Learning and Teaching in the Early Years provides a comprehensive, contemporary and practical introduction to early childhood teaching in Australia. A strong focus on the links between theory, policy and practice firmly aligns this text with the Early Years Learning Framework. Written for students of early childhood programs, this book covers learning and development, as well as professional practice in teaching children from birth to eight years. In recognition of the evolving role of educators, topic areas include learning, teaching, working (...) with families, leading, advocating and researching. Each chapter contains learning objectives, key terms and reflection points. Detailed case studies document the intersection between research, policy and practice, enhancing pre-service and practicing educators' appreciation of how a policy-aligned approach reinforces learning and development in the early years. This text draws on the latest research to present children's learning as a dynamic and active process requiring specific, intentional teaching behaviours. (shrink)

In 1992, in a historic move, the Church of England voted to allow women's ordination to priesthood and in 1994 the first women priests started to be ordained. Despite much research interest, the experiences of priests who are mothers to dependent children have been minimally investigated. Based on in-depth interviews with seventeen mothers ordained in the Church, this paper will focus on how the sacred-profane boundary is managed. Priests who are mothers have a particular insight into the Church hierarchy as (...) they symbolically straddle the competing discourses of sacred and profane. However, instead of reifying these binaries, the experiences of these women show how such dualisms are challenged and managed in everyday life. Indeed, in terms of experience, ritual, ministry and preaching, priests who are mothers are resisting, recasting and renegotiating sacred terrain in subtle and nuanced ways. Mothers thus not only negotiate the practical and sacramental demands placed on priests, but also illuminate how the sacred domain is regulated and constructed. (shrink)

Across the UK, there has been an increase in anti-abortion activism outside abortion clinics. The activism deployed includes explicitly religious activities such as ‘prayerful witnessing’ and ‘pavement counselling’, which aim to discourage women from entering clinics. This article stems from a wider ethnographic study of public activism over abortion to determine what claims about motherhood are being made within these debates. Two arguments are presented. First, how women’s role as mothers is central and essentialised in anti-abortion discourses, with the body (...) of the mother often disappearing as activists seek to erode the distinction between a foetus and a baby by constructing pregnancy as a foetal environment. Motherhood is constructed as ‘natural’ and sacred, therefore abortion must be damaging because it destroys women’s ‘natural’ position. Second, the article argues that although the activists’ arguments are always religiously framed, their activism takes place in a largely secular context, meaning that they have to find ways of appealing to secular audiences. This leads to a complex interrelationship between secular and religious discourses, where theological viewpoints sit alongside ‘scientific’ claims to buttress activists’ views. This article explores how the presence and absence of mothers within activists’ narratives is due to the tensions between religiously based understandings of motherhood, and the need to appeal to a secular audience. (shrink)

The ordination of women to the priesthood in the Church of England in 1994 signified great change. The impact of the new priests was well documented, and their integration became the focus of much research in the following years. One important area of change was the altered dynamics of gender identity. New roles had opened up for women, but new identities had also emerged for men. While women priests were a new historical emergence, so too were clergy husbands. This paper (...) will consider the historical construction of masculinities and femininities within the church and will go on to look at this in the context of clergy spouses, specifically focusing on men occupying this role. Some provisional findings, acting as work in progress, will be considered. (shrink)

This article presents findings from research on young adults in the UK from diverse religious backgrounds. Utilizing questionnaires, interviews and video diaries, it assesses how religious young adults understood and managed the tensions in popular discourse between gender equality as an enshrined value and aspirational narrative, and religion as purportedly instituting gender inequality. The article shows that, despite varied understandings, and the ambivalence and tension in managing ideal and practice, participants of different religious traditions and genders were committed to gender (...) equality. Thus, they viewed gender-unequal practices within their religious cultures as an aberration from the essence of religion. In this way, they firmly rejected the dominant discourse that religion is inherently antithetical to gender equality. (shrink)

Abstract In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third option should (...) be thought of as an attitude or not. In this paper I argue that suspended judgment is (or at least involves) a genuine attitude. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-17 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y Authors Jane Friedman, St Catherine’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3UJ UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116. (shrink)

Jane Heal; VI*—The Disinterested Search for Truth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 97–108, https://doi.org/10.10.

In this paper, the author reflects on an unsuccessful strategy for teaching an introductory philosophy class and charts her transition to a different, successful strategy which strives for intellectual integrity while coming to terms with the “impressive decrease in the level of the average student’s academic preparation.” The author first recalls her attempts to teach an introductory philosophy course with the traditional structure of texts read in chronological order, a midterm and final exam, and two several-page papers throughout the (...) term. This strategy produced panic and incomprehension on the part of both students and professor. Instead, the author recommends a course organized by philosophical theme with stylistically and chronologically mixed readings. Evaluation for this course is based on a series of one-page assignments throughout the term, the topics of which are not strictly academic (e.g. “Explore Marx’ notion of alienation in your own work life”) but which embed course material in a context that is more relevant and comprehensible to students. The author concludes by considering drawbacks to this course structure and arguing that they are outweighed by its benefits. (shrink)

Jane Heal; XV*—Semantic Holism: Still a Good Buy, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 325–339, https://doi.org/10.10.

Jane Heal; XII*—Insincerity and Commands, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 June 1977, Pages 183–202, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.1 (2003) 32-39 [Access article in PDF] Aesthetics, Epistemics, and Feminist Theory Jane Duran Recent feminist analysts of aesthetics and analytic aesthetics in particular seem to have come to the conclusion that the redemption of formulated aesthetic theory from the feminist point of view is a difficult and recondite task. 1 If analytic aesthetics now looks problematic, qua fruitful philosophical enterprise, its future (...) appears bleaker still when the intersection of the androcentric nature of analytic philosophy and the larger feminist project, frequently articulated in other than analytic terms, is examined.In this essay I will assume that there is some future for analytic aesthetics, and I will not dispute the basic assumption that any portion of analytic theory is somewhat immiscible with feminist points of view. My concern, rather, will be to try to show what it is specifically in the nature of analytic theory, both aesthetic and otherwise, which renders it of dubious value to the feminist critique (at least on first blush). Although in the past feminist theorists have tried to characterize the androcentric nature of analytic philosophy on the whole in rather striking terms,it is not clear that these terms have been precise enough. 2 Further, it is not clear that analytic modes are obviously unusable for feminist theory or for the development of a still nascent feminist aesthetics, although what one wants to say here is that this task is a terribly danger-fraught one. 3My goal here is twofold: first, to articulate what precisely it is aboutanalytic aesthetics (or any portion of analytic theory, for that matter) thatmakes it a hindrance — at least preliminarily — to the development of feminist views. In order to do this I will need to examine a relatively uncharted area in the literature, that is the parallel between much of analytic aesthetic theory and analytic epistemology. The second portion of my task will runsomewhat contrary to conventional wisdom: having delineated the mostmasculinist parts of analytic endeavors, I inquire if there is, indeed, anypart of rigorously articulated analytic theory that could lend itself to the development of a feminist aesthetic. [End Page 32] Analytic Philosophy and Aesthetics Analytic aesthetics, like analytic philosophy taken as a whole, has often proceeded as if the development of conceptual clarification and theoretical rigor could do much to "solve" or dissolve aesthetic problems. George Dickie's introductory work, for example, presents the student with a number of difficult areas in aesthetics, and then proceeds to address these areas in much the same manner that other contemporary texts employ for the discussion of issues in ethics, epistemology, or metaphysics.In discussing symbolism, Dickie first attempts to clarify the use of theterm, and then notes that there are problematic areas with regard to whether or not a work of art can both contain a symbol and serve itself as a symbol simultaneously. A symbol "stands for" in some establishable way that which it symbolizes. A symbol serves to transfer someone's thought to something other than itself, and the transfer is not a random association. The transfer depends upon certain features of the symbol which give it a place in a certain meaning system. 4I cite this material as exemplary because the flavor of analytic aesthetics is remarkably similar to the flavor of analytic philosophy as a whole. We sometimes need to remind ourselves that the techniques of analysis developed in the earlier part of this century relied on breakthroughs in logic and formal representation which allowed for a certain precision in matching symbol to thing signified. The original hope of philosophers working at the time of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore had been to develop something close to a logically perfect language with a one-to-one relationship between signifier and signified. However without merit this somewhat arcane task, its goals infused much of the philosophizing that followed it, and even the ordinary language school was, of course, indirectly an offshoot of this work. Nicholas Wolterstorff, for example, notes that "analytic philosophy was to be 'scientific philosophy'....The goal of the analytic philosopher... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 38.2 (2004) 88-94 [Access article in PDF] A Postmodern Tonantzín Jane Duran Visitors to the Puebla area in Mexico are frequently taken to the church of Santa María Tonantzínla, where they are told that they will see three or more styles of architecture simultaneously. Guidebooks to the area prominently feature this church and others like it, both as examples — or so the (...) reader is told — of the "Baroque," and as exemplars of the handiwork and craftsmanship of the indigenous.1 Because of the importance of various notions of style insofar as teaching in the arts is concerned, it might seem important to try to articulate what is meant by simultaneity of styles. In addition, today's students are often baffled by uses of the term "postmodern." In this essay I will argue that Santa María Tonantzínla may have somesurprising lessons for us all.There is no question that the visual effect of the building's interior is, in fact, stunning and that the visitor is simultaneously awed and bemused. Arrivals at this church in the Puebla suburb of Cholula see a riotous profusion of cherubs, angels, and other figures covering the walls, ceiling, nave, and almost every square inch of available space. Although some of the figures do indeed appear to bear a resemblance to those found in European structures created during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, other figures are more or less unrecognizable to most visitors, and clearly seem to be, as the books indicate, of non-European origin. To add to the effect of the stylistic mixing, the façade of the building is somewhat Romanesque, which only makes the interior more surprising and, in its own way, unexpected.I shall argue that work such as that at Tonantzín presents us with a variety of conceptual difficulties from the standpoint of aesthetics, and opens the door for some novel lines of argument. It is first of all quite unclear where the notion of "style" begins at Tonantzín; the boundaries are blurred and here, perhaps more than in most architectural treasures, one does not know how to announce or delineate the various styles. But much more important, [End Page 88] perhaps, is that this very amalgamation lends itself to the notion that one trope, the "postmodern," continually used in a discussion of contemporary architecture, is perhaps more relevant to Tonantzín than one might at first expect. In this essay I shall weave these two lines of argument together to support the contention that Tonantzín is, after all, postmodern. But before we can move to that assertion, it is important to try to think about what a meshing of such styles as "Spanish baroque" and "indigenous" could possibly mean, and why it has seemed urgent for writing on Tonantzín to employ these labels. Architectural Diversity In an intriguing article on the use of terms such as "modern" and "postmodern" in contemporary architecture, David Goldblatt has argued that Venturi's claim that modernity lacks what he terms diversity is more or less vacuous. As Goldblatt claims, the concept of diversity within a given work does not make much sense. More important for our purposes, Goldblatt goes on to provide a gloss on the notion of electicism, and its relation to a variety of architectural styles. He writes: When Venturi claims that modern architecture lacks diversity, he primarily means that it fails to achieve what he calls a pluralism. What he calls for is "Scarlatti and the Beatles, if diversity is to be achieved"....What Venturi is advocating is eclecticism.2As Goldblatt claims, eclecticism is the hallmark of the postmodern in architecture, and the eclectic pastiche that is Las Vegas — especially in terms of borrowed styles, ornamentation, and visible fripperies within the context of one building — becomes exemplary of that term and what it evokes. But to say simply that there may well be instances of the postmodern in architecture before the twentieth century, and before the decline of modernity itself, is to say very little. As Goldblatt... (shrink)

Jane Heal; XII*—Insincerity and Commands, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 June 1977, Pages 183–202, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Right Thing to DoJane RogersIn stark contrast to getting my graduate degree in bioethics in which I discovered that I am inclined to favor an ethics based on my religious beliefs, in nursing school I learned that I had to take my religion out of nursing care. As a bioethics student, I read in my textbook, Bioethics: A Systematic Approach, that “… just because an action is rationally (...) allowed does not mean that everyone agrees one ought to act in that way.” Yet often in nursing I found that we nurses knew what was best for our patients, even if they did not. At least, we believed that we did. This general paternalistic belief spread into every area of the care we gave except for one, and that was religion. [End Page 208]As student nurses, we learned to separate our religion from our care to focus on the patient’s religion or spiritual needs. Our patients should never know of our religious beliefs or even if we had a lack of them. We needed to be completely neutral on all religious issues and focus solely on the patient’s preference. If our patients needed spiritual care, we would find someone to provide it and we would incorporate it into the nursing plan of care. Providing care of the whole patient including their religious needs was the definition of a good nurse. Certainly I wanted to be a good nurse, so I swore I would always include the spiritual needs of my patients as part of my care, while never expressing my own.As fate would have it, as a new nurse I found myself overwhelmed running around just trying to give medications, admit and discharge patients, start IV’s, insert catheters, note doctor’s orders and get my charting done. My time was engaged in trying to calm confused and combative patients, running to grab an emesis basin for a patient to throw up in or answering the phone, so thinking about religion or spiritual care for my patients most of the time amounted to “God help me and my patients get through this shift.” My goal of being a good nurse was starting to look dismal as I realized I had no idea if I could find the time or means and ways to incorporate religion into the care I gave, or if it even mattered if I did.Fortuitously for me, most of my patients never mentioned religion, although at times they did leave some nonverbal clues. I could see a rosary laying on a bedside table or a bible or prayer book next to them in bed. While I would make sure their religious item was always within reach, I remained respectful yet distant in religious matters, never offering any spiritual care or assistance. I was quite accepting of my first Mormon patient wearing the garment under the traditional hospital gown. I was appalled when an unconscious Jehovah Witness patient was nearly given blood. When a minister or priest came to visit, I’d excuse myself quickly so that the work of their God could do what I could not or should not do. Occasionally I was asked by family members to call in a minister or a priest or chaplain and I did that with a great feeling of satisfaction as I was surely providing the spiritual care they requested.Eventually however I did start to indulge in highly spontaneous and random acts of religion. These were always done secretly. The patient or family must never know. Thinking it would help I once covertly gave a patient a special rosary I had with Lourdes water in it thinking it might heal him. I waited to see a miracle. It never came. Despite the absence of that miracle I was still hopeful that perhaps my prayers or another rosary could heal or at least help some of my patients. After all, as a nurse I witnessed lots of healings that astounded me. People I never thought would get better sometimes did anyway.Although I was cognizant that some healing was the direct result of superb medical intervention and excellent nursing care, there were always... (shrink)

This anthology is the first attempt to present a rounded picture of 'Kierkegaard as a philosopher' in English. After an introduction explaining how Kierkegaard viewed the task of 'becoming a philosopher', there are generous extracts from the Concept of Irony and the great pseudonymous works: Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Repetition, Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of Anxiety, Prefaces, Johannes Climacus and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Kierkegaard's own attempts to summarize the significance of his writings are also included, so that readers have the (...) opportunity to make up their own minds about the adequacy of his retrospective accounting. The Kierkegaard who emerges from these pages is not only a penetrating analyst of temporality, individuality, and irony, but also a lithe, witty and versatile stylist. He is probably one of the greatest writers in the philosophical tradition, and surely one of the most humorous. The anthology makes use of a range of classic translations, and includes new translations by Jane Chamberlain and Jonathan Rée, explanatory introductions, an index and a glossary. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 6, June 2019, Page 28-29.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Henry James—Aristotle's Ally, An Exclusive Pact?Jane SingletonIMany claims are advanced for the importance of narrative art works in philosophy. This paper will concentrate on one specific thesis put forward by Martha Nussbaum about the relationship between certain works of literature and moral philosophy. Although Nussbaum explores many roles for narrative artworks in philosophy,1 I shall concentrate on those works where she argues for a close connection between the (...) novels of Henry James and Aristotle's ethics. These are Love's Knowledge,2 where other authors other than James are also considered, and "Exactly and Responsibly: A Defense of Ethical Criticism," an article that formed part of a debate with Richard Posner and Wayne Booth in 1997 and 1998 in Philosophy and Literature.3 It is this latter work that provides the central thesis to be considered.I argue that there are least four possible attributes or combinations of them that Nussbaum might be suggesting are present in James's novels when she claims that James is an ally of Aristotle. My claim will be that James can only be regarded as an ally of Aristotle with respect to some of these attributes. It is a second question to determine precisely how the legitimate attributes isolated in James's novels are to be used to provide an ally for Aristotle's ethics. I shall claim that in any sense in which it is legitimate to regard James as an ally of Aristotle, he could also be regarded as an ally of a generalist theory. This is an important point to emphasise since Nussbaum explicitly enlists James as an ally of Aristotle because of the normative primacy that he gives to the particular. I shall use Kant's theory as an example of a generalist theory. Henry [End Page 61] James, I argue, can be an ally of both Aristotle and Kant but both can adopt an isolationist policy.IIThe specific thesis put forward by Nussbaum in 1998 is as follows:My claim is that in order to investigate this Aristotelian ethical view fully and fairly, we need to turn to texts in which the case for that sort of rationality is made out in a powerful and convincing way—and this cannot be done if we confine ourselves to works written in the abstract style characteristic of most contemporary theory... Aristotle's conception is much more dependent on "allies" who will make out the force of such obscure claims as the claim that "the discernment rests with perception," and that correct action "lies in a mean." Because Aristotle's conception leaves so much to particularized contextual judgment, one cannot well assess the conception without studying complex examples of such particularized judgment; and of course Aristotle's text does not supply such material. I claim that Henry James is a powerful ally of Aristotle, and one whom Aristotle badly needs if he is to convince us of his claims.("ER," pp. 347–48)It is the clarification and discussion of this that provides my point of departure. I shall then consider the four possible characteristics of James's novels that I have isolated. These are: exemplars of good choice, illustrations of the direction of thought to follow for the discernment of the particular, vehicles for developing imagination and sources that enable us to develop an understanding of and engagement of emotions. In each case I shall consider how, if at all, these characteristics enable James to be an ally of either Aristotle or Kant.IIINussbaum's thesis is limited to the late novels of James. "I assert that there is a distinctive type of ethical view... that requires literary works of a very specific type, primarily exemplified by the late novels of James, for its complete investigation" ("ER," p. 348). These include The Wings of the Dove (1902), The Ambassadors (1903), and The Golden Bowl (1904). I shall use examples from each of these although, as Posner notes, The Wings of The Dove, is one book that Nussbaum does not discuss in the article.4 [End Page 62]What attributes or characteristics do these late novels of James possess? They all have in common... (shrink)

This anthology is the first attempt to present a rounded picture of 'Kierkegaard as a philosopher' in English. After an introduction explaining how Kierkegaard viewed the task of 'becoming a philosopher', there are generous extracts from the Concept of Irony and the great pseudonymous works: Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Repetition, Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of Anxiety, Prefaces, Johannes Climacus and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Kierkegaard's own attempts to summarize the significance of his writings are also included, so that readers have the (...) opportunity to make up their own minds about the adequacy of his retrospective accounting. The Kierkegaard who emerges from these pages is not only a penetrating analyst of temporality, individuality, and irony, but also a lithe, witty and versatile stylist. He is probably one of the greatest writers in the philosophical tradition, and surely one of the most humorous. The anthology makes use of a range of classic translations, and includes new translations by Jane Chamberlain and Jonathan Rée, explanatory introductions, an index and a glossary. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Scott Joplin and the Quest for IdentityEarl Stewart and Jane DuranIn his innovative work I Wanna Be Me: Rock Music and the Politics of Identity, Ted Gracyk does much to dismantle notions of cultural authenticity and theft as they are currently articulated by some critics. Explaining that such concepts are less monolithic than some have claimed, Gracyk writes:While popular musicians often "pick up" the music of other cultures, (...) such practices are culturally, politically, and morally complex. In discussing such issues, I hope to show that they are even more complex than is typically thought. Here, I borrow an insight from Michelle Moody-Adams, who argues that prevailing positions in social and cultural anthropology assume that cultures are internally integrated wholes and that each culture is fundamentally a set of self-contained and discrete practices and beliefs. The same assumptions infest discussions of appropriation in cultural studies, folk-lore studies, and ethnomusicology. But these assumptions are highly questionable.1Gracyk's overall point is that what has frequently been simplified as "theft" or "inauthentic" is not susceptible to such easy formulation; indeed, Gracyk contends there is scarcely such a thing as a pure musical tradition.Gracyk's sophisticated argument is one, however, that itself admits of gradations and emendations. While it is no doubt accurate that there is very little that might count as artistically or culturally pure (hence, very little that can justifiably be claimed to have been stolen), some work is much more evocative of a cultural point of view than other efforts, and some work is much more centrally located within a given culture and its traditions than other musical work. In this article we shall make the twofold argument that much of the work of Scott Joplin is located in a tradition that is manifestly African derived, and that the composition of such work had, as one of its motivators, the desire to make a cultural statement. Thus, more so than some of Gracyk's exemplars, Joplin's work is strongly culturally attached, and its attachment needs to be duly noted.IThe origins of Joplin's work speak to the concerns of the nineteenth century and of the period immediately subsequent to emancipation. Most of [End Page 94] the black leadership of the time was united in its belief that a nationalist art would serve in the reconstruction of the image of African Americans. During the latter part of the nineteenth century many of these leaders saw the spiritual as the ideal folkloric basis for a serious black artistic expression. In music this notion was given strong support as a result of a concurrent interest on the part of European composers in African American music—an interest fed by the aesthetic of romanticism, which encouraged artistic investment in the strange, unusual, primitive, and exotic.Most classically trained African American composers attempted to comply with the vision of these black leaders by constructing a more or less European-style music tinctured with African American folk elements. The result would be a set of works that to this day has failed to be adopted by the African American community at large.Scott Joplin tried a different approach. He sought to create an African American musical expression that would be predicated upon an African American vernacular style—ragtime. Joplin essentialized his music in many ways. First, by choosing ragtime as a stylistic paradigm he assured the preservation of black rhythm. Second, to promote continuity and coherence he often employed rhythmic relationships between contrasting sections. Third, he frequently employed African American folk idioms like pentatonicism and call-and-response (antiphony) as interregnal devices in the structure of his melodies. Fourth, to assure an intrastructural linkage with the African American vernacular music of his day, he frequently used phrase structures that were consistent with those employed in folk music, particularly the black spiritual, for example, aaab. In his opera, Treemonisha, he based his libretto largely on black dialect, thus linking it with black literary tradition. These are but a few of the devices Joplin employed to assure a strong cultural essentialism to his music. As a result, Joplin has been acknowledged as one of the great icons of... (shrink)

Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Volume 26, Issue 3, Page 254-257, July-September.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 564-565 [Access article in PDF] Samuel J. Kerstein. Kant's Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xiv + 226. Cloth, $60.00. Summed up in a sentence, this book is both a critical examination of Kant's claim to have derived a supreme moral principle and a limited defense of Kant's project that appears to depart (...) significantly from Kant's own approach. Methodologically, a large portion of this book is devoted to analyzing various key concepts and claims about the nature of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason and testing them against "everyday" moral intuitions via numerous examples and counterexamples.Kerstein begins by distinguishing between the tasks of deduction and derivation of a supreme moral principle, whereby a deduction is understood as an argument for the existence of a supreme moral principle, and a derivation simply assumes this conditionally and goes on to argue that a particular principle and no other can claim the title. Kerstein waives the discussion of whether Kant succeeds in giving a deduction and hence satisfactorily refutes moral skepticism. His focus in the book is on the derivation proposed primarily in Groundwork I and II that if there is a supreme moral principle, then it must be that law expressed in his formulations of the Categorical Imperative (hereafter "CI"). Kerstein addresses Bruce Aune's "traditional" reading of Kant's derivation, wherein the argument utterly fails because Kant allegedly infers a relatively substantive command ("Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to be universal law") from a purely formal, higher order, and hence relatively empty one ("Conform your actions to universal law"). He then devotes a chapter each to two recent, influential defenses of Kant's derivation that seek his argument outside the Groundwork. Kerstein addresses Henry Allison's attempt to rescue the derivation via an account of agency rooted in Kant's notion of transcendental freedom, elaborated in the second Critique. Kerstein rejects Allison's reconstruction on the grounds that it remains too abstract to generate the degree of specificity arrived at in Kant's Groundwork universalization formulation. Chapter Three examines Christine Korsgaard's alternative reconstruction of Kant's argument that focuses on the formulation of humanity ("Act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only"). He rejects her interpretation because, again, the move from the abstract command to conform to universal law to the substantive formulation about humanity as a universally recognizable unconditional good fails. From the former, more abstract claim, he argues, it does not follow that there is a universally recognizable unconditional good, let alone that this good is humanity in itself (and not, say, utility [happiness], or even some intrinsic value unrelated to humanity, both of which Kant rejects as candidates for the unconditionally good).In his own reconstruction, Kerstein dissolves the criticism of the traditional reading of Kant's Groundwork derivation of the formula of universal law by simply denying that Kant [End Page 564] argues directly from the more generic principle to the specific versions of the CI (91ff). Instead he suggests that Kant's argument is less direct, made by way of laying out a set of criteria that any supreme principle must meet, and showing how the CI meets them while no other candidates can. In the second half of the book he takes a painstaking and critical look at a total of eight criteria, each of which Kant holds to be necessary and together are jointly sufficient for establishing the CI as "the supreme norm for the evaluation of the moral permissability and requiredness of an action, but not of its moral value" (165). This statement includes Kerstein's most controversial and interesting reconstructive claim, namely his denial that moral worth attaches only to actions done in accordance with duty as determined by the test... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Making the "One" ImpossibleJane Gallop (bio)The last paragraph of the first chapter of Mother Tongues presents the book's argument. "What I hope to argue in this book," writes Johnson, "is that the plurality of languages and the plurality of sexes are alike in that they both make the 'one' impossible" [25]. While I am not convinced that Mother Tongues actually demonstrates the similarity between the plurality of languages and (...) the plurality of sexes, my reading nonetheless does find its thesis in this sentence. I would say that Johnson's project in this book is to "make the 'one' impossible," that throughout this book, Johnson continually and consistently argues against the "appeal" of "the 'one'"—repeatedly locates herself in, and exhorts us to join her in, resistance to the powerful seductions of "the 'one.'"In the sentence I just quoted, the word "one" is in quotation marks because the word is not quite the proper name for what Johnson is talking about. When I use the phrase "the 'one'" here, as I do in my title ("Making the 'One' Impossible"), and as I will do throughout this paper, the word "one" will always be in quotation marks, scare quotes.In Mother Tongues, "the 'one'" goes by a number of different names. In the last paragraph of the first chapter, for example, where we found our thesis, it is called "universality." Under that guise, we might recognize the politics of this resistance to "the 'one'" (a politics we are, at this point in critical history, all more than ready to climb on board for). Johnson's resistance to "the 'one'" in Mother Tongues, however, usually appears—I'm happy to say—in other, less politic, more perverse guises.The most widespread elaboration of Mother Tongues's resistance to "the 'one'" is through its active interest in the practice of translation. The theory and practice of translation elaborated in this book is one I'd like to call insubordinate translation. At a number of places, Johnson looks at multiple translations of a text along with the original, not in order to determine which is closer to the original, but in order to enlarge the network of meaning. At times, Johnson productively follows meanings which appear in a translation but are not in the original.The first time this occurs is in the first chapter, in a section entitled "Translation." Johnson is looking at two different English translations of Kafka's The Trial: an "old translation" she "happened to have on hand" and "a more recent edition" in which the old translation "had been revised." Studying the first sentence of the novel in the original and the two translations, Johnson seizes on the word traduce, which she finds in the old translation but not the revision and proclaims: "The translation... is thus even better than the original" [16, emphasis added].The next chapter of Mother Tongues gives us a sense of where, theoretically, this insubordination comes from: "the theory that transformed literary studies utterly transformed the practice of translation. Translating Derrida or Lacan became an art in itself" [32]. "An art in itself" suggests a primary creation, not secondary. (We would certainly want to recall here that Johnson herself translated Derrida's Dissemination). [End Page 77]In the third chapter, "The Task of the Translator," we find Johnson comparing an English translation of Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator" to the German original. At one point she ponders the associations of "light" in the word lightly, which is translating the German fluchtig, associations that are not in the original. She concludes: "We have no way of talking about these creations ex nihilo of translation" [57]. Like the earlier "an art in itself," the phrase "creations ex nihilo" again makes translation a primary rather than secondary art. We may have "no way of talking about" these creations, but Mother Tongues does talk about them, regularly, throughout the book.The fifth chapter opens with an epigraph from a letter Benjamin wrote to Horkheimer, or rather an English translation of that letter. The conclusion to the first section of the chapter returns to the word apprehend, which appears in this epigraph: "the psychological... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.3 (2000) 243-258 [Access article in PDF] Poaching on Men's Philosophies of Rhetoric: Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Rhetorical Theory by Women Jane Donawerth Although their discussions have often been ignored in histories of rhetoric, women did participate in the development of philosophies of rhetoric in the eighteenth century and nineteenth century. 1 Most, like Hannah More, left to men preaching, politics, and law (the traditional genres (...) of European rhetoric) and took as their territory conversation and letter writing (more domestic rhetorical forms). 2 But some "poached" on men's territory. In this essay, I examine the tactics that Maria Edgeworth, Eliza Farrar, and Frances Willard used to appropriate and respond to a tradition of rhetoric that by fiat excluded women from rhetorical education, public speaking, and persuasive writing. In order to analyze their poaching on men's territory, I borrow from Michel de Certeau's theory of everyday practices of consumption.In The Practice of Everyday Life (1984), de Certeau suggests that we should study the ways that culture is constituted not only by dominant ideology, but also by "the dominated element in society (a status that does not mean that they are either passive or docile)" (xi-xii). Culture, for de Certeau, is not simply consumed; rather, in everyday life, it is invented "by poaching in countless ways on the property of others" (xii). One must study not just consumers, but also how they consume, what they do and make with the cultural artifacts and constructs offered to them, how they manipulate ideology. For the weak, those lacking political power, de Certeau, like recent feminists, 3 claims sophistic rhetoric, since the Sophists privileged the art of making "the weak position seem the stronger" (xx). How do "users reappropriate the space organized by techniques of sociocultural production?" asks de Certeau (xvii). For the weak, as for the Sophist, "[a] tactic insinuates itself into the other's place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance" (xix). With these issues in play, de Certeau studies everyday practices--shopping, cooking, moving about, and, most important for our purposes, reading. [End Page 243]Although seemingly passive, reading, de Certeau points out, is an "activity" of "silent production" (xxi). The reader does not absorb what he or she reads, but, instead, reinvents it--misunderstands it, adapts it to his or her own interests and concerns, remembers pieces of it, but pieces mutated. "This mutation makes the text habitable" (xxi), argues de Certeau. Thus, the dominant in culture may offer a set of rules, but it is only a basis for improvisation for the multitude of others in society. Consumption is not the imposition of an ideology on a society; a group does not absorb what it consumes. Instead, the group makes what it consumes its own. "'Assimilating' does not mean 'becoming similar to,'" according to de Certeau; rather, it means "'making something similar'" (166). A reader is not, then, a passive consumer. A reader "wander[s] through an imposed system," modifying and inventing a meaning (169). De Certeau thus focuses on the reading practices of the many "others" of society, "the silent, transgressive, ironic or poetic activity of readers... in private" (172). Readers do not absorb what they read. They are "travelers" who move across and "poach" from the "fields" of others' writings (174).With this essay, I examine the ways in which three women poach on men's rhetorical theory. Maria Edgeworth uses parody, comically enlarging key words in Enlightenment rhetoric to make a place for women in it. She reinvents the demonic shrew as a clever sophistic rhetorician. Eliza Farrar uses performance: she places women in the role of disciple, admiring the great men who thought up rhetoric, but then taking over the role of rhetorician with the pretense of laudatory imitation. Frances Willard uses collage: she cuts and pastes her own and other women's ideas about women preaching in with those of the famous men of her society. She creates a republican, presbyterian... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.1 (2003) 32-39 [Access article in PDF] Aesthetics, Epistemics, and Feminist Theory Jane Duran Recent feminist analysts of aesthetics and analytic aesthetics in particular seem to have come to the conclusion that the redemption of formulated aesthetic theory from the feminist point of view is a difficult and recondite task. 1 If analytic aesthetics now looks problematic, qua fruitful philosophical enterprise, its future (...) appears bleaker still when the intersection of the androcentric nature of analytic philosophy and the larger feminist project, frequently articulated in other than analytic terms, is examined.In this essay I will assume that there is some future for analytic aesthetics, and I will not dispute the basic assumption that any portion of analytic theory is somewhat immiscible with feminist points of view. My concern, rather, will be to try to show what it is specifically in the nature of analytic theory, both aesthetic and otherwise, which renders it of dubious value to the feminist critique (at least on first blush). Although in the past feminist theorists have tried to characterize the androcentric nature of analytic philosophy on the whole in rather striking terms,it is not clear that these terms have been precise enough. 2 Further, it is not clear that analytic modes are obviously unusable for feminist theory or for the development of a still nascent feminist aesthetics, although what one wants to say here is that this task is a terribly danger-fraught one. 3My goal here is twofold: first, to articulate what precisely it is aboutanalytic aesthetics (or any portion of analytic theory, for that matter) thatmakes it a hindrance — at least preliminarily — to the development of feminist views. In order to do this I will need to examine a relatively uncharted area in the literature, that is the parallel between much of analytic aesthetic theory and analytic epistemology. The second portion of my task will runsomewhat contrary to conventional wisdom: having delineated the mostmasculinist parts of analytic endeavors, I inquire if there is, indeed, anypart of rigorously articulated analytic theory that could lend itself to the development of a feminist aesthetic. [End Page 32] Analytic Philosophy and Aesthetics Analytic aesthetics, like analytic philosophy taken as a whole, has often proceeded as if the development of conceptual clarification and theoretical rigor could do much to "solve" or dissolve aesthetic problems. George Dickie's introductory work, for example, presents the student with a number of difficult areas in aesthetics, and then proceeds to address these areas in much the same manner that other contemporary texts employ for the discussion of issues in ethics, epistemology, or metaphysics.In discussing symbolism, Dickie first attempts to clarify the use of theterm, and then notes that there are problematic areas with regard to whether or not a work of art can both contain a symbol and serve itself as a symbol simultaneously. A symbol "stands for" in some establishable way that which it symbolizes. A symbol serves to transfer someone's thought to something other than itself, and the transfer is not a random association. The transfer depends upon certain features of the symbol which give it a place in a certain meaning system. 4I cite this material as exemplary because the flavor of analytic aesthetics is remarkably similar to the flavor of analytic philosophy as a whole. We sometimes need to remind ourselves that the techniques of analysis developed in the earlier part of this century relied on breakthroughs in logic and formal representation which allowed for a certain precision in matching symbol to thing signified. The original hope of philosophers working at the time of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore had been to develop something close to a logically perfect language with a one-to-one relationship between signifier and signified. However without merit this somewhat arcane task, its goals infused much of the philosophizing that followed it, and even the ordinary language school was, of course, indirectly an offshoot of this work. Nicholas Wolterstorff, for example, notes that "analytic philosophy was to be 'scientific philosophy'....The goal of the analytic philosopher... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 38.2 (2004) 88-94 [Access article in PDF] A Postmodern Tonantzín Jane Duran Visitors to the Puebla area in Mexico are frequently taken to the church of Santa María Tonantzínla, where they are told that they will see three or more styles of architecture simultaneously. Guidebooks to the area prominently feature this church and others like it, both as examples — or so the (...) reader is told — of the "Baroque," and as exemplars of the handiwork and craftsmanship of the indigenous.1 Because of the importance of various notions of style insofar as teaching in the arts is concerned, it might seem important to try to articulate what is meant by simultaneity of styles. In addition, today's students are often baffled by uses of the term "postmodern." In this essay I will argue that Santa María Tonantzínla may have somesurprising lessons for us all.There is no question that the visual effect of the building's interior is, in fact, stunning and that the visitor is simultaneously awed and bemused. Arrivals at this church in the Puebla suburb of Cholula see a riotous profusion of cherubs, angels, and other figures covering the walls, ceiling, nave, and almost every square inch of available space. Although some of the figures do indeed appear to bear a resemblance to those found in European structures created during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, other figures are more or less unrecognizable to most visitors, and clearly seem to be, as the books indicate, of non-European origin. To add to the effect of the stylistic mixing, the façade of the building is somewhat Romanesque, which only makes the interior more surprising and, in its own way, unexpected.I shall argue that work such as that at Tonantzín presents us with a variety of conceptual difficulties from the standpoint of aesthetics, and opens the door for some novel lines of argument. It is first of all quite unclear where the notion of "style" begins at Tonantzín; the boundaries are blurred and here, perhaps more than in most architectural treasures, one does not know how to announce or delineate the various styles. But much more important, [End Page 88] perhaps, is that this very amalgamation lends itself to the notion that one trope, the "postmodern," continually used in a discussion of contemporary architecture, is perhaps more relevant to Tonantzín than one might at first expect. In this essay I shall weave these two lines of argument together to support the contention that Tonantzín is, after all, postmodern. But before we can move to that assertion, it is important to try to think about what a meshing of such styles as "Spanish baroque" and "indigenous" could possibly mean, and why it has seemed urgent for writing on Tonantzín to employ these labels. Architectural Diversity In an intriguing article on the use of terms such as "modern" and "postmodern" in contemporary architecture, David Goldblatt has argued that Venturi's claim that modernity lacks what he terms diversity is more or less vacuous. As Goldblatt claims, the concept of diversity within a given work does not make much sense. More important for our purposes, Goldblatt goes on to provide a gloss on the notion of electicism, and its relation to a variety of architectural styles. He writes: When Venturi claims that modern architecture lacks diversity, he primarily means that it fails to achieve what he calls a pluralism. What he calls for is "Scarlatti and the Beatles, if diversity is to be achieved"....What Venturi is advocating is eclecticism.2As Goldblatt claims, eclecticism is the hallmark of the postmodern in architecture, and the eclectic pastiche that is Las Vegas — especially in terms of borrowed styles, ornamentation, and visible fripperies within the context of one building — becomes exemplary of that term and what it evokes. But to say simply that there may well be instances of the postmodern in architecture before the twentieth century, and before the decline of modernity itself, is to say very little. As Goldblatt... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Environmental Goodness and the Challenge of American CultureSandra Jane Fairbanks (bio)Until recently, Western virtue ethics has never recognized nature-focused virtues. This is not surprising, since western philosophies and religions have promoted the ideas that humans are superior to nature and that there are no moral principles regulating our relationship to nature. Environmentalists call for a radical change in our attitude towards nature if we are to meet the (...) challenge posed by today’s environmental problems. Thus, recognition of new virtues governing human attitudes and behavior towards nature is highly desirable, both by way of addressing an egregious lacuna in western thought, and as a necessary condition for anything like a viable planet. Unfortunately, a capitalist, consumer culture such as that of the United States presents a variety of serious obstacles to the successful inculcation of any new environmental virtues. Hence, inculcation of environmental virtues should not be the sole focus of environmental education. Such education should also appeal to human self-interest, at least until such time as the very idea of environmental virtue will not seem contrarian relative to prevailing views of the good life.IntroductionWhile there is room for disagreement over details and cases, it is safe to say that traditional Western philosophies and religions have generally [End Page 79] promoted domination and exploitation of the environment. Traditional, predominantly anthropocentric views such as Christianity or Greek philosophy, conjoined with a consumerist model of the good life, have conditioned the attitudes, values, and beliefs of human beings, with disastrous consequences for the environment. As a result, we face a variety of environmental problems—global warming, destruction and depletion of natural resources and wilderness areas, explosive population growth, toxic waste, and so on—that are serious right now, and that may well be catastrophic for future generations. Environmental philosophers, including biocentrists, ecocentrists, and ecofeminists, call for a shift away from anthropocentric theories to theories that emphasize the intrinsic value of nonhuman life, or that of nature in general.All of these environmental philosophies call for a radical change in our attitude towards nature if we are to meet the challenge posed by today’s environmental problems. Since this change in attitude is intended to ground novel and more adequate ways of behaving toward the environment, environmentally-sensitive writers are in the business, implicitly or explicitly, of promoting a new environmental virtue, or a new set of environmental virtues.1 Until recently, Western virtue ethics has never recognized a nature-focused virtue. This is not surprising, since western philosophies and religions have generally promoted the ideas that humans are superior to nature and that there are no moral principles regulating our relationship to nature, except (as, famously, in Kant2) for indirect duties toward humans. The idea that nature, including nonhuman life, natural objects, and ecological wholes has intrinsic value and, hence, moral standing, is a very recent development in Western philosophy.Thus recognition of new virtues governing human attitudes and behavior towards nature is highly desirable, both by way of addressing an egregious lacuna in Western thought, and as (almost certainly) a necessary condition for anything like a viable planet. Unfortunately, as I will argue, a capitalist, consumer culture such as that of the United States—on which I will focus due to its paradigm status—presents a variety of obstacles to the successful inculcation of any new environmental virtues. Thus, inculcation of environmental virtues should not be the sole, and perhaps not even the primary, focus of environmental education, at least in the short term. As I will argue, such education should also appeal, importantly, to human self-interest, at least until such time as the very idea of environmental [End Page 80] virtue will not seem contrarian relative to prevailing views of the good life.The structure of the discussion is as follows: First, I develop a brief sketch of an environmentally good person. I do so by compiling a set of environmental virtues recommended by various prominent biocentrists, ecocentrists and ecofeminists. Second, I address problems posed by American culture for the development of these environmental virtues. Finally, I conclude with practical suggestions for influencing American culture in the direction of environmental awareness and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Pantheology of Pandemic: Sex, Race, Nature, and The VirusMary-Jane Rubenstein (bio)I. PunitheologyThe explanations started pouring in even before the virus attained “pandemic” status in March of 2020: we were being punished. According to a vocal subset of Evangelical pastors and ultra-Orthodox rabbis, the death-dealing virus was divine retribution for the sins of (who else?) LGBT-identified people and their allies, who aggressively violated what the pastors and rabbis (...) called “the order of nature.”1 Meanwhile, their left-leaning counterparts argued that the sin in question wasn’t so much sexual as ecological: in the words of one Roman Catholic commentator, the coronavirus was God’s punishment for “our unfettered domination attitude toward nature.”2At the same time, an equally vocal throng of secular environmentalists called the virus nature’s own punishment for our manifold violations against her—in particular, the extractivism, pollution, alleged overpopulation, deforestation, carbon emissions, and industrial slaughterhouses that allowed the zoonotic strain to break out among humans in the first place.3 Depending on whom [End Page 5] you ask, then, the disaster we’ve come to encapsulate as COVID-19 is either godly or natural retribution for our manifold sins against “nature.”Although these sacred and secular punitheologies are not equivalent, they bear striking similarities to one another thanks to the monotheistic heritage of the concept of “nature” itself. As we will see, whether it is invoked by pastors, politicians, activists, or scientists, “nature” in the Western-descended world is presented as singular, nonwhite, and feminine; morally normative; and prone to abuse. Nature is often capitalized, often maternalized, and reliably distinguished either from a disembodied male God, a universalized “humanity,” or both. Nature, in short, carries immense ideological freight. Specifically, it installs and polices the work of what Kelly Brown Douglas calls “theo-ideology”: a “sacred legitimation” for a social order that seeks to present itself as unquestionable.4 And “nature” does this unparalleled ideological work thanks to the freedom it keeps promising from ideology: “your” way of being might be constructed, distorted, historical, subjective, contingent, artificial, cultural, or indeed sinful, but “ours” is natural—which is to say universally, even transcendently, true.Whether it comes from the mouths of angry clerics or righteous ecologists, then, the call to get right with nature is a call to adhere to one or another self-concealing social arrangement—to a set of interests and values whose power derives from its seeming so “natural.” For this reason, many contemporary thinkers recommend abandoning the term altogether. Donna Haraway suggests we try the non-binary and carefully pluralized “naturecultures”; Bruno Latour proposes “critical zones,” and Timothy Morton pivots to ecological practice which, he insists, can only function if we let go of the romantic delusion of “nature.”5Regardless of nature’s conceptual integrity, it is important to attend to the term in order to account for its rhetorical force and ubiquity—for the polyphibious presence of “nature” within the left and right-wings of science, religion, and politics alike. In this article, I will decode some of the recent, theologically [End Page 6] retributive appeals to nature within early, informal, literary responses to the COVID-19 outbreak in the US. In the process, I hope to unearth some of the mythic norms of race and gender that this concept both entrenches and conceals in the American imagination. Finally, I will ask what happens when we start messing with these categories, beginning with the mirroring chasms between humans and nature, and nature and God. How might we start to think pantheologically about this unrelenting pandemic, and why would anybody want to?II. Sins against NatureAs Catherine Keller noticed as early as April 2020, American pundits across the political spectrum immediately attributed COVID-19 to the relentless justice of an angry God.6 It is perhaps America’s favorite theological maneuver: explaining natural and social disasters as the product of divine vengeance. From Jonathan Edwards’s spider to Fred Phelps’s funeral protests, American preachers and political commentators have got a long-standing knack for putting the fear of God into a suffering nation. (Even my home insurance policy washes its hands of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 564-565 [Access article in PDF] Samuel J. Kerstein. Kant's Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xiv + 226. Cloth, $60.00. Summed up in a sentence, this book is both a critical examination of Kant's claim to have derived a supreme moral principle and a limited defense of Kant's project that appears to depart (...) significantly from Kant's own approach. Methodologically, a large portion of this book is devoted to analyzing various key concepts and claims about the nature of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason and testing them against "everyday" moral intuitions via numerous examples and counterexamples.Kerstein begins by distinguishing between the tasks of deduction and derivation of a supreme moral principle, whereby a deduction is understood as an argument for the existence of a supreme moral principle, and a derivation simply assumes this conditionally and goes on to argue that a particular principle and no other can claim the title. Kerstein waives the discussion of whether Kant succeeds in giving a deduction and hence satisfactorily refutes moral skepticism. His focus in the book is on the derivation proposed primarily in Groundwork I and II that if there is a supreme moral principle, then it must be that law expressed in his formulations of the Categorical Imperative (hereafter "CI"). Kerstein addresses Bruce Aune's "traditional" reading of Kant's derivation, wherein the argument utterly fails because Kant allegedly infers a relatively substantive command ("Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to be universal law") from a purely formal, higher order, and hence relatively empty one ("Conform your actions to universal law"). He then devotes a chapter each to two recent, influential defenses of Kant's derivation that seek his argument outside the Groundwork. Kerstein addresses Henry Allison's attempt to rescue the derivation via an account of agency rooted in Kant's notion of transcendental freedom, elaborated in the second Critique. Kerstein rejects Allison's reconstruction on the grounds that it remains too abstract to generate the degree of specificity arrived at in Kant's Groundwork universalization formulation. Chapter Three examines Christine Korsgaard's alternative reconstruction of Kant's argument that focuses on the formulation of humanity ("Act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only"). He rejects her interpretation because, again, the move from the abstract command to conform to universal law to the substantive formulation about humanity as a universally recognizable unconditional good fails. From the former, more abstract claim, he argues, it does not follow that there is a universally recognizable unconditional good, let alone that this good is humanity in itself (and not, say, utility [happiness], or even some intrinsic value unrelated to humanity, both of which Kant rejects as candidates for the unconditionally good).In his own reconstruction, Kerstein dissolves the criticism of the traditional reading of Kant's Groundwork derivation of the formula of universal law by simply denying that Kant [End Page 564] argues directly from the more generic principle to the specific versions of the CI (91ff). Instead he suggests that Kant's argument is less direct, made by way of laying out a set of criteria that any supreme principle must meet, and showing how the CI meets them while no other candidates can. In the second half of the book he takes a painstaking and critical look at a total of eight criteria, each of which Kant holds to be necessary and together are jointly sufficient for establishing the CI as "the supreme norm for the evaluation of the moral permissability and requiredness of an action, but not of its moral value" (165). This statement includes Kerstein's most controversial and interesting reconstructive claim, namely his denial that moral worth attaches only to actions done in accordance with duty as determined by the test... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century, and: Anne Conway: A Woman PhilosopherJane DuranWomen Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century, by Jacqueline Broad; 204 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. $65.00. Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher, by Sarah Hutton; 280 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. $75.00.Recent work on women philosophers has, in general, approached the topic from two vantage points: on the one hand, a number of anthologies have (...) been published, wherein commentators present a small portion of the woman thinker's work, often without the background necessary for a fuller understanding. On the other hand, some few women philosophers have been the subject of full-length works, but these have tended, by and large, to be women thinkers of the twentieth century, with whose work we are already familiar. Two recent books, one by Jacqueline Broad and the other by Sarah Hutton, go a long way toward improving the situation.Work by Eileen O'Neill, Sarah Hutton and Margaret Atherton, among others, has helped familiarize us with the notion that the seventeenth century—that era so commonly associated with Descartes and the rise of modern philosophy—was also a time of rich theorizing by women philosophers. Jacqueline Broad's book possesses many virtues: it has the finely-tuned style of the careful historian, while at the same time not failing to demonstrate acquaintance with a range of contemporary feminist commentary. Part of the problem in addressing women thinkers of the past is another version of what we are now tempted to call the essentialism problem: does it make sense to think that there is a style that might be demarcated as "feminine," or that might, in some way, pertain uniquely to women theorists? These are difficult issues, but a partial response to the question is to try to remember that it is not for no reason that women thinkers have, indeed, been left out of the canon. As Broad herself says, women philosophers "are now mere footnotes to the standard historical-intellectual accounts of the early modern period" (p. 1).Broad does a superb job of navigating between the need to set out the plain tenets of the thinker's philosophy, and the desire to try to tie it into these larger questions. In six chapters, she addresses the work of Elizabeth of Bohemia, [End Page 200] Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Mary Astell, Damaris Masham and Catharine Trotter Cockburn The chapters on Elizabeth, Margaret Cavendish and Mary Astell are particularly strong—here part of the difficulty is that we do have familiar commentaries addressing the work of these women, and it is hard to try to see them in a new light. We are accustomed, for example, to think of Elizabeth merely as Descartes's correspondent. As is the case with information that is currently coming to bear on the question of Harriet Taylor Mill's input into the work of John Stuart Mill, it is difficult for us to see Elizabeth as a thinker in her own right, or, indeed, to give her the credit that Descartes himself gave her; as Broad notes, he had described her as "the only person I have so far found who has completely understood all my previous works" (p. 13). Margaret Cavendish's reputation has suffered from the somewhat scattered approach of her writings, and Broad cites her "reputation for eccentricity" (p. 38). Nevertheless, the sheer volume of her work and its allusion to the problems addressed by the Cambridge Platonists (areas also worked on by Anne Conway) demands that she be taken far more seriously than she has in the past. Astell has become known largely for her more overtly feminist works, such as A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, but she was also the author of several other pieces addressing issues in metaphysics, and again the amount of her work and its citation during her own time would militate against the notion that it should not receive thorough examination.Broad does a wonderful job of setting out the main philosophical questions found in these theorists' works, and she excels at pitting their views against those of the various male philosophers whose work—according to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Organizational Ethics and Health Care: Expanding Bioethics to the Institutional Arena **Laura Jane Bishop (bio), M. Nichelle Cherry (bio), and Martina Darragh* (bio)In 1995, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) expanded its patient rights standards to include requirements for assuring that hospital business practices would be ethical. Renamed “Patient Rights and Organization Ethics,” these standards are based on the realization that a hospital’s obligation to (...) its patients is derived from two relationships: the patient-provider relationship governed by “clinical ethics,” and the customer-supplier relationship governed by “business ethics.” “[This] boundary between ‘clinical’ ethics and ‘business’ ethics is not clear and in many cases is nonexistent. While marketing and admission practices are seen as issues related to ‘business’ ethics, they can lead to unneeded admissions or demand for unneeded services, both of which can unnecessarily expose the patient to the risk of side effects or complications. Likewise, underutilization of needed services is likely to lead to less than optimal health outcomes” (I. Schyve 1996, p. 17). “These new standards arose out of well-publicized concerns about abuses in which patients were admitted to hospitals unnecessarily and were discharged or transferred only after their insurance expired” (I. Schyve 1996, pp. 15–16).These abuses also sparked eloquent protests against threats to patient well-being and to the nature of the patient-provider relationship in the bioethics literature. The fiduciary responsibility of the provider to inform and to protect the patient was fragmented by insurer business practices such as gag clauses and economic credentialing of providers (VII. Scope Note 31, 1996). The background role that the institution plays, though poorly articulated historically, has been brought sharply into focus by the explosive growth of the managed practice of medicine. The context of medical ethics is no longer limited to the resolution of individual cases, but instead encompasses the adoption of institutional structures to protect and promote patient welfare (IV. Emanuel 1995, p. 335). In this new configuration, the institution and the providers are co-fiduciaries for populations [End Page 189] of patients, and the medicine that is practiced is “appropriately economically disciplined.” The expression “My patient always comes first” is no longer “... intellectually serious or morally responsible.” But, “... to be sure, both conceptually and in practice, being an economically disciplined fiduciary professional or institution is ethically unstable.... The task is to identify the boundaries outside of which institutional policy and behavior will not count as an ethically defensible form of being... [a] fiduciary.” (IV. McCullough 1997, pp. 143–44). This process of delimiting and enforcing boundaries requires the development of “... a language for talking about the ethical values of the organization. If such a language does not exist, discussions about ethics become cumbersome and unlikely to occur” (IV. Cleveland Clinic Foundation 1998, p. 2).As with bioethics generally, the literature addressing organizational ethics is multidisciplinary. JCAHO’s compliance guide for its revised standards, Ethical Issues and Patient Rights, draws on a wealth of ideas from both clinical ethics and business ethics. This is often an awkward alliance. “Because the study of organizational ethics is in its infancy compared to other areas of healthcare ethics, discussions about it often seem like hot air with no palpable payoff” (I. Boyle 1998, p. 2). The fact that “... there is an ancient history that reflects widespread doubt about the moral probity of business” (II. Frederick 1995, p. 209) does not help. To begin, “Aristotle had rude things to say about business” (II. Jackson 1998, p. 401). A brief review of introductions to several of the business ethics textbooks cited in this bibliography reveals that a rebuttal of “business ethics as an oxymoron” is the standard opening paragraph. This stigma is unfounded, and “increased stability” has characterized the state of business ethics literature during the 1990s (II. Beauchamp and Bowie 1997, p. ix). Significant attention has been given to elaborating two often overlapping theories—stakeholder and social contractarian.Originating in the 1960s as a pun on “stockholder,” proponents of stakeholder theory claim that a corporation’s fiduciary responsibility extends beyond increasing its profitability to protecting the rights of individuals or groups affected by its actions. Popular as a strategic planning tool in the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:AngloModern: Painting and Modernity in Britain and the United StatesJane DuranAngloModern: Painting and Modernity in Britain and the United States, by Janet Wolff. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, 172 pp.AngloModern, Janet Wolff's scintillating attempt to limn the construction of modernity in the visual arts, is more than worth reading for a number of reasons. In this work, she details how modernity positioned itself against a number of strands (...) of development, and then, by a process of exclusion, formulated its own stance. As poststructuralist theory has taught us, the procedures of building an excluded body against a center, when closely examined, frequently tell us more about a rubric or label than we could otherwise have imagined.Wolff is primarily concerned with three areas of exclusion/construction for the turn in the visual arts, painting in particular, that began at the opening of the twentieth century. Toward the beginning of the work, she notes that there was always a continuous realist and figurative genre at work even in modernist circles, but it seldom achieved anything like the recognition that the more typically abstract works we associate with the rise of modernism gained. She associates this area of nonrecognition with the work of women in particular, and these two areas alone — the realist/figurative and any work done by a woman artist — constitute two of her most important foci in AngloModern. In addition, and with some difficulty, since it adds a layer of complication, she is concerned about the exclusion and marginalization of Jewish artists during thisperiod — both in galleries and in thecommentary generated by the art world — although it is clear that many of the major "abstract" works associated with modernism were, in fact, produced by Jewish artists.Wolff is at her best in laying out in precise detail how it is that the culture of the art world throws up nearly insurmountable barriers against those deemed unworthy at a fairly early point in the construction of any new movement. The single strongest chapter in the work may well be the second, "Questions of Discovery: the Art of Kathleen McEnery," in which Wolff shows how various processes of categorization kept the work of this extremely talented woman from receiving anything like the recognition it deserved for a long period of time. Wolff sums up her overall project, and how it will relate to an artist such as McEnery, in her Introduction, when she writes:The story of modern art that is challenged [in her book] is the narrative tracing the development of Western painting from France to the United States, in a lineage more or less running from Manet and Post-Impressionism, by way of Cubism and Surrealism, to Abstract Expressionism. It is a story produced and reinforced by critics, academics, curators, and museum directors.(p. 3)Women artists, for example, were frequently excluded not only becausethey were women, but because they may have tended to engage in painting that was more realist, which itself [End Page 118] became coded as "feminine," and so forth. McEnery's intriguing portraits of the early two decades of the twentieth century were "discovered," as Wolff notes for the l987 inaugural exhibition of the National Museum of Women in the Arts, despite the fact that McEnery had at one point been fairly well-known (pp. 41-42). A woman at work in a figurative tradition, and working in suburban circles far away from the geographical centers of the art world, she was quickly at the mercy of the canonical forces of art historical construction.As we attempt to educate our students about rubrics, social movements, and the relationship of the arts to the political events of an era, we can do little better than to cite, for illustrative purposes, a number of interesting cases, and Wolff does just that. In sharp and incisive prose, she not only investigates McEnery's disappearance from the approved version of the early American modernist scene, but she also examines the construction of the early group displayed at the Whitney, the notion of the "feminine" in the work of Simmel and Benjamin, and, finally, the notion of the "Jewish artist." As her exemplar for the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bilingual Aesthetics:A New Sentimental EducationJane DuranBilingual Aesthetics: A New Sentimental Education, by Doris Sommer. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004, 254 pp.Doris Sommer's new work Bilingual Aesthetics is the sort of book that takes one by surprise—and for good reason. Filled with punning twists, and itself a valorizer of word games and magic, this work has not a lot to do with bilingualism (in the standard sense), not (...) a lot to do with aesthetics (again, in the standard academic sense), but a great deal to do with both. Whether the title is read (and Sommer's point is to forward the notion of alternate readings) as the aesthetics of bilingualism or as an account of what a bilingual might make of aesthetics, there is a startling amount of content in the work.Briefly, Sommer essays to make the case that our multicultural society is distinctly better off for being multicultural and multilingual (or at least, in some threatening sense, emergently bilingual) because the literal bilingual has a distinct advantage over her or his monolingual counterpart. The bilingual can play language games, and those games shock, amuse, or jolt—whatever it is that they do, they rouse us out of any state of intellectual torpor into which we might have fallen and they serve to make us all individuals who, in Du Bois' memorable phrase, have "double consciousness."Thus Sommer does in fact mean for her title to be read in at least two ways: Her work attempts to valorize and vindicate a sort of unofficial bilingualism (one of the blurbs on the back of the paperback edition begins by saying "Knowing a second language entails some unease... "), while she also attempts to let us in on the notion that there is an aesthetic that develops from the use of more than one code. Sommer plays remarkably on all these concepts: She is familiar with the standard, overt scholarship on bilingualism—she can cite work by sociolinguists and others. At the same time, as an author known for previous work on literature, especially with regard to Latin America, she is also familiar with much of the standard historical work in aesthetics, including Kant. Citing thinkers such as Kenji Hakuta, William J. Bennett, Wittgenstein, and Elena Poniatowska, Sommer leaves the reader somewhat bedazzled and breathless but better off for having read her work.Her overall thesis, if one may attempt to employ such a phrase, is that bilingualism and code-switching create for us the same sort of uneasiness and inevitable access to the unconscious that works of art and literature produce—and that the edginess that is a concomitant of code-switching is beneficial. Her first chapter "Choose and Lose" reminds Americans that the United States has always been a multilingual place and focuses on how much can be gained from attempting to forward the notion. If there is any difficulty to Sommer's work, it is that she practices what she preaches. Every page demands much of the reader, since every page itself engages in the [End Page 121] sort of rapid-fire twisting and switching that Sommer is trying to support as the ground for a new aesthetic consciousness.Early on, Sommer gives us the following:Complaints about the danger to national coherence [of multi- or bilingualism] can be downright funny.... [One irate journalist wrote:] "How can immigrants identify with America if they can't read Lincoln's words in the language in which they were spoken?(out of many, one) to a multicultural boarding house,...?" No need to be upset at this harangue. It's obviously a joke, even if the author missed it (a common asymmetry in bilingual humor). Notice that the translation from Latin assumes that English-only citizens don't understand the very slogan they hold dear.(p. 26)But of course the joke is to some extent on Sommer and on all of us, as she no doubt intends. It is highly unlikely that the journalist did get the humor, and the only funny part of the entire tirade is that we—assuming we have enough formal education—may be able to make something out of it... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Education and Feminist AestheticsGauguin and the ExoticJane Duran (bio)IntroductionMuch has been made of the way in which Gauguin came to characterize the differences that he saw between the French and Tahitian populations once he had embarked on the series of voyages for which he is now celebrated.1 Although there is evidence to support a number of interpretations with respect to his portrayals of women, one theme has been paramount (...) in a great deal of the commentary: Gauguin came to see the women of Tahiti as not only emblematic of the island itself, and the island's culture, but as the embodiments of a certain sort of feminine grace. The contrasts that Gauguin himself invoked between the "naturalness" of the Polynesian women and what he took to be the falsity of women of his own class in Europe, especially France, has been the subject of much writing. In our attempts to educate undergraduates with respect to categories of oppression, we can appeal to the work of Gauguin as a valuable source of understanding concerning these issues.Given the Eurocentrism of the time, and given that it is roughly this same time period that Said will later go on to associate with the rise of Orientalism, it is probably not possible that Tahiti, its women, and its various flora and fauna could have been seen as anything other than vestiges of the natural in a world already too tamed. Words such as "savage" are used frequently in the criticism of the day to explain Gauguin's subjects, and some of the themes of his work seem to have been chosen specifically because they lent themselves to such an interpretation, at least in European eyes.2 But Gauguin goes a bit further than this crude caricature indicates, at least insofar as his portraits of female figures are concerned. It is clear that, for the [End Page 88] artist, they represent all that is to him unknown about Tahiti, and that at the same time they are coded as the natural, the innocent, and even the holy. An examination of some of his works will bear out the extent to which this is the case.IRegarding Gauguin's attitudes toward Tahiti and its women, Britt Salvesen has noted in recent commentary thatGauguin infused his art with mystery, often by depicting enigmatic female figures, traditional symbols of nature and its secrets. In Tahiti he expected to encounter exotic and sensual women. Given Gauguin's complicated position as both observer and participant in Tahitian society, his ambition to represent the "country's female type" bears close examination. He owned illustrated travel books in which, as he noted scornfully, "all the [natives] … look like Minerva or Pallas Athena." He aimed to disrupt this conventional projection of European ideals and fantasies onto Tahitian women.3As Salvesen indicates, Gauguin expected to find, and did find—by his lights—"exotic" and "sensual" women. Feminist analysis has provided us with an overwhelming amount of material about the extent to which such projections onto women as a group become a near universal human cultural trope, but few individuals allow us to make such strong comparisons with respect to projections on differing female figures as Gauguin does. That he is able to discern the ridiculousness of Academy art with its emphasis on "Pallas Athena" is obvious; what he chooses to do himself is something else again.Inaugurating a variety of personal relationships with women and girls as young as thirteen years of age,4 Gauguin developed a view of the Tahitian woman as emblematic simultaneously of the culture, of a certain sort of innocence, and of a virtually transcendental sacredness. That these images might be thought, naively, to have little to do with sensuality reflects the degree to which we fail to understand that for Gauguin, as for others after him, the sensual itself was sacred. Salvesen notes that one of the early relationships was with the "thirteen-year-old Tehamana. … [o]f Polynesian origin, [in]experienced, and of a seemingly 'impenetrable' character, Tehamana offered Gauguin the mysterious experience he sought in life and art."5If Tehamana represents one take on woman-as-elementally... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Virginia Woolf, Time, and the RealJane DuranCritical appraisal of the work of Virginia Woolf has tended to focus on feminist concerns, or on issues revolving around the actual facts of her upbringing and the extent to which she might have been thought to be a victim of abuse. Although some commentators have noted that Woolf's high modernist style lends itself to a number of readings with respect to sense (...) of self, the passage of time, and a sort of phenomenological reflection, philosophical concerns have, in general, not played a large role in Woolf scholarship to date.In this article I shall argue that some of Woolf's best known work—especially To the Lighthouse—exemplifies a concern for time, reality and a sense of interior life-as-lived that is overtly philosophical in its construction, and even somewhat didactic. Furthermore, I will claim, it is part and parcel of modernism as it is ordinarily conceived to address these issues in some fashion, even if, in many cases, they are not addressed as thoroughly as they are in Woolf's work. Even if we can be certain that a great deal of Woolf's mental disturbance, or mental illness, was the result of childhood abuse, or even inherited tendencies, it still does not detract from the power with which she was able to use depictions of inner turmoil to give us a sense of the fleeting and transitory nature of the real. Indeed, such a sense is one of the hallmarks of Woolf's work and is acknowledged by most of her critics, even if it is not termed a philosophical concern. I will analyze constructs of time and the chronological through a view of To the Lighthouse.IA number of philosophers have offered conceptions of time; these efforts range from those of antiquity to the more technical articulations [End Page 300] of the twentieth century. One of the most haunting evocations of the power of time is in the work of one whose thought is seldom cited in this regard, Simone de Beauvoir. In Old Age, she offers a phenomenological account of the passage of time that reflects an emphasis on the internally-felt disparity between the past and the present that is a frequently-remarked upon aspect of old age.1 There is a paucity of experience-of-the-present among the very elderly, and a reliance upon the past. Concomitantly, there is a foreshortening of the future. As Beauvoir writes: "How far does memory allow us to retrieve our lives? The images... are far from possessing the richness of their original object. An image is the seeing of an absent object by means of an organic and affective analogue" (p. 147). Despite the fact that these images may lack the richness of the original, the somewhat paradoxical effect of being older is that these images predominate.In To the Lighthouse, Woolf plays with time in a way that allows for a development of the internally-sensed structure of time on the parts of the various characters. Although many have remarked upon the well-known middle section, "Time Passes," this aspect of the felt sensation of time as an internal phenomenon, and one on which her characters seem to draw at regular intervals, is a somewhat little remarked feature of the rest of the book. It is present from the outset: James's first thoughts about the trip to the lighthouse highlight time in a sort of reversal of the way that Beauvoir has indicated for the elderly; James's conception of the passing of time is altered in another sense, since he is only six. He has projected himself forward so intently to the trip to the lighthouse that everything else has seemed somewhat unreal. As Woolf writes, "he had looked forward, for years and years it seemed...."2Although the differences between the felt constructions of time between, for example, childhood and old age might seem to partake of the commonplace, Beauvoir is among those philosophers who have used the notion of the truncation of time and the foreshortening of the future among the elderly to make philosophical commentary. By the same token... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century, and: Anne Conway: A Woman PhilosopherJane DuranWomen Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century, by Jacqueline Broad; 204 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. $65.00. Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher, by Sarah Hutton; 280 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. $75.00.Recent work on women philosophers has, in general, approached the topic from two vantage points: on the one hand, a number of anthologies have (...) been published, wherein commentators present a small portion of the woman thinker's work, often without the background necessary for a fuller understanding. On the other hand, some few women philosophers have been the subject of full-length works, but these have tended, by and large, to be women thinkers of the twentieth century, with whose work we are already familiar. Two recent books, one by Jacqueline Broad and the other by Sarah Hutton, go a long way toward improving the situation.Work by Eileen O'Neill, Sarah Hutton and Margaret Atherton, among others, has helped familiarize us with the notion that the seventeenth century—that era so commonly associated with Descartes and the rise of modern philosophy—was also a time of rich theorizing by women philosophers. Jacqueline Broad's book possesses many virtues: it has the finely-tuned style of the careful historian, while at the same time not failing to demonstrate acquaintance with a range of contemporary feminist commentary. Part of the problem in addressing women thinkers of the past is another version of what we are now tempted to call the essentialism problem: does it make sense to think that there is a style that might be demarcated as "feminine," or that might, in some way, pertain uniquely to women theorists? These are difficult issues, but a partial response to the question is to try to remember that it is not for no reason that women thinkers have, indeed, been left out of the canon. As Broad herself says, women philosophers "are now mere footnotes to the standard historical-intellectual accounts of the early modern period" (p. 1).Broad does a superb job of navigating between the need to set out the plain tenets of the thinker's philosophy, and the desire to try to tie it into these larger questions. In six chapters, she addresses the work of Elizabeth of Bohemia, [End Page 200] Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Mary Astell, Damaris Masham and Catharine Trotter Cockburn The chapters on Elizabeth, Margaret Cavendish and Mary Astell are particularly strong—here part of the difficulty is that we do have familiar commentaries addressing the work of these women, and it is hard to try to see them in a new light. We are accustomed, for example, to think of Elizabeth merely as Descartes's correspondent. As is the case with information that is currently coming to bear on the question of Harriet Taylor Mill's input into the work of John Stuart Mill, it is difficult for us to see Elizabeth as a thinker in her own right, or, indeed, to give her the credit that Descartes himself gave her; as Broad notes, he had described her as "the only person I have so far found who has completely understood all my previous works" (p. 13). Margaret Cavendish's reputation has suffered from the somewhat scattered approach of her writings, and Broad cites her "reputation for eccentricity" (p. 38). Nevertheless, the sheer volume of her work and its allusion to the problems addressed by the Cambridge Platonists (areas also worked on by Anne Conway) demands that she be taken far more seriously than she has in the past. Astell has become known largely for her more overtly feminist works, such as A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, but she was also the author of several other pieces addressing issues in metaphysics, and again the amount of her work and its citation during her own time would militate against the notion that it should not receive thorough examination.Broad does a wonderful job of setting out the main philosophical questions found in these theorists' works, and she excels at pitting their views against those of the various male philosophers whose work—according to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religious Perspectives on Bioethics, Part ILaura Jane Bishop (bio) and Mary Carrington Coutts (bio)This is Part One of a two part Scope Note on Religious Perspectives on Bioethics. Part Two will be published in the December 1994 issue of this Journal. This Scope Note has been organized in alphabetical order by the name of the religious tradition.Contents for Parts 1 and 2Part 1Part 2I.GeneralI.Native AmericanII.African Religious TraditionsReligious TraditionsIII.Bahá'í (...) FaithII.Protestantism—willIV.Buddhism and Confucianisminclude a general sectionV.Eastern Orthodoxyand sections focused onVI.Hinduismspecific denominations.VII.IslamIII.Roman CatholicismVIII.JainismIX.JudaismIntroductionThe many religions of the world bring diverse, and occasionally divergent, attitudes to bioethical issues. These beliefs may guide patients and health care professionals as they seek or provide health care. In an attempt to facilitate understanding of and access to information about these beliefs in our pluralistic and global society, this Scope Note identifies literature by the world's major religious groups on topics relating to bioethics.Topics covered by this Scope Note include general attitudes to health and [End Page 155] health care, the physician-patient relationship, treatment refusal, abortion, contraception, sterilization, reproductive technologies, genetics, mental health, human experimentation, organ transplantation and donation, death, euthanasia, suicide, and prolongation of life. Material was not available on all of these topics for each religion.The literature gathered here represents only a small portion of the available writing on religion and medicine, and is limited to that which comments explicitly on bioethical issues. Some faiths have a rich tradition of writing in bioethics; for others the literature is more limited. Variation in coverage is not intended to indicate the relative importance of a faith, but reflects accessibility and space constraints. Individuals interested in obtaining additional information are encouraged to contact the National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature.Specific citations about a region or country were chosen because of the predominance of a religious tradition within the population. In all cases, variation in spelling represents author usage. This Scope Note treats only the literature published in English, and every attempt has been made to identify English language sources for these faiths.It is important to remember that doctrinal and theological differences exist even within the same denomination and that views of individual patients, family members, and health care providers should be sought.Dictionaries and EncyclopediasMelton, J. Gordon, ed. Encyclopedia of American Religions. Fourth edition. Detroit: Gale Research, 1993. 1217 p. Basic information about the history, sacred texts, membership, educational facilities, publications, and North American addresses are provided for 1,730 churches, denominations, sects, and cults. Bibliographies for many faiths supplement this extensive resource.Reich, Warren T., ed. Encyclopedia of Bioethics. New York: Free Press, Macmillan, 1978. 4 volumes. Articles on all the major religions as they relate to bioethics are included in this highly-regarded encyclopedia. In addition, many of the topical essays feature a section on the views of various faiths on the topic under discussion. For the best use of the Encyclopedia, see the subject index in volume 4. (Note: a revised, second edition is due to be published by Macmillan in late 1994.)GeneralAmerican Psychiatric Association. Committee on Religion and Psychiatry. Guidelines Regarding Possible Conflict Between Psychiatrists' Religious Commitment and Psychiatric Practice. American Journal of Psychiatry 147 (4): 542, April 1990. The American Psychiatric Association recommends that psychiatrists respect their patients' religious beliefs and that they not impose their own [End Page 156] beliefs on their patients.Bankowski, Z., and Bryant, J. H. Health Policy, Ethics and Human Values: Proceedings of the XVIIth CIOMS Round Table Conference, Athens Greece. Geneva: Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, 1985. 336 p. Many sections of this volume address issues where religion impacts health policymaking. Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Latin America, and Asia are highlighted for the varied ways in which their religions and cultures are integrated into the provision of health care.Batchelor, Edward, ed. Abortion: The Moral Issues. New York: Pilgrim Press, 1982. 246 p. Batchelor compiles a collection of essays by experts on religious ethics as they relate to abortion. Includes... (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 1, Page 107-108, January 2022.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 69~ created mind will reflect the divine essence in its own unique way (e.g., 77, 83) helps to solve some of the problems which Parkinson finds in the pbenomenalism that he attributes to Leibniz (see xxxi and xxxiv) and also partly motivates the original formulation of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles (50 and his doctrine of marks and traces (51). But the point of The (...) Yale Leibniz surely has less to do with interpretation and more to do with text. Parkinson's translations are generally good. There are only a few cases where the English obscures both Leibniz's Latin and his argument (e.g., a paragraph on p. i 14 contains instances of the Latinfigura which are translated differently). That The Yale Leibniz has the excellent policy of including the original language on facing pages renders irrelevant the fact that one is bound to disagree with this qualified translator on some minor points. Parkinson's edition might have been a bit more scholar-friendly than it is: while his text contains both the page and essay numbers of the Academy edition, his table of contents contains neither; this means that one can neither make a quick comparison between the contents of the two volumes nor easily move back and forth between them. Nor is one privy, in Parkinson's text, to the many and important corrections which Leibniz made to his essays and which are carefully noted in the Academy volume. This is a serious flaw: these papers afford an extraordinary ringside seat on the development of beibniz's philosophy; it is a pity that many of the details of this metaphysical sparring remain out of sight. Despite these minor disappointments, Parkinson's edition of De Summa Rerum remains a genuinely helpful research tool. By taking on these enormously difficult and profoundly important texts and by placing them so securely in the context of Leibniz's later thought, he has done us a very great favor. He has also whetted our appetite for more of The Yale Leibniz. CHRISTIA MERCER Columbia University Claudio Cesa and Norbert Hinske, eds. Kant und seinJahrhundert: Gedenkschriftfiir Giorgio ToneUi. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1993. Pp. xiv + ~lZ. NP. Far-reaching both in historical and philosophical scope as well as in the diversity of scholars represented, this volume is a tribute to an important contemporary historian of philosophy, Giorgio Tonelli (1928-1978). A glance through the seventeen-page chronological bibliography confirms the breadth of Tonelli's historical interests, ranging over work on Albrecht von Hailer, Heine, and Maupertuis as well as his wellknown works on Kant and earlier figures of the Enlightenment. The editors point out in their brief introduction that Tonelli's work was important as an antidote to an earlier tendency in Kant scholarship to read Kant through the lenses of German idealism, rather than focusing on the Kantian corpus in the context of earlier traditions and philosophical achievements. "Sein Jahrhundert" includes essays that encompass the whole of the eighteenth century, as well as important seventeenth-century influences. The volume is quite 692 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER ~995 appropriately international and multilinguai, reflecting Tonelli's own background and widespread influence. The essays are for the most part clearly written, well-informed and carefully argued interpretations of important Enlightenment figures that aim to refocus our attention on neglected or misinterpreted aspects of these philosophers' views. What follows will give interested readers a brief overview of the contents. In "Corsi, Ricorsi and the Way Out of Modern Barbarism in Vico's New Science," Craig Walton offers an interesting 'third way' of reading Vico's notions of"course" and "recourse" that parallels Tonelli's approach to Kant. Walton argues against anachronistic idealist interpretations of corsi/ricorsi as cyclic or recurrence concepts, and also against ahistorical readings of these notions as aesthetic or ironic. Rather, for Vico, the "storia ideale eterna'" is to be understood as purposeful but open-ended, and this can only be fully appreciated if the notion of ricorso is interpreted as the possibility of human response to the course of human history. Ezequiel de Olaso's "Spinoza et l'Espagne ~clair6e... (shrink)

For Lack of a Better Plan: A Framework for Ethical, Legal, and Clinical Challenges in Complex Inpatient Discharge Planning Content Type Journal Article Pages 311-326 DOI 10.1007/s10730-009-9117-6 Authors Jane Jankowski, Albany Medical Center Albany NY 12208 USA Terese Seastrum, Northeast Health 2212 Burdett Ave. Troy NY 12180 USA Robert N. Swidler, Northeast Health 2212 Burdett Ave. Troy NY 12180 USA Wayne Shelton, Alden March Bioethics Institute, Albany Medical College 47 New Scotland Avenue, MC 153 Albany NY 12208-3478 USA Journal (...) HEC Forum Online ISSN 1572-8498 Print ISSN 0956-2737 Journal Volume Volume 21 Journal Issue Volume 21, Number 4. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religious Perspectives on Bioethics, Part 2Laura Jane Bishop (bio) and Mary Carrington Coutts (bio)This is Part Two of a two part Scope Note on Religious Perspectives on Bioethics. Part One was published in the June 1994 issue of this Journal. This Scope Note has been arranged in alphabetical order by the name of the religious tradition.Contents for Parts 1 and 2Part 1I.GeneralVI.HinduismII.African Religious TraditionsVII.IslamIII.Bahá'í FaithVIII.JainismIV.Buddhism and ConfucianismIX.JudaismV.Eastern OrthodoxyPart (...) 2I.Native American ReligiousChristian Scientist TraditionsEpiscopal/AnglicanII.ProtestantismEvangelicalGeneralJehovah's WitnessAnabaptist (Church of theLutheranBrethren, Friends SocietyMethodist/Wesleyan(Quaker), and Mennonite/NazareneAmish/Hutterite)Presbyterian/ReformedAssemblies of GodSeventh-day AdventistBaptistUnitarian UniversalistChurch of Jesus Christ of theUnited Church of Christ Latter-day SaintsIII.Roman CatholicismChristian Church (Disciples of Christ)[End Page 357]IntroductionThe many religions of the world bring diverse, and occasionally divergent attitudes to bioethical issues. These beliefs may guide patients and health care professionals as they seek or provide health care. In an attempt to facilitate understanding of and access to information about these beliefs in our pluralistic and global society, this Scope Note identifies literature by the world's major religious groups on topics relating to bioethics.Topics covered by this Scope Note include general attitudes to health and health care, the physician-patient relationship, treatment refusal, abortion, contraception, sterilization, reproductive technologies, genetics, mental health, human experimentation, organ transplantation and donation, death, euthanasia, suicide, and prolongation of life. Material was not available on all of these topics for each religion.The literature gathered here represents only a small portion of the available writing on religion and medicine for these faith traditions in the United States, and is limited to that which comments explicitly on bioethical issues. Some faiths have a rich tradition of writing on bioethics, for others the literature is more limited. Variation in coverage is not intended to indicate the relative importance of a faith but reflects accessibility and space constraints. Individuals interested in obtaining additional information are encouraged to contact the National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature.It is important to remember that doctrinal and theological differences exist even within the same denomination and that views of individual patients, family members, and health care providers should be sought.Native North American ShamanismAvery, Charlene. Native American Medicine: Traditional Healing. Journal of the American Medical Association 265 (17): 2271, 2273, 1 May 1991. A brief description of the general principles of Southwestern Native American religions is provided. Most tribes believe that health and religious well-being are interconnected.Day, Thomas W. Cross-Cultural Medicine at Home. Minnesota Medicine 75 (3): 15-17, March 1992. The Ojibwe tribe's view of health incorporates spiritual health and emphasizes a holistic approach to health care that encompasses a harmonious balance between the individual, community, and nature, as well as between body, mind, and spirit.Hirschfelder, Arlene B., and Molin, Paulette. The Encyclopedia of Native American Religions. New York: Facts on File, 1992. 367 p. A survey of Native American religions is provided, including tribal histories, descriptions of religious ceremonies, and biographical sketches.Hultkrantz, Åke. Health, Religion, and Medicine in Native North American Traditions. In Healing [End Page 358] and Restoring: Health and Medicine in the World's Religious Traditions, ed. Lawrence Sullivan, pp. 327-58. New York: Macmillan, 1989. Hultkrantz summarizes the Native American attitude toward medicine and health care, explaining that belief in the supernatural and its powers is one of the most important tenets of life. Ailing persons are aided by those who have been trained to act as mediators between the sick individual and the supernatural powers. Attitudes toward health and disease, and the role of the medicine man are demonstrated through the use of examples taken from many tribes.Hultkrantz, Åke. Shamanic Healing and Ritual Drama: Health and Medicine in Native North American Religious Traditions. New York: Crossroad, 1992. 197 p. Hultkrantz surveys the varied traditions of Native North Americans and their outlook on medical care, health, and religion, and emphasizes that Native American medical beliefs... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 30.1 (2000) 25-48 [Access article in PDF] Postcolonialism's Archive Fever Sandhya Shetty and Elizabeth Jane Bellamy Jacques Derrida. Archive Fever. Trans. Eric Prenowitz. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1996. ________. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1976. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1988. 271-313. (...) 1. Reading the Subaltern Archivally--or, Back to Antiquity Many readers of "Can the Subaltern Speak?" have been disturbed by Spivak's controversial answer to her own question, which is that "no scene of speaking" can arise for the subaltern woman; no discursive space can emerge from which she could formulate an "utterance." 1 One way of rephrasing Gayatri Spivak's highly resonant question might be, Can there be such a thing as a "postcolonial archive"? The purpose of our essay is to demonstrate just how crucial the concept of an "archive"--perhaps even a "postcolonial archive"--is for a more sympathetic understanding of Spivak's now notorious "silencing" of the subaltern woman. The underread and scarcely commented-on third and fourth sections of Spivak's essay raise the question, Can we approach the gendered subaltern more productively if our project is to recover not "lost voices" but rather lost texts? In the process of unpacking the textual complexities underlying Britain's 1829 abolition of sati (the widow's self-immolation on her husband's funeral pyre), Spivak pushes us further back in time when she observes intriguingly that "the archival... work involved here is indeed a task of 'measuring silences'" [286, our emphasis]. 2 We contend that her [End Page 25] choice of the term "archival" is highly motivated and can serve as the long-overdue occasion for a return to the largely unread sections of "Can the Subaltern Speak?"We can think of at least two risks involved in our undertaking. For one thing, revisitations to well-known essays can often seem more regressive than innovative. We are well aware that we may have to overcome a certain indifference on the part of readers who, feeling confident that they know it well, judge that "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (now over ten years old) has had its theoretical "moment" and should now give way to more current efforts to locate nonelite, subaltern subjectivity within a politics of resistance. A second concern is that because our project of reading the subaltern woman "archivally" must necessarily reexamine and justify Spivak's career-long engagement with Derrida and with deconstruction, we must be aware of the extent to which her deconstructive feminism has been prematurely and unfairly associated with the supposed political shortcomings of Derridean deconstruction, the regrettable result being an almost reflex aversion to her deconstructive theory within both feminism and postcolonialism. Despite these risks, however, we hope that our use of the archive as the governing principle for our return to Spivak's essay can pave the way for a more sympathetic reading of Spivak's "silent" subaltern. Our essay will argue that "Can the Subaltern Speak?" deserves a foundational or canonical status within postcolonial theory and should experience a "staying power" on the current critical scene as far-reaching and significant as Edward Said's Orientalism.Spivak's essay at one point refers quite literally to the concept of an archive, that is, the colonial "archive" of the East India Company, consisting of the "correspondence among the police stations, the lower and higher courts, the courts of directors, the prince regent's court," and so on [298]--all the documents instrumental in British law's recodification of sati from "ritual" to "crime" (also, we might add, the archive of subaltern historiography). 3 However, as Foucault's concept of the archive reminds us, the [End Page 26] archive is not just "that whole mass of texts that belong to a single discursive [in this case, legal] formation," but can also be conceptualized more abstractly as the "law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11.1 (2001) 91-112 [Access article in PDF] Scope Note 40 Animals in Research and Education: Ethical Issues Laura Jane Bishop and Anita Lonnes Nolen Scientific enquiry is inexorably tied to animal experimentation in the popular imagination and human history. Many, if not most, of the spectacular innovations in the medical understanding and treatment of today's human maladies have been based on research using (...) animals. However, the use of animals in research and experimentation has been debated, defended, and protested by both individuals and organizations at various levels. Responses range from personal lifestyle decisions and fervent philosophical treatises to strident arguments, violent demonstrations, and direct action. The continuum of attitudes about animals and the human relationship with animals spans the range between those who support no regulation of the human use of animals and those who advocate absolute animal liberation from all human use (see II, Orlans 1993, p. 22). History The first recorded experimentation on animals occurred in ancient Rome, but not until the Renaissance did scholars begin serious study of how the body works. Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) and other artists and anatomists pursued anatomical investigations of muscle and bone structure. William Harvey (1578-1657) discovered the circulation of the blood via his experiments on live deer. During this period, much live animal experimentation both in England and France was based on the view of French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) that animals are incapable of feeling pain. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the English utilitarian philosopher, thought otherwise. In his "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation" in 1789, Bentham declared, "The question is not, can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But can they suffer? Despite Bentham and others, the belief that animals could not perceive pain persisted in many quarters into the twentieth century. Nineteenth century French physiologist Claude Bernard [End Page 91] (1813-1878)-and his teacher, François Magendie (1783-1855)-conducted wide-ranging animal experiments including surgery, use of drugs, and removal of body parts from many species. Bernard argued that while no amount of benefit could justify any harm to human research subjects, even extreme harm and pain for animal research subjects could be justified by the potential benefit to human beings. Although he did use anesthetics in his work after their discovery in 1847, even Bernard's later work was controversial because of the numbers of animals used and the repetitive nature of his research. The experiments of Magendie and Bernard both laid the foundations for animal experimentation as a practice for scientific advance and contributed in large measure to the emergence of the anti-vivisection movement. Public protests over animal experiments conducted in France and the fear that these might come to England led to the passage of the first law controlling animal experimentation, the "1876 Cruelty to Animals Act" in England. This history and the dynamic tension between scientific inquiry and public concern set the stage for the activism and scholarship of the twentieth century.Since the 1960s, the amount of attention, activism, and scholarship related to animal use has increased at a rapid pace. The modern animal protection movement, led by the Australian philosopher Peter Singer in his book, Animal Liberation (II, 1975), based its advocacy on animals' ability to experience pain and suffering (Bentham's argument). Singer's book and other investigations into animal research, such as LIFE magazine's photojournalism piece on pet theft, animal cruelty, and animal experimentation (Concentration Camps for Dogs. LIFE (4 February 1966), pp. 22-29), brought the use of animals in research, testing, and education to the attention of the general public. Activists, advocates, laypersons, scientists, lawmakers, and animals themselves, have created the interesting, complicated, and complex history of animal rights and animal welfare over the last several decades. Current Statistics Worldwide, approximately 35 million animals are used in research each year; the United States alone uses 12 million animals annually--more than any other country. In 1998, the official number of research animals recorded in the United States was 1... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Conflicts—and Consensus—about Conflicts of Interest in MedicineMatthew K. Wynia and Bette–Jane Crigger*This fascinating collection of essays about individual experiences of conflict of interest leaves little doubt that physicians remain divided about the importance, impact and meaning of conflicts of interest in their work. These essays offer differing views about what conflicts of interest look and feel like “on the ground” and about whether specific conflicts of interest are (...) bad, just a fact of life, or maybe even good.Conflict, Conflict EverywhereThese essays situate conflict of interest in a variety of contexts: the treatment recommendations a physician makes for an individual patient; the relationship between teaching physician and medical student or practicing physician and health care organization; the interaction between academic researchers and industry collaborators or professional bodies and industry supporters. In this, the narratives taken together reflect the scope of concern about conflict of interest in medicine familiar in the literature. In his classic 1993 essay, Dennis Thompson noted that concerns about conflict of interest encompass issues of physician self–referral, risk sharing between physicians and health care institutions, gifts from industry, hospital purchasing practices, as well as sponsored research and research with patients (Thompson 1993). To that list have subsequently been added relationships with industry in medical education at all levels, physicians’ service as consultants to industry or members of industry speakers bureau, and development of clinical practice guidelines (Lo & Fields 2009).That almost none of these essays draw attention to some widely publicized situations of conflict of interest—for example, gifts to physicians or the provision of drug samples—should, we think, be seen more as an artifact of the authors’ varied individual experiences than as a failure by the authors to engage key concerns in the ongoing professional and public debate. It could also be that the authors, asked to submit personal stories, assumed that yet another essay about the ‘traditional’ issues in the conflicts of interest literature would be seen as redundant, routine or even boring. Or, there is the tantalizing possibility that the absence of some of the more familiar conflicts from these narratives is the early fruit of efforts to address these traditional issues through policies governing interactions between physicians and industry promulgated by academic medical centers and health systems, medical specialty societies, and industry.One significant area of concern that has emerged in recent years is conflict of interest in the development of clinical practice guidelines. E.g., Choudry et al. 2002; Sniderrman & Furberg 2009; Guyatt et al. 2010. Although none of the essays in this [End Page 101] collection address it head on, Perlmutter touches on several key issues. His depiction of how an FDA committee process limited the input he was able to provide as an expert, undermined his potential to contribute to the professional dialogue, and raised concerns about the objectivity of the drug approval process echoes concerns about objectivity, the role of expert opinion, and the presence on guideline development panels of individuals with financial interests in the recommendations to be developed that have been explored at some length in the literature, most recently by the Institute of Medicine in reports on evidentiary standards (Eden et al 2011) and principles for guideline development (Graham et al. 2011).Conflict of Interest or Dual Agency?Several essays set out physicians’ experience in navigating situations of diverging expectations. Bierut, for example, reflects on the disjunction between the goals and products of academic researchers and commercial sponsors. She saw herself advancing basic knowledge and was forced to grapple with the reality of sponsors’ goals to advance commercial ends as well. Nagldinne and Mikulec each recall struggles to reconcile their obligation to exercise professional judgment on behalf of patients with the demands of health care organizations focussed also on the bottom line. Cruz–Flores attests to the challenge of making recommendations for care when one is both a practicing clinician and a clinical investigator engaged in research that might offer benefit to a patient for whom there are limited options.Thompson defined conflicts of interest as “a set of conditions in which professional judgment concerning a primary interest (such as a patient’s welfare or the validity of... (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2020, Page 21-24.