The scientific successes of the last 400 years strongly suggest a picture on which our scientific theories exhibit a layered structure of dependence and determination. Economics is dependent on and determined by psychology; psychology in its turn is, plausibly, dependent on and determined by biology; and so it goes. It is tempting to explain this layered structure of dependence and determination among our theories by appeal to a corresponding layered structure of dependence and determination among the entities putatively treated by (...) those theories. In this paper, I argue that we can resist this temptation: we can explain the sense in which, e.g., the biological truths are dependent on and determined by chemical truths without appealing to properly biological or chemical entities. This opens the door to a view on which, though there are more truths than just the purely physical truths, there are no entities, states, or properties other than the purely physical entities, states, and properties. I argue that some familiar strategies to explicate the idea of a layered structure of theories by appeal to reduction, ground, and truthmaking encounter difficulties. I then show how these difficulties point the way to a more satisfactory treatment which appeals to something very close to the notion of ground. Finally, I show how this treatment provides a theoretical setting in which we might fruitfully frame debates about which entities there really are. (shrink)

The symposiasts press from a number of directions. Erin Kelly contends that Hume’s stability-based sentimentalist ethics cannot do justice to our considered normative moral judgements. Schmitt and Williams criticize my account of Hume’s epistemology proper. I will have to give ground: my book does overstate the extent to which Hume reaches a destructive result, in large part because I overlook significant variants of a stability account of justification. I make other concessions—in regard to the country gentlemen passage and Hume’s 1.3.9 (...) treatment of resemblance—but believe these have limited repercussions. (shrink)

Local Currencies, Local Exchange Trading Systems, and Time Banks are all part of a new social movement that aims to restrict money's purchasing power within a certain geographic area, or within a certain community. According to their proponents, these restrictions may contribute to building sustainable local economies, supporting local businesses and creating “warmer” social relations. This article inquires whether the overall enthusiasm that surrounds alternative currencies is justified. It argues that the potential benefits of these currencies are not sufficient to (...) justify the restrictions they impose on money's purchasing power. Turning these currencies into effective channels of change, by increasing their scope and their strength, could severely hinder the pursuit of social justice, in a way that is probably not even necessary for achieving their objectives. The paper concludes that large-scale limitations of money's purchasing power are, therefore, undesirable. (shrink)

A formal sequent system dealing with Menelaus' configurations is introduced in this paper. The axiomatic sequents of the system stem from 2-cycles of Δ-complexes. The Euclidean and projective interpretations of the sequents are defined and a soundness result is proved. This system is decidable and its provable sequents deliver incidence results. A cyclic operad structure tied to this system is presented by generators and relations.

After examining these decisions in their one-period setting, they devote most of the book to a multiperiod context, which adds the long-term perspective most risk management analyses require.

This chapter contains section titled: Some Context The Traditional Interpretation Disarming the Evidence for the Traditional Interpretation Evidence that Hume Considers Inductive Inference Justified The Traditional Interpretation Revisited Hume's Epistemic Options Applications to Extended Objects and Belief in God Limitations on Enumerative Induction Acknowledgments References.

Contemporary commentators such as Rosalind Hursthouse misconstrue Aristotle’s doctrine of the ethical mean. They propose a monist account of his moral psychology, explaining each virtue in terms of the presence or absence of a single psychological trait. In contrast, the author argues that Aristotle depicts virtue as a balancing of two opposed psychological inclinations that push and pull in different directions. Each inclination is a positive force in its own right; neither is mere privation. This dualistic account of moral psychology (...) is a more specific application of a recurrent explanatory model one finds elsewhere in Aristotle’s wide-ranging philosophy. In discussing the virtuous mean, moral success can be attributed to the human agent as composite whole or to the indivisible soul. (shrink)

Engaging a listener’s trust imposes moral demands upon a presenter in respect of truthtelling and completeness. An agent lies by an utterance that satisfies what are herein defined as signal and mendacity conditions; an agent deceives when, in satisfaction of those conditions, the agent’s utterances contribute to a false belief or thwart a true one. I advert to how we may fool ourselves in observation and in the perception of our originality. Communication with others depends upon a convention or practice (...) of presumed nonuniversal truthfulness. In support of an asserted duty of nondeceptiveness, I offer a reconciliation of pertinent Kantian passages, a sketch of arguments within utilitarianism, contractarianism, and other views, and an account arguing for application of that duty to assertions, implicatures, omissions, equivocation, prevarication, and sophistry insofar as they affect listeners’ doxastic states. For scholarship, this duty is exceptionless. I describe the kernel of intellectual honesty as a virtuous disposition such that when presented with an incentive to deceive, the agent will not deceive. Intellectual honesty delivers candor when it counts. I contrast this with complementary virtues and the surpassing virtue of ingenuousness. An account is given of the connection between intellectual honesty and an influential physical model of integrity. (shrink)

Subtitle: "Experiential understanding and the impossibility of intrinsically valuing suffering." Suffering, I argue, is bad. This paper supports that claim by defending a somewhat bolder-sounding one: namely that if anyone—even a sadistic ‘amoralist’—fully understands the fact that someone else is suffering, then the only evaluative attitude they can possibly form towards the person’s suffering as such is that of being _intrinsically against_ it. I first argue that, necessarily, everyone is disposed to be intrinsically against their _own_ suffering experiences, holding fixed (...) their specific overall degree of emotional aversiveness, because any evaluative attitude other than ‘being against’—including mere indifference—would in certain key circumstances make our suffering less emotionally aversive and thus different from the suffering experience (stipulatively) at issue. Second, fully understanding that someone else is having a given experience—Mary’s experiencing a vividly blue sky, say, or Job’s experiencing heart-rending grief—requires that we represent _experientially_ their very instance of that experience-type (it requires, in other words, token phenomenal concepts). The result is that what goes for our own suffering goes for others’, too: maintaining an accurate experiential representation of the fact that someone else is having a suffering experience with a specific degree of overall emotional aversiveness is only compatible with coming to be intrinsically against their suffering. So suffering is—‘objectively’—bad: it’s only possible to respond with indifference towards anyone’s suffering if we don’t fully understand that they are suffering in the first place. (shrink)

Theories of equal human rights have experienced an exponential growth during the past thirty or forty years. From declarations of human rights, such as the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to arguments about the rights of fetuses versus the rights of women, to claims and counter claims about the rights of minorities to preferential hiring, the rights of animals to life and well-being, and the rights of trees to be preserved, the proliferation of rights affects every phase of (...) our socio-political discourse. Hardly a month goes by without a new book appearing on the subject. (shrink)

XXIX. Retour à Aphrodisias. Compléments à Documents XXV, BCH 1983. XXX. Ampoules chrétiennes. Ces petites ampoules, contenant un peu d'huile sainte, étaient portées sur le corps comme des objets de protection. Types trouvés en Asie Mineure : Saint André, Jean l'Évangéliste, la fuite en Egypte. XXXI. Pline VI 49, Démodamas de Milet et la reine Apamè. Démodamas de Milet, général de Séleucos I, connu par Pline et par des décrets de Milet en l'honneur d'Antiochos et d'Apamè. Son zèle pour le (...) Didymeion. Les décrets milésiens datant de 299, son expédition en Sogdiane se place vers 306. XXXII. Documents pergaméniens. 1. Un décret de Pergame : le décret OGI 332, trouvé près d'Élaia, à trois heures de Pergame, décrétant des honneurs à Attale III victorieux (érection de deux statues ; célébration régulière de l'anniversaire de son retour à Pergame, fête exceptionnelle pour l'entrée du roi dans «notre ville»), émane bien de Pergame et non d'Élaia comme on a cru pouvoir l'affirmer à cause de l'opposition entre « Pergame » et « notre ville » : en fait au moment du vote du décret Attale est bien arrivé sur le territoire de Pergame, et il se repose à l'Asclépieion avant son entrée solennelle dans la ville. Autres entrées solennelles de rois ou de Romains. 2. Un décret d'Élaia : dans le décret Syllogez 694, décidant de consacrer des stèles de bronze portant le traité d'alliance avec Rome, la prééminence de Déméter et Core dans les cultes de la cité montre que ce décret émane d'Élaia, dont les types monétaires montrent, à côté d'Athéna et de l'olivier, Déméter, le grain de blé, la torche. 3. Fabriques royales : les ergastéria mentionnés dans une lettre d'un roi de Pergame (Welles, Roy. Cor., 23) sur les droits et privilèges d'un prêtre ne sont pas des fabriques royales, mais simplement des ateliers-boutiques, construites par le roi, dans un portique du sanctuaire, et louées chaque année au bénéfice du prêtre. XXXIII. A Gaunos avec Quintus de Smyrne. Justesse de la description de « Gaunos la creuse » par Quintus de Smyrne. Les voyageurs et la description de la petite plaine, du lac, et du cadre de montagnes. Le Tarbélos est à identifier avec le massif Sandras Dag. Richesse du territoire, malgré les fièvres : les figues, l'encens, la forêt, la pêche. La place de Gaunos dans le monde hellénistique : Gauniens à l'étranger, notamment en Egypte, avec Zenon. (shrink)

The rationale of patents on transgenic organisms leads to the startling notion of the human qua infringement. The moral reasons by which we may tenably reject such notion are not conclusive as to human life forms outside the body. A close look at recombinant DNA experimentation reveals ingenious processes, but not entities that the body lacks. Except for artificial genes, the genes of biotechnology are found on chromosomes, albeit nonconsecutively, and their uninterrupted transcripts appear in messenger RNA. An enhanced form (...) of protection for ingenious processes, the human methods patent, is proposed and defended as a replacement for product patents. The proposed patent would pertain to biotechnology manufacturing and genetic intervention in somatic and germ cells. A counterpart could govern nonhuman life forms. It is argued that compulsory licensing protections should be a condition of such patent. Contrary to the conservative assumption that statutory sobriquets suffice, the reckoning of what qualifies as a patentable ingenious process will continue to require systematic scientific guidance. (shrink)

Who other than Don Garrett could construct a work this rigorous and comprehensive, encompassing Hume’s aesthetics, political philosophy, and philosophy of religion—not as add-ons but tightly integrated into a genuinely new interpretation? Garrett’s intricate reading has no equal in the architectonic it locates in Hume’s philosophical corpus. This elegantly crafted work will reinvigorate thinking about Hume’s theory of normativity across the epistemic and moral realms.1 I center my comments on a central line of argument in chapters 4, 5, and 7. (...) In chapter 4, Garrett focuses on four “sense-based” concepts or pairs of such concepts: virtue, beauty, causation, and probability.... (shrink)

Comprehensive and accessible, Moral Reasoning introduces students to the historical foundations of moral theory and contemporary ethics. Beginning with Aristotle, the text offers a careful, in-depth introduction to the many schools of moral thought that have contributed to Western philosophy, exploring such topics as utilitarianism, deontology, liberalism, human rights, virtue, and religious ethics. With contemporary examples incorporated throughout, this innovative new book fosters critical reflection on topical moral issues, encouraging students to develop a personal moral compass that transcends peer pressure (...) and ideology. (shrink)

The fundamental argument of this book is that the evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy—from Emerson to Rorty—results in a conception of philosophy as a form of cultural criticism in which the meaning of America is put forward by intellectuals in response to distinct social and cultural crises. In this sense, American Pragmatism is less a philosophical tradition putting forward solutions to perennial problems in the Western philosophical conversation initiated by Plato and more a continuous cultural commentary or set of interpretations that (...) attempt to explain America to itself at a particular historical moment.The goal of a sophisticated neopragmatism is to think genealogically about specific practices in... (shrink)

Originally published in 1961. This book is a study of some important ways of knowledge and experience and of the symbols through which they become articulate. Both ‘knowledge’ and ‘experience’ are interpreted in wide senses which are sanctioned by common use – though not always by the usage of philosophers and scientists. The four main fields considered are: the arts, religion, moral knowledge, and our knowledge of one another. These fields, though distinguishable, are nevertheless found to be interrelated in subtle (...) and interesting ways, and it is contended that increase of ‘wisdom’, or ‘educated understanding’, can be achieved only through acceptance and assimilation of all their many-sided disciplines into personal insight. The book deals in a new way with questions of perennial interest which, because they are fundamental, are difficult. Nevertheless, the writing is lucid and untechnical and addressed to a wide range of readers. (shrink)

Ces Controverses pascaliennes de Louis Lafuma forment un ouvrage assez court mais de premiere importance sur l'oeuvre de Blaise Pascal. S'appuyant sur nombre de sources souvent inedites, l'auteur procede, avec une rigueur et une prudence toutes scientifiques, a des mises au point relatives a des erreurs d'interpretations, des jugements a l'emporte-piece (mais ayant la vie dure) et diverses meprises concernant les textes et inventions de Pascal, des Pensees aux travaux scientifiques : problemes de datation, questions d'authenticite (de fragments aussi (...) bien que de textes entiers tel le Discours sur les passions de l'amour, ou encore de portraits comme celui peint par Philippe de Champaigne), accusations graves (Pascal auteur de fausses lettres, Pascal plagiaire philosophique et scientifique), valeur comparee des differentes editions des Pensees, etc. L'ouvrage de Louis Lafuma retrace enfin, dans un tres beau chapitre, l'histoire exacte de l'invention de la pascaline, la celebre "machine arithmetique" du genie de Port-Royal. (shrink)

Questions of ethics and politics have a long tradition in the classroom as well as the political world. Those who act in the political realm¿including the media, political strategists and consultants, educators, and religious leaders¿are in professions for which a clear code of conduct or an accepted set of ethical norms exists. By contrast, Donald J. Trump, as candidate and as President, has upended the political and ethical context in which he and others operate. This book explores emerging ethical questions (...) that face professionals interacting with a new executive order. Some say the age of Trump is unique and that the norms of ethical professional behavior must be bent to meet this challenge. Others maintain that responding to someone like Trump is precisely why their profession has ethical norms, and that they must put their judgments on hold and respond in what has always been deemed the appropriate professional manner. Each chapter opens with an introduction setting the framework of ethical analysis for a particular profession, is followed by original contributions by notable practitioners, and concludes with a set of questions for students and other readers to ponder and discuss. (shrink)

The main focus of this dissertation is the late medieval doctrine of Concurrentism. Concurrentists hold that God is immediately, causally involved in every event in nature, and yet so are creatures: For any natural effect to obtain, both God and creature must make a genuine causal contribution to the effect. Yet the presence of God's immanent activity in nature is claimed to not overdetermine or render otiose the real and necessary causal input of creatures. I develop and defend this view (...) as follows. First, I explain that---for the theist---any proper account of secondary causation can be given only against the backdrop of God's primary causation, which is best described as God's causal providence. Next, I offer a traditional interpretation of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, one that sharply distinguishes it in kind from ordinary, natural efficient causality or production. Given this interpretation, I argue that simply in virtue of being committed to creation ex nihilo, the theist is thereby committed to a theory of primary causation that I call The Strong View of Divine Providence . SP entails that God must not only sustain or conserve that which He creates, but also act directly in the operations of His creatures, and in the production of their effects. I then employ SP to evaluate the various theories of secondary causation available. Of the three possible contenders---Mere Conservationism, Occasionalism, and Concurrentism---I argue that only the latter two are compatible with SP. I then provide objections to occasionalism, showing how the doctrine either undermines its commitments to both divine providence and human freedom---so is philosophically and theologically unacceptable---or is better categorized as a version of one of the other two theories. Since mere conservationism is ruled out, simply given the conditions of SP, it follows that the most plausible view for the traditional theist to hold is some version of concurrentism. I then offer a positive analysis of concurrentism by explaining why God must concur with creatures, what God's concurrence amounts to, and then describe a simple model to explain how God concurs with creatures. (shrink)

In general historical treatments, one often encounters the idea that Kepler’s and Newton’s discovery of elliptical planetary orbits marked a decisive break with tradition and definitively undermined any possibility of an Aristotelian approach to physics and astronomy. Although Aristotle had no understanding of gravity, I want to demonstrate that elliptical orbits were a refinement of earlier models and that one can produce an Aristotelian account of elliptical orbits once one corrects his crucial mistake about gravity. One interesting side-effect of this (...) straightforwardly Aristotelian approach is that it eliminates the empty, second focal point around which any elliptical system revolves. I should emphasize that the present paper is not intended to contradict, oppose, or replace any aspect of contemporary mathematical physics or astronomy. The point is not to propose a new scientific theory—we all know that planetary orbits are elliptical—but to demonstrate that metaphysical Aristotelianism is more versatile than is generally supposed. (shrink)