Computationalism is the claim that all possible thoughts are computations, i.e. executions of algorithms. The aim of the paper is to show that if intentionality is semantically clear, in a way defined in the paper, then computationalism must be false. Using a convenient version of the phenomenological relation of intentionality and a diagonalization device inspired by Thomson's theorem of 1962, we show there exists a thought that cannot be a computation.

En este trabajo indago sobre la actualidad de la Ilustración en relación con la modernidad, la idea de historia y el lenguaje. Examino la construcción historiográfica de la Ilustración para distinguir los tópicos que caracterizan las rupturas y las continuidades en las sucesivas interpretaciones. Posteriormente, analizo la cuestión en el contexto del debate entre modernidad y posmodernidad. Finalmente, formulo la pregunta sobre la Ilustración en relación con las posibilidades de la filosofía de la historia y con el lenguaje. Se concluye (...) la necesidad de recuperar la filosofía de la historia como legado de la Ilustración, y se plantea cómo podría efectuarse tal recuperación. (shrink)

O presente ensaio resulta de uma indagação introdutória e parcimoniosa acerca da transformação da mundividência científica e epistemológica no século XX. Em primeira instância, são analisados os conceitos fundacionais da Relatividade Restrita e da Relatividade Geral, visando elencar as principais dissonâncias entre a proposta científica de Albert Einstein e a cosmovisão estabelecida pela física clássica. De seguida, é invocada a célebre experiência de Edwin Hubble, responsável pela origem da Teoria do Big-Bang. Como não poderia deixar de ser, esta é também (...) alvo de uma examinação cuidadosa. Por fim, a reflexão estende-se ao domínio indeterminista da mecânica quântica, com o propósito de perscrutar os seus princípios fundamentais. Por forma a assegurar o cumprimento deste desígnio, o trabalho não se furta à exigência de aflorar certos traços elementares das doutrinas de Niels Bohr e Werner Heisenberg. Em suma, o breve estudo que aqui se presentifica procura, sobretudo, trazer à coação os elementos teóricos que ancoram o entendimento da física e da cosmologia nos nossos dias, problematizando, quando necessário, algumas das suas inferências. (shrink)

Fear to contamination is an easy-to-provoke, intense, hard-to-control, and extraordinarily persistent fear. A worsening of preexisting psychiatric disorders was observed during the COVID-19 outbreak, and several studies suggest that those with obsessive–compulsive disorder may be more affected than any other group of people. In the face of worsening OCD symptoms, there is a need for mental health professionals to provide the support needed not only to treat patients who still report symptoms, but also to improve relapse prevention. In this line, (...) it is recommended to improve alternative strategies such as online consultations and digital psychiatry. The aim of this study is to develop augmented reality stimuli that are clinically relevant for patients with cleaning OCD and assess their efficiency to obtain emotionally significant responses. Four AR stimuli were developed: a plastic bag full of garbage, a piece of bread with mold, a dirty sports shoe, and a piece of rotten meat. All stimuli were shown to a clinical group and a control group. Relevant results were the design of the AR stimuli. These stimuli were validated with the statistical difference in perceived anxiety in the meat stimuli between the clinical and control groups. Nevertheless, when looking at effect sizes, all stimuli present effect sizes from small to large, with both shoe and bread between small and medium effect sizes. These results are a valuable support for the clinical use of these AR stimuli in the treatment of cleaning OCD. (shrink)

I address the claim by Valor and Martínez that Goldstein's cassationist approach to Liar-like paradoxes generates paradoxes it cannot solve. I argue that these authors miss an essential point in Goldstein's cassationist approach, namely the thesis that paradoxical sentences are not able to make the statement they seem to make.

Resumo: Este artigo parte da análise da influência de Hegel na construção do conceito de capital e de ideologia, na obra de Marx. Para tal, buscou-se analisar a passagem dos primeiros escritos humanistas de Marx à sua teoria tardia. Da ruptura realizada por Marx em relação a suas obras de juventude, surge o problema de como determinar o sujeito, uma vez que a perspectiva humanista inicial é abandonada. A ideia é a de que, paradoxalmente, quando critica a dialética hegeliana, Marx (...) termina por encontrar problemas que poderiam ser resolvidos através de conceitos hegelianos, como a questão do sujeito de classe. É o que procuraremos argumentar por meio de uma análise sobre o papel da negatividade em Hegel.: This article starts with an analysis of the influence of Hegel on the construction of the concepts of capital and ideology in Marx's work. To this end, we analyze the transition from Marx's first humanist writings to his later theory. Due to the break achieved by Marx in relation to his early works, a problem arises: the determination of the revolutionary subject once the initial humanist perspective has been abandoned. Our thesis is that when Marx leaves Hegel, he paradoxically ends up encountering problems that can only be resolved by Hegelian dialectics,. We argue this by means of an analysis of the role of negativity in Hegel. (shrink)

The strong law of large numbers and considerations concerning additional information strongly suggest that Beauty upon awakening has probability 1/3 to be in a heads-awakening but should still believe the probability that the coin landed heads in the Sunday toss to be 1/2. The problem is that she is in a heads-awakening if and only if the coin landed heads. So, how can she rationally assign different probabilities or credences to propositions she knows imply each other? This is the problem (...) I address in this article. I suggest that ‘p whenever q and vice versa’ may be consistent with p and q having different probabilities if one of them refers to a sample space containing ordinary possible worlds and the other to a sample space containing centred possible worlds, because such spaces may fail to combine into one composite probability space and, as a consequence, ‘whenever’ may not be well defined; such is the main contribution of this article. 1The Sleeping Beauty Game2Groisman’s and Peter Lewis’s Approaches3Discussing Beauty’s Credences4The Principle of Equivalence's Failure5Making Sense of the Principle of Equivalence's Failure6Elga’s and Lewis’s Approaches7ConclusionAppendix. (shrink)

A common argument in support of a beginning of the universe used by advocates of the kalām cosmological argument (KCA) is the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite, or the “Infinity Argument”. However, it turns out that the Infinity Argument loses some of its force when compared with the achievements of set theory and it brings into question the view that God predetermined an endless future. We therefore defend a new formal argument, based on the nature of time (...) (just as geometrical reasoning is based on the nature of space), which addresses more directly the question of beginningless time. (shrink)

According to the dual inheritance theory, cultural learning in our species is a biased and highly efficient process of transmitting cultural traits. Here we define a model of cultural learning where social learning is integrated as a complementary element that facilitates the discovery of a specific behavior by an apprentice, and not as a mechanism that works in opposition to individual learning. In that context, we propose that the emergence of the ability to approve or disapprove of offspring behavior, orienting (...) their learning, transformed primate social learning into a cultural transmission system, like that which characterizes our species. Assessor teaching facilitates the replication and/or reconstruction of behaviors that are difficult to imitate and helps to determine which behaviors should be imitated. We also explore the form in which assessor teaching has conditioned the evolution of our abilities to develop cultures in the hominin line, converting us into individuals equipped with what we call a suadens psychology. Our main point is to defend the hypothesis that suadens psychology determines the stability and dynamics that affect the trajectories of many cultural characters. We compare our proposal with other theories about cultural evolution, specifically with dual inheritance theory and cultural attraction theory. (shrink)

This paper presents the hypothesis that linguistic capacity evolved through the action of natural selection as an instrument which increased the efficiency of the cultural transmission system of early hominids. We suggest that during the early stages of hominization, hominid social learning, based on indirect social learning mechanisms and true imitation, came to constitute cumulative cultural transmission based on true imitation and the approval or disapproval of the learned behaviour of offspring. A key factor for this transformation was the development (...) of a conceptual capacity for categorizing learned behaviour in value terms - positive or negative, good or bad. We believe that some hominids developed this capacity for categorizing behaviour, and such an ability allowed them to approve or disapprove of their offsprings- learned behaviour. With such an ability, hominids were favoured, as they could transmit to their offspring all their behavioural experience about what can and cannot be done. This capacity triggered a cultural transmission system similar to the human one, though pre-linguistic. We suggest that the adaptive advantage provided by this new system of social learning generated a selection pressure in favour of the development of a linguistic capacity allowing children to better understand the new kind of evaluative information received from parents. (shrink)

We consider the evolutionary scheme of morality proposed by Tomasello to defend the idea that the ability to orient the learning of offspring using signs of approval/disapproval could be a decisive and necessary step in the evolution of human morality. Those basic forms of intentional evaluative feedback, something we have called assessor teaching, allow parents to transmit their accumulated experience to their children, both about the behaviors that should be learned as well as how they should be copied. The rationale (...) underlying this process is as follows: if a behavior is approved, then it is good; if it is disapproved, then it is bad. The evaluative guidance on how to behave most probably spread among peers in situations of mutual benefit, such as cooperative child rearing. We argue that our hominin ancestors provided with this capacity for assessor teaching were ideally positioned to develop the two specifically human levels of morality proposed by Tomasello: the morality of fairness and the morality of justice. Assessor teaching could have facilitated the genesis of rudimentary codes of behavior tied with the need to agree about how to behave to succeed in joint cooperative activities. Moreover, learning through assessor teaching provides a plausible explanation for the origin of the objectivist and prescriptive dimensions of human morality. First, we emphasize that individuals feel that they evaluate the behavior of others objectively to guide their learning, and, second, we underline the imperative intention that any moral manifestation possesses. (shrink)

Humans have developed the capacity to approve or disapprove of the behavior of their children and of unrelated individuals. The ability to approve or disapprove transformed social learning into a system of cumulative cultural inheritance, because it increased the reliability of cultural transmission. Moreover, people can transmit their behavioral experiences (regarding what can and cannot be done) to their offspring, thereby avoiding the costs of a laborious, and sometimes dangerous, evaluation of different cultural alternatives. Our thesis is that, during ontogeny, (...) the evaluative communication (approval/disapproval) between parents and offspring is substituted by other evaluative communications among peers, like individuals of the same generation. Each person belongs to a reference social group with individuals that interact more intensively. Humans have developed psychological mechanisms that enable cultural transmission by being receptive to parental advice as well as their reference social group. The selective pressure that promoted these new evaluative interactions arose to facilitate the establishment of efficient cooperative relationships. In short, the social control of behavior is essential to understand human cultural transmission. (shrink)

We use two logical resources, namely, the notion of recursively defined function and the Benardete-Yablo paradox, together with some inherent features of causality and time, as usually conceived, to derive two results: that no ungrounded causal chain exists and that time has a beginning.

La Enciclopedia IberoAmericana de Filosofía es un proyecto de investigación y edición coordinado por el Instituto de Filosofía del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (Madrid), el Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma (México) y el Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas (Buenos Aires), en el que han colaborado más de 500 especialistas de todos los países pertenecientes a la comunidad filosófica hispanoparlante. El proyecto consta de 35 volúmenes, cada uno de los cuales gira en torno a un tema monográfico, (...) tratado de modo diversificado e interdisciplinar. (shrink)

Cantor’s proof that the powerset of the set of all natural numbers is uncountable yields a version of Richard’s paradox when restricted to the full definable universe, that is, to the universe containing all objects that can be defined not just in one formal language but by means of the full expressive power of natural language: this universe seems to be countable on one account and uncountable on another. We argue that the claim that definitional contexts impose restrictions on the (...) scope of quantifiers reveals a natural way out. (shrink)

Este artigo tenta mostrar que as paixões naturais não dão conta, por si sós, da passagem da natureza ao Estado, por mais que o medo seja importante no começo da sociedade. A soberania da reta-razão em Hobbes parece ser necessária à criação do Estado civil. A razão natural, mediante as leis de natureza, apenas proíbe a um homem destruir sua vida ou privar-se dos meios necessários para preservá-la. Só uma razão geométrica, reta, que calcula segundo regras razoáveis, pode operar a (...) saída do estado de solidão em que os homens naturais se encontram inicialmente. O equacionamento da paz e da segurança para a vida satisfeita de cada homem impõe o cálculo que cria a unidade das vontades individuais, isto é, a forma geométrica do Estado soberano. (shrink)

The structure of Yablo’s paradox is analysed and generalised in order to show that beginningless step-by-step determination processes can be used to provoke antinomies, more concretely, to make our logical and our on-tological intuitions clash. The flow of time and the flow of causality are usually conceived of as intimately intertwined, so that temporal causation is the very paradigm of a step-by-step determination process. As a conse-quence, the paradoxical nature of beginningless step-by-step determina-tion processes concerns time and causality as usually (...) conceived. (shrink)

The central idea defended here is that ethical judgements are the product of the adaptive advantage provided by the conceptual capacity to categorise learned behaviour. In the same way that evolution of learning required the presence of value-laden brain structures that guide behaviour in the organism, we propose that the evolution of social learning and the development of human culture required the emergence of a new value system — the 'conceptual capacity to categorise'. This capacity is defined as the ability (...) to categorise one's own behaviour through a conceptual value code — 'favourable/unfavourable' or 'good/bad'. The conceptual capacity to categorise learned behaviour as good or bad was evolutionary successful because it transformed a system of rudimentary cultural transmission based on imitation into a system of efficient and biased cultural heredity based on teaching. Conceptual categorisation allowed the acquisition, through social learning, of adaptive information about behaviour, originating in/from the value-laden brain systems which control learning, without resorting to individual experience. We also suggest that the conceptual capacity to categorise conditioned the evolution of the human intelligence and that the ethical capacity arose as a by-product of both high intelligence and the ability to make evaluations of learned behaviour. (shrink)

¿Podría estar amenazado el futuro de nuestra civilización por un abuso secular de la razón? Cabe argumentar que la Modernidad se construyó sobre la ambición cartesiana de conocer y regular el mundo mediante el discurso racional, postergando el conocimiento sensible y descartando cualquier posibilidad de un conocimiento intelectual diferente de la razón científico-matemática. Según el autor, esta ambición ha moldeado el quehacer científico, filosófico y matemático de la Modernidad y persiste todavía en el discurso ético-político del capitalismo global. Laureano (...) Luna explora las limitaciones del proyecto racionalista moderno rastreando sus límites desde la lógica matemática hasta la racionalidad social, política y económica de la sociedad contemporánea, argumentando la tesis de que los límites del discurso racional que las paradojas o en el teorema de Gödel revelan en la lógica se reproducen en los ámbitos de la ciencia, la ética y la política, porque esos límites dependen todos de un rasgo esencial de la fenomenología del pensamiento. En la elaboración de esta síntesis la obra emprende un análisis de la racionalidad vigente que desemboca en la consideración de sus limitaciones para encarar el futuro. (shrink)

ENTREVISTA COM PROFESSORAS(ES) DE FILOSOFIA DO ENSINO FUNDAMENTAL DO CEARÁCom: Jocilaine Moreira Batista do Vale, Mario Jonny de Castro Cunha, Syssa AdleyRodrigues Monteiro, Fabiana Martins TôrresPor: Antônio Alex Pereira de Sousa, Paulo Willame Araújo de Lim.

We model infinite regress structures — not arguments — by means of ungrounded recursively defined functions in order to show that no such structure can perform the task of providing determination to the items composing it, that is, that no determination process containing an infinite regress structure is successful.

Following an idea from Gödel and Carnap we show how we can speak with absolute generality even if we cannot quantify with absolute generality.

In response to Bhupinder Singh Anand''s article CAN WE REALLY FALSIFY TRUTH BY DICTAT? in THE REASONER II, 1, January 2008,that denies the existence of nonstandard models of Peano Arithmetic, we prove from Compactness the existence of such models.

Poincaré in a 1909 lecture in Göttingen proposed a solution to the apparent incompatibility of two results as viewed from a definitionist perspective: on the one hand, Richard’s proof that the definitions of real numbers form a countable set and, on the other, Cantor’s proof that the real numbers make up an uncountable class. Poincaré argues that, Richard’s result notwithstanding, there is no enumeration of all definable real numbers. We apply previous research by Luna and Taylor on Richard’s paradox, indefinite (...) extensibility and unrestricted quantification to evaluate Poincaré’s proposal. We emphasize that Poincaré’s solution involves an early recourse to indefinite extensibility and argue that his proposal, if it is to completely avoid Richard’s paradox, requires rejecting absolutely unrestricted quantification: Richard’s paradox provides a context in which paradox seems inescapable if unrestricted quantification is possible. In proposing his solution to the apparent conflict between Richard’s and Cantor’s results, Poincaré employs temporal expressions whose exact meaning he does not clarify. We suggest an interpretation of these expressions in terms of order of availability and briefly discuss its explanatory power in topics like paradoxes, limitation theorems and indefinite extensibility. (shrink)

The Monist’s call for papers for this issue ended: “if formalism is true, then it must be possible in principle to mechanize meaning in a conscious thinking and language-using machine; if intentionalism is true, no such project is intelligible”. We use the Grelling-Nelson paradox to show that natural language is indefinitely extensible, which has two important consequences: it cannot be formalized and model theoretic semantics, standard for formal languages, is not suitable for it. We also point out that object-object mapping (...) theories of semantics, the usual account for the possibility of non intentional semantics, doesn’t seem able to account for the indefinitely extensible productivity of natural language. (shrink)

Computationalism is the claim that all possible thoughts are computations, i.e. executions of algorithms. The aim of the paper is to show that if intentionality is semantically clear, in a way defined in the paper, then computationalism must be false. Using a convenient version of the phenomenological relation of intentionality and a diagonalization device inspired by Thomson's theorem of 1962, we show there exists a thought that canno be a computation.

Na sua origem, o vocábulo latino iustitia (iustitiae) está directamente relacionado com o substantivo ius (iuris) e com o adjectivo iustus (iusta, iustum). A palavra iustitia amplia o seu significado primeiro na obra de Cícero (século I a. C.), e abrange novas acepções na época do imperador Augusto (séculos I a. C.-I d. C.) e posteriormente na obra de Séneca, o Filósofo (século I d. C.). Nesta comunicação, pretendemos estabelecer o percurso semântico do substantivo iustitia, assim como precisar a sua (...) amplitude cultural em momentos significativos da história de Roma. (shrink)

Os Romanos, tal como outros povos antigos, procuraram delimitar o percurso do tempo. Seguiram o exemplo de outros povos, sobretudo dos Egípcios e Gregos e basearam-se nas informações recebidas para constituir os seus próprios calendários. Assim, serão mencionados os diferentes calendários desde Rómulo até ao calendário juliano, e ainda a influência deste nos calendários seguintes, no cristão e no gregoriano. Do mesmo modo, serão referidas unidades de contagem do tempo e a sua história, como os dias, as semanas, os meses, (...) os anos, as eras e, por fim, os contadores do tempo, os relógios. (shrink)

O problema do ceticismo é colocado na seguinte questão: é possível obtero conhecimento como um todo? Há argumentos fortes que dizem quenão. Por exemplo, embora o K não possa descansar sobre dados brutos,todos os argumentos devem começar e terminar em algum lugar. Contudo,se nós não podemos justificar, conseqüentemente, não podemos aumentaro K genuíno. Assim, o problema é que, se podemos começar com argumentosdo ceticismo filosófico, que dizem que o K é impossível , então esses argumentos forçam a conexão de conhecimento (...) comjustificação para tentar refutar o ceticismo. Assim, o problema do ceticismoestá intimamente ligado com o problema da justificação. Podemos analisarse há um problema do ceticismo e se ele pode ser entendido comocolocamos inicialmente. Enfim, por que o problema do ceticismo é nossoproblema? Por que temos o ônus da prova? Não podemos inverter o ônusda prova para o cético?The issue of skepticism is put in the following question: is it possible togain knowledge as a whole? There are some strong arguments that sayno. For instance, although K can not rest over gross data, all argumentsmust start and finish somewhere. However, we cannot justify andconsequently enlarge the genuine K. The problem here is: if we can startwith arguments from the philosophical skepticism, the ones that say K is impossible , then such arguments impose that weconnect knowledge to justification on an attempt to refute skepticism. Theissue of skepticism is closely connected to the issue of justification. It ispossible to see whether or not there is a problem with skepticism or if itcan be understood according to our initial proposal. Finally, we ask: whyis the issue of skepticism our problem? Why do we have the burden ofproof? Can we send the burden of proof back to the skeptic? (shrink)

We model infinite regress structures -not arguments- by means of ungrounded recursively defined functions in order to show that no such structure can perform the task of providing determination to the items composing it, that is, that no determination process containing an infinite regress structure is successful.