In this dissertation I seek to answer the question, “What are the virtues of the excellent citizen in a liberal democracy?" This question is important on three levels. First, if civic virtue is as important to the perpetuation of liberal democratic community as neo-liberal and communitarian thinkers have argued, then curiosity alone should motivate us. Second, if projects to foster the virtues are critical, then we must understand the virtues in order to foster them effectively (...) and appropriately. Third, those who wish to attain greater excellence in citizenship need to know what the virtues are so that they may pursue them. In Chapters One and Two, I argue that current accounts of civic virtue are deficient because they fail to explore its basis, nature, and constituents. To better understand civic virtue, we must explore specific citizen virtues. To fulfill this aim, we require a citizen virtue catalog structured by an explanatory framework that is anchored in the role-based nature of citizen virtue. Such a framework provides the rationale for determining which virtues should be included in the catalog and which should not as well as a basis for comparing competing catalogs. As the role of citizen is to assist his state, the citizen virtues are those qualities that enable the citizen to assist the state in achieving its aims” in protecting, promoting, and realizing the liberal democratic ideals (namely, freedom, equality, self-government, collective cooperation, and stability). In the remaining chapters, I survey neo-liberal accounts of citizen virtue proposed by Richard Dagger, William Galston, David Jones, Mark Kingwell, Stephen Macedo, and Thomas Spragens, Jr. I apply the Chapter Two framework to assess the virtue candidates they propose. These chapters share a common format but differ in focus. Chapter Three takes up the citizen virtues that treat political community: cooperation, participation, vigilance, deliberative excellence, and obedience to law. Chapter Four, the liberal citizen virtues: allegiance to liberal democratic community, tolerance, and respect for rights. And Chapter Five, the citizen virtues relating to self-governance: autonomy, responsibility, and restraint. Chapter Six concludes. (shrink)

The essays in the volume address educational issues that arise when national, sub-national and supra-national identities compete. How can we determine the limits to parental educational rights when liberalism's concern to protect and promote children's autonomy conflicts with the desire to maintain communal integrity? Given the advances made by the forces of globalization, can the liberal-democratic state morally justify its traditional purpose of forging a cohesive national identity? Or has increasing globalization rendered this educational aim obsolete and morally (...) corrupt? Should liberal education instead seek to foster a sense of global citizenship, even if doing so would suppress patriotic identification?In addressing these and many other questions, the volume examines the theoretical and practical issues at stake between nationalists, multiculturalists and cosmopolitans in the field of education. The fifteen essays, plus an introductory essay by the editors, provide a genuine, productive dialogue between political and legal philosophers and educational theorists. (shrink)

The essays in this volume address the educational issues which arise when national, sub-national, and supra-national identities compete. How can we determine the limits of parental educational rights when the concern of liberalism to protect and promote children's autonomy conflicts with the desire to maintain communal integrity? Given the advances made by the forces of globalization, can the liberal-democratic state morally justify its traditional purpose of forging a cohesive national identity? Or has increasing globalization rendered this educational aim (...) obsolete and morally corrupt? Should liberal education instead seek to foster a sense of global citizenship, even if doing so would suppress patriotic identification? In addressing these and many other questions, the volume examines the theoretical and practical issues at stake between nationalists, multiculturalists, and cosmopolitans in the field of education. The fifteen essays, plus an introductory essay by the editors, provide a genuine, productive dialogue between political and legal philosophers and educational theorists. (shrink)

Recently, mental strength education requires to change in a way that establishes a military value system suitable for a liberal democracy while facing the need to strengthen mental strength in response to unpredictable security situations. The key to fulfilling these twofold objectives lies in the fact that there is a positive correlation between the enhancement of a soldier’s democratic awareness and intangible force. Therefore, it is of great importance to emphasize the concept of ‘citizen in uniform’ as one (...) of the central military values. However, this concept has one problem before its use in military mental strength in which the orders of the military status and the orders of the civic seem heterogeneous and even conflicting. This study aims to dissolve the internal tension of this concept through a new philosophical interpretation of citizens in uniform, freedom, people and state, thereby providing the foundation for establishing for establishing new military values and enhancement of mental force. To this end, it examines the explanation of the current curriculum regarding these concepts first and diagnoses its several problems (II). The current curriculum presents a brief explanation of the compatibility of civil rights and military obligations but does not resolve the conflict between the two. A new understanding of them is possible by introducing Hegelian insights in Philosophy of Rights (III). From Hegel's point of view, freedom is not the mere absence of coercion but a capacity for self-determination. Freedom is difficult to realize wholly at the level of an isolated individual, and it calls for an ethical community to give it a specific form. A state that is the best entity in humanity is the supreme unit that defines individual freedom and identity. Then it naturally derives that national defense is one of the supreme missions directly related to the freedom and identity of its people. A re-description of the contents of the curriculum based on these insights can conceptually resolve the aforementioned problem and even strengthen its arguments (IV). The state and the people are in a more essential correlation than previously depicted, and liberal democratic values such as freedom, human rights and welfare are proved as constitutive of a state itself. The superiority of liberal democracy, which the current textbook attempts to prove, also becomes transparent. Finally, military duties do not conceptually conflict with civil freedom but are considered as a form of it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Girardian Critique of the Liberal Democratic Peace TheoryKyle Scott (bio)IntroductionRené Girard is unfamiliar to most political scientists, but the liberal democratic peace theory (LDPT) is known by almost all in the discipline. René Girard has developed a theory of the origin and perpetuation of violence that is well known to scholars in literature, anthropology, and theology. Girard’s theory can be adapted to the LDPT (...) in order to provide a causal explanation for the empirical evidence that finds democracies do not go to war with one another. Without understanding why democracies do not fight one another, the LDPT is only an empirical artifact. Uncovering a causal explanation, if one exists, can help lead researchers to unravel the paradox of why democracies do not go to war with one another but are just as war prone as nondemocracies. In addition to unraveling this paradox, understanding the causal link between peace and democracy will help us find out whether more democracies will lead to more peace.Girard poses a challenge to the democratization for peace thesis, a thesis that serves as the basis for much of the foreign policy of the United States.1 For Girard, violence originates in desire. A subject desires what others desire and [End Page 45] therefore others are seen as roadblocks to that desire. This can turn violent. But the violence does not have to occur between the two subjects who have the same desire; it can be redirected to a surrogate victim who ends up being a scapegoat. If Girard’s theory is applied to the LDPT, the conclusion would be that nondemocracies are merely scapegoats for democracies so that order can be maintained in communities of democracies. Therefore, if the world becomes composed entirely of democracies, there will be no scapegoats left and democracies will fight one another.Such a theory of violence, and such a critique of the LDPT, is unfamiliar to mainstream political scientists.2 I do not suggest that Girard’s theory holds the answer to the problem of achieving perpetual peace, but the base assumption of Girard’s theory should be addressed by those who favor the LDPT. Girard begins from the idea that to achieve peace one must first understand the origin of violence. The LDPT, on the other hand, looks only at the conditions in which peace occurs, ignoring the origins of violence, thus potentially arriving at misleading conclusions.3 Applying Girard’s theory to the LDPT, and deriving alternative hypotheses from that application, will benefit all those who study war, as Girard provides a fresh perspective in the search for the causal mechanism underlying the empirical findings.Fortunately this article is not the first to apply Girard’s theory outside its traditional arenas. John Steele explains that expressive punishment can be explained in Girardian terms; R. G. Hamerton-Kelly argues that nuclear deterrence can be understood in Girardian terms; and Scott Thomas examines the current state of international affairs in a Girardian context.4 These studies can be used as a template by scholars trying to apply Girard’s theory to a field of study that has not previously used it. I will follow this template by first providing a critical examination of the current state of LDPT scholarship and then moving on to a discussion of Girard’s theory of violence. Section III contrasts Girard’s theory with other alternative explanations of war and peace in order to distinguish Girard’s theory from these explanations and to help clarify Girard’s theory.I. The Liberal Democratic Peace TheoryThe most widely accepted theory in international relations is the LDPT, even though empirical evidence supports both sides in the debate. However, most scholars agree that stable democracies do not go to war with other stable democracies.5 There are critics who suggest that the logic underlying the democratic [End Page 46] peace theory is flawed, and that exceptions to the theory can be found.6 The point of this article is not to contest the findings of those who support or refute the LDPT, but to illuminate one of its gravest shortcomings—the lack of a convincing causal explanation—and to provide direction to... (shrink)

This study compares the codes of media ethics adopted by the PCCPress Complaints Commission, the IFJInternational Federation of Journalists and the SPJSociety of Professional Journalists based on the claim that it is the public's right to know, and examines the origins of this concept. A new approach is presented here which falls between the liberal-democratic approach on the one hand and on the other, the extreme ultra-Orthodox approach that claims that it is the public's duty not to know. (...) This new approach which indicates that it is the public's duty to know has evolved from the analysis of Jewish texts from Biblical times and from the study of events in Jewish community life throughout the world. This novel approach is likely to effect a change in the contents of broadcasts and in the boundaries of media ethics. (shrink)

The idea that victims of social injustice who commit crimes ought not to be subject to punishment has attracted serious attention in recent legal and political philosophy. R. A. Duff has argued, for example, a states that perpetrates social injustice lacks the standing to punish victims of such injustice who commit crimes. A crucial premiss in his argument concerns the fact that when courts in liberal society mete out legitimate criminal punishments, they are conceived as acting in the name (...) of all citizens—on behalf of the whole political community. Resisting this premiss, Peter Chau has suggested that courts ought to be conceived as acting only in the name of “just citizens”: citizens who cannot be plausibly seen as having contributed to distributive injustice. When conceived in this way, Chau argues, courts can no longer plausibly be regarded as lacking standing to punish. This article uses the debate between Duff and Chau to explain why the question of whether to punish socially deprived offenders can only be answered adequately when connected to broader concerns of democratic theory. Specifically, it argues that Chau’s proposal is not available within the context of the kind of political community upon which (Duff rightly believes) a system of liberal criminal law depends for its justification and maintenance: a community in which citizens see the law as embodying shared norms whose specific demands they disagree about. State officials are morally permitted to see themselves as acting on behalf of a subset of the citizenry, I argue, only in circumstances of democratic crisis : circumstances in which a moral community can no longer be plausibly said to exist. (shrink)

Whether religious and other voluntary associations should reflect public values is a subject of controversy. Corey Brettschneider argues that the state should assert its own values of free and equal citizenship, deliberately attempting to transform the beliefs of illiberal groups through court decisions and through selective withdrawal of tax exemptions. I argue, however, that as long as individuals and groups comply with the law, it is not the business of the state to change their beliefs. Moreover, public authority itself does (...) not always exemplify his preferred values. Second, although I oppose direct funding for organizations that oppose public values, determining which organizations espouse the “right” values accords too much power to public authority. Moreover, many associations evolve over time. Finally, the true threat lies in practices that voluntary associations may seek to impose on the larger community. (shrink)

How should we understand the familiar demand that journalists ‘be objective’? One possibility is that journalists are under an obligation to report only the facts of the matter. However, facts need to be interpreted, selected, and communicated. How can this be done objectively? This paper aims to explain the concept of journalistic objectivity in methodological terms. Specifically, I will argue that the ideal of journalistic objectivity should be recast as a commitment to John Rawls’s conception of public reason. Journalism plays (...) a vital role in the operation of all modern liberal democracies, functioning as the public watchdog, the fourth estate, or the conduit through which vital information flows to the citizenry. Journalism is, therefore, an institution that is best understood as part of the basic structure of society. In Political Liberalism, Rawls explicitly excludes media of any kind from the demands of public reason because he doesn’t think that they play a political role that is important enough to bring them under the official auspices of public reason. I will argue that overlooking the political significance of journalism is a mistake, but one that can be corrected while keeping within the spirit and most important elements of his theory. This revision will widen the scope for what counts as journalism beyond traditional outlets and forms of media but will impose the demands of public reason on anyone who intends to participate in the institution. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Social‐scientific data, such as those found in Philip E. Converse's 1964 essay, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” have led some to question whether basic assumptions about democratic legitimacy are unfounded. However, by another set of criteria, we have the “democracy” that was intended by the Framers—namely, a liberal representative system that avoids strong civic engagement by the citizenry. At its deepest level, the American system has been designed to ensure elite influence over the main (...) ambitions of American policy: the expansion of public and private power. When social scientists accumulate findings of civic disengagement and ignorance, it is wrongly supposed to be an indictment of the citizenry; rather, those findings should be understood as the expected result of a certain set of commitments throughout American political history, of which civic apathy and ignorance are the desired outcomes. (shrink)

The essay attempts to outline the historical ideological ties between Spain and its former Latin American colonies, with the main accent on the period following Spain’s and most of Latin America’s conversion to democracy in the wake of the fall of the Franco regime and other Latin-American military dictatorships. The author offers a detailed analysis, focusing especially on the democratic, decidedly pro-European and left-liberal government in Spain and its impact on Latin America, most of which today shows clear (...) leftist tendencies. Also discussed are Latin-American reflections on universalism. (shrink)

This paper subjects to critical analysis four common arguments in the sociopolitical theory literature supporting the cultural nationalist thesis that liberal democracy is viable only against the background of a single national public culture: the arguments that (1) social integration in a liberal democracy requires shared norms and beliefs (Schnapper); (2) the levels of trust that democratic politics requires can be attained only among conationals (Miller); (3) democratic deliberation requires communicational transparency, possible in turn only within (...) a shared national public culture (Miller, Barry); and (4) the economic viability of specifically industrialized liberal democracies requires a single national culture (Gellner). I argue that all four arguments fail: At best, a shared cultural nation may reduce some of the costs liberal democratic societies must incur; at worst, cultural nationalist policies ironically undermine social integration. The failure of these cultural nationalist arguments clears the way for a normative theory of liberal democracy in multinational and postnational contexts. (shrink)

The relationship between Eastern Orthodoxy and the political ethos of the West is of crucial importance for contextualizing the Church’s social engagement in the present day. Aristotle Papanikolaou and Vigen Guroian highlight points of tension in their respective accounts of the relationship between the Orthodoxy and western democratic social orders. Analysis of their argument provides a context for examining their contrasting understandings of human rights as a dimension of the public engagement of Orthodox Christians with the political realm. While (...) neither completely rejects appeals to human rights, neither claims that such rhetoric manifests the full truth about the dignity of the human person according to the theological anthropology of Orthodox Christianity. Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, Archbishop Anastasios Yannoulatos of Albania, the statements of the Council of Crete, and several other contemporary Orthodox voices place appeals to human rights in a theologically nuanced context that affirms their legitimacy while refraining from identifying them with the fullness of the moral and spiritual vision of Orthodox Christianity. Analysis of the debate between Papanikolaou and Guroian gives rise to a tentative affirmation of the critical use of the language of human rights in Eastern Orthodox social ethics. (shrink)

In both political science and political theory, democratization has largely been considered a problem for non-liberal democratic countries. Drawing on Chinese political thinker Jiwei Ci’s writings on freedom, democracy, agency, plausibility, and legitimacy, I critically reconstruct Ci’s theory of democratization and his method of theorizing. I argue that a normative account of democratization is embedded in Ci’s political thought, which is based upon a philosophical anthropology of the modern man and focuses on broadening political possibilities in a given (...) society. Ci’s theory allows us to think about democratization beyond the binary of democracy and authoritarianism, as his theory places democratization as an inherent and persistent challenge for all political communities. (shrink)

For decades, scholars and politicians have vigorously debated whether Confucianism is compatible with democracy, yet little is known about how it affects the process of democratization in East Asia. In this book, Doh Chull Shin examines the prevalence of core Confucian legacies and their impacts on civic and political orientations in six Confucian countries: China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Analyses of the Asian Barometer and World Values surveys reveal that popular attachment to Confucian legacies has mixed results (...) on democratic demand. While Confucian political legacies encourage demand for a non-liberal democratic government that prioritizes the economic welfare of the community over the freedom of individual citizens, its social legacies promote interpersonal trust and tolerance, which are critical components of democratic civic life. Thus, the author argues that citizens of historically Confucian Asia have an opportunity to combine the best of Confucian ideals and democratic principles in a novel, particularly East Asian brand of democracy. (shrink)

This paper is a survey of recent work on liberal-democratic civic education. The main goal is trying to offer an approach to the dilemmas of public schooling in pluralistic societies. Accordingly, these are some points to discuss: How can a liberal-democracy build a common civic identity among group based diversity? Which values could be shared by democratic citizens who are members of different religious, ethnical or linguistic communities? To sum up, this article wants to show the (...) dificulties of public shools in order to educate children in shared civic virtues. Specially, in a social context in which families and churches socializate them in their particular moral values and religious beliefs. (shrink)

Selected by Christianity Today as one of the 100 most important books on religion of the twentieth century. Leading theological ethicist Stanley Hauerwas shows how discussions of Christology and the authority of scripture involve questions about what kind of community the church must be to rightly tell the stories of God. He challenges the dominant assumption of contemporary Christian social ethics that there is a special relation between Christianity and some form of liberal democratic social system.

After a recent spate of terrorist attacks in European and American cities, liberal democracies are reintroducing emergency securitarian measures that curtail rights and/or expand police powers. Political theorists who study ESMs are familiar with how such measures become instruments of discrimination and abuse, but the fundamental conflict ESMs pose for not just civil liberty but also democratic equality still remains insufficiently explored. Such phenomena are usually explained as a function of public panic or fear-mongering in times of crisis, (...) but I show that the tension between security and equality is in fact much deeper and more general. It follows a different logic than the more familiar tension between security and liberty, and it concerns not just the rule of law in protecting liberty but also the role of law in integrating new or previously subjected groups into a democratic community. As liberal-democratic societies become increasingly diverse and multicultural in the present era of mass immigration and global interconnectedness, this tension between security and equality is likely to become more pronounced. (shrink)

Carens has done more than any other political theorist or philosopher to develop the normative perspective of prospective migrants from within the liberal democratic tradition, but he has not sufficiently engaged with the other side of the argument – in particular, with the value of political community and the principle of collective self-determination. What is at stake for the immigrant-receiving country that might justify its claim to control immigration? I first examine Carens’ theory of social membership and (...) its connection to political community. I then discuss his method of ‘political theory from the ground up’ and his interpretation of democratic principles. I conclude with a discussion of the principle of collective self-determination. (shrink)

Abstract: The cosmopolitan ideal of liberal universalism seems to be at odds with liberalism's insistence on national borders for liberal democratic communities, creating disparate standards of distributive justice for insiders and outsiders. The liberal's dilemma on the question of cosmopolitan justice would seem to be an extension of this broader conundrum of conflicting loyalties of statism and globalism. The challenge for liberalism, then, seems to be to show how the practices of exclusive membership embody the principle (...) of moral equality. While discerning a variety of liberal reasons to give some scope to the claim that statism and globalism need not be an irreconcilable dilemma within liberalism, the essay argues that these reasons fail to provide a satisfactory resolution. Instead, the essay points out, global democracy can be the direction for both a statist and a cosmopolitan liberal, and the two camps a case not of conflicting loyalties but of multiple loyalties. (shrink)

Nationalism appears to be so entrenched in political life and discourse, that its illiberal face is often deemed to be an exception and unfortunate coincidence triggered by international terrorism. Alternatively, it may be depicted as the result of ill-thought policies which can be reversible. In this paper, I argue that liberal nationalism is conceptually flawed and politically illiberal. Illiberal tendencies are an integral part of it and these cannot be corrected by ‘taming’ unruly nationalism or by articulating ‘benign’ adaptations (...) of it. Because the liberal and illiberal faces are interwoven in complex ways, my suggestion is to look far ahead and beyond it. The territory may be uncharted, but a commitment to a pro-human welfare orientation could open the way for separating liberalism from nationalism and aligning the former with critical democratic politics. The challenge, as I see it, is to articulate a liberal anationalism which by affirming equal human dignity and the importance of non-domination could sustain inclusionary and democratic communities. (shrink)

In multicultural societies different communities live side by side with each other, respecting each other's identities and traditions to different degrees, sometimes living in harmony and sometimes in conflict. The phenomenon of multiculturalism requires us to re-examine many of the concepts used in political theory, for example 'citizenship', 'rights', 'toleration', 'democracy'. Most of all, multiculturalism demands a redefinition of educational ends and means. The writers in this volume employ their discussions of multiculturalism to reflect on the liberal democratic (...) tradition and in so doing allow us better to understand its scope as well as its limits. (shrink)

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls defends the claim that ‘decent’ societies (non-liberal, non-democratic constitutional republics) deserve full and good standing in the international community. His defense of decent societies consists of two main arguments. First, he argues that the basic human right to political participation does not imply a right to democratic political institutions. This argument has been thoroughly discussed by commentators. Second, he argues that decent societies, if admitted to the international community, (...) would pose no special threat to the stability of that community. This argument has largely been ignored. My aim in this article is to analyze this second argument, which I call the ‘peace argument'. argumen. (shrink)

This dissertation defends an ideal of democratic citizenship inspired by John Dewey’s theory of human flourishing, or “growth.” In its emphasis on the interrelatedness of individual development and social progress, Deweyan growth orients us toward a morally substantive approach to addressing the important question of how diverse citizens can live together well. I argue, however, that Dewey’s understanding of growth as a process by which conflicting interests, beliefs, and values are integrated into a more unified whole—both within the (...) class='Hi'>community and within the self—is inadequate to the radical pluralism characteristic of contemporary liberal democratic societies. Given the pragmatist insight into the crucial role of socialization in identity formation, the problem with conceptualizing the ideal self as an integrated unity is that, for many, the complexity and diversity of our social world presents an insuperable obstacle to sustaining a unified (or always unifying) self. Most of us have multiple “selves” forged by the various groups with whom we identify and the often incongruous roles we play in our personal, professional, and/or public lives. Hence I offer a reconstruction of Deweyan growth that accounts for persistent yet positively valued diversity, both within the self and within the community. On the view I urge, which draws on the work of neopragmatist Richard Rorty and Chicana feminist Gloria Anzaldua, divisions within the self and between citizens are not merely problems always to be overcome, but potential resources for creating a stronger, more inclusive democracy. (shrink)

The increasing number of residents and citizens with non-Western cultural backgrounds in the European Union (EU) has prompted the question of whether EU member states (and other Western democracies) can accommodate the newcomers and maintain their free polities (‘liberal democracies’). The answer depends on how important – if at all – cultural groundings are to democratic polities. The analysis of a fascinating Habermas-Ratzinger debate on the ‘pre-political moral foundations of the free-state’ suggests that while legitimacy originates on the (...) will of the citizens that conform the political community, liberal democracies might not be completely free from moral principles implicit in their political culture. This possibility has normative implications for the political future of the EU - and of the West in general - particularly regarding immigration, integration and citizenship policies. (shrink)

The creation of new search powers in the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act post-9/11 to make citizens more transparent to state surveillance was less a new phenomenon than an extension of preexisting tendencies to make citizens transparent to the state, so the risks they pose can be efficiently managed. However, 9/11 brought about a shift in the ways in which the Supreme Court of Canada talked about terrorism; terrorism was no longer placed on a continuum of criminal activity but was elevated to (...) a threat to Canadian values as a whole. I argue that, paradoxically, this shift reconnected the Court to earlier discourses about privacy as an essential element of democratic governance and reinvigorated narratives around the importance of the public-private boundary to democratic relationships by situating privacy within narratives informed by social memory. From this perspective, privacy can be conceptualized as a status claim: as citizens, we are entitled to privacy because privacy is the boundary that creates right relationships between citizens and between citizens and the state. This avoids pitting privacy as an individual right against societal interests in transparency because it more fully actualizes Priscilla Regan’s call to theorize the value of privacy as a public good central to liberal democratic governance. This conception also reconnects Alan Westin’s original understanding of privacy as an element of liberal democracy to the sociological research he drew on, enriching the liberal conception of privacy by locating it in the intersubjective communication of cultural actors living in community. (shrink)

Spinoza's Ethics is rarely read as a work of political theory. Its formidable geometric structure and its author's commitment to a kind of metaphysical determinism do not seem promising materials from which to fashion a theory of democratic self-government. Yet impressions can mislead. A close reading of the Ethics reveals it to be an impassioned, deeply political book. Its aim is not only to liberate the individualfrom false beliefs and systems of power but also to enable us to act (...) in concert as members of a democratic community. Above all, the work represents a celebration of individuality and the joys of life in all its plenitude. The Ethics provides Spinoza's clearest answer to the question "What is a free people (libera multitudo)? " only briefly alluded to at the end of his unfinished Political Treatise. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that the corresponding rise of postmodernism and the triumph of neo-liberalism are not only not accidental, the triumph of neo-liberalism has been facilitated by postmodernism. Postmodernism has been primarily directed not against mainstream modernism, the modernism of Hobbes, Smith, Darwin and social Darwinism, but against the radical modernist quest for justice and emancipation with its roots in German thought. The Social Democratic State, the principles of which were articulated by Hegel, is construed as (...) a partial triumph of this radical modernism, realizing a higher level of reciprocal recognition and overcoming much of the brutality of the Liberal State. Postmodernism is shown to be a manifestation of the decadence of the Social Democratic State, characterized by the disintegration of cognitive and ethical developments which have been the condition for people to form communities based on reciprocal recognition. In this regard it parallels the decadence which took place in ancient Rome, for similar reasons: both the Roman Empire and the Social Democratic State reduced people to passive recipients of the benefits of their societies. The implications of this are twofold. If Social Democracy is to be revived, it will require a struggle for ‘strong’ democracy; that is, for a major role for participatory democracy. On the other hand if people opt for the creation of confederations of genuinely democratic communities to replace the State, this will not be achieved by postmodern decadence but through the developments of cognitive forms and communities through which the recognition of people as free agents is instititionalized. (shrink)

Matthew Lipman claims that the community of inquiry is an exemplar of democracy in action. To many proponents the community of inquiry is considered invaluable for achieving desirable social and political ends through education for democracy. But what sort of democracy should we be educating for? In this paper I outline three models of democracy: the liberal model, which emphasises rights and duties, and draws upon pre-political assumptions about freedom; communitarianism, which focuses on identity and participation in (...) the creation of political ends; and deliberative self-governance, whereby citizens deliberatively shape their collective lives in public forums—at various levels of government and in different political and social arenas. I argue that some kind of deliberative democracy is defensible as a preliminary justification for how citizens might shape their lives, and therefore compatible with other forms of democracy, insofar as they can result from democratic deliberations. Acceptance of such a view raises further questions about the purpose or aims of education consistent with this conception of democracy. I contend that it requires an educational model that is committed to aligning curriculum, pedagogy, assessment and school governance to produce a transformational environment that will inform our structures—a commitment to democratic education and not merely education for democracy. Lipman goes part of the way to achieving these ends, but learning how to be proficient at democratic decision-making is like all tasks children and adolescents learn to perform. It involves action, understanding, and awareness of what counts as doing the task adequately. (shrink)

Liberal and communitarian democrats describe different ways in which liberty, democracy, and community might exist together in political associations. The modern differentiation of political associations from traditional communities favours liberal accounts, in which a democratic society's collective acts do not extend beyond the official decisions of elected governments. While participatory self-rule does not seem possible at the level of the nation-state, however, there remain analogues to communal practices in various styles of political reasoning. Communitarians should therefore (...) advocate customs of argument in which inferences considered acceptable by liberal-democrats no longer count as politically adequate. A fuller morality of public choice should result. (shrink)

This article examines when economic sanctions should be imposed on liberal democracies that violate democratic norms. The argument is made from the social-liberal standpoint, which recognises the moral status of political communities. While social liberals rarely refer to the use of economic sanctions as a pressure tool, by examining why they restrict military intervention and economic aid to cases of massive human rights violations or acute humanitarian need, the article is able to show why they are likely (...) to impose strong restrictions on the use of economic sanctions as well. After reconstructing the social-liberal case against economic sanctions, the article develops the argument that liberal democracies have reasons to support sanctions on other liberal democracies, even when they perpetrate injustices on a smaller scale. Liberal democracies share especially strong ideological, cultural and institutional bonds, and these peer group relations open them to mutual influence. When one liberal democracy commits serious injustices while still proclaiming allegiance to the democratic ethos, it can adversely affect the vitality of the democratic culture in those other liberal democracies with which it maintains close relations. Other liberal democracies therefore have the right and the obligation to condemn this behaviour, in order to preserve their allegiance to their values. The article defends the use of economic sanctions in light of some recent critiques, and concludes by providing an overall assessment of the factors which liberal democracies ought to take into account when they consider imposing economic sanctions on other liberal democracies. (shrink)

Constructing Community examines community from the particular perspective of the shaping and control of urban space in contemporary liberal democracies. Following a consideration and critique of influential theories of community that have arisen within European philosophy over the last three decades, Brian Elliott investigates parallel approaches to community within urban theory and practice over the same period. Underlying the comparison of political theory and urban practice is a basic assumption that community and place are (...) intimately connected such that the one cannot be adequately understood without the other. The underlying intention of this book is to advocate a particular understanding of community, one that centers on collective, grassroots oppositional action. While it draws on certain current theories and practices, the model of community put forward is far from the orthodox position. This study is a provocative and original analysis of the question of urban politics in contemporary liberal democracies. It offers a strong case for reconsidering current debates on democratic politics in light of the connection between political power and the control of public space and the built environment. (shrink)

In The Democratic Soul, Aaron L. Herold argues that liberal democracy's current crisis—of extreme polarization, rising populism, and disillusionment with political institutions—must be understood as the culmination of a deeper dissatisfaction with the liberal Enlightenment. Major elements of both the Left and the Right now reject the Enlightenment's emphasis on rights as theoretically unfounded and morally undesirable and have sought to recover a contrasting politics of obligation. But this has re-opened questions about the relationship between politics and (...) religion long thought settled. To address our situation, Herold examines the political thought of Spinoza and Tocqueville, two authors united in support of liberal democracy but with differing assessments of the Enlightenment. Through an original reading of Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise, Herold uncovers the theological foundation of liberal democracy: a comprehensive moral teaching rehabilitating human self-interest, denigrating "devotion" as a relic of "superstition," and cultivating a pride in living, acting, and thinking for oneself. In his political vision, Spinoza articulates our highest hopes for liberalism, for he is confident such an outlook will produce both intellectual flourishing and a paradoxical recovery of community. But Spinoza's project contains tensions which continue to trouble democracy today. As Herold shows via a new interpretation of Tocqueville's Democracy in America, the dissatisfactions now destabilizing democracy can be traced to the Enlightenment's failure to find a place for religious longings whose existence it largely denied. In particular, Tocqueville described a natural human desire for a kind of happiness found, at least partly, in self-sacrifice. Because modernity weakens religion precisely as it makes democracy stronger than liberalism, it permits this desire to find new and dangerous outlets. Tocqueville thus sought to design a "new political science" which could rectify this problem and which therefore remains indispensable today in recovering the moderation lacking in contemporary politics. (shrink)

Democracy is emerging as the political system of choice throughout the world. Peoples now freed from the shackles of totalitarian systems seek to share the benefits made possible by democracy in its "home bases" in North America and Western Europe. Yet, paradoxically, in the last decade liberal democracy has been subjected to an onslaught of criticism from thinkers at its "home bases". Criticisms of democracy have been informed by scholarship in feminism, postmodernism and communitarianism as well as the revived (...) interest in applying ethics to public policy. These criticisms raise important questions about the traditional values - liberalism, neutrality or equality, autonomy, and human rights - thought to justify democracy. They also raise questions about the success of democratic systems in promoting alternative values and in protecting lifestyles not desired by majorities. This anthology contains essays by authors at the forefront of the controversy as well as by acute observers of the processes by which "democratic" public policy is formed. The essays include criticisms of democratic theory and practice, defences of liberalism (the set of values often thought to ground democracy), calls for major revisions of democratic institutions and practices, and recommendations for new ways of understanding our rights and responsibilities as members of democratic communities. Show More Show Less. (shrink)

This paper seeks to reconstruct the role of schooling in a moment of accelerated social, political, economic, geo-political, climatic, indeed planetary crisis. It identifies the school as a potentially prefigurative institution, an evolutionary social frontier, capable of nurturing the democratic social character, a form of sensibility apart from which authentic political democracy is not possible. As theorized by Herbert Marcuse and Richard Hart and Antonio Negri, the “new sensibility” or “multitude” is characterized by greater psychological freedom, individuality, social creativity (...) and self-rule, comprising a “whole of singularities” that “acts in common”. It suggests a human subject with a vital, biological drive for liberation, with a consciousness capable of breaking through the material as well as ideological veil of a society based on hierarchy and domination, and is associated politically with democracy and social-anarchism, or what Murray Bookchin called “communalism”. This paper identifies three main characteristics of an institution informed by this form of modal subjectivity, all of them based on student-teacher dialogue: an emergent, project-based curriculum, whole-school direct democratic governance on all levels of the community, and the regular practice of communal philosophical inquiry, through which we problematize the concepts we live by, in the interest of their ongoing reconstruction. (shrink)

The paper examines the complex relation between anti-democratic forces (“the extremists”) and the broader liberal-democratic institutional environment. The task of containing extremists is analysed both from a theoretical standpoint and in terms of its practical feasibility. I argue that the realities of political communication and the character of political argumentation make containing extremism in practice a much more daunting proposition than is usually understood in the literature. Insights from political philosophy, political science and communication theory are brought (...) together to press these points. As a result, extremists often cannot be stopped from running for office even if the state possesses tools to ban extremist parties. Moreover, once extremist politicians become members of legislative bodies, several democratic and procedural considerations start to apply to them so that it becomes difficult to limit their influence. Their elevated status (given their positions as legitimate representatives of the people, together with the increased media and argumentative platform they gain) complicates attempts at stopping the proliferation of their views. The last part of the paper briefly sketches possible (remnants of) a strategy of containment, arguing that only a combination of informal sanctions can be (partially) successful, including deplatforming, refusal to engage with them, and a pariah status in the legislative assembly. (shrink)

Les langues de bois ne sont pas l’apanage des systèmes autoritaires et totalitaires. Les sociétés démocratiques et ouvertes n’échappent pas, loin s’en faut, au phénomène. Les professionnels de la « com », sous l’influence de processus de civilisations dont le principal effet consiste à produire des sociétés de plus en plus policées, élaborent à la demande de leurs donneurs d’ordre des dispositifs discursifs et des méthodes visant à réduire les risques propres à la communication. Privilégiant une conception instrumentale de la (...) communication, le destin des « communicants » se réduirait-il à transformer leur activité en principale arme contre les valeurs démocratiques et humanistes portées par la communication ? Pour dépasser la com et libérer la communication de toutes les langues de bois qui l’emprisonnent, il convient de transformer les conditions pratiques de l’exercice de ces professionnels en renforçant leur rôle de médiateur.« Doublespeak » in its different forms is by no means the sole preserve of authoritarian or totalitarian regime: open democratic societies are equally afflicted. Professionals in « communication », working under the influence of processes of civilisation whose main effect is to produce increasingly policed societies, receive commissions to develop patterns and methods of discourse whose aim is to minimise the risks inherent to communication itself. In treating communication primarily as an instrument, these « communicators » may well find that their activities are turning into a particularly lethal weapon against the democratic and humanist values that are inherent to communication. To move beyond this subverted form of communication and liberate it from the many forms of doublespeak that have imprisoned it, the practical conditions in which they exercise their profession need to be transformed by reinforcing their role as mediators. (shrink)

In an era defined by events that continuously shake Fukuyama’s thesis according to which liberal democracy constitutes the end of History, there is need for a democratic ideal that puts the role of civic action at the heart of its justification. In this article, I argue that John Dewey’s democratic ideal understood as a matter of civic co-creation, where democratic pursuits are continually redefined by citizens through solving communal problems - not set by history, once and (...) for all - provides a valuable response to this need. To this end, this article reconsiders Deweyan democracy by:(1) presenting it as a transformational process, in opposition to liberal democracy; (2) discussing Dewey’s conception of active citizenship as requiring more than mere political participation; (3) articulating Dewey’s democratic ideal as a form of applied social intelligence; (4) making explicit the pedagogical consequences of Deweyan democracy; and (5) interpreting it as a form of peaceful conflict resolution aiming at balance in inter-personal relationships. (shrink)

The paper discusses three aspects of belonging to religious systems of belief within a modern liberal society, namely (1) the sincerity and consistency of belief, (2) the possibility of exteriorization of belief through broader social interactions or transactions, and (3) the relationship between religious belief and the modern concept of affirmative tolerance, or affirmation of differences, which has become a pronounced public policy in multicultural liberal societies. The author argues that, while negative tolerance allows sincere religious belief to (...) flourish in the private sphere and for benevolence to be shown to those who are seen as mistaken in their beliefs, affirmative tolerance opens an array of logical issues. The demand to extend potential substantive validation to opposed beliefs produces the ricochet effect of de-validating one’s own beliefs. This creates difficulties for religious communities when issues at stake are beliefs that, in the respective belief-systems, are definitive of the moral goodness and moral badness. Upon a more careful examination of the logical relations between the soteriological promises characteristic of what is sometimes called the ‘substantive’ layer of religiousness, on the one hand, and the public expectation of a tolerant coexistence of religious communities on a social level, on the other hand, it becomes clear that the tolerance required can only be a negative tolerance. Any expectation of affirmative tolerance de-values the soteriological script of the respective system of religious belief, and is thus likely to lead to serious disturbances in a liberal context of multi-cultural coexistence. The author argues that the recent political announcements of a ‘failure of the multicultural experiment’ are caused by the aggressive pursuit of ‘affirmative tolerance’ rather than by any in-built intolerance of others in any of the large religious belief systems now prevalent in the liberal democratic world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Women on the Global Market: Irigaray and the Democratic StateNicole Fermon (bio)Best known for her subtle interrogation of philosophy and psychoanalysis, Luce Irigaray clearly also conducts a dialogue with the political, proposing that women’s erasure from culture and society invalidates all economies, sexual or political. Because woman has disappeared both figuratively and literally from society [see Sen, “More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing”], Irigaray conceives the contemporary (...) ethical project as a recall to difference rather than equality, to difference between women and men—that is, sexual difference. She characterizes relations between men and women as market relations in which women are commodities, objects, but never subjects of exchange, objects to men but not to themselves: women do not belong to themselves but exist “to keep relationships among men running smoothly” [TS 192]. Women under these conditions require imaginative ways to reconfigure the self, to subvert the melancholy and regression of masculinist economies and envisage a future in which women would not be ashamed of the feminine, would experience it as a positivity worth emulating.Irigaray contends that after the gains of egalitarian politics are carefully examined, the inclusion of women in the political arena has failed to take into account women’s distinct and different position from men, and from each other, as well as perpetuating the fiction of the “neutral” citizen, the ahistorical individual citizen of the nation-state. It is that fiction Irigaray dispels in her critique of liberal democratic politics and its creation, “citizens who are neuter in regard to familial singularity, its laws, and necessary sexual difference” [SG 112] in order to benefit the State and its laws. The subject is male; the citizen is neuter. Who is the female citizen in contemporary society? What is the ethical elaboration of the contractual relations between women and men, and between sexed individuals and the community? How do women imagine a distinct set of rights and responsibilities based on self-definition and autonomy, given the particular strictures of contemporary politics—that is, the market-driven, antidemocratic nature of the current economic national and global forces? Irigaray suggests that “the return of women to collective work, to public places, to social relations, demands linguistic mutations” and profound transformations, an embodied imagination with force and agency in civil life [TD 65].Irigaray warns that if civil and political participation is construed in overly narrow terms, if focus is on economic or judicial “circuits” alone, we overlook the symbolic organization of power—women risk losing “everything without even being acknowledged” [TD 56]. Instead an interval of recognition can expand the political to include the concerns and activities of real women, lest silence imply consent to sexual neutrality, or more likely, to women’s obliteration under men’s interests and concerns. Women’s insistence on self-definition and wage labor, on love and justly remunerated work, [End Page 120] testifies to the obduracy of women’s difference, one that is not likely to disappear. The patriarchal family is still the legal norm, even when certain exceptions are made, while enduring questions regarding women’s health and children’s physical welfare as priorities beyond market considerations are consigned to legislative obfuscation, still a political afterthought. Instead, in the US the liberal state removes the slender welfare net specific to women and children, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and fails to provide medical coverage to those who are among the most vulnerable of its citizens. Women without access to the legal protection of sex-neutral citizenship, poor working women without language (the money for an effective “mouthpiece” to represent their distress in a court of law), are further disempowered by liberal politics’ insistence on sexual neutrality—that is, on repression or amnesia regarding the lived experiences of women.Sexual difference is key to any project of self-definition by women. Irigaray insists on the sexual nature of this self-definition, not solely for its obvious procreative necessity, but because the natural world is a source of renewal and fecundity which requires attentive interrogation and respect [SG 15]. This rebirth seems alien to the structure of male politics, which instead seem to provoke disasters (Bhopal, Chernobyl, or the current runaway... (shrink)

In the current crisis of liberal democracy, Confucianism has been cited as offering superior alternative models of government. With the resources from Dewey’s Pragmatism, this paper defends democracy, which should not be equated to de facto liberal democracies, as desirable for Confucian societies. It examines the affinities between Confucian and Dewey’s conception of the person and community and argues for an understanding of democratic values that brings together Dewey’s democratic values and Confucian ideals of personal (...) cultivation and virtuous governance. (shrink)

In liberal thought, democracy is guaranteed by the unity of community and government. The community of citizens elects its government according to political preferences. The government rules over the community with powers that are limited by unalienable human, civil, and political rights. These assumptions have characterized Classical Liberalism, Revisionist Liberalism, and contemporary Neo-Liberal theories. However, the assumed unity of community and government becomes problematic in Global Post-Fordism. Recent research on the globalization of the economy (...) and society has underscored the increasing inability of nation-states to exercise power over their communities, which, in turn, limits the ability of communities to express their will at the nation-state level. The current phase of capitalism is characterized by socio-economic relations that transcend the jurisdictions of nation-states and local spaces. By introducing features characteristic of Classical Liberalism, Revisionist Liberalism and Neo-liberalism, and the contribution of the theory of Reflexive Modernization, which represents a novel attempt to rethink democracy within the liberal tradition, the issue of the fracture of the unity of community and government can be addressed. The inability of governments to control economic and non-economic environments creates a crisis of representation that implies serious limits to liberal democracy. This situation is particularly important for the agricultural and food sector since its development and programs for its democratization have been historically based on the intervention of agencies of and control by the nation-state. (shrink)

This book makes a significant contribution to the contemporary debate about multiculturalism and democratic theory. It reflects upon the ways in which claims about culture and identity are advanced by immigrants, national minorities, aboriginals, and other groups. It argues that liberal democrats should provide recognition and support for minority cultures and identities, and examines case studies from a number of different societies to show how theorists can learn about justice.

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family:CalistoMT;} From his theory of communicative action (1981) until his later political writings, the philosopher Jürgen Habermas has put on the juridical language the main responsibility of describing the essence of Civil Society. That´s why the Habermasian analysis becomes a defence of a capitalistic conception of the actual society, (...) turning around a strict notion of individual. (shrink)

This paper examines some neglected aspects of the conceptualisation of teaching as a ‘practice’ and as involving a ‘community of practice’. The concepts of a ‘practice’ and of a ‘community of practice’ are brought into focus by contrasting the differing senses of the notions employed in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Etienne Wenger respectively. Concepts of educational ‘practice’ and ‘communities of practice’ which embody a coherent overall holistic vision of education are contrasted with senses of educational ‘practice’ (...) and ‘communities of practice’ which relate to lower level, specific and subordinate elements of the educational process which are detachable from such visions. The possibility of specifying a single, common, overall, holistic conception of an educational ‘practice’ or ‘community of practice’ in the context of a pluralistic, diverse, liberal democratic society is discussed. It is suggested that the demands of diversity in this context open up the possibility of, and the need for, diverse forms of teacher education and training based on differing and partly competing conceptions of educational ‘practice’ and ‘communities of practice’ involving contrasting, coherent, overall, holistic visions of education. (shrink)

A democratic society cannot flourish if its citizens merely pursue their own narrow interests. If it is to do more than survive, at least a substantial proportion of its citizens must fulfill responsibilities that go beyond simply avoiding the violation of others' rights and occasionally casting a vote. The vitality and success of a democracy requires that many citizens — ideally all of them — contribute something to their communities and participate responsibly in the political process. The disposition to (...) do these things is a large part of what constitutes civic virtue. But that virtue encompasses considerably more. My task here is to explore civic virtue. I first outline a conception of virtue in general and, with that set out, pursue the question of what makes a virtue civic. My special concern is to articulate what constitutes civic virtue in relation to an enduring problem for democratic societies and especially for the pluralistic democracies of the Western world: how to determine what constitutes a proper relation between religion and politics and, in the lives of religious citizens having civic virtue, an appropriate balance between religious and secular considerations. (shrink)

Most liberal political theorists of education argue that it is better to teach students to tolerate diversity, than to protect the potentially illiberal commitments of some members of the political communities. In fact, neither approach is wholly satisfying, yet they remain the focus of much political theorizing about education. This article suggests that this misguided focus is, in part, a consequence of a focus, by liberal political theorists of education, upon the 1987 Mozert v. Hawkins court case. Mozert (...) raised serious questions about the nature of toleration in liberal society, but from an educational standpoint, the Mozert case led political theorists to consider what curricular content is appropriate for liberal political education, rather than on the practices that democratic citizens must cultivate. I turn to Hannah Arendt to offer a critical account of the liberal responses to Mozert and then call for a theory of democratic education that fosters practices of democratic decision-making and has, as its aim, not merely to foster respect for diversity, but to allow future citizens to practice critical engagement with diversity. (shrink)

The debate on the role and identity of Christian social ethics in liberal democracy touches upon the question about the relationship between universality and specificity. Rather than argue for the difference between these approaches, it can be argued that they are to be understood in a differentiated unity with each other. This idea can be substantiated by a figurative appropriation of a Chalcedonian Christology, particularly the communicatio idiomatum . The communicative dimension of this concept has been found to be (...) useful for a reinterpretation of the idea of responsibility. By engaging contemporary positions of communicative ethics, H. Richard Niebuhr's understanding of responsibility as responsiveness, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Christological concept of responsibility in a constructive dialogue with each other, the article has attempted to outline main tenets of a responsive concept of responsibility based on a broadly conceived Chalcedonian Christology. This responsive understanding of responsibility serves as the foundation of a third position beyond the futile antagonism of liberalism and communitarianism. Hereby it maintains the reasonableness of a liberal democratic assertion of a common political discourse, and yet it also contends the necessity of authentic particular worldviews and outlooks. In its argument for such a third-way thinking it hopes to contribute with an understanding where these positions are seen in a constructive relationship – rather than in contrast – with each other. (shrink)

The paper examines two recent arguments, by Keith Graham and Richard Norman, to the effect that a liberal individualist foundation is insufficient for a socialist conception of democracy and needs to be replaced or supplemented by collectivist notions [I]. It concludes that these arguments are unsound and that a defensible education for democratic citizenship on socialist lines should be based on liberal values, not least that of personal autonomy. At the same time it concedes to collectivism that (...) socialist democracy needs to operate within a social framework, but sees national communities rather than social classes or smaller-scale groupings as the most promising candidates for this. (shrink)