The contemporary scientific and technological progress builds on the accomplishments of classical mechanics from the 19th century when the so-called ‘European scientific method and values’ were accepted practically by the whole educated world. Most scientific results and conclusions were reached based on the causal ontological approach proposed in principle already by Plato’s Socrates and developed further by Aristotle. Despite the late-modern paradigm shift in science, the topicality of the ontological approach proposed by Aristotle remains. On the other hand, (...) 19th and 20th century philosophers, mainly positivists such as Mach and Avenarius but also Schlick and Carnap, attempted to change this approach to unify scientific knowledge in accordance with an ideological, i.e. positivist outlook on reality. The authors place a special emphasis on the contribution of Rudolf Carnap and his interaction with Martin Heidegger. Three very different theories are applied to physical reality in the present: classical mechanics in the standard macroscopic realm, Copenhagen quantum mechanics in the microscopic realm, and special theory of reality in both realms in the case of systems consisting of objects having higher velocity values. Any explanation or description of transitions between different realms and theories had not been provided until now. Our paper describes the corresponding evolution in the modern period and identifies the underlying false philosophical assumptions and statements existing in today’s scientific systems. We will then demonstrate that one common theory for all realms of reality may exist; one that will be based fully on Hamilton equations. Only time change of particle impulse is to be determined by a corresponding force. All necessary characteristics of physical reality may be derived in such a case. Direct correlations of such physical approach to philosophy will be drawn. (shrink)

The article examines the relevance of Aristotle’s analysis that concerns the syllogistic figures. On the assumption that Aristotle’s analytics was inspired by the method of geometric analysis, we show how Aristotle used the three terms, when he formulated the three syllogistic figures. So far it has not been appropriately recognized that the three terms — the major, the middle and the minor one — were viewed by Aristotle syntactically and predicatively in the form of diagrams. Many (...) scholars have misunderstood Aristotle in that in the second and third figure the middle term is outside and that in the second figure the major term is next to the middle one, whereas in the third figure it is further from it. By means of diagrams, we have elucidated how this perfectly accords with Aristotle's planar and graphic arrangement. In the light of these diagrams, one can appropriately capture the definition of syllogism as a predicative set of terms. Irrespective of the tricky question concerning the abbreviations that Aristotle himself used with reference to these types of predication, the reconstructed figures allow us better to comprehend the reductions of syllogism to the first figure. We assume that the figures of syllogism are analogous to the figures of categorical predication, i.e., they are specific syntactic and semantic models. Aristotle demanded certain logical and methodological competence within analytics, which reflects his great commitment and contribution to the field. (shrink)

This paper offers a new Polish translation of Aristotle’s Book Delta of his Metaphysics. It takes into account its original title and subtitle that have been preserved in ancient catalogues. It is argued that the title and subtitle did not concerns any “ambiguity” of expressions as it is often mistakenly assumed, but rather the many ways of predicating of various terms. Nor is it a typical lexicon of philosophical concepts, but rather a methodical survey of certain expressions that begin (...) with physical and categorical specifications to make the terminological domain of the first philosophy more precise. (shrink)

What is meant under the genuine title of Aristotle’s ta Analytika is rarely properly understood. Presumably, his analytics was inspired by the method of geometric analysis. For Aristotle, this was a regressive or heuristic procedure, departing from a proposed conclusion and asking which premises could be found in order to syllogize, demonstrate or explain it. The terms that form categorical and modal propositions play a fundamental role in analytics. Aristotle introduces letters in lieu of the triples of (...) terms constitut­ing the propositions and the three syllogistic figures that schematize them. His formulation of the three syllogistic figures refers to a syntacti­cal and predicative order and position of the triples of terms, arranged in some diagrammed schemata, which, regrettably, are missing from the extant text of the Prior Analytics. Considering planar and graphic arrangements, both vertical and horizontal orders as well as the posi­tion of the three terms involved, we propose a reconstruction, at least to some extent, of these probable lettered diagrams. In such reconstructed diagrams, we can appropriately capture the definition of syllogism as a predicative connexion of terms, and easier survey a synoptic account of all valid predicative relations and transpositions, and also reduce the imperfect syllogisms into the moods of the first figure. Aristotle’s syllogistic is an analytical calculation of terms, understood as predicates and subjects within the categorical propositions, and more precisely of three terms schematized in three figures in predicative links such that, by means of a middle, follows from necessity a conclusion of the extreme terms. The necessity of the consequence is not based on the implication or inference of the propositions, but on a predictive transi­tivity through the middle term within the syllogistic figures. Syllogism must draw its conclusion through the way its terms are predicated of one another. Aristotle in his Prior Analytics developed also a complex account of modal syllogisms within necessity and possibility of belonging. This account involves also such an analyti­cal reduction to the syllogistic figures. In this analytical perspective, we try to throw some light on his modal syllogisms, although this difficult and nowadays thoroughly discussed topic would require a much wider treatment. (shrink)

R. Loredana Cardullo, Il libro Alpha della Metafisica di Aristotele tra storiografia e teoria, Catania 2009, pp. 294. R. Loredana Cardullo, A sclepio di Tralle. Commentario al libro Alpha Meizon della Metafisica di Aristotele. Intoduzione, testo greco, traduzione e note di commento, Acireale-Roma 2012, pp. 512. Paris 2012, pp. 164.

MacIntyre is a major defender of the resurgence of the Aristotelian approach in ethical and political theory. He considers Aristotelianism not only a feasible, but also an intellectually superior alternative to most contemporary dominant ideologies, and to liberalism in particular. There is, however, an important and instructive modification to his view of what is admissible from Aristotle that should be accounted for. The paper traces MacIntyre’s search for a defensible restatement of the Aristotelian ethics and examines in particular his (...) changing attitude to metaphysics as the basis for ethics within his project. Different stages of the development to his proposed Aristotelian alternative are analyzed and evaluated. The paper tries to show that despite the fact that MacIntyre initially repudiated Aristotle’s metaphysical biology, nevertheless his account has always been (implicitly or explicitly) metaphysical. (shrink)

This book is an extensive review & analysis of Aristotelian thought as received & adapted by such medieval commentators as Ammonius, Philoponus, Boethius, al-Farabi, Yahya ibn 'Adi, Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Martin of Dacia, Simon of Faversham, John Duns Scotus, Peter of Spain, Robert Kilwardby, William of Ockham, & Giles of Rome. The discussions range from metaphysics to logic, linguistics, & epistemology, encompassing such topics as being, god, causation, actuality, potentiality, universals, individuation, signification, cognition, certainty, infallibility, error, ignorance, analogy, (...) grammar, interpretation, foundationalism, & the eucharist & transubstantiation. (shrink)

The present account – conducted in the paradigm of the recent approach to Plato – comprises a new translation with a short introduction and source bibliography. It consists of three major parts: I. Plato’s own testimonies: arguments against writing; II. References within the dialogues to the dialectic of principles ; III. Testimonia Platonica. Apart from the relevant parts of Plato’s dialogues, the testimonies of Aristotle, Theophrastus and Sextus Empiricus have been taken into account. The translation of the testimonies has (...) been arranged in a more systematizing manner than it was in the previous editions. The idea is to provide the Polish reader with reliable sources on the widely discussed hermeneutics of the written and unwritten Plato. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present a new Polish translation of Aristotle’s Poetics, namely, those of its central chapters (6–19) that deal with the Stagirite’s explication of the mimesis of tragedy. When interpreting the first five chapters of the treatise, it is important to recognize the mimetic distinctions and forms according to means and objects as well as the question of how poetic creativity takes shape (generally from improvisation through epic to comedy and tragedy). On the basis (...) of these preliminary assumptions, Aristotle proceeds to define tragedy and analyze its components, forms and functions in more detail. Unlike the previous Polish translations of the Poetics, we have attempted here to render Aristotle’s essential technical expressions as faithfully as possible, without distorting them in accord with various concepts of modern aesthetics or literary criticism. We have also sought to preserve the Stagirite’s typical composition and his complex argument. Only in this way can the sense of Aristotle’s leading assumptions and distinctions be properly discerned. For the ease of reading, we also introduce more paragraphs and relevant subject headings into the text. (shrink)

The label idios apodeixis/logos «particular demonstration or argument» of Gorgias is known to us only from the third section of the little work attributed to Aristotle under the title De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. Its authenticity seems to be unjustly questioned. We try to show that from the Aristotelian perspective we can properly understand the context of Gorgias’ own argument from his lost treatise On Not-Being or On Nature. Parmenides – using implicitly the polysemy of the verb ἔστιν/εἶναι – presented (...) a certain ontological argument «being is, because being is being». Gorgias, however, makes a parody of this by offering a meontological argument: «not-being is because not-being is not-being». Consequently Gorgias then attempts to demonstrate, by means of refutation, that «it is not either to be or not be», i.e. «nothing is». We propose, thus, a reconstruction of Gorgias’ account of meonological and nihilistic argumentation. In this context we find in Plato’s Sophist and in Aristotle’s writings certain allusions to Gorgias’ idios apodeixis, which have not been sufficiently recognized and properly interpreted. (shrink)

Ancient Platonists and Aristotelians considered the heuristic method of reasoning to first principles as “analysis.” It was derived from Greek geometrical practice. Plato’s theory of first principles, as we reconstruct it following Aristotle, postulated such an “analytic system.” In this system both sensible things and mathematical objects, ideas and eidetic numbers are gradually reduced to the same principles (ἕν – μέγα – μικρόν). In the reversal order, from the principles are genetically elicited eidetic numbers and through them numbers, mathematical (...) objects, and sensible things. This is a great analytical system that in fact has a mathematical structure. It transcends the physical explanation of the Timaios and is a broad translation of the nature of things. Our considerations concern a reconstruction and debatable issues, and they follow the following topics: 1. Testimonia Platonica, 2. Analytic theory of principles and agrapha dogmata, 3. Contextual problem and the field of agrapha dogmata, 4. The construction of a system: a procedure from and toward the principles, 5. The alleged paradox: “Good – One.” Ethics or mathematics? 6. Written and unwritten dogmata: dialogue or system? (shrink)

Alfred Tarski frequently declared that his semantic definition of truth was inspired by Aristotle’s views. The present paper discusses this issue in the context of Marian Wesoły’s criticism of the thesis that there is an affinity between Tarski’s views and those of Aristotle. The article concludes with an inquiry into whether Aristotle’s definition of truthfulness can be identified with the correspondence theory of truth.

Strategic games require reasoning about other people’s and one’s own beliefs or intentions. Although they have clear commonalities with psychological tests of theory of mind, they are not clearly related to theory of mind tests for children between 9 and 10 years of age “Flobbe et al. J Logic Language Inform 17(4):417–442 (2008)”. We studied children’s (5–12 years of age) individual differences in how they played a strategic game by analyzing the strategies that they applied in a zero, first, and (...) second-order reasoning task. For the zero-order task, we found two subgroups with different accuracy levels. For the first-order task, subgroups of children applied different suboptimal strategies or an optimal strategy. For the second-order task only suboptimal strategies were present. Strategy use for all tasks was related to age. The 5- and 6-year old children were additionally tested on theory of mind understanding and executive functioning. Strategy-use in these children was related to working memory, but not to theory of mind after correction for age, verbal ability and general IQ. (shrink)

The paper deals with the ethical-moral dimension of Popper’s critical rationalism, which is the less analyzed aspect of his philosophy. Critical rationalism is not without assumptions. As a life attitude, it is actualized on the basis of one’s moral preferences based rather on assumptions than on critical reasonableness. Critical rationalism does not exclude logical argumentation and reasoning, but the adoption of them is predominantly the result of an individual moral decision and choice, based, paradoxically enough, on an irrational belief in (...) reason. The author considers this attitude to be productive, as it emphasizes individual moral responsibility. Nobody is able to persuade us about the relevance of what we don’t want to adopt and apply. Thus we find ourselves in the sphere of personal morality. (shrink)

Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). During the (...) last 2300 years this basic idea has been expressed in many ways, resulting in a rather extended family of views, theories, and theory sketches. The members of the family employ various concepts for the relevant relation (correspondence, conformity, congruence, agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signification, representation, reference, satisfaction) and/or various concepts for the relevant portion of reality (facts, states of affairs, situations, events, objects, sequences of objects, sets, properties, tropes). The resulting multiplicity of versions and reformulations of the theory is due to a blend of substantive and terminological differences. (shrink)

To study animal welfare empirically we need an objective basis for deciding when an animal is suffering. Suffering includes a wide range ofunpleasant emotional states such as fear, boredom, pain, and hunger. Suffering has evolved as a mechanism for avoiding sources ofdanger and threats to fitness. Captive animals often suffer in situations in which they are prevented from doing something that they are highly motivated to do. The an animal is prepared to pay to attain or to escape a situation (...) is an index ofhow the animal about that situation. Withholding conditions or commodities for which an animal shows (i.e., for which it continues to work despite increasing costs) is very likely to cause suffering. In designing environments for animals in zoos, farms, and laboratories, priority should be given to features for which animals show inelastic demand. The care ofanimals can thereby be based on an objective, animal-centered assessment of their needs. (shrink)

What is animal welfare? Why has it proved so difficult to find a definition that everyone can agree on? This concise and accessible guide is for anyone who is interested in animals and who has wondered how we can assess their welfare scientifically. It defines animal welfare as 'health and animals having what they want', a definition that can be easily understood by scientists and non-scientists alike, expresses in simple words what underlies many existing definitions, and shows what evidence we (...) need to collect to improve animal welfare in practice. Above all, it puts the animal's own point of view at the heart of an assessment of its welfare. But, can we really understand what animals want? A consistent theme running through the book is that not only is it possible to establish what animals want, but that this information is vital in helping us to make sense of the long and often confusing list of welfare measures that are now in use such as 'stress' and 'feel good hormones', expressive sounds and gestures, natural behaviour, cognitive bias, and stereotypies. Defining welfare as 'health and what animals want' allows us to distinguish between measures that are simply what an animal does when it is alert, aroused, or active and those measures that genuinely allow us to distinguish between situations the animals themselves see as positive or negative. Sentience (conscious feelings of pleasure, pain, and suffering) is for many people the essence of what is meant by welfare, but studying consciousness is notoriously difficult, particularly in non-human species. These difficulties are discussed in the context of our current - and as yet incomplete - knowledge of human and animal consciousness. Finally, the book highlights some key ideas in the relationship between animal welfare science and animal ethics and shows how closely the well-being of humans is linked to that of other animals. The Science of Animal Welfare is an ideal companion for undergraduate and graduate students taking courses in animal behaviour and welfare, as well as for professional researchers, practitioners and animal welfare consultants. At the same time, it is easily understandable to non-scientists and anyone without prior knowledge but with an interest in animals and the rapidly evolving science of animal welfare. (shrink)

The PhD thesis advances a new approach to vagueness as dispersion, comparing it with the main philosophical theories of vagueness in the analytic tradition.

This paper is concerned with a popular view about the nature of propositions, commonly known as the Russellian view of propositions. Alvin Plantinga has dubbed it, or more precisely, a crucial consequence of it, Existentialism, and in his paper “On Existentialism” (1983) he has presented a forceful argument intended as a reductio of this view. In what follows, I describe the main relevant ingredients of the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs. I present a relatively simple response Russellians (...) might want to make to Plantinga’s anti-existentialist argument. I then explore one aspect of this response—one that leads to some rather curious consequences for the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs. (shrink)

The author first used the neologisms mediot and mediotism in a series of 1973 essays. Both anagrams of “media idiot”, they base on the Greek idiotes in its meaning of “non-specialist” or “ignorant” rather than mentally backward. The terms basically refer to recipients of printed, electronic and digital media-press readers, TV viewers, radio listeners and internauts. Mediots uncritically accept all the media say, will-lessly allowing them to mould their minds and souls like plasticine. As if hypnotized, they readily submit to (...) every fashion, stereotype or snobbery the media propagate.Mediotism is a limitation and sign of contemporary humanity’s spiritual and intellectual weakness. At the same time, it constitutes an enormous challenge. Mediotism symptoms are easy to spot—they appear in all social classes and professions and on all education levels; its closest relatives are functional illiteracy and Erich Fromm’s “consumer idiot”.It is worth noting that mediotism and mediot have become commonly used terms in public (especially political) debate thanks to author’s two book publications and radio appearances. (shrink)

Truthmakers have come to play a central role in David Armstrong's metaphysics. They are the things that stand in the relation of truthmaking to truthbearers. This chapter focuses on the relation. More specifically, it discusses a thesis Armstrong holds about truthmaking that is of special importance to him; namely, the thesis that truthmaking is an internal relation. It explores what work this thesis is supposed to do for Armstrong, especially for this doctrine of the ontological free lunch, raising questions and (...) pointing out difficulties along the way. At the end of the chapter, it is shown that Armstrong's preferred truthbearers generate a serious difficulty for his thesis that the truthmaking relation is internal. (shrink)

Children in the Ancient Near Eastern Household. By Kristine Garroway. Explorations in Ancient Near Eastern Civilizations, vol. 3. Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2014. Pp. xvii + 374. $57.50.

Viewing missionary Protestantism and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as carriers of transnational institutional innovation, this article compares their successes and failures at creating self-sustaining institutions in distant societies. Missionary Protestantism and NGOs are similar in that they attempt to establish formal organizations outside kinship, lineage, and ethnic forms of solidarity. Focusing on institutions as ways to create collective capacities that organize social life, we trace the route whereby Protestant missionaries established congregational religion in Africa and identify social practices that made this (...) enterprise successful but are comparatively absent in current NGO attempts to transform organizational life. Largely ignored by sociologists interested in institutional transformation, the history of congregational religion offers valuable sociological lessons about the conditions for radical institutional innovation. Its success was rooted first, in colonial missionaries’ ability to enforce new ways of life on small exemplary communities; second, in local adaptations (African prophetic movements, Pentecostalism) that deepened and widened the social reach of congregational principles; and third in the incentives Protestantism created for propagating the congregational form. (shrink)

Through Our Eyes Only? is an immensely engaging exploration of one of the greatest remaining biological mysteries: the possibility of conscious experiences in non-human animals. Dawkins argues that the idea of consciousness in other species has now progressed from a vague possibility to a plausible, scientifically respectable view. Written in an accessible and entertaining style, this book aims to show how near -- and how far -- we are to understanding what goes on in the minds of other animals. 'Her (...) approach ... is impeccable ... Her writing is highly accessible, lively and illustrative.' - Booklist on the hardback edition. (shrink)

A constant of Frege’s writing is his rejection of indeterminate predicates as found in natural language. This paper follows Frege’s remarks on vagueness from the early "Begriffsschrift” to his mature works, drawing brief parallels with the main contemporary theories of vagueness. I critically examine Frege’s arguments for the inconsistency of natural language and argue that the inability to accommodate vagueness in his mature ontology is mainly due to heuristic rules of thumb which Frege took as essential, not to a deep (...) problem in his fundamental apparatus. (shrink)

As to the preference which most people—as long as they are not annoyed by instances—feel in favor of true propositions, this must be based, apparently, upon an ultimate ethical proposition: ‘It is good to believe true propositions, and bad to believe false ones’. This proposition, it is to be hoped, is true; but if it is not, there is no reason to think that we do ill in believing it. Bertrand Russell, “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions” (1904).

Margaret Urban Walker’s essay ‘Getting out of line’ questions gendered assumptions about moral agency in old age and its assumed links to the concept of a ‘career self.’ In this article I develop and apply her critique to consider what forms ageing activism might take. This focuses on recognising and remembering the value of connections with people and with struggles that may both pre-date and outlive the individual. I suggest that we need to think of remembering as future as well (...) as past oriented and as political as well as personal. In developing my argument I draw from experience of working with old people in initiatives focussed on achieving change in health and social care services, on accounts of feminist activists of different generations and on personal reflections of contacts that embody both awareness of different vulnerabilities and of shared struggles for change. (shrink)

Critical comments on Guido Melchior’s book, Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (2019). In the second part of his book, Melchior aims to employ his sensitivity account of the epistemic concept of checking to explain well-known puzzle cases about knowing. My comments focus on Melchior’s explanation of knowledge-closure puzzles, as exemplified by Dretske’s zebra case. I raise three critical points about the explanation Melchior proposes for puzzles of this type.