This collection presents the English-language reader for the first time with essays that are representative of Bernstein's much-neglected revisionist period, 1901-1921. Bernstein himself suggested that this later work included significant new elements, indicating further progress in his liberal-socialist theory. Bernstein's later work acquires additional significance in light of the events of 1989, which have discredited not only Marxism-Leninism, but revolutionary Marxist theory in general, thus making the reevaluation of Bernstein's revisionism a worthwhile experience.

In physics, free will is debated mainly in regard to the observer-dependent effects. To eliminate them from quantum mechanics, superdeterminism postulates that the universe is a computation, and consciousness is an automaton. As a result, free will is impossible. Quantum no-go theorems tell us that the only natural phenomenon that might be able to account for every bit of freedom in the universe is quantum randomness. With randomness in Nature, the universe could not have been predetermined completely in the sense (...) that it should be impossible in principle to compute from the big bang or at any later moment whether live and conscious observers might or might not appear there. After all, superdeterminism comes to be either self-inconsistent by assuming randomness, at least, at the initial conditions of the big bang, or untestable and mysterious by pushing every bit of freedom in back to the prerequisites of the universe “designed” in the big bang. (shrink)

"Allerdings, das ist eine grosse Frage, der ich zu sehr ausgewichen bin, die Evidenz des Ich als ein Identisches, das also doch nicht in dem Bündel bestehen kann." (Husserl, 1907) Bekanntlich verwirft Husserl in den Logischen Untersuchungen die Auffassung, "dass die Beziehung auf das Ich etwas zum we sentlichen Bestande des intentionalen Erlebnisses selbst Gehöriges sei'',! und bildet um 1907, nach Einführung der phänomenolo gischen Reduktion, "die Beziehung auf das Ich zu unterlassen, oder von ihr zu abstrahieren" geradezu die Bedingung, (...) ein "reines Phänomen im Sinne der Phänomenologie" 2 zu gewinnen. Und bekanntlich heisst es demgegenüber in den Ideen von 1913: "Unter den allgemeinen Wesenseigentümlichkeiten des tran szendental gereinigten Erlebnisgebietes gebührt eigentlich die erste Stelle der Beziehung auf das,reine' Ich",3 und revidiert Husserl in der zweiten Auflage der Logischen Untersuchungen von 4 1913 seine Stellungnahme zur Frage des reinen Ich. Weniger bekannt ist bisher, wie Husserl auf seinem Denkweg von der einen zur anderen Stellungnahme zum Problem des Ich gekommen ist. Was bewegte ihn, das "Ich" in die phänomeno logische Problematik einzubeziehen? Zu vermuten war, dem Wandel in der Stellung zum Problem des Ich liege ein Wandel im Verständnis der Phänomenologie selbst zugrunde. Welche Phänomene motivierten, auf dem phänomenologischen Boden selbst, die Einbeziehung des Ich? Vor allem dieser Frage gehen wir, unter Berücksichtigung des Nachlassmaterials des Husserl Archivs (Leuven), in unserer Studie nach. (shrink)

The book makes a direct contribution to the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science.

The paper presents, first, some general remarks about Husserl’s philosophical Phenomenology in view of relating it to the scientific study of consciousness, and recalls some of the basic methodological tenets of a Husserlian phenomenology of consciousness (I). It then introduces some recent work on so-called “mental imagery” in cognitive psychology and neuroscience (II). Next, a detailed exposition of a reflective analysis of conscious experiences that involve “imagery” or “images” is given (III), arguing thereby that reflective conceptual clarifications of various forms (...) of such experiences could contribute to research into their finer details. In order to show more distinctly that the conscious experiences involved in the contemporary cognitive and neuroscientific imagery research are indeed differently structured, a simple notation for designating the various structural components of the experiences under study will be used. In concluding (IV), some methodological assets concerning the present proposal of integrating the method of Husserlian phenomenology into the present-day, and hopefully even more so into the future study of consciousness are highlighted! (shrink)

Was passiert, wenn jemand zeigt, dass die Dreifaltigkeit der Ausgangspunkt der Freiheitsgeschichte der Menschheit ist? Dass in ihr das Risiko grundgelegt ist, das in jeder Begegnung eingeschlossen ist? Dass sie das Netz ist, das jede menschliche Liebe unterfangt? Und dass sie schliesslich die ausserste Spannung auszieht, von der Fulle des Seins zum Nichts und zum Tod? Plotzlich ruckt dann die Dreifaltigkeit mitten ins Zentrum des Verstehens von Menschheitsentwicklung und Kultur, von Gottinnigkeit ebenso wie von Gottesferne. Nichts Geringeres unternimmt die vorliegende (...) Arbeit des Franziskaners P. Eduard Prenga. Den wesentlichen Bezugspunkt bildet dabei der italienische Theologe Piero Coda, der an der Papstlichen Lateran-Universitat sein Lehrer war. Der Mensch in seiner Geschichtlichkeit ist das Ziel der sich schenkenden Liebe Gottes, so wie sie im Neuen Testament bezeichnet wird: agape. Deshalb offenbart dieser sich selbst. Diese Offenbarung stellt die Theologie vor die Frage: Wie kann die Dreieinigkeit gedacht und ins Menschliche "uber-setzt" werden? Die vorliegende Studie unternimmt den Versuch einer Antwort, indem sie vom trinitatstheologischen Denken des italienischen Theologen Piero Coda ausgeht und zu Edmund Husserls Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivitat und Interpersonalitat gelangt. Dabei ist sie sowohl trinitarische Ontologie als auch trinitarische Phanomenologie. (shrink)

"Like Hanslick, Professor Payzant is both musician and philosopher; and he has brought the knowledge and insights of both disciplines to this large undertaking." --Gordon Epperson, _Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism_.

There is widespread agreement among philosophers that we refer to, think or talk about non-existent objects in much the same way as we refer to, think or talk about other objects. This paper explores the case of objects of fiction in the perspective of Husserlian philosophical phenomenology. In this perspective, everything objective is dealt with as object of some consciousness and as presenting itself in subjective modes. Within the scope of this paper, the focus of the descriptive analysis will be (...) on showing in some detail how conscious experiences of intentionally referring to something fictive in pre-linguistic intuitive acts of imagining something are to be articulated with regard to the object of consciousness, i.e. noematically, and with regard to the intentional act, i.e. noetically. Special attention will be given to the reflective finding of some consciousness being intentionally implied and thereby modified in the very performance of an intentional act of representifying (vergegenwärtigen) something in fiction and to the question of identity and individuation of objects in fiction. It will be argued that modifications occurring in representificational consciousness, which Husserl called ‘as-if’ or ‘quasi’ modifications, provide the key for understanding the phenomenology of fictional intentionality and reference. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The older schools were not indeed wholly extinct; but all belief in the systems taught had been practically undermined, and a general disposition to doubt ...

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 111 Heft: 3 Seiten: 819-821.

The roles of classical realism, logical positivism, and pragmatic instrumentalism in the shaping of fundamental ideas in quantum physics are examined in the light of some recent historical and sociological studies of the factors that influenced their development. It is shown that those studies indicate that the conventionalistic form of instrumentalism that has dominated all the major post-World War II developments in quantum physics is not an outgrowth of the Copenhagen school, and that despite the “schism” in twentieth century physics (...) created by the Bohr-Einstein “disagreements” on foundational issues in quantum theory, both their philosophical stands were very much opposed to those of conventionalistic instrumentalism. Quotations from the writings of Dirac, Heisenberg, Popper, Russell, and other influential thinkers, are provided, illustrating the fact that, despite the various divergencies in their opinions, they all either opposed the instrumentalist concept of “truth” in general, or its conventionalistic version in post-World War II quantum physics in particular. The basic epistemic ideas of a quantum geometry approach to quantum physics are reviewed and discussed from the point of view of a quantum realism that seeks to reconcile Bohr's “positivism” with Einstein's “realism” by emphasizing the existence of an underlying quantum reality, in which they both believed. This quantum geometry framework seeks to introduce geometro-stochastic concepts that are specifically designed for the systematic description of that underlying quantum reality, by developing the conceptual and mathematical tools that are most appropriate for such a use. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

This is an EXACT reproduction of a book published before 1923.

Having been struck by the Levinasian aspects of J.M. Coetzee's Age of Iron, this article tries to ‘reveal' Coetzee's novel as a Levinasian narration of how the other ruptures a specific subject's self-regarding egoism, leading the subject to take up its responsibility for the other. Throughout, the concreteness and realism of the novel is considered supplementary to the abstraction of Levinas's philosophical thought. It is demonstrated how the main character in Age of Iron, Elizabeth Curren, is confronted by the other (...) as a face, has her right to be put into question by the other, experiences guilt for her usurpation of the place of the other, which becomes positive in her assuming responsibility for the other. In awakening to the other, Curren moves from a Heideggerean concern with her own death (she is dying of cancer) towards a Levinasian prioritising of the other's life over her own. Her coming into contact with the political violence and oppression of late 1980s South Africa adds to and focuses her expiation for the other. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.24(1) 2005: 22-32. (shrink)

In this paper I explore possibilities of bringing post-positivist philosophies of empirical science to bear on the dynamics of mathematical development. This is done by way of a convergent accommodation of a mathematical version of Lakatos's methodology of research programmes, and a version of Kuhn's account of scientific change that is made applicable to mathematics by cleansing it of all references to the psychology of perception. The resulting view is argued in the light of two case histories of radical conceptual (...) innovations. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)