RésuméLes concepts de Ian Hacking ont apporté une contribution importante aux débats dans le domaine de la philosophie de la psychiatrie, qui est aussi au coeur de son Cours au Collège de France. Titulaire de la « Chaire de philosophie et d’histoire des concepts scientifiques » après Michel Foucault, il est l’auteur d’une réflexion sur la classification des troubles mentaux à partir de la problématique des natural kinds. Pour expliquer les cas d’études développés dans son enseignement parisien, nous revenons d’abord (...) sur une série de concepts, pour ensuite poser la question du statut des métaphores scientifiques, et enfin discuter les rapports entre les notions de « maladie mentale transitoire » et de culture-bound syndrome – cette dernière étant issue de la psychiatrie transculturelle canadienne. (shrink)

La maladie de l'ame... la belle expression platonicienne n'a de cesse d'etre d'actualite. Non seulement elle est prompte a revenir d'epoque en epoque, mais elle semble particulierement friande de la notre. Que cette maladie designe une vague tristesse, un taedium vitae, ou, plus grave, une depression, elle implique tout a la fois la souffrance morale et la souffrance physique. L'ame et le corps sont divises mais se retrouvent dans la douleur si bien que la maladie de l'ame vient de ce (...) que nous avons un corps. De ce constat paradoxal Jackie Pigeaud tire une histoire, celle du triomphe du dualisme, du fardeau de l'ame et du corps contraints a etre separes et ensemble a perpetuite. Cette histoire trouve son origine dans le monde grec, et plus exactement dans sa philosophie. La division entre maladies de l'ame et autres maladies, c'est-a-dire maladies du corps, appartient a la philosophie. La medecine aurait ete bien soulagee de cette partition. Est-ce a dire qu'elle n'entendait pas etre philosophique? Sans doute: Hippocrate en offre un bon exemple. L'accord, tacite, est le suivant: l'ame appartient au philosophe et le corps au medecin. Ciceron s'occupe des passions et Galien suspend son jugement des qu'il approche la psyche. Chacun y trouve son compte mais les consequences sont importantes: la partition du champ des maladies, la place du malade dans la societe, les traitements a apporter, notamment a la folie, dependent de ce dualisme initial. Si le legs de la medecine greco-romaine est riche, il est aussi fort lourd et trouve des developpements tout au long de l'histoire de la medecine, jusqu'a la constitution au XVIIIe siecle de la psychiatrie. D'une ecriture et d'une pensee personnelles et profondes, ce livre est un essai sur l'histoire de la pensee medicale, depuis l'Antiquite jusqu'a nos jours. La Maladie de l'ame a ete un succes des sa parution, et ce succes n'a pas ete dementi depuis. L'ouvrage n'etait malheureusement plus disponible: les livres ont leur destin commentait l'auteur. Avec cette edition revue et augmentee, accompagnee d'une preface nouvelle, le livre connait enfin le sort qu'il merite.Jackie Pigeaud est professeur emerite de litterature latine a l'Universite de Nantes et membre de l'Institut universitaire de France. On lui doit egalement, aux Belles Lettres, Folie et cures de la folie chez les medecins de l'Antiquite greco-romaine. La manie. (shrink)

Luke Demaitre's Leprosy in Premodern Medicine: A Malady of the Whole Body is a highly interesting study of the medical history of leprosy and the medical and social perceptions on leprosy that have been around for centuries. Remarkably, it is likely that leprosy will disappear from the face of the Earth in our generation, thanks to the development of a curative treatment and its increasing availability (although the battle has not yet been won completely). Demaitre's book is a very good (...) read not only for its information about leprosy but also for all interested in or affected by the social phenomenon of stigma. In illnesses such as leprosy, HIV/AIDS, epilepsy, and mental disorders such as schizophrenia, the stigma attached to the condition may be worse than the condition itself. (shrink)

This text is an innovative exploration of philosophy and madness in the context of the critical engagement of Heidegger's phenomenological ontology with Freudian psychoanalysis. Included is a play in which, after a mental breakdown, Martin Heidegger undergoes psychoanalytic treatment from Dr. Medard Boss. Boss is essentially caught between two intellectual giants: his patient, Heidegger, who challenges him to evolve beyond traditional Freudian psychoanalysis, and his mentor, Freud, who acts as a "ghostly" consultant in facilitating Heidegger's return to health. The dialogue (...) of the play consists of actual quotes taken from the major thinkers themselves, which enhances the authenticity of this fictitious production. In addition, the theoretical perspectives of Freud, Heidegger, Boss, and Ludwig Binswanger are included to enhance the readers' background knowledge. In the process of disclosing these brilliant theorists, this book uncovers what each orientation has to offer the others."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

This text is an innovative exploration of philosophy and madness in the context of the critical engagement of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology with Freudian psychoanalysis. Included is a play in which, after a mental breakdown, Martin Heidegger undergoes psychoanalytic treatment from Dr. Medard Boss. Boss is essentially caught between two intellectual giants: his patient, Heidegger, who challenges him to evolve beyond traditional Freudian psychoanalysis, and his mentor, Freud, who acts as a “ghostly” consultant in facilitating Heidegger’s return to health. The dialogue (...) of the play consists of actual quotes taken from the major thinkers themselves, which enhances the authenticity of this fictitious production. In addition, the theoretical perspectives of Freud, Heidegger, Boss, and Ludwig Binswanger are included to enhance the readers’ background knowledge. In the process of disclosing these brilliant theorists, this book uncovers what each orientation has to offer the others. (shrink)

Dans ce texte, nous proposons un cadre, qui vise à intégrer les contributions des approches constructionnistes et biologiques dans un domaine précis, celui des maladies mentales. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons quelques propositions récentes faites par des philosophes de la biologie — plus spécifiquement les idées avancées par les tenants de la « théorie des systèmes développementaux » ainsi que la notion d’« enracinement génératif » .In this paper, we are proposing a framework to integrate the core insights (...) of the constructivist and biological approaches of mental illness. In order to do so, we will use some recent propositions by philosophers of biology, specifically ideas put forth by «developmental system theory» and the notion of «generative entrenchment». (shrink)

Since the time of Hippocrates, madness has typically been viewed through the lens of disease, dysfunction, and defect. In 'Madness', philosopher of science Justin Garson presents a radically different paradigm for conceiving of madness and the forms that it takes. In this paradigm, which he calls madness-as-strategy, madness is neither a disease nor a defect, but a designed feature, like the heart or lungs.

In 1897, Cambridge University created a professorship in Mental Philosophy and Logic; despite the double name it was filled by a “mental philosopher,” James Ward, who did no work in logic. The chief logician candidate, John Venn, then turned his attention elsewhere, leaving Cambridge without senior leadership in logic. Ward himself turned to other philosophical issues, doing little further original work in mental philosophy. Cambridge became a center for a fresh interpretation of logic in the early 20th century, but with (...) no help from Venn. Psychology split off from mental philosophy, and what remained, the “philosophy of mind,” was developed elsewhere until after Ward’s tenure. (shrink)

Five leading figures in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science debate the central topic of mental representation. Each author's contribution is specially written for this volume, and then collectively discussed by the others. The editor frames the discussions and provides a way into the debates for new readers. An exciting feature of this collection is the transcribed discussion among all the contributors following each exchange. This is the latest thinking on mental representation carefully and critically analysed by the leading (...) thinkers in the field. (shrink)

Henri Maldiney est ancien élève de l’Ecole normale supérieure. Il fut prisonnier en Allemagne pendant la guerre. Il est un des représentants en France du courant philosophique de la phénoménologie. Ses champs de réflexion concernent la maladie mentale, l'art et, bien sûr la philosophie. Il a influencé nombre de psychiatres, de philosophes et d'artistes. La meilleure façon de proposer une introduction à la pensée de Henri Maldiney, c’est peut-être de faire partager une expérience personnelle de rencontre. Bernard Rigaud, en travaillant (...) sur différents sujets, a croisé et recroisé de façon régulière la pensée de ce philosophe. À chaque occasion, il a eu le sentiment d’être éclairé et inspiré. Partant des différentes modalités du mal-être, la pensée d’Henri Maldiney devient une pensée sur l’être. Mais comment penser ce qui est? Le philosophe nous conduit sur les voies de l’art, et sur les voies des dysfonctionnements, de la folie, de la dépression... (shrink)

English summary: Based on the famous essay by Georges Canguilhem on what is normal and pathological (originally published in 1943), extensive philosophical literature (mainly Anglo-Saxon) has attempted to define these concepts and analyze their status. The main discussion focuses on the following question: can you describe health and illness as natural phenomena or are they states that are determined by values? French text. French description: Depuis le celebre essai de Georges Canguilhem sur le normal et le pathologique publie initialement en (...) 1943 et dont l'un des objectifs etait la clarification des concepts de sante et de maladie, une litterature philosophique abondante, principalement anglo-saxonne, s'est attachee a definir ces concepts et a analyser leur statut. Le principal debat de ce domaine emergent de la philosophie de la medecine porte sur la question: peut-on decrire la sante et la maladie comme des phenomenes naturels ou s'agit-il d'etats qui sont determines par des valeurs? Tous les textes presentes dans ce volume ont participe de cette controverse. Ceux de la premiere section accordent une part importante a la composante biologique. Ceux de la seconde donnent le primat a la notion d'action. Ceux de la derniere section mettent en question l'utilite ou la possibilite meme de definir les deux concepts. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive study of the views of ancient philosophers on mental disorders. Relying on the original Greek and Latin textual sources, the author describes and analyses how the ancient philosophers explained mental illness and its symptoms, including hallucinations, delusions, strange fears and inappropriate moods and how they accounted for the respective roles of body and mind in such disorders. Also considered are ethical questions relating to mental illness, approaches to treatment and the position of mentally ill people (...) in societies of the times. The volume opens with a historical overview that examines ancient medical accounts of mental illness, from Hippocrates' famous Sacred Disease to late antiquity medical authors. Separate chapters interpret in detail the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Galen and the Stoics and a final chapter summarises the views of various strains of Scepticism, the Epicurean school and the Middle and Neo-Platonists. Offering an important and useful contribution to the study of ancient philosophy, psychology and medicine. This volume sheds new light on the history of mental illness and presents a new angle on ancient philosophical psychology. (shrink)

This book offers an ability-based view of mental disorders. It develops a detailed analysis of the concept of inability that is relevant in the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic context by drawing on the most recent literature on the concepts of ability, reasons and harm. What is it to have a mental disorder? This book contends that an individual has a mental disorder if and only if (1) they are-in the relevant sense-unable to respond adequately to their available (apparent) reasons in their (...) thinking, feeling or acting and (2) they are harmed by the condition underlying or resulting from that inability. The author calls this the "Rehability View". This view can account for what is "mental" about mental disorders: it is the rational relations among an individual's attitudes and actions that is "disordered", and the relevant norms are the norms of reasons. This view is compatible with explanations of mental disorders in terms of biological dysfunctions, without reducing the former to the latter. The aim is not to offer just another conception of mental disorder, but to develop a systematic approach that incorporates insights from philosophy of psychiatry and adjacent philosophical disciplines. Philosophy of Mental Disorder will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of psychiatry, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, ethics, and mental health. (shrink)

Les maladies de l’âme, dans les textes médicaux arabes des IXe-XIe siècles, jouent un rôle important dans la réflexion des médecins sur la nature de l’âme et ses rapports au corps. Au IXe siècle et au début du Xc siècle, la conception platonicogalénique formait la base de cette anthropologie médicale. Mais, avec le tournant aristotélicien qui marqua la philosophie arabe au Xc siècle, les bases de cette anthropologie furent remises en question, ainsi que la place du savoir médical et (...) sa relation à la philosophie naturelle. (shrink)

Ce livre s'emploie d'abord a dechiffrer des traces, des lignes, des figures naturelles, ensuite a tirer des regles generales de comprehension afin de fonder une science morphogenetique. Un paysage en devient un probleme. Il ne se cantonne pas dans la seule geologie critique. Il s'attache a montrer les ressources offertes par une science de l'espace, c'est-a-dire l'etudes des etalements, des rencontres et des distributions. La projection sur le sol des donnees peut les eclairer. Plus, la psychologie, la maladie mentale ont (...) elles-memes beneficie de cette optique topographique, parce que les hommes ne se concoivent qu'a travers les reseaux et les emplacements qui les definissent. L'espace n'est plus un cadre ou un contenant, mais un operateur decisif d'analyse et de constitution. Le savant gagne a se situer en des points-centres ou noeuds qui autorisent une lecture synoptique, de meme que les groupes se doivent d'explorer, voire de modifier les positions de leurs elements, ainsi que les liens qui les joignent. Cette neo-geographie va d'une science du paysage et des indices a l'examen des rapports souterrains, des chemins insoupconnes et des communications sociales. (shrink)

La savoir pyschiatrique et la pensée philosophique entretiennent des relations étroites d'intercritique et d'éclairage réciproque. La dynamique de ces échanges est sans cesse relancée par la croissance des connaissances sur les maladies mentales, l'organisation du cerveau et par les mutations de la société. La sémiologie, les interprétations psychopathologiques, la thérapeutique entraînent le praticien au seuil des cercles de la métaphysique de la connaissance et de l'intersubjectivité. Le savoir de la psychiatrie incite à reformuler certaines interrogations philosophiques essentielles. Il (...) permet d'esquisser les tracés des nouvelles frontières des " topiques " du psychisme humain et des diverses représentations et théories de l'Esprit. (shrink)

Does metacognition--the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance--derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations, and is essentially related to mental agency.

The effects of mental disorder are apparent and pervasive, in suffering, loss of freedom and life opportunities, negative impacts on education, work satisfaction and productivity, complications in law, institutions of healthcare, and more. With a new edition of the 'bible' of psychiatric diagnosis - the DSM - under developmental, it is timely to take a step back and re-evalutate exactly how we diagnose and define mental disorder. This new book by Derek Bolton tackles the problems involved in the definition and (...) boundaries of mental disorder. It addresses two main questions regarding mental illness. Firstly, what is the basis of the standards or norms by which we judge that a person has a mental disorder - that the person's mind is not working as it should, that their mental functioning is abnormal? Controversies about these questions have been dominated by the contrast between norms that are medical, scientific or natural, on the one hand, and social norms on the other. The norms that define mental disorder seem to belong to psychiatry, to be medical and scientific, but are they really social norms, hijacked and disguised by the medical profession? Secondly, what is the validity of the distinction between mental disorder and order, between abnormal and normal mental functioning? To what extent, notwithstanding appearances, does mental disorder involve meaningful reactions and problem-solving? These responses may be to normal problems of living, or to not so normal problems - to severe psycho-social challenges. Is there after all order in mental disorder? With the closing of asylums and the appearance of care in the community, mental disorder is now in our midst. While attempts have been made to define clearly a concept of mental disorder that is truly medical as opposed to social, there is increasing evidence that such a distinction is unviable - there is no clear line between what is normal in the population and what is abnormal. 'What is Mental Disorder?' reviews these various crucial developments and their profound impact for the concept and its boundaries in a provocative and timely book. (shrink)

Philosophy of Mental Illness The Philosophy of Mental Illness is an interdisciplinary field of study that combines views and methods from the philosophy of mind, psychology, neuroscience, and moral philosophy in order to analyze the nature of mental illness. Philosophers of mental illness are concerned with examining the ontological, epistemological, and normative issues arising from […].

This paper has two main objectives. The first, which could be said to be the ultimate objective, is to gradually introduce the research project of African philosophy to the philosophical scholars in Taiwan (as a case study) and by extension to Asia in general. The second is to expose the crucial role of contemporary African philosophy in the mental liberation and emancipation of the African peoples. And by the means of this role of contemporary African philosophy introduce it to philosophical (...) scholars and scholars in the humanities in Taiwan. It highlights the need and areas for a comparative or complementary research between African and Asia philosophies, with special focus on contemporary Taiwan philosophical scholarship. This work posits “mental liberation” as the end and motivation of African Philosophy. It maintains that, whereas the Western philosophical traditions, in most part, aim at mental liberation disinterestedly or strictly epistemologically, and the Eastern philosophical traditions, in most part, aim at mental liberation socio-ethically, the African philosophical traditions, in most part, aim at mental liberation socio-politically. (shrink)

"These days, who still has a soul?" asks Julia Kristeva in her latest psychoanalytic exploration, New Maladies of the Soul. Drawing on her fifteen years of experience as a practicing psychoanalyst, Kristeva reveals to readers a new kind of patient, symptomatic of an age of political upheaval, mass mediated culture, and the dramatic overhaul of familial and sexual mores. New Maladies of the Soul poses a troubling question about the human subject in the West today: Is the psychic (...) space that we have traditionally known disappearing? Kristeva finds that the psychoanalytic models of Freud and Lacan need to be reread in light of this new patient, a product of the contemporary moral crisis of values resulting from a loss of ideology and a deterioration of belief. By revisiting Freud and Lacan, Kristeva offers the hope of a new psychoanalysis. Each patient, she contends, suffers from a unique malady which must be targeted. In the first half of New Maladies of the Soul, Kristeva offers a series of detailed and fascinating case studies that reinforce her provocative theoretical notions. These case studies illustrate today's "new maladies" - common psychiatric disturbances such as hysteria, obsessional neurosis, and perversion - as they are manifested in today's patient. Drawing on the work of psychologist Helene Deutsch and the writer Germaine de Stael. Kristeva turns her attention in the second half of New Maladies of the Soul to women's experience and contributions within the broader context of contemporary history. Delving into art, literature, autobiography, and theories of language, she continues with an exploration of cultural products ranging from the Bible to the work of Leonardo da Vinci. Julia Kristeva offers the hope that these maladies harbor new creative potential, and new hope for the soul - if we can comprehend their effect on the individual and collective experiences of our time. (shrink)

(First paragraphs.) — The notion of “mental time” refers to the experience and awareness of time, including that of past, present, and future, and that of the passing of time. This experience and awareness of time raises a number of puzzling questions. How do we experience time? What exactly do we experience when we experience time? Do we actually experience time? Or do we infer time from something in, or some aspect of our experience? And so forth. These and many (...) related questions in the “philosophy of mental time”, the topic of this special issue of the Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, are not purely philosophical questions. Or at least, they are not likely to be satisfactorily answered by philosophers alone. Rather, they also need the input of neuroscientists, psychologists, physicists, linguists, and others. And conversely, answers to these questions may have implications outside the scope of philosophy. The papers in this special issue illustrate this inherent multi- or interdisciplinarity of the philosophy and science of mental time. In this theme introduction, we want to give a few more examples to illustrate this interdisciplinarity, but also to point out that much of the field is still wide open—that is, these illustrations raise more questions than answers. (shrink)

This paper investigates how "representation" is actually used in some areas in cognitive neuroscience. It is argued that recent philosophy has largely ignored an important kind of representation that differs in interesting ways from the representations that are standardly recognized in philosophy of mind. This overlooked kind of representation does not represent by having intentional contents; rather members of the kind represent by displaying or instantiating features. The investigation is not simply an ethnographic study of the discourse of neuroscientists. If (...) there are indeed two different kinds of representations, and the non-standard ones are the ones referred to in some areas of cognitive neuroscience, then we will have to give up the idea that appealing to inner representations with intentional contents is the defining distinction between cognitive neuroscience and behaviorist psychology (Montgomery, 1995). Further, if the conclusions of this paper are correct, many general accounts of how neural states represent are either false or theoretically ill-motivated. (shrink)

Six Maladies of the Contemporary Spirit undertakes an analysis of history, culture and the individual in terms of what Noica describes as the fundamental precariousness of Being. From the level of inanimate matter to that of the human spirit, Being does not reside inertly in the logical categories of universal/general/particular/individual and determinations we employ to define it, but is continually transforming the nexus of relations between them.

Philosophes et psychiatres nourrissent des capillarités secrètes et des questionnements communs. Souvent, la méditation du philosophe se met à l'école de ces situations et de ces visages de l'humain malade qui habitent des masques que l'on croit inhabitables, "horla", et que lui rapporte le psychiatre. Sous le souci de biologiser la maladie mentale, le savoir et le savoir-faire de la psychiatrie font le pari de l'humanité et de la nécessité de la relation, demandant: où demeure-t-il celui dont on dit qu'il (...) est un "demeuré"? Où est vraiment l'homme, lorsque nous découvrons combien nous sommes pressés de tracer très vite, trop vite, la frontière entre le délire et la réalité? (shrink)

The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played an important role in the development of memory research in the last couple decades. Despite its growing importance in psychology, philosophers have only begun to develop an interest in philosophical questions pertaining to the relationship between memory and mental time travel. Thus, this paper proposes a more systematic discussion of the relationship between memory and mental time travel from the point of view of philosophy. I start (...) by discussing some of the motivations to take memory to be a form of mental time travel. I call the resulting view of memory the mental time travel view. I then proceed to consider important philosophical questions pertaining to memory and develop them in the context of the mental time travel view. I conclude by suggesting that the intersection of the philosophy of memory and research on mental time travel not only provides new perspectives to think about traditional philosophical questions, but also new questions that have not been explored before. (shrink)

Here is an overview of what is to come. In Sections I and II, I will sketch two of the projects frequently pursued by moral philosophers, and the methods typically invoked in those projects. I will argue that these projects presuppose (or at least suggest) a particular sort of account of the mental representation of human value systems, since the methods make sense only if we assume a certain kind of story about how the human mind stores information about values. (...) The burden of my argument in Section III will be that while the jury is still out, there is some evidence suggesting that this account of mental representation is mistaken. If it is mistaken, it follows that two of the central methods of moral philosophy have to be substantially modified, or perhaps abandoned, and that the goals philosophers have sought to achieve with these methods may themselves be misguided. I fear that many of my philosophical colleagues will find this a quite radical suggestion. But if anything is clear in this area, it is that the methods we will be considering have not been conspicuously successful, though it certainly has not been for want of trying. So perhaps it is time for some radical, empirically informed rethinking of goals and methods in these parts of moral philosophy. (shrink)

With respect to the topic of “powers and abilities,” most readers will associate David Hume with his multi-pronged critique of traditional attempts to make robust explanatory use of those notions in a philosophical or scientific context. But Hume’s own philosophy is also structured around the attribution to human beings of a variety of basic faculties or mental powers – such as the reason and the imagination, or the various powers involved in Hume’s account of im- pressions of reflection and the (...) passions. Indeed, there is a clear case to be made that, despite his deflationary account of our concept of power, Hume continues to treat certain basic powers or faculties as forming the explanatory bedrock for his new “science of man”. In this essay, I will discuss how this apparent conflict between the “critical” (if not outright skeptical) and “constructive” aspects of Hume’s discussion of powers and abilities is best resolved – with special attention to the question of how this illuminates Hume’s place in the development of early modern conceptions of the proper method for philosophy. (shrink)

Charles Rosen commence son livre, Aux confins du sens. Propos sur la musique, en posant la question suivante :« Qu’est-ce que comprendre la musique ? Il est relativement facile de répondre à cette question, si on la pose à un niveau très modeste. Comprendre la musique, c’est tout simplement ne se sentir..