Le constat est maintenant partout: la puissance du fondamentalisme religieux, la montee des populismes de droite comme de gauche, le discredit de la classe politique, le rejet de la construction europeenne, rendent caducs les schemas anciens. En particulier l'idee que la democratie, a force de bienveillance, peut tolerer toutes les differences, toutes les croyances. Oui! Il y a des croyances insupportables et intolerables. Non! Le populisme n'est pas une illusion qui se dissipera d'elle-meme avec un peu de pedagogie et de (...) bonne volonte. Non! La politique internationale n'obeit pas aux chartes du droit international. Il faut denoncer la tyrannie des bons sentiments, la politique de l'emotion et de la compassion. Non que la bienveillance soit un sentiment indigne, mais nous devons cesser de croire qu'on peut batir sur elle une communaute politique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:33 HOW TO BECOME A MODERATE SKEPTIC: HUME'S WAY OUT OF PYRRHONISM The nature and extent of Hume's skepticism have been assessed in various ways. He was viewed as a radical skeptic until the end of the XIXth century. Many contemporary interpretations, which can be traced back to Kemp Smith's book, have claimed since that a reassessment was indispensable if we are to take seriously either the very project (...) of a science of human nature or Hume's naturalist conception of belief. The idea of a science of human nature presupposes that at least some sort of positive knowledge is possible. The naturalist conception of belief claims that some of our beliefs, though lacking rational justification, are nevertheless unavoidable and gain this way a certainty all their own. Both the Treatise of Human Nature in Book I and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding -1 conclude with a moderate or mitigated skepticism after making a strong case for radical pyrrhonism. In this paper I wish to carry out two connected tasks: first I want to consider whether Hume's skepticism in the Treatise is the same as that of the Enquiry or not; second, I want to determine which arguments he puts forward for his shift from pyrrhonism to modern skepticism. The most noticeable differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry occur immediately after the analysis of causation. In the Enquiry we find almost nothing concerning the reality of the external world and the nature of the self, but Hume emphasizes heavily the 34 anti-metaphysical and anti-theological outcomes of the science of human nature in his sections on Liberty and Necessity (VIII), on Miracles (X), on Providence and a possible future state (XI). He stresses the devastating agnostic consequences of his principles and his agnosticism culminates in the dreadful censorship of the final lines of the book. On the contrary, the fourth part of the Treatise, Book I, offers an intricate and sophisticated treatment of various subjects. The intricacy shows in the very title of this part: "Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy." Hume actually intertwines the exposition of his skeptical system — an expression which sounds odd — with the critical examination of rival systems and an attempt at accounting for the nature of things. These intricate undertakings are the direct upshot of Hume's analysis of causation. He thinks he has established that our causal beliefs are the products of custom alone and that nevertheless they are our only reliable beliefs. Lacking any rational justification, they are simply natural — which means that we cannot hinder ourselves from making inferences and predictions. Accordingly, reason has been immersed in the wider concept of imagination and thus naturalized: it is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (T 179). Basically, some beliefs are unavoidable. Now, a crucial problem is to know how far we can go into the analysis of such natural beliefs. In the Treatise, Hume sets out to investigate some of them whereas in the Enquiry he is more prudent and merely talks of instincts without considering their mechanism. In the Treatise, the tentative analysis of these natural beliefs has important metaphysical outcomes. Using the concepts and principles of his new-born science of human nature, Hume provides us with 35 a new ontology which states the nature of things from the standpoint of our beliefs concerning it. Thus, we get a Humean version of the nature of the external world and of the nature of the self. Unfortunately, this assessment of what there is on the basis of what we believe there is has unwanted skeptical effects. Hume's "as if" ontology tends to appear definitely fictitious, all the more so because the analysis of our natural beliefs is not successful and even quite defective. So, the skeptical outcome pushes through the positive project itself as the failure to account for our natural beliefs shakes the very belief in their special reliability. Such is, for example, the blatant result of the study of our belief in the external world (T 217). Again, in the Treatise, Hume is eager to emphasize the devastating anti-metaphysical implications of his thought. Under the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:33 HOW TO BECOME A MODERATE SKEPTIC: HUME'S WAY OUT OF PYRRHONISM The nature and extent of Hume's skepticism have been assessed in various ways. He was viewed as a radical skeptic until the end of the XIXth century. Many contemporary interpretations, which can be traced back to Kemp Smith's book, have claimed since that a reassessment was indispensable if we are to take seriously either the very project (...) of a science of human nature or Hume's naturalist conception of belief. The idea of a science of human nature presupposes that at least some sort of positive knowledge is possible. The naturalist conception of belief claims that some of our beliefs, though lacking rational justification, are nevertheless unavoidable and gain this way a certainty all their own. Both the Treatise of Human Nature in Book I and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding -1 conclude with a moderate or mitigated skepticism after making a strong case for radical pyrrhonism. In this paper I wish to carry out two connected tasks: first I want to consider whether Hume's skepticism in the Treatise is the same as that of the Enquiry or not; second, I want to determine which arguments he puts forward for his shift from pyrrhonism to modern skepticism. The most noticeable differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry occur immediately after the analysis of causation. In the Enquiry we find almost nothing concerning the reality of the external world and the nature of the self, but Hume emphasizes heavily the 34 anti-metaphysical and anti-theological outcomes of the science of human nature in his sections on Liberty and Necessity (VIII), on Miracles (X), on Providence and a possible future state (XI). He stresses the devastating agnostic consequences of his principles and his agnosticism culminates in the dreadful censorship of the final lines of the book. On the contrary, the fourth part of the Treatise, Book I, offers an intricate and sophisticated treatment of various subjects. The intricacy shows in the very title of this part: "Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy." Hume actually intertwines the exposition of his skeptical system — an expression which sounds odd — with the critical examination of rival systems and an attempt at accounting for the nature of things. These intricate undertakings are the direct upshot of Hume's analysis of causation. He thinks he has established that our causal beliefs are the products of custom alone and that nevertheless they are our only reliable beliefs. Lacking any rational justification, they are simply natural — which means that we cannot hinder ourselves from making inferences and predictions. Accordingly, reason has been immersed in the wider concept of imagination and thus naturalized: it is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (T 179). Basically, some beliefs are unavoidable. Now, a crucial problem is to know how far we can go into the analysis of such natural beliefs. In the Treatise, Hume sets out to investigate some of them whereas in the Enquiry he is more prudent and merely talks of instincts without considering their mechanism. In the Treatise, the tentative analysis of these natural beliefs has important metaphysical outcomes. Using the concepts and principles of his new-born science of human nature, Hume provides us with 35 a new ontology which states the nature of things from the standpoint of our beliefs concerning it. Thus, we get a Humean version of the nature of the external world and of the nature of the self. Unfortunately, this assessment of what there is on the basis of what we believe there is has unwanted skeptical effects. Hume's "as if" ontology tends to appear definitely fictitious, all the more so because the analysis of our natural beliefs is not successful and even quite defective. So, the skeptical outcome pushes through the positive project itself as the failure to account for our natural beliefs shakes the very belief in their special reliability. Such is, for example, the blatant result of the study of our belief in the external world (T 217). Again, in the Treatise, Hume is eager to emphasize the devastating anti-metaphysical implications of his thought. Under the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:360 HUME'S NATURALI Z EP PHILOSOPHY In "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine claimed that the failure of reductive-foundationalist attempts in epistemology, after the model of Carnap' s Aufbau, must lead to a redefinition of epistemology's task. Instead of setting out to reconstruct the whole fabric of our knowledge from absolute data through deductive operations, we should investigate how human subjects derive their knowledge of nature from sensory inputs. Thus epistemology is (...) to be conceived as a branch of natural science, cognate with psychology, not as the study of the foundations of science any more. In the present paper, I will first outline Quine's position and his related interpretation of Hume's philosophical enterprise. Then, I will try to assess the relevance and fairness of Quine's account and consider in what measure it allows us to understand the novelty of Hume's conception of philosophy, since Hume also advocated a nonfoundationalist conception of philosophy which bears some striking analogy to naturalized epistemology. Finally, I will suggest which consequences are to be drawn from this unusual view of Hume, especially as regards the self-reference of philosophy. Quine's position in the matter of epistemology is well known. For him, under its traditional form and program, epistemology used to deal with the foundations of science, be it mathematics or the science of nature. This foundationalist approach had two connected aspects, one which Quine calls conceptual; the other he calls doctrinal. As Quine 361 puts it "the conceptual studies are concerned with clarifying concepts by defining them, some in terms of others" (Quine, p. 69). In the same manner, the doctrinal studies attempt to establish laws "by proving them, some on the basis of others" (Quine, p. 69). Derivative concepts will be defined in terms of the clearer ones and complex laws will be proved from primitive and obvious ones. Thus the traditional or classical conception of epistemology involves simultaneously a theory of concepts or meanings and a theory of truth. These two branches (Quine speaks of a duality of structure or bifurcation) converge so as to provide an analysis of the way our knowledge of nature -- and our knowledge in general — stems from and is built upon our sensory experience which validates it. In so characterizing epistemology, Quine simply restates in his own terms the f oundationalist and reductivist program of positivist epistemology, which itself tied in with the logicist program in mathematics. Then Quine suggests that Hume dealt with both sides of this program, the conceptual and the doctrinal. To begin with, Hume developed what might be called a theory of concepts or meanings in terms of our sensory data. Such is the point of his theory of ideas which consists in tracing them back to the original impressions they are derived from. In spite of its limitations, which hinge on the lack of an approach in terms of statements, Hume's phenomenalism does the job of a theory of meaning and concepts. Hume also attempted to give an answer to the question of the truth of our knowledge. In this case again, his phenomenalist stand allows him to account for the truth of our singular statements concerning our perceptions, even though this result is achieved at the cost of identifying objects and sensory data. 362 However, when Hume comes to general statements and singular statements concerning future events, his attempt fails. This is not surprising. According to Quine, if it were possible to improve on Hume's theory of meaning and concepts, especially through the use of contextual definition techniques, by contrast, all the attempts to logically derive the truth of our knowledge from true premises have failed. In matter of induction, we are not one step further than Hume was. "The most modest of generalizations about observable traits will cover more cases than its utterer can have had occasions actually to observe. The hopelessness of grounding natural science upon immediate experience in a firmly logical way was acknowledged" (Quine, p. 74). Or "the Humean predicament is the human predicament." For Quine, foundationalist attempts of the sort Hume engaged in involve two cardinal principles of empiricism which remain unchallenged. One of these principles is to the effect... (shrink)

Les hommes ont toujours agi sur eux-mêmes, et pris en charge leur propre évolution. Avec aujourd'hui deux traits absolument nouveaux. D'une part, les capacités d'action de l'espèce humaine sur elle-même sont incomparablement plus puissantes que par le passé, notamment dans le domaine des technologies de la vie. D'autre part, nous contrôlons si bien notre milieu et l'avons si parfaitement aménagé pour notre survie que nous avons mis en danger notre environnement. Le philosophe Peter Sloterdijk conduit une réflexion peu conventionnelle sur (...) ce double déséquilibre, déséquilibre de la domestication de l'homme par lui-même, déséquilibre de l'environnement par la mobilisation infinie des ressources. En prolongeant ses réflexions, il s'agit ici de réfléchir à cette situation. Faut-il poursuivre et même accélérer sur la voie de la mutation, en inventant le nouvel homme, c'est-à-dire le surhomme? Ou faut-il à nouveau penser la nature humaine dans sa finitude et, contre la mobilisation infinie, en appeler à la dé-mobilisation et à la voie du Tao, mais au risque de l'étouffement dans la mesure, la sagesse et l'ennui? (shrink)

Mélissa Thériault,Dominique Sirois-Rouleau | : Bien connu pour ses prises de positions tranchées et polémiques sur le fonctionnement des institutions culturelles et des milieux artistiques, le philosophe français Yves Michaud est aussi un observateur assidu des nouvelles tendances de consommation. L’objectif de cette étude critique est d’ouvrir une discussion critique qui s’impose sur certaines affirmations dont le caractère polémique est aussi manifeste que fertile : la notion de vaporisation de l’art, le statut « orphelin » du design et (...) son rapprochement avec l’art et le luxe et, finalement, la question de l’authenticité. Nous discuterons chacun de ces éléments afin de répondre aux zones grises de l’analyse présentée dans l’essai de Michaud. Nous conclurons par une discussion sur la possibilité même de considérer l’art comme un luxe en montrant dans quelle mesure la conception du luxe telle que défendue par Michaud correspond en fait à un concept bien différent. | : Well known for his controversial positions on the functioning of cultural institutions and artistic communities, French philosopher Yves Michaud is also a fine observer of new consumer trends. The aim of this study is to open a critical discussion on polemic statements made by Michaud in Le nouveau luxe. Expérience, arrogances, authenticité : the notion of vaporization of the art, the “orphan” status of design and the connexion between art and luxury and, finally, authenticity. We discuss each of these elements to clarify the gray areas of the analysis presented by Michaud. We conclude with a discussion on the relevance to consider art as a luxury by showing how design, as understood by Michaud, matches a very different concept. (shrink)

Les institutions - et en premier lieu l'Eglise - où s'exprimait et se vivait l'expérience du sacré se sont peu à peu effritées. Mais le sacré déborde le cadre des institutions et il en reste des vestiges, entre autres, dans la littérature. C'est dans l'oeuvre de Cioran que Sara Danièle Bélanger Michaud les a cherchés. Emil Michel Cioran (1911 - 1995) est un philosophe et essayiste d'origine roumaine qui a vécu en France à partir de 1937. Il est principalement (...) connu pour ses aphorismes et pour son recueil De l'inconvénient d'être né, paru en 1973. Dans son essai, l'auteure présente son oeuvre comme une manifestation de la quête du sacré et une nouvelle manière de l'habiter. Elle écrit : " Qu'il soit question de sa quête spirituelle (ou de son ratage spirituel), de ses rencontres avec l'absolu, de ses expériences d'extase, de son obsession pour le doute ou encore de sa nature religieuse à rebours, c'est toujours en même temps du sacré dont il est question ". (shrink)

Avec trois entretiens de Jean-Luc Nancy Cosa volante : l'art n'est ni un objet, ni un ensemble de composantes formelles, encore moins schème et substance. L'art les arts plutôt, dans leur pluralité différentielle élève la question d'une forme en formation. Cette forma formans traverse de part en part la pensée des arts de Jean-Luc Nancy où importe surtout l'approche de ce qui, dans l'art, fait sens (sensibilité, intelligence, sensation, sensualité). A travers touches, intensités, vibrations, timbres, tonalités, colorations, grains, résonances, rythmes, (...) il s'agit de voir comment les arts donnent forme au monde. Cet ouvrage explore plusieurs motifs du travail de Nancy : sa réflexion sur l'iconologie "chrétienne" au sein de sa "déconstruction du christianisme", la question de ses "étranges corps étrangers", les modalités de ses ekphraseis, sa poétique cinétique, entre autres. Trois entretiens avec le philosophe constituent des moments privilégiés de cet échange autour de la question de l'art. (shrink)

Pour yourself glass of Three Wizard's Chardonnay, Winkle's Old Peculiar, or Soggy Mountain Dew, pull up a three-legged chair, and for Om's sake, stay out of the bathtub! Keep and eye open for the octarine flashes that would indicate magic is trying to escape from the pages and be ready to grab something made of copper in order to ground uncontrolled magic without harmful incident (Some would Consider the Copper Safeguard Unnecessary) You are now ready to dive into Discworld and (...) Philosophy and join a group of philosophical Discworld fans as they explore truth, history, death, luck, morality, and reality in the magical inverse of the Disc. (shrink)

John C. Altmann decides whether Dracula can really be blamed for his crimes, since it's his nature as a vampire to behave a certain way. Robert Arp argues that Dracula's addiction to live human blood dooms him to perpetual frustration and misery. John V. Karavitis sees Dracula as a Randian individual pitted against the Marxist collective. Greg Littmann maintains that if we disapprove of Dracula's behavior, we ought to be vegetarians. James Edwin Mahon uses the example of Dracula to resolve (...) nagging problems about the desirability of immortality. Adam Barkman and Michael Versteeg ponder what it would really feel like to be Dracula, and thereby shed some light on the nature of consciousness. Robert Vuckovich looks at the sexual morality of Dracula and other characters in the Dracula saga. Ariane de Waal explains that "Dragula" is scary because every time this being appears, it causes "gender trouble." And Cari Callis demonstrates that the Count is really the Jungian Shadow archetype--with added Shapeshifter elements--in the journey of Mina Harker, heroine/victim of Stoker's novel, from silly girl to empowered woman. (shrink)

This chapter deals with one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, inappropriate appeal to authority (IAA). IAA has many different facets. At its core, it is a fallacy that assumes that because someone is an authority, we should listen to that person. The problem with IAA is that it ignores content in favor of credentials and power. There are a few different ways in which IAA can occur. IAA seems to be the result of a flaw in human thinking. (...) Social cognitive theory, a theory that helps explain human action, notes that humans tend to act like each other. The tendency to listen to authorities who are not authorities explains why celebrities are able to sell us stuff. The important thing to remember about IAA is that it is not just a fallacy that comes up in arguments that do not matter. (shrink)

The literature on the Cambridge Platonists abounds with references to Neoplatonism and the Alexandrian Fathers on general themes of philosophical and theological methodology. The specific theme of the spiritual senses of the soul has received scant attention however, to the detriment of our understanding of their place in this important tradition of Christian speculation. Thus, while much attention has been paid to the clear influence of Plotinus and the Florentine Academy, far less has been given to important theological figures that (...) also form a vital part of the tradition the Cambridge Platonists find irresistible. Similarly, scholarship on the spiritual senses has tended to ignore early modern Protestant developments in this tradition focusing instead on patristic, medieval, and later modern figures. In response to these oversights, the present chapter provides a close reading and analysis of the reception and modification of Origen of Alexandria’s (185-252) doctrine of the spiritual senses in the “Discourse on the True Way or Method of Attaining to Divine Knowledge” by the Cambridge Platonist, John Smith (1618-1652). Although Smith accepted much of the doctrine as he found it in Origen his allegiance to modern notions of methodology, derived especially from Descartes, as well as his Protestantism, made taking the doctrine on authority or antiquity alone unacceptable. Smith therefore offered his own case for the spiritual senses, at once intentionally mimicking the Alexandrian’s interpretive synthesis of Platonism and Scripture (“Origen as model”) and echoing Origen’s own words (“Origen as source”). Whereas Origen made spiritual sensibility intelligible by means of Middle Platonic thought, Smith’s Neoplatonism provided the conceptual tools needed to make sense of biblical passages without suggesting a merely metaphorical meaning for sensory language concerning the awareness of spiritual realities. In this way, both tradition and innovation guide Smith’s reformulation of the doctrine of the spiritual senses. In addition to demonstrating Smith’s debt to patristic thought, this chapter also discusses his influence on such leading figures in modern theology as John Wesley (1703-1791) and Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758). The chapter thus presents an important moment in the development of Christian speculation about the spiritual senses that begins to bridge scholarship on the Patristic and Enlightenment periods. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'intentional fallacy (IF)'. The IF is an odd kind of fallacy. Rather than being a fallacy focused on logic and argumentation, it is a fallacy that focuses on art, relating to how we judge art and engage in literary criticism. The IF focuses on the fact that we often think that there is one right interpretation of a work of art. According to David Fenner, the IF “states that (...) we do not need to know, nor can we on most occasions, what was in the mind of the artist in order to interpret the art work”. So, it seems unreasonable to use the artist's intention as the most important way to understand a work of art as the artist's intention is often unavailable. The IF is an error in art interpretation that causes us to realize important things about art. (shrink)

"La poétique de Celan- a profondément incisé la réflexion de Derrida, lui devenant indispensable pour repenser les questions de la date, de la crypte et du secret. De Schibboleth à Béliers et à son dernier séminaire, La bête et le souverain, Derrida s'est aussi intéressé au poème celanien comme lieu d'une souveraine solitude, d'une souveraineté autre, peut-être, quand il parle de lui-même. Cet essai tente d'analyser la portée du deuil et de la dette contractée par le philosophe à l'endroit du (...) poète. De la rencontre entre Celan et Derrida, nulle archive ne saura témoigner. Le verbe "témoigner" évoque une sorte de mot de passe secret entre eux : "Niemand/ zeugt für den/ Zeugen" et "Die Welt ist fort, ich muss dicte tragen". Ces deux vers, Jacques Derrida incitait ses lecteurs à les apprendre par coeur pour deux raisons : d'abord, pour méditer sans fin le rapport à la langue, à l'idiome plutôt, de Celan, creusant, enibuissant, retournant sa langue dans la langue allemande ; ensuite, pour mesurer relever, dit Derrida la nécessaire et impossible épreuve de la traduction, cette question qui est non seulement l'un des enjeux les plus importants de la "déconstruction" mais aussi le foyer d'une éthique de la lecture."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

La question cosmopolitique est restée en marge de l'intérêt qui a été porté à la pensée juridico-politique de Kant. Mais l'intérêt philosophique de la question cosmopolitique dépasse très largement ce cadre. Elle atteste d'abord que la théorie politique de Kant ne se limite pas une théorie de l'Etat. Il doit y avoir un en deçà et un au-delà de l'Etat, où la politique dépasse l'idée de peuple pour atteindre celle d'humanité. En ce sens, Kant est l'antidote de Carl Schmitt, qui (...) portait en lui la haine de l'idée cosmopolitique. Cet antagonisme théorique entre Schmitt et Kant, entre le poison et le remède, est largement attesté dans ce volume. Ce qui montre à quel point nous avons besoin aujourd'hui du cosmopolitisme de Kant, pour penser le passage de la guerre à la paix, la place de l'hôte étranger dans nos sociétés complexes et la nouvelle configuration d'un monde globalisé. (shrink)

Présenter un aperçu de la « mystique chrétienne médiévale » n’est possible qu’en la situant brièvement dans l’histoire de la « mystique » en Occident. Le terme n’est pas dénué d’ambiguïté. Apparaissant dans le contexte des religions à mystères, la mystique évolue vers une expérience silencieuse que les mots ne peuvent capter, avant de désigner des phénomènes anormaux décrits dans une rhétorique de l’étrange. Par rapport à la littérature moderne, les textes médiévaux sont très sobres. Faisant à écho à la (...) théologie mystique de Denys l’Aréopagite (ve-vie s.), ils présentent une voie d’union à l’Un en deçà des mots et des concepts. Il ne suffit pas de connaître (mathein) Dieu par un savoir notionnel, il faut en faire l’expérience, « en pâtir » (pathein). Ce « pâtir Dieu » sera repris par Maître Eckhart (1260-1328), le chef de file de la mystique rhénane. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Nice Tattoo What is Art? Art World Theory: Art is Participation in the Art World Formalism: Art is the Result of Formal Properties Working Together Expressionism: Art Elicits an Emotional Response from the Viewer What Do These Theories Accomplish for Tattoos? Tattoos as Performance Art The Human Canvas Tattoos, Mortality, and Deep Meaning.

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: appeal to tradition (ATT). ATT means to ignore the evidence that we should change because we have been doing something for a long time. ATTs are tremendously useful fallacies. ATTs hinge on sentimental tendencies and unwillingness to change, and are particularly dangerous when they prevents change. ATT seems to suggest that there is something good about tradition that trumps any other concerns. The problem is that since tradition has (...) nothing to do with morality, it is really easy for ATT to be used to justify anything, from continuing to tell children that Santa exists to preventing an oppressed group of people from voting. Perhaps at the core of ATT is belief that family and cultural traditions are important. In some ways, ATT is a popular fallacy of grandmothers all over the world. (shrink)

Jar Jar Binks might be the most hated individual in the Star Wars universe. He should feel a great deal of guilt over his actions in the Senate, though well meaning, because they caused so much strife. This chapter considers how Darth Vader would reflect on his own actions: it is unlikely that he feels particularly good about inadvertently provoking Leia's confession of love. The chapter now talks about Immanuel Kant. Kant's ethics are focused on intentions, the reasons why people (...) choose to act as they do. Jar Jar was, like most of the Senate, a victim of Palpatine's deceptions. The author highlights that it is fair to say that Jar Jar did not make the choice to grant Palpatine emergency powers because he could not do otherwise. So, even though the consequences were grave, and Jar Jar's decision hasty, he can be absolved for what he did. (shrink)

Lois is so easily deceived by Clark’s glasses and mild‐mannered demeanor because identity isn’t nearly as clear as we’d like to believe. In fact, may be there is a strong sense in which Clark Kent and Superman really are two different people. Memory isn't the right place to look for identity, unless we want to agree that Superman losing his memory would mean that he was, in effect, dead. If we look at personal identity as something we just kind of (...) make up about ourselves and others, basically as just using names to avoid confusion and complexity, then we can start to give Lois some slack for never realizing that Superman and Clark aren't the same person. When we name things, we give them a common‐sense version of identity, and Superman and Clark are given two different identities by society and even themselves. (shrink)

From the Foreward by Mortimer J. Adler Of all the question or issues concerning human freedom, none is more fundamental in itself and in its consequences than the problem of free choice; and none has been the subject of more persistent and, at the same time, apparently irresolvable controversyThis bookis the perfect antidote for the errors, the misunderstandings or worse, the ignorances that beset the modern discussion of free choice. Even the reader who comes to this book with little or (...) no knowledge of the philosophical literature on the subjects that it treats cannot fail to appreciate its remarkable clarity, its felicitous combination of detailed concreteness with abstract precision, its exploration of common experience and its elucidation of common sense, and, above all, the intelligibility, reasonableness, and fairness of its exposition of free choice. (shrink)