Maurice Blanchot, the eminent literary and cultural critic, has had a vast influence on contemporary French writers—among them Jean Paul Sartre and Jacques Derrida. From the 1930s through the present day, his writings have been shaping the international literary consciousness. The Space of Literature , first published in France in 1955, is central to the development of Blanchot's thought. In it he reflects on literature and the unique demand it makes upon our attention. Thus he explores the process of (...) reading as well as the nature of artistic creativity, all the while considering the relation of the literary work to time, to history, and to death. This book consists not so much in the application of a critical method or the demonstration of a theory of literature as in a patiently deliberate meditation upon the literary experience, informed most notably by studies of Mallarme;, Kafka, Rilke, and Hölderlin. Blanchot's discussions of those writers are among the finest in any language. (shrink)

Following an approach that is empirical but not psychological, and dialectical but not dialogical, in this book Maurice Finocchiaro defines concepts such as reasoning, argument, argument analysis, critical reasoning, methodological reflection, judgment, critical thinking, and informal logic. Including extended critiques of the views of many contemporary scholars, he also integrates into the discussion Arnauld's Port-Royal Logic, Gramsci's theory of intellectuals, and case studies from the history of science, particularly the work of Galileo, Newton, Huygens, and Lavoisier.

Mandelbaum believes that views regarding history and man and reason pose problems for philosophy, and he offers critical discussions of some of those problems at the conclusions of parts 2, 3, and 4.

"This book tries to assess Galileo's work in its historical singularity. It is constructed around a precise question: How did Galileo create the modern science of motion? Starting from this question, I shall go on to determine as accurately as I can what concepts and methods helped classical mechanics to take shape." [Preface].

Originally published in 1964. In four essays, Professor Mandelbaum challenges some of the most common assumptions of contemporary epistemology. Through historical analyses and critical argument, he attempts to show that one cannot successfully sever the connections between philosophic and scientific accounts of sense perception. While each essay is independent of the others, and the argument of each must therefore be judged on its own merits, one theme is common to all: that critical realism, as Mandelbaum calls it, is a viable (...) epistemological position, even though some schools of thought hold it in low esteem. (shrink)

He focuses on Hegel and Nietzche, perhaps to give Mallarme and Kafka a breathing spell. Paper edition (unseen), $10.95. No index or bibliography. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

The history of ideas deals with the elemental unit-ideas which for Lovejoy are components of systems distinguished by their patterns. Special histories explain how a particular form of human history developed. General histories draw on special histories to document or explain social contexts. Since patterns influence philosophers, the history of ideas contributes little to the history of philosophy, a discontinuous strand within a period's continuous intellectual history. By accepting cultural pluralism, denying the monistic position that there always are internal connections (...) among all or some strands of intellectual and cultural history, both continuity and change in philosophy can be best understood. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Originally published in 1971. The purpose of this book is to draw attention to important aspects of thought in the nineteenth century. While its central concerns lie within the philosophic tradition, materials drawn from the social sciences and elsewhere provide important illustrations of the intellectual movements that the author attempts to trace. This book aims at examining philosophic modes of thought as well as sifting presuppositions held in common by a diverse group of thinkers whose antecedents and whose intentions often (...) had little in common. After a preliminary tracing of the main strands of continuity within philosophy itself, the author concentrates on how, out of diverse and disparate sources, certain common beliefs and attitudes regarding history, man, and reason came to pervade a great deal of nineteenth-century thought. Geographically, this book focuses on English, French, and German thought. Mandelbaum believes that views regarding history and man and reason pose problems for philosophy, and he offers critical discussions of some of those problems at the conclusions of parts 2, 3, and 4. (shrink)

Laws through which we explain particular events need not be laws which describe uniform sequences of events; they may be laws stating uniform connections between two types of factor contained within a complex event. Hempel's apparent insistence that laws state the conditions invariably accompanying a type of complex event, that the event be an instance of the laws "covering" it, results from the Humean analysis in which causation obtains between types of events and "the cause" means necessary conditions. But historians (...) often depict sufficient conditions. On the other hand, some knowledge of general laws is a presupposition of Dray's "continuous series" model of historical explanation. (shrink)

Maurice Blanchot’s “The Strange and the Stranger” (1958) is an essential text for understanding Blanchot’s thought, its development, and its enduring importance. He presents an early account of the impersonal “neuter” in subject-less experiences like “alienation,” “alteration,” “dispersion,” “disappearance,” and “absence.” These experiences of strangeness threaten thought, which is only “itself and for-itself its own experience.” Relatedly, they also reveal “the neutrality of being or neutrality as being.” With reference to both Emmanuel Levinas and Martin Heidegger, Blanchot clarifies the (...) meaning and exigency of a neuter that can take “upon itself the reality of alienation.”. (shrink)

Frequently, throughout the history of modern philosophy, it has been held that although claims to knowledge can be adequately defended against relativistic arguments, judgments of value cannot. Positions of this type were widely accepted in Anglo-American philosophy during the last half-century. To be sure, some philosophers have at all times attacked such a dichotomy, holding that arguments similar to those which justify a rejection of relativism is mistaken in both spheres. Recently, however, there has been an attack on the same (...) dichotomy from the opposite direction. An increasing number of philosophers have accepted positions that lead to a relativization of judgments of fact as well as of judgments of value. This tendency has many independent roots, and those who accept it in one form or another may hold antithetical positions on a variety of other issues. I shall therefore not attempt to disentangle the presuppositions which underlie contemporary relativistic theories of knowledge, though I shall indicate some of them in passing; rather, I shall confine myself to showing that an acceptance of relativism in the theory of knowledge frequently—and perhaps always—involves a prior commitment to non-relativistic interpretations of at least some judgments concerning matters of fact. Consequently, whatever may be the case with respect to judgments of value, epistemological relativism may be said to be self-limiting. (shrink)

... A Contemporary History of African Philosophy, Owerri: Amamihe Publications, 1999. PARRINDER, GEOFFREY, African Traditional Religion, London: Sheldon, ...

Featuring essays originally published in La Nouvelle Revue Française, this collection clearly demonstrates why Maurice Blanchot was a key figure in exploring the relation between literature and philosophy.

The belief of Gallie, Danto, and others that history is constructing narratives is too simplistic and neglects the role of inquiry and discovery. Teleology in history - only events relevant to a known outcome find a place in a work -while similar to that in narratives is not decisive, since in any explanation the explicandum controls the explicans to some extent. History is not recounting a linear sequence of intelligible human actions but is an analysis of a complex pattern of (...) change into factors that served to make it what it was. Social backgrounds and conditions that are influences but not actually parts of the story of actions are crucial; the fundamental relationship is part to whole, not antecedent to consequent. (shrink)

Mr Dobb examines the history of economic thought in the light of the modern controversy over capital theory and, more particularly, the appearance of Sraffa's book The Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities, which was a watershed in the critical discussions constituted a crucial turning-point in the history of economics: an estimate not unconnected with his reinterpretation of nineteenth-century economic thought as consisting of two streams or traditions commonly confused under the generic title of 'the classical tradition' against which (...) Jevons so strongly reacted. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:242 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Thus Locke's mistake is not the simplistic one of bringing in a new type of perception --perception of the agreement of an idea with something which is not an idea. He attributes the certainty which is appropriate for a general verbal truth concerning archetypal ideas to a real truth concerning ectypal ideas. There is an additional difficulty in Locke's use of the distinction between adequate (...) and inadequate ectypal ideas when he uses them in his theory of self knowledge. How can we be sure that these simple ectypal ideas are adequate? We have certainty concerning the adequacy of our archetypal ideas because we have a complete knowledge of the archetype which is itself an idea. However, we are not given a complete knowledge of the archetype of simple ectypal ideas. We are assured of the adequacy of simple ectypal ideas only by assuming the truth of the causal principle. This leads to a circular argument. We can be assured of the adequacy of the causal relation considered as a product of our own construction. If the idea of the causal relation is archetypal, then the idea of this relation is adequate. However, when the causal relation is used to assure us of the adequacy of our simple ectypal ideas, the causal relation is no longer restricted to the level of archetypal ideas. In order to insure the adequacy of our simple ideas, the causal relation must be a relation between our ectypal ideas and something which is not an idea, viz., the power which causes the sensation. Archetypal ideas of relations are adequate, but this is not an archetypal idea of a relation, and thus we have no way of judging its adequacy. The only way to determine the adequacy of the causal connection is to show the adequacy of our simple ectypal ideas, but the adequacy of these simple ectypal ideas is itself predicated on the adequacy of the idea of the causal relation. Thus, the whole argument for the adequacy of simple ectypal ideas is circular. Either the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are identical as claimed in Book Three, or the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are not identical, as claimed in Book Two. If the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are identical, then these simple ideas are archetypal and adequate but they afford us no knowledge about any extra-mental thing. If the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are not identical then simple ideas are ectypal, but we cannot be assured of their adequacy because their adequacy is dependent on the causal relation whose adequacy is not assured. Thus, Locke's epistemology does not support his claim for intuitive knowledge of his own existence, but the mistakes he does make are not nearly as simplistic as they are often claimed to be. DONALD W. GOTTERBARN University of Southern California THE DISTINGUISHABLE AND THE SEPARABLE; A NOTE ON HUME AND CAUSATION In this note, I shall be concemed with only one part of Hume's doctrine of causation, and my criticism of this feature of his position will leave much of the remainder untouched. This is not to say that my point is unimportant, for I shall challenge Hume's fight to claim that there cannot in any case be a direct impression of connection, force, or power. He attempted to establish this claim by argument, and I wish to show that there is a fatal flaw in that argument. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 243 In order that what follows shall not be misunderstood, two points must be noted. First, I would not claim that we have an impression of connection, force, or power in all cases in which we hold that events are related as cause and effect. There are many instances in which this is not true, and the number and even the varieties of these cases could be greatly expanded beyond the illustrations which Hume gave in the Treatise and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding. I shall only argue that he did not offer adequate reasons for holding that there are no eases in which we can possibly have such... (shrink)

Un “philosophe des cultures” appelé Louis Gardet est devenu un “islamologue catholique” de renommée mondiale après avoir vécu, de 1933 à 1945, dans la “khalwa” des Petits Frères de Jésus à El-Abiodh Sidi Cheikh, en Algérie. Frère André “en religion”, disciple du bienheureux Charles de Foucauld et ami fidèle de Jacques Maritain, s'est employé, par ses ouvrages, à faire connaître l'islam aux chrétiens. En thomiste convaincu, il s'est interrogé sur les relations de la philosophie avec les diverses formes de la (...) mystique de l'Inde, du judaïsme, du christianisme et de l'islam : comment y apprécier la “mystique du Soi” et la “mystique de l'Autre”? Personnellement engagé dans le dialogue islamo-chrétien, il a ouvert la voie à une meilleure compréhension entre les disciples du Christ et les fidèles du Coran. Ardent défenseur d'un monothéisme personnaliste, commun aux uns et aux autres, il demeure, pour tous, un modèle d'humanisme œcuménique qui s'enracine dans la transcendance du Dieu d'Abraham. (shrink)