People reason not only in beliefs, but also in intentions, preferences, and other attitudes. They form preferences from existing preferences, or intentions from existing beliefs and intentions, and so on. This often involves choosing between rival conclusions. Building on Broome (Rationality through reasoning, Hoboken, Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118609088, 2013) and Dietrich et al. (J Philos 116:585–614. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20191161138, 2019), we present a philosophical and formal analysis of reasoning in attitudes, with or without facing choices in reasoning. We give different accounts of choosing, in (...) terms of a conscious activity or a partly subconscious process. Reasoning in attitudes differs fundamentally from reasoning _about_ attitudes, a form of theoretical reasoning in which one discovers rather than forms attitudes. We show that reasoning in attitudes has standard formal properties (such as monotonicity), but is indeterministic, reflecting choice in reasoning. Like theoretical reasoning, it need not follow logical entailment, but for a more radical reason, namely indeterminism. This makes reasoning in attitudes harder to model logically than theoretical reasoning. But it can be studied abstractly, using indeterministic consequence operators. (shrink)

John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account into a model that differs from ordinary choice-theoretic models through focusing on psychology and the reasoning process. Within that model, we ask Broome’s central question of whether reasoning can make us more rational: whether it allows us to acquire transitive preferences, consistent beliefs, non-akratic intentions, and so on. We identify three structural types of (...) rationality requirements: consistency requirements, completeness requirements, and closedness requirements. Many standard rationality requirements fall under this typology. Based on three theorems, we argue that reasoning is successful in achieving closedness requirements, but not in achieving consistency or completeness requirements. We assess how far our negative results reveal gaps in Broome's theory, or deficiencies in choice theory and behavioral economics. (shrink)

We present an abstract model of rationality that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. Rationality requires coherence between your attitudes, such as your beliefs, values, and intentions. We define three 'logical' conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness, and closedness. They parallel the familiar logical conditions on beliefs, but contrast with standard rationality conditions like preference transitivity. We establish a formal correspondence between our logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome's programme 'rationality through reasoning', we formally characterize how you can (...) (not) become more logical by reasoning. Our analysis connects rationality with logic, and enables logical talk about multi-attitude psychology. (shrink)

Using a conviction-based measure, we find that local public corruption exerts a negative effect on the lending activity of US banks. Our baseline estimations show that the difference in public corruption between, for example, Alabama, where corruption is high, and Minnesota, where corruption is low, implies that banks headquartered in the former state grant 0.55% less credit ceteris paribus. Using proxies for relationship lending and monitoring, we also find that these bank characteristics weaken the negative effect of public corruption on (...) lending. These results are robust to tests that address endogeneity, to the use of perception-based measures of corruption, and after controlling for credit demand conditions. In further analysis, we show that these effects are more evident for smaller banks and banks operating in a single state. These findings provide evidence that public corruption could facilitate information asymmetry in the lending market and, thus, could hinder local development by reducing bank credit. (shrink)

Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (TS) is a childhood neuropsychiatric disorder characterised by the presence of motor and vocal tics. Patients with malignant TS experience severe disease sequelae; risking morbidity and mortality due to tics, self-harm, psychiatric comorbidities and suicide. By definition, those cases termed ‘malignant’ are refractory to all conventional psychiatric and pharmacological regimens. In these instances, deep brain stimulation (DBS) may be efficacious. Current 2015 guidelines recommend a 6-month period absent of suicidal ideation before DBS is offered to (...) patients with TS. We therefore wondered whether it may be ethically justifiable to offer DBS to a minor with malignant TS. We begin with a discussion of non-maleficence and beneficence. New evidence suggests that suicide risk in young patients with TS has been underestimated. In turn, DBS may represent an invaluable opportunity for children with malignant TS to secure future safety, independence and fulfilment. Postponing treatment is associated with additional risks. Ultimately, we assert this unique risk-benefit calculus justifies offering DBS to paediatric patients with malignant TS. A multidisciplinary team of clinicians must determine whether DBS is in the best interest of their individual patients. We conclude with a suggestion for future TS-DBS guidelines regarding suicidal ideation. The importance of informed consent and assent is underscored. (shrink)

Jaswal & Akhtar in their target article convincingly argue that subjects with autism do not have diminished social motivation. However, they still recognize that autistic people behave socially in an unusual way. Why? Here we suggest that these behaviours are the results of a multisensory integration deficit. Viewed from this perspective, the assumption that autistic people's unusual behaviours indicate diminished social motivation has to be replaced by the one that they have diminished social prediction skills.

We prove that an intermediate predicate logic characterized by a class of finite partially ordered sets is recursively axiomatizable iff it is "finite", i.e., iff it is characterized by a single finite partially ordered set. Therefore, the predicate logic LFin of the class of all predicate Kripke frames with finitely many possible worlds is not recursively axiomatizable.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the?Pussy riot? case and the peculiarities of Russian postsecularism. Special emphasis is placed on the phenomenon of post-secular hybrids, i.e. the overcoming of the situation of social differentiation between religion and other social subsystems. It is claimed that the materials of the trial against?Pussy riot? make evident the appearance in Russia of at least three post-secular hybrids: 1) the blending of religion and politics; 2) installation of religious norms into the public order (...) of the secular state; 3) significance of confessional legal experts as part of the new?ideological state apparatus?. Slucaj?Pusi rajot? postao je glavni religijski, ako ne i drustveno-politicki dogadjaj u Rusiji u 2012. godini. Autor ce na osnovu analize materijala koji se odnosi na navedeni slucaj i diskusije koje su potom usledile, pokusati da pokaze specificnosti ruskog iskustva desekularizacije i prelaza prema novoj situaciji postsekularizma. Kroz prizmu sudjenja ucesnicima pank molebana bice razmotreni postsekularni hibridi nastali kao rezultat desekularizacije, u kojima su cudnovato isprepleteni religijski i svetovni elementi. Radi se o tri postsekularna hibrida: ukrstanju religijske i sekularne sfere, ukrstanju religije i javnog poretka i pojavi konfesionalnih religiologa - eksperata. (shrink)

We propose a new, rather simple and short proof of Kripke-completeness for the predicate variant of Dummett's logic. Also a family of Kripke-incomplete extensions of this logic that are complete w.r.t. Kripke frames with equality (or equivalently, w.r.t. Kripke sheaves [8]), is described.

An intermediate predicate logic L is called finite iff it is characterized by a finite partially ordered set M, i.e., iff L is the logic of the class of all predicate Kripke frames based on M. In this paper we study axiomatizability of logics of this kind. Namely, we consider logics characterized by finite trees M of a certain type (levelwise uniform trees) and establish the finite axiomatizability criterion for this case.

Os tempos conjunturais de 1745 a 1818 são, tal como a vida e actuação de António Ribeiro dos Santos, diversificados e dissonantes. Qual o problema de fundo deste artigo? Tentar retraçar e compreender as linhas de um desenho, de componente biográfico-intelectual, em que as cores da paleta do barroco atlântico-joanino paulatina mas persistentemente se tornam mutáveis em luzes enciclopédicas e europeias. O Reino estendia-se em paisagens de senhorios e concelhos, pontuadas por uma rede crescente de espaços urbanos em extensões de (...) império atlântico e olhadas intermitentes ou dependentes da Europa. Os poderes do rei afirmavam-se, mas limitavam-se com o crescimento das estruturas da administração e das justiças. Um instituto jurídico, que se ia tornando distinto, ganhava e afirmava-se sob a designação de Estado. Os privilégios e excepções sentiam o crescimento do Estado, que vivia das leis, perante as quais, cada vez mais, todos se queriam iguais. Nas paisagens, sujeitos àqueles poderes, viviam vassalos. Vassalos que eram uma das preocupações da época. (shrink)

The Kripke-completeness and incompleteness of some intermediate predicate logics is established. In particular, we obtain a Kripke-incomplete logic (H* +A+D+K) where H* is the intuitionistic predicate calculus, A is a disjunction-free propositional formula, D = x(P(x) V Q) xP(x) V Q, K = ¬¬x(P(x) V ¬P(x)) (the negative answer to a question of T. Shimura).

The completeness w.r.t. Kripke frames with equality (or, equivalently, w.r.t. Kripke sheaves, [ 8 ] or [4, Sect. 3.6]) is established for three superintuitionistic predicate logics: ( Q - H + D *), ( Q - H + D *&K), ( Q - H + D *& K & J ). Here Q - H is intuitionistic predicate logic, J is the principle of the weak excluded middle, K is Kuroda’s axiom, and D * (cf. [ 12 ]) is a (...) weakened version of the well-known constant domains principle D . Namely, the formula D states that any individual has ancestors in earlier worlds, and D * states that any individual has $${\neg\neg}$$ -ancestors (i.e., ancestors up to $${\neg\neg}$$ -equality) in earlier worlds. In particular, the logic ( Q - H + D *& K & J ) is the Kripke sheaf completion of ( Q - H + E & K & J ), where E is a version of Markov’s principle (cf. [ 12 ]). On the other hand, we show that the logic ( Q - H + D *& J ) is incomplete w.r.t. Kripke sheaves. (shrink)

An example of finite tree Mo is presented such that its predicate logic (i.e. the intermediate predicate logic characterized by the class of all predicate Kripke frames based on Mo) is not finitely axiomatizable. Hence it is shown that the predicate analogue of de Jongh - McKay - Hosoi's theorem on the finite axiomatizability of every finite intermediate propositional logic is not true.