Philosophical ability, so that the principles chosen for formalization are not trivial or absurd.

The following text is a translation of Semyon Frank’s “L’intuition fondamentale de Bergson” published in Henri Bergson: Essais et témoignages inédits, edited by Albert Béguin and Pierre Thévenaz, Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1941. In this article, Frank addresses Bergson’s notion of intuition, his anti-intellectualism, his mysticism, his closeness to Lebensphilosophie, the notion of lived experience, the distinction between intuition as pure contemplation and intuition as living knowledge, the distinction between cognition of the atemporal essence of reality and cognition of (...) the world of becoming, pragmatism, the disinterested and open intuitive spiritual attitude vs the utilitarian attitude of social groups closed in on themselves, the transrational vs the irrational, spiritual life, psychic life, the Absolute, and the temporal flux. The article contains criticisms of Bergson on the issues of time and intuition: the durée, the intuitive time, is incomprehensible without an atemporal foundation. Therefore, according to Frank, Plato was correct—contra Bergson—to define time as the moving image of eternity. And, if there is such an atemporal foundation, then, contrary to what Bergson seems to think, intuition as living knowledge cannot be the sole mode of intuition. Moreover, unlike what Bergson appears to think, an intuition of the Absolute would be an intuition of the transrational rather than of the irrational. The translation is preceded by an introduction tracing the genesis of the article, which was commissioned by the Swiss philosopher Pierre Thévenaz. (shrink)

Que nous apprend la vie publique urbaine de notre culture morale et politique? Comment perçoit-on les autres, et comment définit-on, dans l'espace limité des rencontres auxquelles nous expose le côtoiement urbain le plus routinier, le périmètre de ce que l'on doit à autrui, ce que l'on peut en attendre, en craindre ou en exiger? Des métamorphoses de la mendicité à la politisation du phénomène de «harcèlement de rue», l'étude des «relations en public» chère au sociologue américain Erving Goffman est ici (...) prolongée, pour analyser la façon dont les formes ordinaires de la coexistence urbaine participent à la fabrique de nos cultures démocratiques. L'ethnographie de longue durée menée par Carole Gayet-Viaud montre, au fil des séquences d'enquête, mêlant observations des espaces publics urbains (rues, transports, jardins, terrasses de café, etc.) et entretiens relatifs à ces expériences, le travail normatif à l'œuvre dans ces échanges. La définition des choses dues entre inconnus, telles que la vie publique les donne à voir, dessine ainsi une civilité irréductible à un corpus de règles qu'il ne s'agirait que d'appliquer. C'est, bien plutôt, une activité permanente de réglage des conduites, qui inscrit, dans des pratiques d'apparence anodine, aux frontières des sphères morale et politique, une définition située des exigences de la vie commune, des égards qui articulent un sens du juste et du convenable, et tentent de les faire coïncider."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Although an invasive medical intervention, Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) has been regarded as an efficient and safe treatment of Parkinson’s disease for the last 20 years. In terms of clinical ethics, it is worth asking whether the use of DBS may have unanticipated negative effects similar to those associated with other types of psychosurgery. Clinical studies of epileptic patients who have undergone an anterior temporal lobectomy have identified a range of side effects and complications in a number of domains: psychological, (...) behavioural, affective and social. In many cases, patients express difficulty adjusting from being chronically ill to their new status as ‘treated’ or ‘seizure free’. This postoperative response adjustment has been described in the literature on epilepsy as the ‘Burden of Normality’ (BoN) syndrome. Most of the discussion about DBS postoperative changes to self is focused on abnormal side effects caused by the intervention (ie, hypersexuality, hypomania, etc). By contrast, relatively little attention is paid to the idea that successfully ‘treated’ individuals might experience difficulties in adjusting to becoming ‘normal’. The purpose of this paper is (1) to articulate the postoperative DBS psychosocial adjustment process in terms of the BoN syndrome, (2) to address whether the BoN syndrome illustrates that DBS treatment poses a threat to the patient’s identity, and (3) to examine whether the current framework for rehabilitation after DBS procedures should be updated and take into account the BoN syndrome as a postoperative self-change response. (shrink)

Following Wallace’s suggestion, Darwin framed his theory using Spencer’s expression “survival of the fittest”. Since then, fitness occupies a significant place in the conventional understanding of Darwinism, even though the explicit meaning of the term ‘fitness’ is rarely stated. In this paper I examine some of the different roles that fitness has played in the development of the theory. Whereas the meaning of fitness was originally understood in ecological terms, it took a statistical turn in terms of reproductive success throughout (...) the 20th Century. This has lead to the ever-increasing importance of sexually reproducing organisms and the populations they compose in evolutionary explanations. I will argue that, moving forward, evolutionary theory should look back at its ecological roots in order to be more inclusive in the type of systems it examines. Many biological systems can only be satisfactorily accounted for by offering a non-reproductive account of fitness. This argument will be made by examining biological systems with very small or transient population structures. I argue this has significant consequences for how we define Darwinism, increasing the significance of survival over that of reproduction. (shrink)

Ecological fitness has been suggested to provide a unifying definition of fitness. However, a metric for this notion of fitness was in most cases unavailable except by proxy with differential reproductive success. In this article, I show how differential persistence of lineages can be used as a way to assess ecological fitness. This view is inspired by a better understanding of the evolution of some clonal plants, colonial organisms, and ecosystems. Differential persistence shows the limitation of an ensemblist noncausal understanding (...) of evolution. Causal explanations are necessary to understand the evolution by natural selection of these biological systems. †To contact the author write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, P.O. Box 6128, Station Centre‐Ville, Montreal, Quebec, H3C 3J7 Canada; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

The idea that deep brain stimulation (DBS) induces changes to personality, identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy and self (PIAAAS) is so deeply entrenched within neuroethics discourses that it has become an unchallenged narrative. In this article, we critically assess evidence about putative effects of DBS on PIAAAS. We conducted a literature review of more than 1535 articles to investigate the prevalence of scientific evidence regarding these potential DBS-induced changes. While we observed an increase in the number of publications in theoretical neuroethics (...) that mention putative DBS-induced changes to patients’ postoperative PIAAAS, we found a critical lack of primary empirical studies corroborating these claims. Our findings strongly suggest that the theoretical neuroethics debate on putative effects of DBS relies on very limited empirical evidence and is, instead, reliant on unsubstantiated speculative assumptions probablyin lieuof robust evidence. As such, this may reflect the likelihood of a speculative neuroethics bubble that may need to be deflated. Nevertheless, despite the low number of first-hand primary studies and large number of marginal and single case reports, potential postoperative DBS changes experienced by patients remain a critical ethical concern. We recommend further empirical research in order to enhance theoretical neuroethics work in the area. In particular, we call for the development of better instruments capable of capturing potential postoperative variations of PIAAAS. (shrink)

By taking seriously the idea that democracy is a way of life, a pragmatist approach to democracy invites us to reconsider how manners and the political realm of free thought may be related. The present contribution argues that civil interactions are part of the experience of citizenship and represent one of the ways through which political principles can come to life. Civility is therefore described as an activity rather than a set of rules, the role of which in democratic life (...) has been often underestimated. In civil interactions, people struggle and hesitate, and even fight to establish conditions of respect, trust, solidarity, or authority. They practically define the bond between people who have nothing more in common than living in the same society. Far from being a mere mechanical or conservative repetition of inherited habits, civil interactions, when studied closely, exhibit the constant effort people make to promote what they care about. Civility should therefore be considered as an activity the difficulties associated with which aim at embodying through sociability, the political link between citizens. Hospitality to difference, helpfulness, attention to others, even quarrels over what is fair, discussions and reflections about the relevance of the categories through which people perceive one another, have to be analysed in this perspective, as effective parts of the activity of caring for the common world. (shrink)

At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes action-output (...) in the midst of ongoing movement, and consequently requires a constant self-locating spatiotemporal reference frame as basis for these computations. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency have encouraged both the proliferation of anticipative feedforward processing mechansims, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, this recursive i-here-now processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness. (shrink)

. Computational chemistry grew in a new era of “desktop modeling,” which coincided with a growing demand for modeling software, especially from the pharmaceutical industry. Parameterization of models in computational chemistry is an arduous enterprise, and we argue that this activity leads, in this specific context, to tensions among scientists regarding the epistemic opacity transparency of parameterized methods and the software implementing them. We relate one flame war from the Computational Chemistry mailing List in order to assess in detail the (...) relationships between modeling methods, parameterization, software and the various forms of their enclosure or disclosure. Our claim is that parameterization issues are an important and often neglected source of epistemic opacity and that this opacity is entangled in methods and software alike. Models and software must be addressed together to understand the epistemological tensions at stake. (shrink)

In this book Frederic Schick develops his challenge to standard decision theory. He argues that talk of the beliefs and desires of an agent is not sufficient to explain choices. To account for a given choice we need to take into consideration how the agent understands the problem, how he sees in a selective way the options open to him. The author applies his new logic to a host of common human predicaments. Why do people in choice experiments act so (...) often against expectations? Why do people cooperate in situations where textbook logic predicts that they won't? What exactly is weakness of will? What are people reporting when they say their lives have no meaning for them? This book questions the foundations of technical and philosophical decision theory and will appeal to all those who work in that field, be they philosophers, economists and psychologists. (shrink)

Les approches classiques de l'engagement se sont principalement intéressées à ses déterminants, rapportés à des variables sociodémographiques, des dispositions, des vertus ou des rétributions, comme à autant de motifs déjà constitués en amont et extrinsèques à l'expérience de l'engagement. Or, les intérêts des personnes - et leur puissance d'agir elle-même - peuvent s'analyser comme des produits de l'engagement, pour peu qu'on le saisisse dans sa dimension temporelle, itérative et située. Envisagé comme expérience, il paraît indissociable d'une enquête menée à la (...) fois sur soi et sur le monde, où les personnes interrogent autant leurs propres désirs et possibilités d'agir, que la vie commune qu'elles souhaitent cultiver ou voir advenir. Ce volume rassemble une série de contributions théoriques et empiriques qui explorent des façons d'articuler souci de soi et souci du monde. Elles documentent la façon dont les engagements circulent entre différentes sphères de la vie et entre moments biographiques, en suivant les formes d'expérimentation auxquelles ils donnent lieu. Notre compréhension du rapport au politique s'en trouve enrichie, ressaisie depuis la trame des expériences de la vie commune faites en personne"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The phenomenological effects of deep brain stimulation (DBS) on the self of the patient remains poorly understood and under described in the literature, despite growing evidence that a significant number of patients experience postoperative neuropsychiatric changes. To address this lack of phenomenological evidence, we conducted in-depth, semistructured interviews with 17 patients with Parkinson's disease who had undergone DBS. Exploring the subjective character specific to patients' experience of being implanted gives empirical and conceptual understanding of the potential phenomenon of DBS-induced self-estrangement. (...) Our study concluded that (1) the more patients preoperatively felt alienated by their illness, the more they experienced postoperative self-estrangement, and (2) the notion of self-estrangement seems to exist in association with certain common qualitative characters, namely, loss of control, which reflects a deteriorative estrangement, and distorted perception of capacities, which reveals a restorative estrangement. These findings indicate that subjective self-reports help us to understand some aspects of the potential phenomenon of DBS-induced self-estrangement. (shrink)

This is an important new book about human motivation, about the reasons people have for their actions. What is distinctively new about it is its focus on how people see or understand their situations, options, and prospects. By taking account of people's understandings, Professor Schick is able to expand the current theory of decision and action. The author provides a perspective on the topic by outlining its history. He defends his new theory against criticism, considers its formal structure, and shows (...) at length how it resolves many currently debated problems: the problems of conflict and weakness of will, Allais' problem, Kahneman and Tversky's problems, Newcomb's problem, and others. The book will be of special interest to philosophers, psychologists, and economists. (shrink)

De la fin du XVIIIe siècle à 1830, l’Amérique hispanique est entrée dans l’ère des révolutions atlantiques. Sur les côtes du Venezuela, dans les années 1790, les échos des révolutions de France, de Saint-Domingue et d’autres îles des Antilles ont contribué à la floraison de révoltes et de conspirations aux mots d’ordre nouveaux. Les demandes de liberté des esclaves et d’égalité des métis s’inscrivaient désormais dans un nouvel horizon d’attente révolutionnaire. Cependant, la monarchie hispanique était toujours capable de mobiliser des (...) troupes pour défendre l’ordre établi. À partir de 1806, le Vénézuélien Francisco de Miranda, ancien général de la Révolution française, tenta de coordonner, d’abord sans succès, les efforts des premiers indépendantistes. La première indépendance fut proclamée à Caracas en 1811 dans un contexte de dislocation de la monarchie hispanique, à la suite de l’invasion des troupes napoléoniennes et des conflits entre péninsulaires et hispano-américains. Les patriotes proclamèrent l’égalité civile en mettant fin aux catégories socio-raciales d’Ancien Régime, mais maintinrent l’esclavage. Ce n’est que progressivement qu’ils incorporèrent des esclaves aux armées en échange de la liberté. Malgré ces libérations par les armes, l’alliance avec Haïti et les tentatives de Simón Bolívar, l’indépendance ne coïncida pas avec l’abolition de l’esclavage, qui fut finalement proclamée au Venezuela en 1854. (shrink)