Disclosure of health information is a sensitive matter, particularly in the context of serious illness. In conservative societies—those which predominate in the developing world—direct truth disclosure undoubtedly presents an ethical conundrum to the modern physician. The aim of this study is to explore the truth disclosure practices of physicians in Jordan, a developing country. In this descriptive, cross-sectional study, 240 physicians were initially selected by stratified random sampling. The sample was drawn from four major hospitals in Amman, Jordan. A closed-ended (...) questionnaire was distributed and completed by self-report. A total of 164 physicians completed the questionnaire. Thirty-seven physicians usually withheld the diagnosis of “serious illness” from patients, while 127 physicians usually divulged the information directly. Among the latter, 108 physicians made exceptions to their disclosure policy. Specialists were more likely to withhold health information. Non-disclosure was primarily motivated by request from the patient’s family. In twenty cases, non-disclosure was undertaken independently. In conclusion, most respondents opt to disclose the truth; however, the vast majority of these respondents make exceptions. Instances of non-disclosure are primarily motivated by sociocultural constructs. (shrink)

Contributed papers on concept of False and Indivisibles (Philosophy) in Hindu philosophy presented at Seminar organized by Department of Advaita Vedanta, Rāṣṭrīyasaṃskr̥tavidyāpīṭham, Tirupati from December 31, 2005 to January 01, 2006).

El Estado es un concepto clave en la filosofía jurídico-política de José Ortega y Gasset (Madrid, 1883-1955). Sin embargo, resulta sorprendente que, pese a la importancia que para este autor tenía dicha noción, no haya sido estudiada con la misma profundidad e interés que otras vertientes de su pensamiento. A este respecto, basta repasar las monografías y los artículos publicados hasta la fecha sobre la figura y la obra de Ortega para constatar que, en términos cuantitativos, las investigaciones dedicadas (...) a la idea orteguiana del Estado han sido apenas testimoniales, y desde luego no son tan significativas como las que se han podido dedicar a otros temas o tópicos más conocidos de su pensamiento. Así pues, el presente libro pretende abordar el estudio de la realidad problemática del Estado en su triple dimensión histórica, sociológica y política. De acuerdo con tal propósito, esta monografía se divide en tres partes: en la primera de ellas, se estudian las instituciones políticas de Roma entendidas por Ortega como precedentes ineludibles para la formación histórica del Estado. La segunda parte de la obra versa sobre el Estado concebido como culminación de lo social, es decir, como órgano diferenciado para el ejercicio del poder público, lo cual conduce indefectiblemente hasta la Teoría de los usos sociales. Por último, la tercera parte se centra en el concepto orteguiano de Estado como forma de organización política, explica la relación que mantienen el Estado y nación en su obra, y expone las líneas principales del programa político pensado por Ortega para modernizar, regenerar y europeizar a España. (shrink)

El propósito de este ensayo es presentar una lectura de los pasajes principales en los que Aristóteles deja ver qué comprende por πειραστική: una noción que los intérpretes consideran que él recortó sobre el perfil filosófico de Sócrates y su élenchos. Frente a una cantidad de dificultades presentadas por perspectivas influyentes, argumentaré que no hay razones para considerar que Aristóteles habría diferenciado la peirástica de la dialéctica ni por la forma de sus silogismos ni porque sus puntos de partida tengan (...) una naturaleza diferente de los éndoxa. Por el contrario, defenderé la tesis de que la peirástica puede ser vista como un cierto conocimiento experto que en la práctica se hace manifiesto como un momento refutatorio exitoso de la dialéctica filosóficamente aplicada: aquel en el cual la dialéctica stricto sensu se vuelve reluctante a la pérdida del rumbo en la búsqueda de los principios del conocimiento experto que representa la amenaza sofística de la sabiduría aparente sobre un asunto dado. Intentaré mostrar cómo parte de la actividad – dialéctica a los ojos de Aristóteles – de Sócrates se ajustaba a varios requerimientos de su arte inferencial de Tópicos. Sugeriré que ello no significa que Aristóteles haya edificado la peirástica sobre el élenchos socrático, sino que parte de la actividad de Sócrates ha sido utilizada como evidencia filosófica de sus propias concepciones dialécticas fundamentales. (shrink)

Mīr Zāhid's glosses on al-Dawwānī's commentary on al-Suhrawardī's Hayākil al-nūr on Islamic philosophy.

al-Dawwānī's commentary on al-Suhrawardī's Hayākil al-nūr.

La obra del filósofo estadounidense David H. Finkelstein, Expression and the Inner, publicada originariamente en 2003 por Harvard University Press (2ª ed. 2008) puede ahora leerse en la versión española de Lino San Juan, editada por la ovetense KRK Ediciones con el título: La expresión y lo interno. Finkelstein propone en La expresión y lo interno un análisis expresivista del autoconocimiento. Podría parecer cuando menos sorprendente y aún más admirable que con tan sólo dos capítulos (“Detectivismo y constitutivismo” y “Expresión”) (...) y un Epílogo (“Deliberación y transparencia”), Finkelstein haya conseguido presentar en esta obra un planteamiento calificado por muchos como una auténtica renovación de la discusión analítica en torno al tema del autoconocimiento, o sea, acerca del problema de qué clase de autoridad quepa atribuir a las expresiones sobre nuestros propios estados de ánimo y/o nuestros estados mentales sin más. (shrink)

W. H. Hudson tuvo un contacto muy temprano con El origen de las especies; probablemente haya leído el libro el mismo año de su aparición . Esta lectura lo acercó a una filosofía naturalista que, a la vez, lo alejó de la formación materna en cuestión religiosa, y lo condujo a asumir una posición evolucionista crítica. De hecho, contradijo observaciones de Darwin que éste revisó, además de mencionarlo en la segunda edición de El origen de las especies . Asimismo, (...) son numerosas las citas que Hudson hace de Darwin en sus textos. Aunque pueden marcarse diferencias, ciertos tópicos generales del evolucionismo, son fácilmente reconocibles a lo largo de su producción. El trabajo pretende avanzar sobre estos aspectos para identificar cuán profundamente caló en su concepción del mundo la perspectiva evolucionista.W. H. Hudson had an early contact with The Origin of Species. He may have read it in the same year of its publication . This reading brought him close to a naturalist philosophy that, in turn, took him away from an education in religious practice, fostered by his mother, and made him adopt a critical evolutionist position. In fact, he contradicted Darwin's observations, which he latter reviewed, in addition to mentioning him in the second edition of The Origin of Species . Also, there are numerous quotations of Darwin in Hudson's works. Even though differences can be noted, certain general topics on evolutionism may be easily recognized throughout his production. This paper attempts to move forward in these aspects in order to identify how deeply the evolutionist perspective influenced Hudson's conception of the world. (shrink)

Tomemos el camino iniciado por Ricœur, quien, de la mano de Aristóteles, reconoce en el Mythos, en la trama, la estructura lingüística más conveniente para decir aquello en lo que consiste “devenir un sí mismo”. ¿Caben relatos que digan más pertinentemente qué es un sí mismo? La aparición, cada vez más insistente, de otros modos de narrar ―extraños y peculiares por su falta de estructura y por su condición de narraciones decepcionantes― cuestionan que la trama sea el modo narrativo que (...) más le pertenece a la identidad personal. Tal sería el caso de P. Handke, J. Winkler, H. Müller, T. Bernhard, C. Lispector, E. Jelinek, D. Kis o W.G Sebald. Entonces cabría la posibilidad de relatarnos no ya para sostenernos, para apacentarnos con viento ―en palabras de Sánchez Ferlosio― sino para decir más verdaderamente lo que somos: ruido y furia. «Es significativo que la relación que aquí se aprecia entre nuestra lectora y la literatura sea tan radicalmente filosófica. La lectora ha escrito un texto en el que destellan los aspectos más nodales del pensar contemporáneo, que en su realidad no deja de ser clásico. No se trata de que haya escudriñado asuntos filosóficos en los textos literarios, es que lo que resulta filosófico es su propia lectura, su mirada, su consideración, porque trata a los textos como la literatura se trata a sí misma». (shrink)

Hart said that analytical jurisprudence is descriptive and general but did not draw an explicit distinction between conceptual questions that are in the main theoretical and others that are in the main practical. In Hart’s account, analytical jurisprudence searches for some kind of clarity about the idea of law and the other basic legal ideas as they occur in our ordinary experience. In the Postscript he explains that jurisprudence is the ‘theoretical or scientific study of law as a social phenomenon’, (...) which may, on occasion, but typically does not, rely on moral deliberation. It is to be contrasted to ‘practical’ questions as to how to live one’s life. I shall call this view ‘descriptivism’. It has been a very influential position in analytical jurisprudence and it is being defended by Hart’s followers even today. In this essay I raise some doubts about its coherence. First, I do not think Hart defended this view consistently —even though he did so in the Postscript. Second, I do not think that the position has been adequately defended, either by Hart or by his followers. There is still a great deal of ambiguity as to the precise position of jurisprudence between theoretical and practical reason.Resumen:Hart sostuvo que la jurisprudencia analítica es descriptiva y general pero no elaboró una distinción explícita entre las preguntas conceptuales que son principalmente teóricas y otras que son principalmente prácticas. En la explicación de Hart, la jurisprudencia analítica busca cierto tipo de claridad acerca de la noción de derecho y las demás ideas básicas tal cual ellas ocurren en nuestra experiencia ordinaria. En el Post Scriptum, él explica que la jurisprudencia es el ‘estudio teórico o científico del derecho como un fenómeno social’, el cual puede, en ocasiones, basarse en la deliberación moral, pero típicamente no lo hace. Esto puede contrastarse con las preguntas “prácticas” acerca de como las personas dirigen su propia vida. Llamo esta tesis “descriptivismo”. Esta ha sido una posición muy influyente en la jurisprudencia analítica y ha sido defendida por los seguidores de Hart hasta hoy. En este ensayo despierto dudas sobre su coherencia. Primero, no creo que Hart defendiera esta tesis de forma consistente. Segundo, no creo que la posición haya sido defendida de forma adecuada, ni por Hart ni por sus seguidores. Aún existe una gran ambigüedad acerca de la posición exacta de la jurisprudencia entre la razón teórica y la razón práctica. (shrink)

My object in this paper is to suggest a few reflections on some themes in Bentham's work which others as well as I have noted, without perhaps developing them as fully as might with advantage be done. There will be nothing like full development in the limited compass of what is said here, but what is said may at least indicate possible directions for further exploration. The greater part of the paper will be concerned with the notion of natural authority; (...) but I want to begin by taking a broader, though no doubt rather superficial, view of the role in Bentham's thinking of the concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘the natural’. (shrink)

The object of this article is to examine, with the work of Jeremy Bentham as the principal example, one strand in the complex pattern of European social theory during the second half of the eighteenth century. This was of course the period not only of the American and French revolutions, but of the culmination of the movements of thought constituting what we know as the Enlightenment. Like all great historical episodes, the Enlightenment was both the fulfilment of long-established processes and (...) the inauguration of new processes of which the fulfilment lay in the future. Thus the seminal ideas of seventeenth-century rationalism realized and perhaps exhausted their potentialities in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The ideas with which this article is concerned, however—conveniently grouped and labelled as the ideas of utilitarianism—only began to achieve systematic development in these later decades of the eighteenth century. Within that period—during the first half and more of Bentham's long life—attempts to apply those ideas to the solution of social problems met largely with failure and frustration. Yet unrealized potentialities remained, the realization of which was reserved for a time when the world of the philosophes no longer existed. The movements for social and political reform which have played so large a part in modern history since the French Revolution may be judged in widely differing ways; but whatever the verdict, these movements surely cannot be understood without due consideration of that part of their origins which lies in eighteenth-century utilitarianism. (shrink)

On Islamic practices, doctrines and on Islamic ethics.

The Responsible Self was H. Richard Niebuhr's most important work in Christian ethics. In it he probes the most fundamental character of the moral life and it stands today as a landmark contribution to the field. The Library of Theological Ethics series focuses on what it means to think theologically and ethically. It presents a selection of important and otherwise unavailable texts in easily accessible form. Volumes in this series will enable sustained dialogue with predecessors though reflection on classic works (...) in the field. (shrink)

P. O. Bodunrin, in his 1981 essay, asks: ‘Is there an African Philosophy, and if there is, what is it?’ This question has occupied centre stage among younger African intellectuals for about a decade now. The most articulate among these intellectuals, who are themselves philosophers, are Bodunrin , Kwasi Wiredu , H. Odera Oruka , Marcien Towa and Eboussi Boulaga , and Paulin Hountondji . These philosophers among others are in dialogue with one another and currently are seen to be (...) the principal architects of a new orientation in African thought. (shrink)

Early in Peter Abelard's Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian, the philosopher and the Christian easily come to agreement about what the point of ethics is: “[T]he culmination of true ethics … is gathered together in this: that it reveal where the ultimate good is and by what road we are to arrive there.” They also agree that, since the enjoyment of this ultimate good “comprises true blessedness,” ethics “far surpasses other teachings in both usefulness and worthiness.” (...) As Abelard understood them, both fundamental elements of his twelfth-century ethical culture — Greek philosophy and Christian religion — held a common view of the nature of ethical inquiry, one that was so obvious to them that his characters do not even state it in a fully explicit way. They take for granted, as we take the ground we stand on, the premise that the most important function of ethical theory is to tell you what sort of life is most desirable, or most worth living. That is, the point of ethics is that it is good for you, that it serves your self-interest. (shrink)

Byzantine Empire; economic and social conditions; history.

H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Joseph Boyle, John Peppin, David Solomon; Christian Bioethics, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Vol.

Branner, H.C. Humanismens krise.--Hansen, Martin A. Eneren og massen.

H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.; Controversies, Conflicts, and Consensus: A Concluding, Untheological Postscript, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Med.

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can (and often does) assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying (...) 'man's estate'. This does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)

Edmund D. Pellegrino has played a central role in shaping the fields of bioethics and the philosophy of medicine. His writings encompass original explorations of the healing relationship, the need to place humanism in the medical curriculum, the nature of the patient’s good, and the importance of a virtue-based normative ethics for health care. In this anthology, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., and Fabrice Jotterand have created a rich presentation of Pellegrino’s thought and its development. Pellegrino’s work has been dedicated to (...) showing that bioethics must be understood in the context of medical humanities, and that medical humanities, in turn, must be understood in the context of the philosophy of medicine. Arguing that bioethics should not be restricted to topics such as abortion, third-party-assisted reproduction, physician-assisted suicide, or cloning, Pellegrino has instead stressed that such issues are shaped by foundational views regarding the nature of the physician-patient relationship and the goals of medicine, which are the proper focus of the philosophy of medicine. This volume includes a preface by Dr. Pellegrino and a comprehensive Introduction by the editors. Of interest to medical ethicists as well as students, scholars, and physicians, _The Philosophy of Medicine Reborn_ offers fascinating insights into the emergence of a field and the work of one of its pioneers. “After a long period of dormancy, philosophy of medicine has blossomed with new life. The single most important physician-philosopher in that rebirth has been Edmund Pellegrino. His contributions to virtue theory, the concept of beneficence, the dispute over the internal and external sources of a morality for medicine, and the role of the Hippocratic tradition are all critical. The essays collected in this volume have changed the history of the philosophy of medicine. He shows that philosophy of medicine can be done with both passion and compassion.” —_Robert M. Veatch, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University_ “Edmund Pellegrino's words have helped medical students, faculty, scholars and patients address the challenges they encounter in medicine and medical practice. His personal support has also been critical for many of us in developing programs in medical ethics and philosophy of medicine in our universities. Dr. Pellegrino combines the wisdom of a great physician with those of a great philosopher to produce a body of writing that will continue to inspire us all. This volume contains some of his best and most influential work.” —_Loretta Kopelman, The Brody School of Medicine, East Carolina University_ _ _ “Edmund Pellegrino has been a leading light in the philosophy of medicine for a generation. He was instrumental in the birth of bioethics, founded one of the leading journals, and provided able leadership in organizing early activities of the profession. He has served as department chairman, dean, and university president. Most recently, he chairs the President’s Council on Bioethics. In all this, first and foremost, he has been a physician. Those who are ill and suffering make a claim upon him. To respond to this claim, Pellegrino creatively brings together the worlds of science and of the humanities. For him, that is what medicine is about, making it the most scientific of the humanities and the most humane of the sciences. Fortunately for us, Pellegrino brings these worlds together in thought, as well as in practice. In this selection from his writings, Engelhardt and Jotterand have captured the heart of Pellegrino’s project, both in depth and breadth, so we can also hear that claim of the ill and so we can see what worlds must come together if we are to respond in the appropriate way.” —_George Khushf, University of South Carolina_ “Pellegrino’s work is both a treasure and important for understanding bioethics. His work in philosophy of medicine addresses the crucial questions that are so important to understanding the practice of medicine and the ethics of health care.” —_Kevin Wildes, President, Loyola University_ _ _. (shrink)

The full range of Bentham's engagement with Blackstone's view of law is beyond the scope of a single article. Yet it is important to recognize at the outset, even in a more restricted enquiry into the matter, that the engagement, begun when Bentham, not quite sixteen years of age, started to attend Blackstone's Oxford lectures, was indeed a lifelong affair. Whatever Bentham had in mind when, at the age of eighty, in 1828, he began to write a work entitled ‘A (...) familar view of Blackstone: or say Blackstone familiarized’, the manuscripts at least suffice to prove that ‘Our Author’ was still in the forefront of his mind at that octogenarian but still indefatigably active stage of his career. Every aspect of Bentham's multifarious intellectual activity over the intervening decades had been touched in some measure by his response to Blackstone's ideas. It still seems true to say what was said a dozen years ago: It would be an exaggeration to say that Bentham elaborated his own conception of law by way of a constant and conscious dialectic with the views of Blackstone. But it would be an exaggeration for which the evidence would afford some excuse. (shrink)

al-Qism al-awwal. Fī ḍawābiṭ al-fikr (manṭiq) --.