One of the distinguishing features of mathematics is the exceptional level of consensus among mathematicians. However, an analysis of what mathematicians agree on, how they achieve this agreement, and the relevant historical conditions is lacking. This paper is a programmatic intervention providing a preliminary analysis and outlining a research program in this direction.First, I review the process of ‘negotiation’ that yields agreement about the validity of proofs. This process most often does generate consensus, however, it may give rise (...) to another kind of disagreement: whether the original and new proof are effectively the same, leading to potential disagreement about the validity of the original proof.Second, I historicize the phenomenon of consensus. I show that in earlier European mathematics and other mathematical cultures, consensus about the validity of arguments was substantially weaker or conceived differently than it is today. This means that contemporary consensus about the validity of mathematical proofs should be explained by historical changes in mathematical practice.Finally, I conjecture what brought about the contemporary form of mathematical consensus. Since a sharp rise in consensus occurs around the turn of the 20th century, it makes sense to explain this consensus by the concurrent formalization of mathematics. However, this explanation has a major flaw: it explains a really existing phenomenon (consensus) by something that hardly ever happens (writing proofs in formal languages). I will therefore explain the ways in which formalization does enter mathematical practice so as to account for contemporary forms of mathematical consensus. (shrink)

Progress in addiction science is hampered by disagreements and ambiguity around its core construct: addiction. Addiction Ontology (AddictO) offers a path to a solution of the kind that has addressed similar problems in other areas of science: a set of clearly and uniquely defined entities to which terms such as ‘addiction’, addictive disorder’ and ‘substance dependence ’can be applied for ease of reference while recognizing that it is the construct definitions and their unique IDs that are central, not the terms.

The relationship between representative democracy and conflict in John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy has been interpreted in very different ways. While some scholars claim that Millian democracy is incompatible with political conflict, others identify in Mill a radical agonism that would offer a non-consensual model of deliberative democracy. This paper argues that neither of these views is accurate: although he highlights the centrality of conflict in political life, Mill believes that democratic deliberation presupposes a minimal level of consensus regarding (...) the formal value of the basic principles of democracy. Initially, I reconstruct the relationship between conflict and consensus in Mill’s conception of representative democracy. I then investigate his association of representation and advocacy and show that Mill’s encomium on political conflict was influenced by Guizot's work. Finally, I explain how a democratic debate riven with conflict is conducive to individual freedom. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I (...) have in mind could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

The lecture is an argument for a marriage of theory and experience. It contains something old, something new, something borrowed and something true. The argument is that the dichotomy between science and art, between theory and experience is resolved and the components unified when the role of consensus in the acceptance of theory and the conception of experience is made clear. Moreover, the unification achieved brings with it a method for unifying the empiricism of Moritz Schlick1 with the consensualism (...) of Otto Neurath.2 In earlier work, I developed a mathematical model of consensus with Carl Wagner. That work concerned the aggregation of probabilities by weights of respect assigned by members of a community to each other that converged toward a consensual probability. The convergence depended on connectedness among the members of the group in terms of positive weights. We thought of the probabilities as probabilities of scientific theories or hypotheses. The process converging toward consensus was mathematically equivalent to finding consensual weights to be assigned to members of the group that could be used as a measure of competence and expertise. The consensual weights can be applied to find consensus concerning factors other than probabilities. The use of probabilities was in fact an incidental, though formally well articulated, application of the underlying aggregation of weights to obtain convergence toward consensual weights. (shrink)

While there is a longstanding discussion about the interpretation of the extended, general principle of relativity, there seems to be a consensus that the special principle of relativity is absolutely clear and unproblematic. However, a closer look at the literature on relativistic physics reveals a more confusing picture. There is a huge variety of, sometimes metaphoric, formulations of the relativity principle, and there are different, sometimes controversial, views on its actual content. The aim of this paper is to develop (...) a precise language in order to provide a precise formulation of the principle. In view of the fact that the special relativity principle is considered as a universal meta-law, which must be valid for all physical laws in all situations, we try to keep the formalism as general as possible. The benefit of the formal reconstruction is that it makes explicit all the necessary conceptual components of the principle; it brings out many subtle details and the related conceptual problems. (shrink)

The fact of reasonable pluralism in liberal democracies threatens the stability of such societies. John Rawls proposed a solution to this problem: The different comprehensive moral doctrines endorsed by the citizens overlap on a shared political conception of justice, e.g. his justice as fairness. Optimally, accepting the political conception is for each citizen individually justified by the method of wide reflective equilibrium. If this holds, society is in full reflective equilibrium. Rawls does not in detail investigate the conditions under which (...) a full reflective equilibrium is possible or likely. This paper outlines a new strategy for addressing this open question by using the formal model of reflective equilibrium recently developed by Beisbart et al. First, it is argued that a bounded rationality perspective is appropriate which requires certain changes in the model. Second, the paper rephrases the open question about Rawlsian full reflective equilibrium in terms of the model. The question is narrowed down by focusing on the inferential connections between comprehensive doctrines and political conception. Rawls himself makes a demanding assumption about which connections are necessary for a full reflective equilibrium. Third, the paper presents a simulation study design that is focused on simplicity. The results are discussed, they fit with Rawls’s assumption. However, because of the strong idealisations, they provide a useful benchmark rather than a final answer. The paper presents suggestions for more elaborate study designs. (shrink)

Two senses of ‘ontology’ can be distinguished in the current literature. First is the sense favored by information scientists, who view ontologies as software implementations designed to capture in some formal way the consensus conceptualization shared by those working on information systems or databases in a given domain. [Gruber 1993] Second is the sense favored by philosophers, who regard ontologies as theories of different types of entities (objects, processes, relations, functions) [Smith 2003]. Where information systems ontologists seek to (...) maximize reasoning efficiency even at the price of simplifications on the side of representation, philosophical ontologists argue that representational adequacy can bring benefits for the stability and resistance to error of an ontological framework and also for its extendibility in the future. In bioinformatics, however, a third sense of ‘ontology’ has established itself, above all as a result of the successes of the Gene Ontology (hereafter: GO), which is a tool for the representation and processing of information about gene products and their biological functions [Gene Ontology Consortium 2000]. We show how Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) has established itself as an overarching ontology drawing on all three of the strands distinguished above, and describe applications of BFO especially in the treatment of biological granularity. (shrink)

The standard image of how consensus can be achieved is by pooling evidence and reducing if not eliminating disagreements. But rather than just pooling substantive evidence on a certain question, why not also take into account the formal, testimonial evidence provided by the fact that a majority of the group adopt a particular answer? Shouldn't we be reinforced by the discovery that we are on that majority side, and undermined by the discovery that we are not? Shouldn't this (...) be so, in particular, when Condorcet's jury theorem applies? It turns out not. There are serious problems attending any strategy of majoritarian deference. (shrink)

Big data is opening new angles on old questions about scientific progress. Is scientific knowledge cumulative? If yes, how does it make progress? In the life sciences, what we call the Consensus Principle has dominated the design of data discovery and integration tools: the design of a formal classificatory system for expressing a body of data should be grounded in consensus. Based on current approaches in biomedicine and systematic biology, we formulate and compare three types of the (...) Consensus Principle: realist, contextual-best, and coordinative. Contrasted with the realist program of the Open Biomedical Ontologies Foundry, we argue that historical practices in systematic biology provide an important and overlooked alternative based on coordinative consensus. Systematists have developed a robust system for referring to taxonomic entities that can deliver high quality data discovery and integration without invoking consensus about reality or “settled” science. (shrink)

The collection and classification of data into meaningful categories is a key step in the process of knowledge making. In the life sciences, the design of data discovery and integration tools has relied on the premise that a formal classificatory system for expressing a body of data should be grounded in consensus definitions for classifications. On this approach, exemplified by the realist program of the Open Biomedical Ontologies Foundry, progress is maximized by grounding the representation and aggregation of (...) data on settled knowledge. We argue that historical practices in systematic biology provide an important and overlooked alternative approach to classifying and disseminating data, based on a principle of coordinative rather than definitional consensus. Systematists have developed a robust system for referring to taxonomic entities that can deliver high quality data discovery and integration without invoking consensus about reality or “settled” science. (shrink)

The pace of scientific progress may be hindered by the tendency of our academic institutions to reward being popular rather than being right. A market-based alternative, where scientists can more formally 'stake their reputation', is presented here. It offers clear incentives to be careful and honest while contributing to a visible, self-consistent consensus on controversial scientific questions. In addition, it allows patrons to choose questions to be researched without choosing people or methods. The bulk of this paper is spent (...) in examining potential problems with the proposed approach. After this examination, the idea still seems to be plausible and worthy of further study. (shrink)

Of all the methodological terms used by Heidegger in the early Freiburg period, few have attracted less consensus than Formal Indication. With its relation to the earliest lecture series, critical debate has tended to focus on the extent to which this concept defines the difference between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology. The argument of this paper is that Formal Indication is best understood in its relation to Heidegger’s other key methodological term from this period, Phenomenological Destruction. Not only (...) do both concepts grow out of the same problem set, but they act in a limited sense as counter-movements to one another. Considered together, I argue, they make up Heidegger’s response to the problem of language as expressed by Paul Natorp, and first dealt with in the Kriegsnotsemester in 1919. (shrink)

This study addresses the nature of the contribution made by Christian feminist thinkers who claim that mutuality is a necessary part of a Christian social ethical framework. The theological method employed is analytical and comparative toward the end of illuminating, testing, and demonstrating the thesis: mutuality is a formal norm for Christian social ethics that functions along with love and justice to promote a balance of power that is required for optimum human flourishing, a flourishing set within the interdependent (...) context of the whole of creation. ;Chapter One analyzes selected primary sources of Rosemary Radford Ruether, Carter Heyward, Beverly Wildung Harrison, and Elizabeth A. Johnson isolating their definition and treatment of the term, "mutuality." A consensus definition of mutuality drawn from definitions by the four feminists. It is concluded that, similar to the tripartite nature of justice, mutuality has four forms--cosmic, gender, generative, and social. ;Chapters Two and Three illustrate several moments in the history of Christian thought wherein antecedents of the feminists' notion of mutuality are found. Selected primary works of Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Martin Buber, and H. Richard Niebuhr are examined. ;Chapter Four compares the four feminists' definition of mutuality with definitions of formal norm by Josef Fuchs, Lisa Sowle Cahill, and Timothy E. O'Connell, determining that mutuality is a formal norm for Christian social ethics. Chapter Five is a case study. Utilizing our definition, it is shown how consideration of mutuality and its four forms influences the ethical analyses of George Weigel, Jean Bethke Elshtain, and Stanley Hauerwas in determining if the Persian Gulf War was a just war. It is concluded that the probative value of the formal norm, mutuality, is multifaceted. First and foremost, it requires the moral agent to deal concretely in moral reflection and moral decision-making. Specific and careful attention needs to be given to the reality revealing questions in the concrete, as well as in the abstract. Second, mutuality requires the moral agent to probe the dynamics of power in an ethical dilemma and to seek out ways to shape those dynamics to serve power-with. It is a complement to and corrective of love and justice. Third, engaging the norm of mutuality presses the moral agent toward inclusivity drawing into the process of moral reflection concern for the thriving and flourishing of all involved. More than the norms of love and justice, mutuality places humans in a perspective within the whole of creation. (shrink)

This contribution is a critical and constructive engage ment with discourse ethics. First, it clarifies why discourse ethics has difficulties with the grounding and application of moral norms. Second, it turns to a positive appropriation of the formal and proce dural aspects of discourse ethics. The goal is the elaboration of an ethics that is able to incorporate the material aspects of goods and the formal dimension of ethical validity and consensuability. Every morality is the formal application (...) of some substantive good. Every ethical perspective demands its evaluation in terms of its uni versability. In order to achieve this mediation, it is suggested that we must incorporate not only the historical dimension of moral systems, but also the role of critical consciousness and the negativity embod ied by those who are victims of the existing consensus. The essay con cludes with six points that need to be considered when formulating a material ethics that is universalizable and, most importantly, that can address the massive poverty and dehumanization of those excluded from the present community of communication. Key Words: application • consensual • corporeality • discourse ethics • formal • grounding • intersubjective • Kantian • liberation • ethics • material • phronesis • procedural • validity. (shrink)

For more than a half-century, evidence scholars have been exploring whether the criminal standard of proof can be grounded in decision theory. Such grounding would require the emergence of a social consensus about the utilities to be assigned to the four outcomes at trial. Significant disagreement remains, even among legal scholars, about the relative desirability of those outcomes and even about the formalisms for manipulating their respective utilities. We attempt to diagnose the principal reasons for this dissensus and to (...) suggest ways in which a broadly shared evaluation might be forged, both with respect to the appropriate equations for defining the standard of proof and with respect to the appropriate utilities to associate with the various trial outcomes. Where consensus cannot be forged, we hold that remaining differences can probably be finessed. We also suggest ways to elicit the utilities of individuals on these matters so as to avoid the usual flaws of such surveys. Along the way, we note a). the disproportionate role that the Blackstone ratio of errors continues to play in appraisals of the utilities of trial outcomes (despite its unintelligibility in the context of utilities) and b). the persisting belief -for which there is no theoretical basis-that every plausible assignment of utilities will inevitably result in a very high standard of proof. Finally, we examine some of the technical features associated with a proposed rank ordering of the utilities of trial outcomes. (shrink)

Formal logic is an antiquated science, but there have been no convincing solutions of such theoretical problems as its scientific object and its scientific character. The political report of the Eighth National Party Congress has called on us "to engage in the study of the basic theories of Marxism-Leninism and of the scientific sectors closely related to Marxism-Leninism." Since there is a consensus that formal logic is a discipline that is closely related to the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, (...) it is therefore necessary to study and clarify some of the basic problems of formal logic. (shrink)

As discussed by John Rawls, in a well-ordered society, a public political culture’s wide educational role bears the primary responsibility for developing reasonable individuals for the stability of a politically liberal society. Rawlsian scholars have also focused on the stability and enhancement of developed liberal democratic societies by means of those societies’ education systems. In this sense, one thing that is common to Rawlsian scholars’ and Rawls’s own understanding of the role of education appears to be a concern over the (...) stability of a politically liberal society since it is highly dependent on the character of its citizens. Also, it is usually believed that a politically liberal account of education can be implemented in a developed politically liberal society. In contrast, this study discusses the possibility of implementing a politically liberal account of education in a developing liberal society that may become a developed liberal democracy under an overlapping consensus. (shrink)

Group decisions raise a number of substantial philosophical and methodological issues. We focus on the goal of the group decision exercise itself. We ask: What should be counted as a good group decision-making result? The right decision might not be accessible to, or please, any of the group members. Conversely, a popular decision can fail to be the correct decision. In this paper we discuss what it means for a decision to be "right" and what components are required in a (...) decision process to produce happy decision-makers. Importantly, we discuss how "right" decisions can produce happy decision-makers, or rather, the conditions under which happy decision-makers and right decisions coincide. In a large range of contexts, we argue for the adoption of formal consensus models to assist in the group decision-making process. In particular, we advocate the formal consensus convergence model of Lehrer and Wagner (1981), because a strong case can be made as to why the underlying algorithm produces a result that should make each of the experts in a group happy. Arguably, this model facilitates true consensus, where the group choice is effectively each person's individual choice. We analyse Lehrer and Wagner's algorithm for reaching consensus on group probabilities/utilities in the context of complex decision-making for conservation biology. While many conservation decisions are driven by a search for objective utility/probability distributions (regarding extinction risks of species and the like), other components of conservation management primarily concern the interests of stakeholders. We conclude with cautionary notes on mandating consensus in decision scenarios for which no fact of the matter exists. For such decision settings alternative types of social choice methods are more appropriate. (shrink)

It is always possible to construct a real function φ, given random quantities X and Y with continuous distribution functions F and G, respectively, in such a way that φ(X) and φ(Y), also random quantities, have both the same distribution function, say H. This result of De Finetti introduces an alternative way to somehow describe the `opinion' of a group of experts about a continuous random quantity by the construction of Fields of coincidence of opinions (FCO). A Field of coincidence (...) of opinions is a finite union of intervals where the opinions of the experts coincide with respect to that quantity of interest. We speculate on (dis)advantages of Fields of Opinion compared to usual `probability' measures of a group and on their relation with a continuous version of the well-known Allais' paradox. (shrink)

Possible measures to mitigate climate change require global collective actions whose impacts will be felt by many, if not all. Implementing such actions requires successful communication of the reasons for them, and hence the underlying climate science, to a degree that far exceeds typical scientific issues which do not require large-scale societal response. Empirical studies have identified factors, such as the perceived level of consensus in scientific opinion and the perceived reliability of scientists, that can limit people's trust in (...) science communicators and their subsequent acceptance of climate change claims. Little consideration has been given, however, to recent formal results within philosophy concerning the relationship between truth, the reliability of evidence sources, the coherence of multiple pieces of evidence/testimonies, and the impact of independence between sources of evidence. This study draws on these results to evaluate exactly what has been established in the empirical literature about the factors that bias the public's reception of scientific communications about climate change. (shrink)

By means of multi-agent simulations, it investigates the truth and consensus-conduciveness of controversial debates. The book brings together research in formal epistemology and argumentation theory.

This paper explores the scope and limits of rational consensus through mutual respect, with the primary focus on the best known formal model of consensus: the Lehrer–Wagner model. We consider various arguments against the rationality of the Lehrer–Wagner model as a model of consensus about factual matters. We conclude that models such as this face problems in achieving rational consensus on disagreements about unknown factual matters, but that they hold considerable promise as models of how (...) to rationally resolve non-factual disagreements. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer (...) us a solution concept for disagreements behind the veil of ignorance. (shrink)

Aims: The Research Diagnostic Criteria for Temporomandi¬bular Disorders (RDC/TMD) Axis I diagnostic algorithms were demonstrated to be reliable but below target sensitivity and specificity. Empirical data supported Axis I algorithm revisions that were valid. Axis II instruments were shown to be both reliable and valid. An international consensus workshop was convened to obtain recommendations and finalization of new Axis I diagnostic algorithms and new Axis II instruments. Methods: A comprehensive search of published TMD diagnostic literature was followed by review (...) and consensus via a formal structured process by a panel of experts for revision of the RDC/TMD. Results: The recommended Diagnostic Criteria for TMD (DC/TMD) Axis I protocol includes both a valid screener for pain diagnoses and valid criteria for the most common pain-related TMDs and for one intra-articular disorder. The Axis II protocol retains selected RDC/TMD screening instruments augmented with new instruments to better assess the interactions between pain and psychosocial functioning. A comprehensive classification system is also presented. Conclusion: The recommended evidence-based DC/TMD protocol is appropriate for use in both the clinical and research settings. Simple Axis I and II screening tests augmented by validated Axis I and Axis II instruments allow for identification of simple to complex TMD patients. (shrink)

Since Leibniz first put forward the sufficient reason law in his philosophical work "The Monadology" (1914), the issue of the law of sufficient reason has aroused heated discussions in the field of logic in our country. The question of whether the law of sufficient reason is the basic law of formal logic was particularly heated in the domestic logic circle in 1978-1980. Since then, there has been little discussion, but from the newly compiled formal logic textbooks published one (...) after another, no consensus has been reached. Although they didn't agree on the question of "whether or not", the two sides elaborated their arguments in detail and put forward some new opinions, thus creating new conditions for solving this problem scientifically. Firstly, this paper analyzes the different viewpoints of both sides of the argument. Secondly, it analyzes whether the law of sufficient reason is the basic law of formal logic from whether Leibniz put forward the law of sufficient reason. Finally, on this basis, a new transformation method is put forward. After this transformation, the law of sufficient reason is an important basic law of deductive logic, which can be juxtaposed with the other three logical laws, such as identity, and coordinated with the "three laws" and complement each other. (shrink)

There is some consensus on the claim that imagination as suppositional thinking can have epistemic value insofar as it’s constrained by a principle of minimal alteration of how we know or believe reality to be – compatibly with the need to accommodate the supposition initiating the imaginative exercise. But in the philosophy of imagination there is no formally precise account of how exactly such minimal alteration is to work. I propose one. I focus on counterfactual imagination, arguing that this (...) can be modeled as simulated belief revision governed by Laplacian imaging. So understood, it can be rationally justified by accuracy considerations: it minimizes expected belief inaccuracy, as measured by the Brier score. (shrink)