuar un enlace y una conexión entre la dimensión natural y el horizonte personal, en el cual la vida se eleva a la consciencia y a la libertad responsable. El reclamo al ethos quiere, entonces, organizar los niveles de la vida, del poder sobre ella y de las normas para regularlo en una perspectiva completa, en la cual el momento subjetivo y aquel objetivo se impliquen recíprocamente, en modo de evitar tanto formas de imposición extraña, percibidas como heterónomas, como la exaltación de la opción arbitraria, asumida como única regla. El último paso lleva a ensanchar el discurso del ámbito humano a aquel de la realidad completa, para subrayar cómo naturaleza y persona puedan ser conexas, si como fundamento último está un Logos creador y ordenador, una Inteligencia creadora, capaz de hacer posible una verdad de las cosas a un nivel primariamente ontológico. El camino conceptual desarrollado busca delinear, en tal modo, un proceso, al mismo tiempo teórico y real, en el cual las posibilidades de la técnica en relación a la vida y a la vida humana no sean confiadas a la mera casualidad de elecciones arbitrarias y de opciones prometeicas, sino sean colocadas en un más amplio horizonte ontológico, dotado de intrinseca inteligibilidad y finalidad, y por tanto capaz de unir, a un nivel más alto y más profundo, naturaleza y cultura, orden objetivo y proyectualidad personal, libertad y responsabilidad. (shrink)

A paper read on June 25, 2007, on the occasion of the presentation of the two volumes offered to Fulvio Tessitore for his seventieth birthday . The author focuses on the essays collected in the first book, showing how the variety of the theoretical proposals advanced by the contributors finds its vivifying and unifying centre in Tessitore’s historicist teaching.