Featuring more than 150 articles by more than 70 leading scholars, this is the first encyclopedia devoted to empiricism. The _Encyclopedia of Empiricism_ serves four main purposes. First, it provides a convenient source for scholars and students seeking information on particular figures, topics, or doctrines, specifically in their relation to empiricism as an historical movement or to empiricism as a broader tendency of thought. Because each entry contains a brief bibliography of primary and secondary sources, it can usefully serve as (...) a point of first reference. Second, the _Encyclopedia_ illustrates the continuity and logical development of the Empiricist movement by examining, within topical articles, the contributions of a number of different philosophers related to the statement and solution of particular issues. Third, it explicates the relations, both logical and historical, between empiricism as a movement of the 17th and 18th centuries and the various species of empiricism that preceded and succeeded it. Finally, the _Encyclopedia_ explores some of the most important intellectual influences on empiricism as a methodology of thought. Outstanding Academic Book. (shrink)

At Epistles 2.2.87–9 Horace introduces an argument against writing poetry based on the unpleasant mutual admiration required in poetic society with an anecdote about an orator and a jurisconsult: †frater erat Romae† consulti rhetor, ut alter alterius sermone meros audiret honores, Gracchus ut hic illi, foret huic ut Mucius ille.

At Epistles 2.2.87–9 Horace introduces an argument against writing poetry based on the unpleasant mutual admiration required in poetic society with an anecdote about an orator and a jurisconsult: †frater erat Romae† consulti rhetor, ut alter alterius sermone meros audiret honores, Gracchus ut hic illi, foret huic ut Mucius ille.

At the forefront of international concerns about global legislation and regulation, a host of noted environmentalists and business ethicists examine ethical issues in consumption from the points of view of environmental sustainability, economic development, and free enterprise.

Republicanism and imperialism are typically understood to be located at opposite ends of the political spectrum. In Imperial Republics, Edward G. Andrew challenges the supposed incompatibility of these theories with regard to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century revolutions in England, the United States, and France. Many scholars have noted the influence of the Roman state on the ideology of republican revolutionaries, especially in the model it provided for transforming subordinate subjects into autonomous citizens. Andrew finds an equally important parallel between Rome's expansionary (...) dynamic — in contrast to that of Athens, Sparta, or Carthage — and the imperial rivalries that emerged between the United States, France, and England in the age of revolutions. Imperial Republics is a sophisticated, wide-ranging examination of the intellectual origins of republican movements, and explains why revolutionaries felt the need to 'don the toga' in laying the foundation for their own uprisings. (shrink)

Because it is too important to be left to generals war is important enough to be studied by philosophy. The use of themselves as a force has no history and animals fight and have a history but do not wage war and make history. War takes life and creates a way of life. Don Quixote wishes to see in hell the inventor of “the dreadful fury of those devilish instruments of artillery … which is the cause that very often a (...) cowardly base hand takes away the life of the bravest gentleman.” Gunpowder, according to Hegel, is the work of thought and, like the printing press, promotes thought. Humanity required gunpowder and it was invented. The principle of chivalry, honor, is a particularity of feeling, the exact opposite of the universal of thought, and men cannot realize their common humanity where weapons are “arms,” physical forces. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:70 HUME'S LETTER TO STEWART A Note on a Paper by D. C. Stove In a recent paper, D. C. Stove raises an historical problem. There exists a letter, written in 1754 by Hume to John Stewart, then Professor of Natural Philosophy at Edinburgh, in which the following words occur:. „. J never asserted so absurd a Proposition, as that any thing might arise without a Cause: I only (...) maintained, that our Certainty of the Falsehood of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source. Some commentators, most notably Norman Kemp-Smith, take this as telling strongly in favour of a non-sceptical reading of Hume. Stove undertakes to show beyond reasonable doubt that the claim made in the letter is in blatant contradiction with central theses of Hume's published philosophy, so that it has to be regarded as useless as evidence for the interpretation of the latter. There is a mystery as to how Hume came to say something so clearly false about what he himself had written; Stove offers certain conjectures, none of which he finds wholly satisfactory. As the conclusion of the first, exegetical, part of his article, Stove advances the thesis that Hume held the falsity of the Causal Principle to be possible in at least three senses of "possible". These senses he specifies accurately, but doesn't wish to rest anything on the detail of his specification of the third; it is important only that it be stronger than either of the preceding two. This done, he takes a look at the letter to Stewart, and says, with reference to the first part of the 71 passage quoted above: That something might begin to exist without a cause, is evidently equivalent to the proposition that it is possib Ie for something to begin to exist without a cause. That, in turn, is evidently equivalent to the proposition that the falsity of the Causal Principle is possible. (Stove's o underlining). It follows that what Hume says in the letter is simply false. It could be true only if the "might" referred to some sense of possibility even weaker than the weakest of Stove's three senses. But since that is mere self-consistency, there is no such sense. Now the argument to the contradiction relies on reading "might" as "it is possible", in some sense of those words. Stove says, as we have seen, that they are "evidently equivalent", but the equivalence is certainly not evident, and it may well be asked whether it exists at all. After all, there are English constructions with "might" which don't have modal force: "Do you think something might have happened to them without our knowing about it?" The hearer is not, of course, being asked whether it- is possible that something should have happened without their knowledge; he is being asked for his opinion on whether something actually has so happened. "Most unlikely", would be a perfectly natural and acceptable response. Again : "ïou stay here, to take care of any problem that might arise before we get back". Obviously it is not intended that the hearer should start taking precautions against all possibilities, only that he should cope with whatever actually arises, if anything. 72 This is quite normal modern usage, and I know no reason to think that it wasn't also norT.il usage in the 18th Century. Admittedly, it isn't modern philocophers ' usage - we would be very careful, in writing or; logical matters, not to use the word "might" unless it was definitely the modal proposition that we had in mind, but earlier times haven't always been so professional about their vocabulary. Certainly, if Hume, in the letter to Stewart, was denying that he had ever asserted the possibility of the falsehood of the Causal Principle it would be, as Stove shows, extremely hard to see what he could have been thinking of. But if what he meant could have been as well expressed by "I never asserted... that anything arises without a cause" then most of Stove's problems are over, for there is no 3 conflict with any of the theses (1) - (3) which he... (shrink)

This article examines the intrinsic and instrumental value of higher education, in relation to jobs that do not exist anymore and jobs that do not exist yet.

Joan Weiner (2007) has argued that Frege’s definitions of numbers are linguistic stipulations, with no content-preserving or ontological point: they don’t capture any determinate content of numerals, as they have none, and don’t present numbers as preexisting objects. I show that this view is based on exegetical and systematic errors. First, Idemonstrate that Weiner misrepresents the Fregean notions of ‘Foundations-content’, sense, reference, and truth. I then consider the role of definitions, demonstrating that they cannot be mere linguistic stipulations, since they (...) have a content-preserving, ontological point, and a decompositional aspect; Frege’s project of logical analysis and systematisation makes no sense without definitions so understood. The pivotal ontological role of elucidations is also explained. Next, three aspects of definition are distinguished, the informal versus the formal aspect, and the aspect of definition achieved through the entire process of systematisation, which encompasses the previous two and is little discussed in the literature. It is suggested that these insights can contribute to resolving some of the puzzles concerning the tension between the epistemological aim of logicism and Frege’s presentation of definitions as arbitrary conventions. Finally, I stress the interdependence between the epistemological and ontological aspects of Frege’s project of defining number. (shrink)

If beliefs are a map by which we steer, then, ceteris paribus, we should want a more accurate map. However, the world could be structured so as to punish learning with respect to certain topics—by learning new information, one’s situation could be worse than it otherwise would have been. We investigate whether the world is structured so as to punish learning specifically about moral nihilism. We ask, if an ordinary person had the option to learn the truth about moral nihilism, (...) ought she to take it? We argue, given plausible assumptions about ordinary human preferences, she should not. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:70 HUME'S LETTER TO STEWART A Note on a Paper by D. C. Stove In a recent paper, D. C. Stove raises an historical problem. There exists a letter, written in 1754 by Hume to John Stewart, then Professor of Natural Philosophy at Edinburgh, in which the following words occur:. „. J never asserted so absurd a Proposition, as that any thing might arise without a Cause: I only (...) maintained, that our Certainty of the Falsehood of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source. Some commentators, most notably Norman Kemp-Smith, take this as telling strongly in favour of a non-sceptical reading of Hume. Stove undertakes to show beyond reasonable doubt that the claim made in the letter is in blatant contradiction with central theses of Hume's published philosophy, so that it has to be regarded as useless as evidence for the interpretation of the latter. There is a mystery as to how Hume came to say something so clearly false about what he himself had written; Stove offers certain conjectures, none of which he finds wholly satisfactory. As the conclusion of the first, exegetical, part of his article, Stove advances the thesis that Hume held the falsity of the Causal Principle to be possible in at least three senses of "possible". These senses he specifies accurately, but doesn't wish to rest anything on the detail of his specification of the third; it is important only that it be stronger than either of the preceding two. This done, he takes a look at the letter to Stewart, and says, with reference to the first part of the 71 passage quoted above: That something might begin to exist without a cause, is evidently equivalent to the proposition that it is possib Ie for something to begin to exist without a cause. That, in turn, is evidently equivalent to the proposition that the falsity of the Causal Principle is possible. (Stove's o underlining). It follows that what Hume says in the letter is simply false. It could be true only if the "might" referred to some sense of possibility even weaker than the weakest of Stove's three senses. But since that is mere self-consistency, there is no such sense. Now the argument to the contradiction relies on reading "might" as "it is possible", in some sense of those words. Stove says, as we have seen, that they are "evidently equivalent", but the equivalence is certainly not evident, and it may well be asked whether it exists at all. After all, there are English constructions with "might" which don't have modal force: "Do you think something might have happened to them without our knowing about it?" The hearer is not, of course, being asked whether it- is possible that something should have happened without their knowledge; he is being asked for his opinion on whether something actually has so happened. "Most unlikely", would be a perfectly natural and acceptable response. Again : "ïou stay here, to take care of any problem that might arise before we get back". Obviously it is not intended that the hearer should start taking precautions against all possibilities, only that he should cope with whatever actually arises, if anything. 72 This is quite normal modern usage, and I know no reason to think that it wasn't also norT.il usage in the 18th Century. Admittedly, it isn't modern philocophers ' usage - we would be very careful, in writing or; logical matters, not to use the word "might" unless it was definitely the modal proposition that we had in mind, but earlier times haven't always been so professional about their vocabulary. Certainly, if Hume, in the letter to Stewart, was denying that he had ever asserted the possibility of the falsehood of the Causal Principle it would be, as Stove shows, extremely hard to see what he could have been thinking of. But if what he meant could have been as well expressed by "I never asserted... that anything arises without a cause" then most of Stove's problems are over, for there is no 3 conflict with any of the theses (1) - (3) which he... (shrink)

Joan Weiner has argued that Frege’s definitions of numbers constitute linguistic stipulations that carry no ontological commitment: they don’t present numbers as pre-existing objects. This paper offers a critical discussion of this view, showing that it is vitiated by serious exegetical errors and that it saddles Frege’s project with insuperable substantive difficulties. It is first demonstrated that Weiner misrepresents the Fregean notions of so-called Foundations-content, and of sense, reference, and truth. The discussion then focuses on the role of definitions in (...) Frege’s work, demonstrating that they cannot be understood as mere linguistic stipulations, since they have an ontological aim. The paper concludes with stressing both the epistemological and the ontological aspects of Frege’s project, and their crucial interdependence. (shrink)

Joan Weiner (2007) has argued that Frege’s definitions of numbers are linguistic stipulations, with no content-preserving or ontological point: they don’t capture any determinate content of numerals, as they have none, and don’t present numbers as preexisting objects. I show that this view is based on exegetical and systematic errors. First, Idemonstrate that Weiner misrepresents the Fregean notions of ‘Foundations-content’, sense, reference, and truth. I then consider the role of definitions, demonstrating that they cannot be mere linguistic stipulations, since they (...) have a content-preserving, ontological point, and a decompositional aspect; Frege’s project of logical analysis and systematisation makes no sense without definitions so understood. The pivotal ontological role of elucidations is also explained. Next, three aspects of definition are distinguished, the informal versus the formal aspect, and the aspect of definition achieved through the entire process of systematisation, which encompasses the previous two and is little discussed in the literature. It is suggested that these insights can contribute to resolving some of the puzzles concerning the tension between the epistemological aim of logicism and Frege’s presentation of definitions as arbitrary conventions. Finally, I stress the interdependence between the epistemological and ontological aspects of Frege’s project of defining number. (shrink)

Buller recently posted a critique of evolutionary psychology (reproduced below). Although I disagree with many of his assertions, this is the most credible attempt to critique evolutionary psychology that I have encountered. Buller’s arguments regarding improper motivational inferences from evolutionary psychological explanations are largely correct--such inferences are indeed erroneous. Furthermore, the mistakes he identifies have been made by some prominent evolutionists including, apparently, W. D. Hamilton (Symons, personal communication). However, most evolutionary psychologists are not saying what he claims they are (...) saying. Buller wishes to find evolutionary psychology trapped in Freudian quicksand so that he can rescue it. Instead, it is he who must hoist himself from the bog using the theoretical rigging created by evolutionary psychologists over the last two decades, including, most prominently, Don Symons, a primary target of his essay. (shrink)

Diego Gambetta and Gloria Origgi describe Italy as a country in which there is a widespread preference for promising high quality goods and delivering low quality goods. Builders are presented as an example. Gambetta and Origgi make proposals regarding why there are these preferences. I was going to ask, why don’t they just try being builders for a while? But metaphorically speaking, they are builders, which makes explaining the problems they face easier.

Jonathan Quong classifies varieties of liberalism based on two yes-or-no questions. I show that there is a kind of perfectionist liberalism that cannot be located on his map. I call it backdoor liberal perfectionism.

Jonathan Edwards is known as one of the most respected thinkers in American history and presided over the Great Awakening, one of the formative colonial events. What many don't realize is Edwards lived during a time of widespread conflict, which eventually touched the people of Northampton personally. Through these collected sermons, many of which are unpublished, Edwards sought to instruct, train, and comfort his congregation during a precarious season in provincial life. These sermons demonstrate the scope of (...) Edwards's greatness: a global thinker intimately connected to the British Empire as well as shepherd of the Northampton flock. The first part of this collection presents the sermons Edwards preached while the theater of war centered on the continent and the Caribbean. During this phase, Edwards's sermons leveraged martial language to promote the burgeoning revivals. In 1744, war was transplanted to the colonies in which the Northampton congregation personally participated. After a short hiatus of international conflict, warfare spread throughout the colonies. While he served a frontier mission, Edwards prepared his Indian congregation for yet another season of war. These sermons present Edwards as theologian, historian, philosopher, but most importantly, as pastor. (shrink)

A long-standing theoretical tradition in clinical psychology and psychiatry sees deliberate self-harm , such as wrist-cutting, as “functional”—a means to avoid painful emotions, for example, or to elicit attention from others. There is substantial evidence that DSH serves these functions. Yet the specific links between self-harm and such functions remain obscure. Why don’t self-harmers use less destructive behaviors to blunt painful emotions or elicit attention? Economists and biologists have used game theory to show that, under certain circumstances, self-harmful behaviors by (...) economic agents and animals serve important strategic goals. In particular, “costly signals” can credibly reveal a “private state” in situations where verbal claims and other “cheap” signals might be disbelieved. Here, DSH is scrutinized using signaling theory, and a variant, the theory of bargaining with private information. The social contexts and associated features of DSH suggest that it might be a costly, and therefore credible, signal of need that compels social partners to respond. (shrink)

This paper responds to Mary Beard’s assessment of the claim that Frazer’s book The Golden Bough was popular because it provided practical aid for colonialists. Beard rejects this as an inadequate explanation: reference to colonialism is part of an adequate explanation, but a full explanation must go beyond this particular ism. I present two objections to the case she makes for her inadequacy conclusion, though I don’t think his book aided much with colonialism.

This paper introduces an obvious interpretation of what Milan Kundera is “saying” about his characters the students Gabrielle and Michelle: don’t be like this. It contrasts the satirical way of developing character with a Tompkins’ paradox situation. I also raise a rather subtle question about the translation.

Various tribes deny that males have a role in causing pregnancy. Edmund Leach thinks members don’t actually believe tribal dogma. I propose that there is a practical value in denying our biological knowledge.

Adam Smith recommends specialization but I present a problem of when you are stuck with a certain apprentice but they don’t seem suited to your specialism. If you were less specialized or more versatile, you could solve the problem.

Historian of anthropology George Stocking tells us: from the point of view of parts of the Victorian middle class, Victorian society was highly evolved yet also contained savage components. Why don’t they change their ways, or why didn’t they? There is a Quinean solution.

The Aesthetic Sense of Life is a fast-moving book about how to see the world and get value from living every day with the "everyday." Do the infinite number of sensations we're surrounded with every day have intrinsic value? If not, what gives them value? Who appreciates the sunrise if we don't? Is it enough for just us to appreciate it? Or do we have to share it? The Aesthetic Sense of Life considers and answers to questions such as these (...) in clear, readable prose, offering a way of looking at life that makes clear its value and its meaning. The aesthetic sense of life is neither the viewpoint of the saints—for whom the sensations of the world are mere murmuring and illusion—nor the viewpoint of those completely fulfilled by their things, their gadgets, the particulars of their own lives. Most of us fall in the middle between these two extremes: we appreciate, say, a good cup of coffee, a power tool, a new set of towels, or a juicy steak, but don't think the answer to the riddle of existence is to be found in any of these. We appreciate them without thinking them sufficient. What's missing from them? What's missing is this: a sense that they can give meaning to life. (shrink)

This paper addresses a puzzle some people have about immigration. We are told that the immigrants we are taking in are talented, but then why don’t their own societies keep them?

This paper presents what I call “the flowchart solution” to Joe Horton’s all-or-nothing problem. Rather than three options – don’t save any child, save one, or save two – there is a flowchart with a choice of don’t save or save, and then within save, save one or save two.

The Nature of God explores a perennial problem in the philosophy of religion.

Peter Russell was King Alfonso XIII Professor of Spanish Studies at the University of Oxford 1953–81. He was recruited into the secret service in the mid-1930s and was sent to Spain during the Civil War. On returning to Oxford, Russell joined Military Intelligence and among other duties was responsible for seeing that the Duke and Duchess of Windsor reached the Bahamas safely. He resumed his academic career after the war and quickly established himself as a scholar of exceptional range and (...) dynamism. Influential publications included ‘Don Quixote as a funny book’ MLA 64, 312–26. Russell was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1977. Obituary by Bruce Taylor. (shrink)