Genetic testing can be used to determine if unexplained fractures in children could have resulted from a predisposition to bone fractures, e.g., osteogenesis imperfecta. However, uncertainty is introduced if a variant of unknown significance is identified. Proper interpretation of VUS in these situations is critical because of its influence on clinical care and in court rulings. This study sought to understand how VUS are interpreted and used by practitioners when there is a differential diagnosis including both osteogenesis imperfecta and non-accidental (...) injury.A 15-question survey was emailed to physicians who requested analysis of two genes, COL1A1 and COL1A2, from the University of Washington from 2005-2013 for patient cases involving suspicion of child abuse.Among the 89 participants, responses differed about when genetic testing should be ordered for osteogenesis imperfecta, who should be consulted about utilization of VUS test results, follow-up procedures, and who should receive the VUS results.There are no clear guidelines for how to interpret and follow up on VUS. In the legal setting, misinterpreted VUS could lead to unintended consequences and deleterious ramifications for family members. The need for better practice guidelines to help promote more equitable handling of these sensitive legal cases is clear. (shrink)

The analytic method by which Descartes discovered the first principle of his philosophy—cogito, ergo sum—is a unique cognitive process of direct insight and nonlogical inference. It differs markedly from inductive as well as deductive procedures, but also from older models of the direct noetic apprehension of first principles, notably those of Plato and Aristotle. However, a critical examination of Descartes’s argument for the innateness of the idea of God shows that there are serious obstacles in the way of his employment (...) of the analytic method of discovery to reach this or any other conclusion about ideas that do not fall within the scope of ordinary human experience. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: The analytic method by which Descartes established the first principle of his philosophy is a unique cognitive process of direct insight and non-logical inference that differs markedly from the deductive model of noetic apprehension long associated with seventeenth-century rationalism. In this paper, it is shown that the same analytic process is at work in the Third Meditation proof of the innateness of the idea of God, where, however, there are serious doubts about its legitimacy.

The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. We have changed, by insensible degrees, (...) our philosophy of economic life, our notions of what is reasonable and what is tolerable; and we have done this without changing our technique or our copybook maxims. Hence our tears and troubles. (shrink)

InLeibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought, Robert McRae alleges a flat “contradiction” at the heart of Leibniz's doctrine of three grades of monads: bare entelechies characterized by perception; animal souls capable both of perception and of sensation; and rational souls, minds or spirits endowed not only with capacities for perception and sensation but also with consciousness of self or what Leibniz calls “apperception.” Apperception is a necessary condition of those distinctively human mental processes associated with understanding and with reason. Insofar as (...) it is also a sufficient condition of rationality, it is not ascribable to animals. But apperception is a necessary condition of sensation or feeling as well; and animals are capable of sensation, according to Leibniz, who decisively rejected the Cartesian doctrine that beasts are nothing but material automata. “On the one hand,” writes McRae, “what distinguishes animals from lower forms of life is sensation or feeling, but on the other hand apperception is a necessary condition of sensation, and apperception distinguishes human beings from animals”. “We are thus left with an unresolved inconsistency in Leibniz's account of sensation, so far as sensation is attributable both to men and animals”. (shrink)

In two separate studies, published some four years apart, Robert McRae has argued the provocative thesis that the idea of extension is not to be numbered among the ideas accounted innate by Descartes, but among the adventitious. He has defended this view despite explicit statements to the contrary by Descartes both in the Correspondence and in the second part of the Principles of Philosophy. Against such evidence McRae has urged the overriding importance of the sixth Meditation, where, he alleges, Descartes (...) asserts “unequivocally… that the idea of extension is produced in us by bodies and is therefore not innate”. It is only in the later of the two studies that McRae's reasons for regarding the testimony of the sixth Meditation as authoritative are fully spelt out. Express statements to the contrary “must give away”, he writes, “for the proof of the existence of body by the adventitious idea of it is absolutely crucial to the Meditations”. In this paper I propose to challenge McRae's interpretation of the extension of the concept “innate idea”, while acknowledging his signal contribution to the clearing up of the intensional meaning, or rather meanings, of the concept of innateness. My thesis is that “extension” is an innate idea, though constraints of time will allow me to do little more than try to show that McRae's stated reasons for rejecting this view are not compelling. (shrink)

The problem of the person may be described as the crux of Descartes' philosophy in the fairly obvious literal sense that it is the point of intersection of the two chief axes of the system, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind. The actual, if not professed aim of the former is the ousting of the occult powers and faculties of Scholastic-Aristotelian physics by the mechanical concept of force or action-by-contact. The chief tenet of the latter is that (...) mind, whose essence is thinking, is clearly and distinctly conceivable apart from matter, the essence of which is extension. From this, by an illicit inference which need not concern us further, Descartes concludes that the mind is “really distinct” from matter, that is, a substance capable of existing apart from body in its own right. Where these two lines of thought meet, the problem of the person constitutes itself in the following manner. (shrink)

Thomas Murray's graceful and humane book illuminates one of the most morally complex areas of everyday life: the relationship between parents and children. What do children mean to their parents, and how far do parental obligations go? What, from the beginning of life to its end, is the worth of a child? Ethicist Murray leaves the rarefied air of abstract moral philosophy in order to reflect on the moral perplexities of ordinary life and ordinary people. Observing that abstract (...) moral terms such as altruism and selfishness can be buried in the everyday doings of families, he maintains that ethical theory needs a richer description than it now has of the moral life of parents and children. How far should adults go in their quest for children? What options are available to women who do not want to bear a child now? Should couples be allowed to reject a child because of genetic disability or "wrong" gender? How can we weigh the competing claims of the genetic and the rearing parents to a particular child? _The Worth of a Child_ couples impressive learning with a conversational style. Only by getting down to cases, Murray insists, can we reach moral conclusions that are unsentimental, farsighted, and just. In an era of intense public and private acrimony about the place and meaning of "family values," his practical wisdom about extraordinary difficult moral issues offers compelling reading for both experienced and prospective parents, as well as for ethicists, social and behavioral scientists, and legal theorists. (shrink)

It is argued, on the basis of ideas derived from Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Husserl's Logical Investigations, that the formal comprehends more than the logical. More specifically: that there exist certain formal-ontological constants (part, whole, overlapping, etc.) which do not fall within the province of logic. A two-dimensional directly depicting language is developed for the representation of the constants of formal ontology, and means are provided for the extension of this language to enable the representation of certain materially necessary relations. The (...) paper concludes with a discussion of the relationship between formal logic, formal ontology, and mathematics. (shrink)

To adequately model mathematical arguments the analyst must be able to represent the mathematical objects under discussion and the relationships between them, as well as inferences drawn about these objects and relationships as the discourse unfolds. We introduce a framework with these properties, which has been used to analyse mathematical dialogues and expository texts. The framework can recover salient elements of discourse at, and within, the sentence level, as well as the way mathematical content connects to form larger argumentative structures. (...) We show how the framework might be used to support computational reasoning, and argue that it provides a more natural way to examine the process of proving theorems than do Lamport’s structured proofs. (shrink)

We consider connections between number sense—the ability to judge number—and the interpretation of natural language quantifiers. In particular, we present empirical evidence concerning the neuroanatomical underpinnings of number sense and quantifier interpretation. We show, further, that impairment of number sense in patients can result in the impairment of the ability to interpret sentences containing quantifiers. This result demonstrates that number sense supports some aspects of the language faculty.

On one view, the point of an assertion is to update the common ground (Stalnaker 1978, Karttunen 1974). On another, the point of an assertion is to propose an update to the com- mon ground (Groenendijk 2009, Mascarenhas 2009, and related work on the structure of discourse, e.g., Ginzburg 1996, Roberts 1996, Gunlogson 2001). In Murray (to appear), I merge these two views. I argue based on evidence from declarative sentences with eviden- tials that assertion has two components: what (...) is at-issue and what is not. The not-at-issue component of assertion is added directly to the common ground while the at-issue compo- nent is proposed to be added to the common ground. Here, I extend this analysis to yes/no questions in Cheyenne and their interaction with evidentials. I propose that the distinction between what is at-issue and what is not is also present in questions, and that it can be modeled in the same way. Specifically, both declarative and interrogative sentences make two contributions: they restrict and structure the common ground. The restriction is based on the not-at-issue component while the structuring relation is based on the at-issue component. (shrink)

This paper introduces Richard Rorty’s notion of the liberal ironist and his vision of a liberal utopia and explores the implications of these for philosophical questions concerning morality, as well as morality in general. Rorty’s assertions of the contingency of language, society and self are explored. Under the contingency of language, the figure of the ironist is defined, and Rorty’s conception of vocabularies is discussed. Under the contingency of society, Rorty’s definition of liberalism, his opposition of literary culture to materialist (...) and metaphysical culture, and his notions concerning utopian politics are discussed. Under the contingency of self, Rorty’s critique of Kantian and his appropriations of Deweyan and Freudian conceptions of morality are presented. Other key factors discussed are Rorty’s theory of the separation of the private and public spheres of life and his ideas concerning cruelty and human solidarity. In this way, a critical analysis of Rorty’s proposed balance between private, ironic doubt and public, liberal social hope is presented and assessed in terms of its merit as a system of thought suited to the needs of post-metaphysical, liberal societies. (shrink)

More than any other thinker, Giorgio Agamben shows us that philosophy is also a matter of style and politics a matter of poetics. This book explores the unexpected and illuminating paths that his work traces across the territories of law and literature, linguistics, dance or cinema, in search of a new idea and practice of the community. It offers an irreplaceable introduction to one of the most fascinating thinkers of our time.'Jacques RanciereGathering some of the most important established and emerging (...) scholars to examine his body of work, this collection of essays seeks to explore Agamben's thought from these broader philosophical and literary concerns, underpinning its place within larger debates in continental philosophy. Including a contribution by Agamben himself, it is essential reading for anyone interested in his work.In the past five years, Giorgio Agamben has emerged as one of the most important continental philosophers. This burgeoning popularity of his work has largely been confined to a study of the homo sacer series. Yet these later 'political' works have their foundation in Agamben's earlier works on the philosophy of language, aesthetics and literature. From a philosophy of language and linguistics that leads to a broader theory of representation, Agamben develops a critical theory that attempts to explore the hiatuses and paradoxes that govern discursive practice across a broad range of disciplines. (shrink)

During the 1970s, monetarism and the new classical macroeconomics ushered in an era of neoliberal economic policymaking. Keynesian economics was pushed aside. It was almost forgotten that when Keynesian thinking had dominated economic policymaking in the middle decades of the twentieth century, it had coincided with postwar economic reconstruction in both Europe and Japan, and the unprecedented prosperity and stable growth of the 1950s and 1960s. The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the recession that followed changed all that. Influential (...) voices in both academic economics and amongst policy-makers and commentators began to remind us how useful Keynesian ways of thinking could be, especially in coming to terms with our current economic predicaments. When politicians across the globe were confronted with economic crisis, they introduced pragmatic and workable measures that bore all the hallmarks of Keynesianism. This book is about the fall and rise of Keynesian economics.Eatwell and Milgate range widely across the landscape that defines their subject matter. They consider how powerful Keynesian ideas can be when applied to past and present economic problems. They show how helpful these ideas are in explaining why we came to find ourselves in the disorder we are in. They examine where and how the analytical and methodological foundations of conventional macroeconomic wisdom went wrong. They set out a blueprint for an alternative that provides a clearer, more consistent, and more applicable approach to understanding how markets work. They also highlight the interpretive shortcomings that have come to characterize Keynes scholarship itself. They do all of this within the context of a provocative reconsideration of some of the most pressing economic problems that confront financial markets and the global economy today. They conclude that Keynesian ideas are not just for crises, but for constructive economic policy making at all times. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 35.1 (2002) 22-49 [Access article in PDF] Kenneth Burke: A Dialogue of Motives Jeffrey W. Murray [Figures] Introduction In "Four Master Tropes," Appendix D of A Grammar of Motives (1969a), Kenneth Burke investigates the tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. His "primary concern with them... [is] not with their purely figurative usage, but with their role in the discovery and description of 'the truth'" (...) (1969a, 503). Burke's placement of "the truth" in quotation marks reflects his rejection of any simplistically objectivist notion of truth. He is not interested in how these rhetorical figures ornament truth, as if truth existed prior to the entrance of rhetoric. Rather, the relationship between these four master tropes and truth is more complicated. Truth is, for Burke, a rhetorical product as much as a rhetorical precursor. Hence, the tropes function not only epistemologically in the discovery of truth, but also ontologically in the very constitution of truth. 1 Burke's subsequent discussion of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony illustrates how each trope functions dramatistically to make, and to make known, the world.When Burke discusses the trope of irony, the relationship between rhetoric and truth is further complicated. Irony is dialogical. 2 Whereas metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche offer particular perspectives for viewing and knowing the world, irony offers a "perspective of perspectives" (1969a, 512). Ultimately, irony depends upon the perspectives of Others—of other symbol users—and is thus an explicitly dialogical rather than rhetorical trope. Moreover, this inclusion of the voices of Others in the construction of "truth" distinguishes irony as ethical. Irony may, in fact, offer the clearest view of Burke's own incipient theory of ethics. Over against his few explicit discussions of ethics, which reflect either an Aristotelian or Kantian approach to ethics, 3 Burke's development of the master trope of irony as a dialogical vehicle for the construction of intersubjective [End Page 22] truth reveals his maturing approach to ethics and a tacit synthesis of his dramatistic accounts of epistemology, ontology, and ethics.Yet another concept is even more foundational for Burke's incipient theory of ethics within a dramatistic framework. Recalcitrance precedes irony as an account of the presencing of otherness in and through language. Prior to the experience of irony as a clash of perspectives, recalcitrance is the very crashing in of the second perspective. It is the resistance that is met by any particular symbolic framing of the world. Together, recalcitrance and irony form the core of Burke's (underdeveloped) dramatistic theory of ethics and constitute the groundwork for his proposed final installment of his trilogy, which might instead be appropriately "A Dialogue of Motives."Using Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenology of the Other and reconception of ethics as the call to responsibility, 4 this article will demonstrate that Burke's notions of recalcitrance and irony are the groundwork for a full dramatistic description of the phenomenological encounter with the Other and of the nature of the ethical encounter. Moreover, this discussion of recalcitrance and irony will be placed in the context of Burke's two major works, A Grammar of Motives (1969a) and A Rhetoric of Motives (1969b), in an attempt to indicate the implicit trajectory of these works toward the third volume of the trilogy, referred to here as "A Dialogue of Motives." 5 The addition of "A Dialogue of Motives" will rectify Burke's lack of emphasis on ethics and upon the Other, and together, Burke's A Grammar of Motives, A Rhetoric of Motives, and "A Dialogue of Motives"will recast traditional philosophy's main branches of ontology, epistemology, and ethics into dramatistic—i.e., grammatical, rhetorical, and dialogical—terms.In addition, this proposed completion of Burke's trilogy provides a unique conception of dialogue that promises to expand and enrich existing conceptions of dialogue within the field of communication studies. Specifically, a dramatistic notion of dialogue bifurcates traditional notions of two-way, dialogical communication into a "rhetoric" of motives that seeks identification and a "dialogue" of motives that maintains difference. To that end, Burke's notion of dialectic will be discussed in order to... (shrink)

First published in 1964, this is a short collection of both literary and philosophical essays. Whilst two essays consider Greek literature written at the point at which the Athenian empire was breaking apart, another group explore the background from which Christianity arose, considering Paganism and the religious philosophy at the time of Christ. These, in particular, display Gilbert Murray’s ‘profound belief in ethics and disbelief in all revelational religions’ as well as his conviction that the roots of our society (...) lie within Greek civilization. Finally, there is an interesting discussion of Order and the motives of those who seek to overthrow it. (shrink)

Digital artifacts from iPads to databases pervade our lives, and the design decisions that shape them affect how we think, act, communicate, and understand the world. But the pace of change has been so rapid that technical innovation is outstripping design. Interactors are often mystified and frustrated by their enticing but confusing new devices; meanwhile, product design teams struggle to articulate shared and enduring design goals. With Inventing the Medium, Janet Murray provides a unified vocabulary and a common methodology (...) for the design of digital objects and environments. It will be an essential guide for both students and practitioners in this evolving field. Murray explains that innovative interaction designers should think of all objects made with bits--whether games or Web pages, robots or the latest killer apps--as belonging to a single new medium: the digital medium. Designers can speed the process of useful and lasting innovation by focusing on the collective cultural task of inventing this new medium. Exploring strategies for maximizing the expressive power of digital artifacts, Murray identifies and examines four representational affordances of digital environments that provide the core palette for designers across applications: computational procedures, user participation, navigable space, and encyclopedic capacity. Each chapter includes a set of Design Explorations--creative exercises for students and thought experiments for practitioners--that allow readers to apply the ideas in the chapter to particular design problems. Inventing the Medium also provides more than 200 illustrations of specific design strategies drawn from multiple genres and platforms and a glossary of design concepts. (shrink)

First published in 1938, these lectures argue that liberality is the foundation of civilization. According to Gilbert Murray, civilization provides the surplus of security, leisure and wealth that makes liberality possible; a failure of liberality is the surest test of the failure of a civilization. This is a fascinating reissue that will be of great value to students with an interest in political philosophy and the foundations of liberal society.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (2001) 355-363 [Access article in PDF] Plato on Power, Moral Responsibility and the Alleged Neutrality of Gorgias' Art of Rhetoric (Gorgias 456c-457b) James Stuart Murray 1. Introduction You are sitting in your office on a quiet Thursday afternoon when an agitated university administrator enters with news that the students in your "Plato class" have just been interviewed on the city's largest radio station. According (...) to them, their professor claimed that the demise of their university is a direct result of the fact that senior administrative positions are held by a motley assortment of business-oriented, academically cynical, "renewal"-promoting "innovators" whose main preoccupation is "government funding opportunities" in areas of dubious academic importance.Your response might be: "That's not what I taught them." Or perhaps you might say, "That's not exactly what I taught them--I didn't say it was a 'motley' assortment." In either case, you would be relying on some form of what Robert Wardy (170, n.r 20) has dubbed the "blame students, not teachers defence." He asserts, perhaps correctly, that this defense gained the status of topos within the ancient rhetorical tradition. A version of it certainly does seem to show up in Isocrates' Antidosis (250-52) and perhaps in his Nicocles (3-4), and it is suggested by remarks in both Aristotle's Rhetoric (1355b) and Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria (II,16,5). On this occasion, however, I am concerned with only one rendition, probably its earliest extant instance in Greek literature. In Plato's Gorgias, the eponymous sophist argues as follows: Imagine someone who after attending wrestling school, 1 getting his body into good shape and becoming a boxer, went on to strike his father and mother or any other family member or friend. By Zeus, that's no reason to hate physical trainers... and to exile them from their cities! For while these people imparted their skills to be used justly against enemies and wrongdoers, and in [End Page 355] defense, not aggression, their pupils pervert their strength and skill and misuse them. So it's not their teachers who are wicked, nor is this a reason why the craft should be a cause of wickedness; the ones who misuse it are supposedly the wicked ones. And the same is true for oratory as well. The orator has the ability to speak against everyone on every subject, so as in gatherings to be more persuasive, in short, about anything he likes, but the fact that he has the ability to rob doctors or other craftsmen of their reputations doesn't give him any more of a reason to do it. He should use oratory justly, as he would any competitive skill. And I suppose that if a person who has become an orator goes on with this ability and this craft to commit wrongdoing, we shouldn't hate his teacher and exile him from our cities. For while the teacher imparted it to be used justly, the pupil is making the opposite use of it. So it's the misuser whom it's just to hate and exile or put to death, not the teacher. (Gorgias 456d, 457a-b) 2Change "exile from our cities" to "fire from our universities" and this makes a good passage to remember when confronted by that agitated administrator mentioned above. Blame the students, not the teachers.Not much comment has been provoked by this defense of Gorgianic rhetoric and its underlying rhetor/boxer analogy, except over the question of whether we should read the passage as an accurate reflection of the words of the historical Gorgias or as a Platonic invention. In a previous generation, E. R. Dodds (212) reckoned that this defense was "probably the standpoint of the historical Gorgias," while E. A. Havelock (195) cautioned that "there is little--very little--that he [i.e., Plato] lets Gorgias say in the Gorgias." In our own day, and on a more general level, Thomas Cole (151) states that "Plato's... (shrink)

RésuméAprès avoir déflni la Psychologie comme la science des personnaliés, de leurs activité au sein des situations qui les confrontent, et de leur développement dans un milieu physique, social et culturel donné, le Dr Murray formule un certain nombre de propositions et conceptions théo‐riques destinées à rendre compte des faits psychiques. Les unes sont ?ordre général, les autres concernent la motivation. Propositions générales. 1. La personnalitéà son siège dans le cerveau.2. Elle dure et se développe dans le temps par (...) suite des opérations qu'elle est amenée à produire.3. Ces opérations sont internes ou externes, et correspondent à des attitudes ?introversion ou ?extroversion. Toutes comportent une dimension temporelle, un début, un déroulement de longueur variable, une fin.4. Les opérations externes sont constituteées ?une série de champs momentanés , le champ lui‐même résultant de la combinaison ?une situation externe et ?un état interne. II importe de distinguer de la situation réelle, la situation telle que la voit le sujet. Cette distinction revêt une importance particulière dans le cas des relations sociales.5. Ľobjet ?étude du Psychologue consiste alors, non pas dans le comportement du seul sujet, mais dans ľinteraction du sujet et de ľobjet. Celle‐ci, avec ses deux aspects complémentaires de besoin et de pression est ce que le Dr Murray à appeié ailleurs un théme.6. Les actions Psychologiques s'ordonnént fréquemment en séquences tendant àľobtention ?un but éioigné. Les démarches intermédiates s'expliquent alors, non pas par ľinfluence des facteurs externes contemporains, mais par celle des facteurs internes antérieurs. Ce sont, non des réactions, mais des proactions. Elles ne sont pas homéostatiques et subor‐données à la restitution ?un équilibre antérieur, mais _HYPERLINK “superstatiqu.es” et visant à la production de quelque chose de neuf. Séquences et proactions composent pour une grande part ľego‐system.7. Ľévolution de la personnalité s'ordonné en périodes relativement longues dont il est possible de prendre au cours de brefs laps de temps une sorte ?échantillonnage.8. La personnalité fait montre ?une intégration variable, perceptible aux niveaux des opérations, des séquences ou des périodes.9. Elle se transforme sans cesse par ľeffet des opérations ou elle est engageée, ces transformations graduelles et insensibles pouvant s'accumuler jusquà déclencher à un moment donné des revirements spectaculaires tels que les conversions.10. Le donné du Psychologue est de deux sortes: faits subjectifs communiqués par le sujet, faits objectifs recueillis par ľobservateur extérieur. II importe ensuite ?expliquer ce donné, autrement dit de construire une représentation hypothétique du psychisme du sujet, qui permette de comprendre ses conduites passées et de prédire ses conduites futures. Ces constructions n'ont pas encore atteint le stade ?une tľpologie satisfaisante. Concepts relatifs à la motivation. Dans la représentation théorique dont il vient ?être parlé, une place éminente revient aux concepts relatifs à la motivation: tendance, instinct, besoin, vecteur psychique concu à la façon de Lewin. La Psychologie américaine à pendant longtemps tendu à restreindre le nombre de ces besoins, et à n'admettre comme tout à fait fondamentaux et originels que ceux qui concernent la nourriture et le sexe. II est impossible de comprendre les actions humaines si ľon ne réserve une place à des tendances, activités et satisfactions ?un ordre plus élevé. Notamment:1. Ľêtre vivant peut dépenser le surplus ?énergie dont il dispose dans des actions spontanées, non déclenchées par un stimulus externe. Ľaction trouve alors sa gratification en elle‐même et non dans le résultat qu'elle procure .2. Un plaisir supplémentaire peut résulter de la manière plus ou moins harmonieuse dont se déroule ľaction, indépendamment de ľeffet où elle arrive.3‐4. Il existe des besoins ?ordre mental oùľesprit cherche sa satisfaction propre et non celle de ľorganisme. On voit alors ľimagination ľemporter sur la perception et le donné s'analyser et se recomposer en créations originales. Ces besoins et les actes qu'ils provoquent procurent les trois sortes de plaisirs distingués plus haut. Leur but n'est pas préala‐blement donné, mais doit être construit pièce par pièce.5‐6. à côté des besoins positifs existent des besoins négatifs qui poussent àéviter, exclure, ou détruire. De même, aux besoins réactifs s'opposent les besoins proactifs, spontanés et créateurs. Les premiers peuvent devenir proréactifs par ľintervention de ľanticipation, les seconds réproactifs sous ľeffet de circonstances inattendues. Ces diverses sortes de conduites peuvent servir à classer les individus ?après la place considérable ou réduite qu'elles occupent dans son comportement.7. Les besoins se spécifient par canalisation ou cathection . Ils peuvent aussi par généralisation sétendre à de nouveaux objets. Ľexcès ou le manque absolu de fixation sont des symptômes ?immaturityé. – Une importance particulière revient, dans le cadre de cette théorie, à la notion freudienne de cathexis. Certains objets et buts sont adoptés à la faveur de circonstances où joue le trial and error. Dautres, purement idéaux àľorigine, sont recherchds par ľindividu sans jamais avoir été rencontrés par lui. Si le trial and error intervient ici, c'est sur le plan de ľimagination. – La Psychologie américaine à restreint en général la notion et le terme ?apprentissage àľacquisition des moyens de satisfaction àľexclusion des fins. De même, la civilisation contemporaine, si elle à prodigieusement développé’ les techniques, à perdu la notion ?un commun idéal humaniste. II importerait de revenir, ?un point de vue théorique non moins que pratique, àľapprentissage des fins, autrement dit au processus par lequel ľindividu, sous la poussée de besoins largement indifférenciés adopte tel nouveau but, s'attache à telle valeur, jugée par lui source de satisfaction.8. Les besoins peuvent être conscients ou inconscients. Dans le dernier cas, ľindividu les refoule sous la pression des impératifs sociaux. Ils se mafestent alors de diverses façons détournées, éventuellement névrotiques, et peuvent se retourner contre le sujet.9‐10. II existe un ordre ?urgence dans la satisfaction des besoins, les plus biologiques réclamant le plus impérieusement satisfaction, les plus Aleves et altruistes ne se faisant sentir qu'ensuite.11. La Psychologic sociale récente à artificiellement dissoci^ les notions ?inUret, attitude et valeur de celle de besoin. Mais la notion de besoin à son tour demande une analľse plus poussee. Le besoin comprend deux composantes : Ľaction à quoi il pousse ou vedeur proprement dit, la valeur ou entite valorisee au benefice de laquelle s'effectue cette action. Toute conduite concrete apparait alors comme un systéme valeur‐uecteur et peut être analľsee de ce double point de vue. (shrink)

This book collects together four essays by the very well-known academic Gilbert Murray that were first presented between 1914 and 1939. The author seeks to present a statement of his profound belief in ethics and disbelief in revelational religions. The philosophy of this great thinker is accessibly written while it addresses deep questions of the nature of morality and the basis of religions. This collection was first published in 1940.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Michael Murray THE CONFLICT BETWEEN POETRY AND LITERATURE While Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur are widely regarded as engaged in a common hermeneutic enterprise, the greater radicality of Heidegger must fracture such a view. This difference shows up in a striking manner in the conflict between the concept of poetry and the concept of literature. After elucidating its significance, I shall explore a new sense of fiction that reinscribes (...) the conflict and invites us to interpret a canto of Wallace Stevens. Let us enter Gadamer's dispute with Heidegger where he declares: "It is true... I can appeal to the 'transcendental' sense of Heidegger's Being and Time. But where else I call on Heidegger — in that I seek to think 'understanding" as a 'happening7 — [my thought] is turned in an entirely different direction." That direction, Gadamer goes on to explain, arose "out ofthe need for self-clarification that came over me as a philologist and interpreter of philosophical texts." To which he adds trenchantly: "My point of departure is not the complete forgetfulness of Being, the 'night of Being,' rather on the contrary — I say this against Heidegger as well as Buber— the unreality of such an assertion. That also holds good for our relation to the tradition." ' This last statement is directed against the encompassing project of Heidegger's later work, his epochal history ofBeing from Anaximander to Nietzsche. This ontological history or aletheia process is charted in terms of the figure of day and night that come so easily in German where the West is das Abendland. Heidegger hyphenates this name (Abend-land) in order to bring forward its status as land of the evening. The historical 59 60Philosophy and Literature evening in question points us back toward the dawn of the West in early Greek thought, poetry, and life, and to its second weaker beginning in the Classical period, and thence ahead to die darkening ofthe modern world, marked by the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth, the massification of man, and the resentment of the creative — a darkening that has passed into its night and approaches its midnight now in the age of the Gestell or total framework. As such this time betokens the possibility of a second dawn nourished by the memory of the first, though it cannot be a return. Elsewhere Heidegger elaborates this late modern situation in Hölderlinian terms as the Age between the No Longer and the Not Yet. What is thought by the time of die Between and by the language of the lighting-concealing history-of-Being is, according to Heidegger, what really specifies the hermeneutic situation of modern man, poetry, and society. While Gadamer accepts the nineteenth- and twentieth-century discovery ofhistoricity, and tries to advance insights of Heidegger along with his own to clarify the conditions of humanistic knowledge, he rejects the consummative eschatology of Hegel but no less the catastrophic eschatology of Heidegger. As he emphatically declares: "I do not believe at all that we live Tietween' two worlds.... Only the prophet who already sees the promised land would have, in my estimation, the possibility of saying the like. I remember, instead of this, the one world I only know, and which in all decay has lost far less of its evidence and cohesion than it talks itselfinto."2 Of course Heidegger himself insists upon a relation to tradition, reiterated in the asseveration of his later years "that everything essential, everything great arises from man's rootedness in his homeland and tradition."3 Nevertheless, one must say that the revolutionary renewal of Heidegger that presupposes the revolutionary break is not the renewal for which Gadamer speaks. To Ulustrate this divergence of Gadamer from Heidegger we may ponder the concept of the classic. This example occupies an important place in the argument of Truth and Method because the experience of the classic is recognized as combining a genuine historical efficaciousness with a normative significance in the formation of the Western literary tradition (TM, pp. 253ff). In a more recent paper Gadamer explains die "peculiar contemporaneity" that accrues to classic works of literature by reason of tiieir Wirkungsgeschichte or effective-history.* First, they occupy "a... (shrink)

We examine the emergence of the ‘postfeminist’ sensibility from feminist theory and praxis, and its relation and relevance to education. Analytical frameworks such as postfeminism and intersectionality have given equal weight to recognition-based struggles, such as those based on sexual, racial, class-based, gender-related identities. We follow Nancy Fraser’s argument that these identity-based movements have been co-opted by neoliberal politicians and bureaucratic policy-makers, and become a divide and rule strategy, neglecting the subjugating power of capital. Beginning with third-wave feminism’s emphasis on (...) individual identity, women’s struggles have been become a part of the greater parisitic neoliberal project. We consider the implications of this docile and domesticated feminism for the education of women. (shrink)

David Murray; VII—Disembodied Brains, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 121–138, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotel.

David Murray; VII—Disembodied Brains, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 121–138, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotel.

The theoretical framework proposed by Dienes & Perner sets the wrong standards for knowledge to be considered explicit. Animals other than humans possess knowledge, too, some of which is probably explicit. We argue that a comparative approach to investigating knowledge is likely to be more fruitful than one based on linguistic constructs and unobservable phenomena.

First published in 1953, this seminal introduction to political philosophy is intended for both the student of political theory and for the general reader. After an introduction which explains the nature and purpose of philosophy, Dr Murray provides a critical examination of the principle theories advanced by political philosophers from Plato to Marx, paying special attention to contemporary issues. The book also makes an attempt to define the essential issues of philosophical significance in contemporary politics, with special reference to (...) the conflict between political authority and individual rights, and to show how the different moral assumptions underlying authoritarian and democratic systems of government are ultimately based upon different theories of logic. (shrink)

What are the ethical concerns among the growing populations of business people in Central & Eastern Europe, and how might they be dealt with practically in the course of business life? David Murray has been a management consultant since 1979 working primarily with the Hay Group in the area of strategic organisational change. Since founding Maine Consulting Services in 1991 he spends most of his time in the field of business and professional ethics, also holding a Visiting Fellowship at (...) the University of Central Lancashire. He is chairman of the Professional & Technical Board at the (British) Institute of Quality Assurance and a coordinating editor of the quarterly Organisations & People. Marek Kucia is a social researcher operating his own research agency (which organised the Polish part of this exercise) and an academic teaching sociology, and conducting and co‐ordinating Central European Studies at the Jagiellonian University, Krakow. He studied political science, sociology and philosophy at Krakow and studied for his PhD at Oxford. He has also worked for Gallup, London, in opinion and market research. This survey report is based on presentations made in April 1994 to the EBEN Research Centres Conference in Prague, and in June 1994 to the conference on “Ethics in Transition” organised in Gödöllö, Hungary, by the Democracy after Communism Foundation, Budapest. The authors wish to acknowledge the major contribution to this work of Mr Juraj Kusnierik of the Central European Foundation, SEN, Bratislava, who co‐ordinated the survey exercise. The project was sponsored by The Ethics Development Initiative, CARE, London; the Central European Foundation, SEN, Bratislava, Slovakia; SIS Ltd., Bratislava, Slovakia; and Maine Consulting Services, 16 Acrefield, Blackburn, Lancashire, England BB2 7BJ, to which all correspondence connected with this report should be addressed. (shrink)

In an era of information overload, our need to learn how to critically evaluate the growing flood of information has never been greater. Critical Reflection showcases the role of reason in a world saturated by media-enhanced persuasion and complex scientific and technological jargon.Drawing from the classic philosophical texts, this engaging textbook on the art of analyzing arguments is also relevant to today's undergraduates in its use of real-life examples and exercises drawn mainly from media and politics. Malcolm Murray and (...) Nebojsa Kujundzic cover the standard subjects in a one-semester course on critical thinking, offering ways to analyze arguments. (shrink)

Kenneth Burke: A Dialogue of Motives employs the philosophy of ethics of Emmanuel Levinas to develop a uniquely dramatistic philosophy of ethics. Jeffrey Murray analyzes Kenneth Burke's A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives and offers the notion of "a dialogue of motives" as a completion of Burke's proposed trilogy and as a supplement to Burke's own tools for rhetorical criticism.

First published in 1938, these lectures argue that liberality is the foundation of civilization. According to Gilbert Murray, civilization provides the surplus of security, leisure and wealth that makes liberality possible; a failure of liberality is the surest test of the failure of a civilization. This is a fascinating reissue that will be of great value to students with an interest in political philosophy and the foundations of liberal society.