According to Etienne Souriau, ontology must be grasped in light of an ontogonic perspective in which future is to be rebuilt permanently as an act. We show that “constant forms” support Souriau’s aim that ontogony must be both ubiquitous and pragmatic. Firstly, the “constant forms” support Souriau’s ubiquitous ontogony which aims to escape the reification due to the “law of localization”. Secondly, as far as they are considered as “action template”, the “constant forms” support (...) Souriau’s pragmatic ontogony according to which “existence is an act”. Thirdly, Souriau characterizes as “constant forms” the morphems on which is based his synaptic vision (as opposed to the ontic vision) which values the dynamical role of transitions in order to create a future as an act, as it is required by the criteria of pragmatic ontogony. (shrink)

Il volume contiene la traduzione della Prefazione e del Libro I dell'opera di Benjamin Constant (1767-1830) - teorico della democrazia liberale, storico e filosofo nel dominio delle religioni, romanziere, politico che debutta nella Rivoluzione francese, matura sotto il regime napoleonico, invecchia durante la monarchia della Restaurazione - De la Religion, pubblicata in cinque tomi tra il 1824 e il 1831. Corredato di un ampio saggio introduttivo del curatore, il libro colma una lacuna della cultura filosofica italiana, ossia l'assenza di (...) una traduzione dell'opera religiosa di Constant, di cui viene proposta la parte iniziale contenente l'introduzione generale alla vasta storia comparata delle religioni antiche - dal feticismo al politeismo - che compone il lavoro constantiano. "Opera capitale per intendere compiutamente il Constant" - scrive Fulvio Tessitore nella Presentazione - e, ancor più, l'età nevralgica in cui essa apparve e della quale è uno dei vertici letterari e teoretici--OCLC. (shrink)

This is the first full-length English translation of Benjamin Constant's massive study of humanity's religious forms and development, published in five volumes between 1824 and 1831. Constant (1767-1830) regarded On Religion, worked on over the course of many years, as perhaps his most important philosophical work. He called it "the only interest, the only consolation of my life," and "the book that I was destined by nature to write." While the recent revival of interest in Constant's (...) thought has been welcome and fruitful, it has been incomplete, tending to leave out of account his writings on religion. In this connection, On Religion is essential reading and of interest for many reasons. As an analysis of humanity's religious experience, the work is notable for its methodology. Unlike previous writers with dogmatic commitments, whether theological or philosophical, Constant aimed to work with well-established facts and to relate religious forms to their historical contexts and civilizational developments. In this way, he was a precursor of the scientific study of religion. This objectivity, however, was not tantamount to moral-political neutrality. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, he wanted partisans of the new order to recognize that the religious impulse was natural to the human heart: to extirpate religion was therefore a fool's errand and worse. Likewise, he instructed religious reactionaries that history had left them behind: now the natural state of the religious sentiment was an unfettered "spirituality" left free to find new forms of expression. His counsel to contemporaries has proven prescient concerning subsequent religious developments in democratic and totalitarian societies. In his day, Constant was a consistent liberal, a life-long advocate of representative government, as well as of the central liberal arrangement concerning religion: separation of church and state. But On Religion demonstrates that principled liberalism can turn a sympathetic as well as analytic eye toward religion and, in an unbegrudging way, find an important place for it in free society. There are signs that this is a lesson that contemporary liberalism would do well to relearn. Peter Paul Seaton Jr. teaches philosophy at St. Mary's Seminary and University in Baltimore. His scholarly interests focus on the intersection of religion, politics, and philosophy. He has translated a number of works in French thought, especially political philosophy. These include works by Pierre Manent, Democracy without Nations? and Modern Liberty and Its Discontents (with Daniel J. Mahoney), Chantal Delsol, Unjust Justice, and Rémi Brague, On the God of the Christians and The Legitimacy of the Human. (shrink)

We argue that political propaganda is a negative phenomenon, against a recent strain of philosophical theorizing that argues that political propaganda can sometimes be neutral or even positive. After an exploration of the sense and connotation of the word ‘propaganda’ in ordinary use and in the scholarly literature, we discuss Ross’s (2002) account of propaganda as an epistemically defective form of political communication. We claim that, with some refinements, it is an explanatorily useful analysis. We then assess two prominent attempts (...) that aim at classifying legitimate cases of public communication as cases of propaganda, namely Ross’s (2013) revision of her previous model, and Stanley’s (2015) influential account. We show that some of the cases in contention are problematic and that the arguments the authors offer for classifying other non-problematic cases as propaganda are inconclusive. We also argue that the idea of considering legitimate public communication as propaganda is unmotivated. (shrink)

For María Zambrano all forms of knowledge are articulated from tradition, because what is essential is located in the past, as if it were a question of a substratum per se which is always known and transmitted. Wisdom increases by accumulation: knowledges add up, they become part of a ..

Résumé L’article propose un aperçu des relations entre le droit et les sciences dans la Chine des Qing (1644-1911), mises en perceptive avec la façon dont ces liens ont été décrits par les historiens de l’Europe moderne. Savoirs scientifiques et savoir juridique découlaient en Chine d’une matrice commune déterminant les conditions d’accès au savoir. Cette théorie de la connaissance, fixée dans les Classiques confucéens, somme d’ouvrages au cœur du curriculum des lettrés et au fondement de l’organisation bureaucratique, était commune à (...) l’ensemble des champs disciplinaires. Se dégageaient ainsi une heuristique ou encore des formes communes de structuration du raisonnement semblables quelles que soient les sciences considérées. Nous illustrons ces points à travers l’étude de plusieurs facettes de l’organisation du savoir juridique, mis au regard des principes structurant le savoir mathématique. (shrink)

Ethics, Sin, and Redemption. This chapter considers Abelard’s reflection on ethical issues in his Collationes, couched in the form of a debate among a philosopher and a Jew and a Christian about the relationship between pagan ethics and Christian faith. It argues that arguments put by the philosopher reflect many of the concerns put by Heloise, to which Abelard sought to find a Christian response. It then looks at Abelard’s commentary on St Paul’s Epistle to the Romans and Expositio in (...) Hexameron, written at the request of Heloise, in terms of Abelard’s evolving interest in the work of both creation and redemption. (shrink)

La créativité est une valeur aujourd’hui abondamment conférée à des objets fort divers. Ainsi, bien qu’elle soit principalement discutée dans le domaine de l’art, on en parle souvent à propos des sciences, du sport, de l’entrepreneuriat, de la politique, de la pédagogie ou encore de situations plus ordinaires, telles que la créativité culinaire ou humoristique. En quoi ces diverses formes de créativité se ressemblent-elles ? Qu’est-ce qui fait leur valeur et en quoi se distinguent-elles de proches parentes comme l’originalité, l’inventivité (...) ou l’intelligence ? (shrink)

We review some of the main implications of the free-energy principle (FEP) for the study of the self-organization of living systems – and how the FEP can help us to understand (and model) biotic self-organization across the many temporal and spatial scales over which life exists. In order to maintain its integrity as a bounded system, any biological system - from single cells to complex organisms and societies - has to limit the disorder or dispersion (i.e., the long-run entropy) of (...) its constituent states. We review how this can be achieved by living systems that minimize their variational free energy. Variational free energy is an information theoretic construct, originally introduced into theoretical neuroscience and biology to explain perception, action, and learning. It has since been extended to explain the evolution, development, form, and function of entire organisms, providing a principled model of biotic self-organization and autopoiesis. It has provided insights into biological systems across spatiotemporal scales, ranging from microscales (e.g., sub- and multicellular dynamics), to intermediate scales (e.g., groups of interacting animals and culture), through to macroscale phenomena (the evolution of entire species). A crucial corollary of the FEP is that an organism just is (i.e., embodies or entails) an implicit model of its environment. As such, organisms come to embody causal relationships of their ecological niche, which, in turn, is influenced by their resulting behaviors. Crucially, free-energy minimization can be shown to be equivalent to the maximization of Bayesian model evidence. This allows us to cast natural selection in terms of Bayesian model selection, providing a robust theoretical account of how organisms come to match or accommodate the spatiotemporal complexity of their surrounding niche. In line with the theme of this volume; namely, biological complexity and self-organization, this chapter will examine a variational approach to self-organization across multiple dynamical scales. (shrink)

This paper reflects on the limits of logical form set by a novel criterion of logicality proposed in (Bonnay and Speitel, 2021). The interest stems from the fact that the delineation of logical terms according to the criterion exceeds the boundaries of standard first-order logic. Among ‘novel’ logical terms is the quantifier “there are infinitely many”. Since the structure of the natural numbers is categorically characterisable in a language including this quantifier we ask: does this imply that arithmetical forms (...) have been reduced to logical forms? And, in general, what other conditions need to be satisfied for a form to qualify as “fully logical”? We survey answers to these questions. (shrink)

En 1928 la théorie des form constants par Klüver catégorisait les hallucinations visuelles en quatre grandes catégories. Alors que la notion de form constants venait à s’appliquer virtuellement à toutes les figures entoptiques, comme l’avait prévu son auteur, dont les photismes synesthésiques, Cytowic a décrit et Carol Steen représenté ce que voient réellement des synesthètes visuels. L’une des caractéristiques d’œuvres de peintres synesthètes serait justement la présence de ces formes classées par Klüver. L’anthropologie avec la thèse de l’externalisation a montré (...) que certaines cultures ont repris les form constants perçues dans le premier stade de l’intoxication pour en faire les patterns de leur art. Les modèles physiologico-mathématiques permettent de localiser en V1 l’origine de production des photismes et d’expliquer leur morphogénèse. Mais une explication des circuits neuraux empruntés pour passer des différents types de déclencheur sensoriel à l’apparition de photismes synesthésiques reste aujourd’hui au stade de l’hypothèse. La synesthésie est l’objet de recherches alliant les sciences les plus contemporaines dont la génomique. Il est possible que les études sur la synesthésie transforment son statut de phénomène marginal en un élément essentiel dans la compréhension du système physiologique sous-jacent à l’esprit humain. In 1928, Klüver’s theory of form constants placed visual hallucinations into four broad categories. Whereas, as predicted by its author, the notion of form constants was virtually applicable to all entoptic figures, including synesthetic photisms, the very notion of entoptics was definitively extended. Cytowic has described and Carol Steen has represented what visual synesthetes actually see. The presence of these forms, as they have been classified by Klüver, is precisely one of the characteristics of the works of synesthetic painters. With the thesis of externalization, the field of Anthropology has shown that some cultures have adopted the constant forms perceived in the first stage of intoxication as patterns for their art. Physiological-mathematical models allow us to locate the origin of photism production in V1, and to explain these photisms’ morphogenesis. But, even today, an explanation of the neural pathways used to pass from different types of sensory triggers to the appearance of synesthetic photisms remains at the hypothesis stage. Synesthesia is a research topic that combines some of the most contemporary sciences, including genomics. Studies on synesthesia may just transform its status as that of a marginal phenomenon into that of an essential element in understanding the physiological system underlying the human mind. (shrink)

Let L be a first-order language and Φ and ψ two $\Sigma _{1}^{1}$ L-sentences that cannot be satisfied simultaneously in any finite L-structure. Then obviously the following principle Chain L,Φ,ψ (n,m) holds: For any chain of finite L-structures C 1 ,...,C m with the universe [n] one of the following conditions must fail: 1. $C_{1}\vDash \Phi $ , 2. C i ≅ C i+1 , for i = 1,...,m — 1, 3. $C_{m}\vDash \Psi $ . For each fixed L and (...) parameters n,m the principle Chain L,Φ,ψ (n,m) can be encoded into a propositional DNF formula of size polynomial in n,m. For any language L containing only constants and unary predicates we show that there is a constant c L such that the following holds: If a constant depth Frege system in DeMorgan language proves Chain L,Φ,ψ (n, c L · n) by a size s proof then the class of finite L-structures with universe [n] satisfying Φ can be separated from the class of those L-structures on [n] satisfying ψ by a depth 3 formula of size $2^{{\rm log}(s)^{O(1)}}$ and with bottom fan-in ${\rm log}(s)^{O(1)}$. (shrink)

From cytological examination, the size and form of the chromosomes in the eukaryotic nucleus are invariant across generations, leading to the expectation that constancy of inheritance likely depends on constancy of the chromosomal DNA molecule conveying the constant phenotype. Indeed, except for rare mutations, major phenotypic traits appear largely without change from generation to generation. Thus, when it was discovered that the inheritance of traits for bacteria, mitochondria and chloroplasts was also constant, it was assumed that chromosomes in (...) those locations were also constant. Such has not turned out to be the case, however; those chromosomes are highly variable in structure. I propose, therefore, that only for the nucleus is there a requirement that a chromosome be “finished” (contain only fully replicated genomes) before it may segregate to daughter cells. This requirement does not apply to the variable chromosomes among chloroplasts, mitochondria and bacteria. BioEssays 29:474–483, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Bolzano’s definition of consequence in effect associates with each set X of symbols (in a given interpreted language) a consequence relation X . We present this in a precise and abstract form, in particular studying minimal sets of symbols generating X . Then we present a method for going in the other direction: extracting from an arbitrary consequence relation its associated set C of constants. We show that this returns the expected logical constants from familiar consequence relations, and that, restricting (...) attention to sets of symbols satisfying a strong minimality condition, there is an isomorphism between the set of strongly minimal sets of symbols and the set of corresponding consequence relations (both ordered under inclusion). (shrink)

Logical form is thought to be discovered by keeping fixed the logical constants and allowing the non-logical content in the sentence to vary. The problem of logical constants is the problem of defining what counts as a logical constant. In this paper, I will argue that the concept ’logical constant’ is vague. I demonstrate the vagueness of logical constancy by providing a sorites argument, thereby showing the sorites-susceptibility of the concept. Many prior papers in the literature on logical (...) constants hint at this vagueness, but do not explore how theories of vagueness apply to logical constants. In the second half of this paper, I do just this. I consider approaches to logical constants that resemble nihilism about vagueness and more recent theories that relativize truth to precisifications. Finally, I argue that approaches that accept the potential indeterminate status of putative logical constants are preferable to nihilism or relativism about logical constancy. (shrink)

Logic is usually thought to concern itself only with features that sentences and arguments possess in virtue of their logical structures or forms. The logical form of a sentence or argument is determined by its syntactic or semantic structure and by the placement of certain expressions called “logical constants.”[1] Thus, for example, the sentences Every boy loves some girl. and Some boy loves every girl. are thought to differ in logical form, even though they share a common syntactic and (...) semantic structure, because they differ in the placement of the logical constants “every” and “some”. By contrast, the sentences Every girl loves some boy. and Every boy loves some girl. are thought to have the same logical form, because “girl” and “boy” are not logical constants. Thus, in order to settle questions about logical form, and ultimately about which arguments are logically valid and which sentences logically true, we must distinguish the “logical constants” of a language from its nonlogical expressions. (shrink)

The anthropological constants - as Edward Schillebeeckx discovered - are the parameters of a system of coordinates which run through the whole human history like lines of longitude and provide constant guidance in clarifying human dignity. They influence one another and delineate man's basic form. Failure to recognize one of these profoundly human constants uproots the whole and damages man and the society and distorts the whole of human culture.These constants simply outline, as it were, the system of parameters (...) in which specific norms must be sought through dialogue and after an analyses and interpretation of the concrete society structure and the position of the person in it. (shrink)

Physics presents us with a symphony of natural constants: G, h, c, etc. Up to this point, constants have received comparatively little philosophical attention. In this paper I provide an account of dimensionful constants, in particular the gravitational constant. I propose that they represent inter-quantity structure in the form of relations between quantities with different dimensions. I use this account of G to settle a debate over whether mass scalings are symmetries of Newtonian Gravitation. I argue that they are (...) not, but only if we interpret mass anti-quidditistically. This is analogous to anti-haecceitism in the presence of spacetime symmetries. (shrink)

The cosmological constant is back. Several lines of evidence point to the conclusion that either there is a positive cosmological constant or else the universe is filled with a strange form of matter (“quintessence”) that mimics some of the effects of a positive lambda. This paper investigates the implications of the former possibility. Two senses in which the cosmological constant can be a constant are distinguished: the capital Λ sense in which lambda is a universal (...) class='Hi'>constant on a par with the charge of the electron, and the lower case λ sense in which lambda is a humble constant of integration. The latter interpretation has been touted as the means to a solution to various problems in physics. These claims are critically examined with an eye to discerning the implications for philosophy of science and foundations of physics. (shrink)

In the first years of its existence between 1957 and 1960 the efforts of the radical collective the Situationist International (SI) centred on its program of “unitary urbanism.” This program sought to challenge the functionalist character of hegemonic forms of urban planning through novel practices of urban experimentation and contestation. Situationist urbanism arose largely through the collaboration between Guy Debord and the Dutch avant-garde architect Constant. This article explores the political dimension of situationist urbanism and the tensions that (...) led to Constant’s secession from the group in 1960. Through analysis of the affinities and divergences between urbanism in its modernist and situationist forms a case is made for the crucial contribution situationist practices might make to the restoration of public space as a vital arena of contemporary political contestation and community. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Jan Masschelein’s keynote lecture. Taking its point of departure in a befriended support of his argument, the paper begins in the mood of affirmation as a form of critique. Thereafter it engages, first, with what it reads as a slightly retrotopian approach to digitalization in the paper. Second, it brings to attention that the gesture of rejuvenation and regeneration, which Masschelein suggests, always involves a moment of return or repetition. The question is asked what (...) form the gesture of retrieving inherited pedagogical forms from the past takes in Masschelein’s proposal, and it is suggested that such retrieving is a work of constant translation. Third, a comment is made about the advocating of orature, issuing the reminder that on-campus education usually comes without noise reduction, that is, it requires reflection also on the discord that is calibrated in and through our voices. (shrink)

«Etienne Gilson laissait à sa mort, en septembre 1978, le manuscrit d'un ouvrage largement inédit dont il avait achevé la préparation dix ans plus tôt, à en croire l'indication marginale "janvier 1968" qui figure sur la table des matières, complète et paginée. Ce volume posthume qu'Etienne Gilson avait intitulé malicieusement Constantes philosophiques de l'être comporte huit chapitres, inédits pour moitié, tandis que les autres reprennent sous une forme parfois assez différente et généralement plus développée la matière d'essais publiés séparément de (...) 1952 à 1967. La composition des textes ainsi rassemblés s'échelonne donc sur une quinzaine d'années sans qu'on puisse toujours dater avec précision la rédaction des quatre chapitres jusqu'à présent inédits. Ce qui est sûr en tout cas, c'est que, comme l'auteur le souligne lui-même dans sa Préface, tous ont été conçus dans la perspective d'un recueil d'ensemble, qui s'est constitué progressivement et comme de lui-même. Le présent ouvrage, beaucoup plus doctrinal qu'historique, se situe par ailleurs dans le prolongement direct des réflexions que le grand historien avait d'abord développées dans l'Etre et l'Essence. L'auteur y poursuit en particulier, à la faveur d'une mise en perspective de l'ensemble de la tradition philosophique occidentale, un débat déjà engagé dans les appendices de la seconde édition de l'Etre et l'Essence, en 1962 ; débat qui porte sur ce que Gilson nomme ici "la nouvelle philosophie de l'être". S'interrogeant en philosophe "sur les données de l'histoire", l'historien demande à présent : "qu'y a-t-il de nouveau dans les aventures de l'être?", la nouveauté tenant pour l'essentiel au "cas Heidegger". Par où l'historien de la pensée médiévale n'ajoute pas simplement une pièce nouvelle au dossier déjà volumineux de l'interprétation thomiste de la Seinsfrage, mais contribue, à sa façon, à la position de la question de la structure ontothéologique de la métaphysique.» -- Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

I defend a version of color subjectivism — that colors are sortals for certain neural events — by arguing against a sophisticated form of color objectivism and by showing how a subjectivist can legitimately explain the phenomenal fact that colors seem to be properties of external objects.

The notion of logical form and its applications are at the heart of some of the classical problems in philosophical logic and are the focus of Peter Long’s investigations in the three essays that comprise this volume. In the first, major, essay the concern is with the notion of logical form as it applies to arguments involving hypotethical statements, for example ‘If today is Wednesday then tomorrow is Thursday; today is Wednesday: therefore tomorrow is Thursday.’ Whilst such an argument is (...) cited by logical textbooks as a paradigm of one that is ‘formally valid’, it is not hard to show that the conjunction forming a hypothetical statement is not a logical constant, in which case the argument form If p then q; p: therefore q is not a logical form. But, then, how can logic claim to be the science of formal inference? The author resolves this difficulty by drawing a fundamental distinction within the notion of the form under which an argument is valid. With this distinction it becomes possible for the first time to determine the status of any formally valid argument involving hypotheticals, whether as premises or conclusion or both. The second and third essays take up the notion of logical form as it applies to such simple propositions as ‘This sheet is white’ and ‘London is north of Paris.’ When we speak of the first as giving expression to the relation of relations’s relating to its terms, what is in question is a formal relation and we call it such because the relation is expressed through these propositions having the respective forms Fa and Fab. It is shown that the confusion of formal relations with relations proper explains the assimilation of facts to complexes and is that the root of the theory of universals. _Peter Long_ has taught at the University of Leeds and University College London, and is a past Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. (shrink)

This paper endorses and defends M. J. Cresswell's view that the distinction drawn in linguistic semantics between strictly "logical" implication and merely lexical implication is bogus, and then explores the bad consequences that concession has for the Davidsonian semantic program. A pattern of semantic explanation made famous by Davidson's "The logical form of action sentences" is shown to be far less interesting than has been thought.

Benjamin Constant's On Religion was a major effort to include religion within liberal political thought, insisting on the possibility of religious progress and perfectibility. It was also a major critique of Catholicism and of clericalism in any form. And it was one of the most wide-ranging comparative studies of religion since it purported to cover all religions worldwide before Christianity. Constant worked on it for most of his adult life, more than 40 years. This article traces the rise (...) of the language of progress and perfectibility in Constant's milieu, finding roots in Rousseau, Scottish thinkers, Germans and Swiss such as Madame de Staël, Condorcet, William Godwin, and others. He also sprinkled some of his ideas about progress and perfectibility in his wide-ranging political writings. But it was in On Religion that he went into the idea of progress and perfectibility in depth, finding both a universal human need for religion and religious progress in every religion and over time. It may be true that he underestimated the possibility of regress and failure in human development, but nevertheless this work stands as a monument to liberal confidence in a better future. (shrink)

This essay forms part of an “elegiac symposium” on “what gets lost during paradigm shifts,” and it replies to an earlier contribution to that symposium, “Regarding Change at Ise-Jingu” by Jeffrey M. Perl (14, no. 2 [2008]: 208-20; DOI 10.1215/0961754X-2007-069]) . Andersen argues against or supplements Perl's contention that Japanese attitudes toward change differ radically from those that are standard in the West. Andersen expands on arguments made by Roland Barthes—an explicator and partisan of Japanese thought—to show that at (...) least one Greek myth (that of the unchanging ship Argo) deals with change, originality, updating, fakes, and replication in a way similar to those standard in Japanese culture. Andersen then pursues his argument, as well, with respect to works by Rodin, Sade, and Leonardo da Vinci. (shrink)

The paper investigates the propriety of applying the form versus matter distinction to arguments and to logic in general. Its main point is that many of the currently pervasive views on form and matter with respect to logic rest on several substantive and even contentious assumptions which are nevertheless uncritically accepted. Indeed, many of the issues raised by the application of this distinction to arguments seem to be related to a questionable combination of different presuppositions and expectations; this holds in (...) particular of the vexed issue of demarcating the class of logical constants. I begin with a characterization of currently widespread views on form and matter in logic, which I refer to as 'logical hylomorphism as we know it'—LHAWKI, for short—and argue that the hylomorphism underlying LHAWKI is mereological. Next, I sketch an overview of the historical developments leading from Aristotelian, non-mereological metaphysical hylomorphism to mereological logical hylomorphism (LHAWKI). I conclude with a reassessment of the prospects for the combination of hylomorphism and logic, arguing in particular that LHAWKI is not the only and certainly not the most suitable version of logical hylomorphism. In particular, this implies that the project of demarcating the class of logical constants as a means to define the scope and nature of logic rests on highly problematic assumptions. (shrink)

Work on the nature and scope of formal logic has focused unduly on the distinction between logical and extra-logical vocabulary; which argument forms a logical theory countenances depends not only on its stock of logical terms, but also on its range of grammatical categories and modes of composition. Furthermore, there is a sense in which logical terms are unnecessary. Alexandra Zinke has recently pointed out that propositional logic can be done without logical terms. By defining a logical-term-free language with (...) the full expressive power of first-order logic with identity, I show that this is true of logic more generally. Furthermore, having, in a logical theory, non-trivial valid forms that do not involve logical terms is not merely a technical possibility. As the case of adverbs shows, issues about the range of argument forms logic should countenance can quite naturally arise in such a way that they do not turn on whether we countenance certain terms as logical. (shrink)

During the past two centuries, and in particular during the inter-war period, American ways of living and of thinking have become one principal object of European reflections on modernity. This essay explores some of the ways in which the rejection or affirmation of modernity in Europe has been channelled through observations on America. It is argued that the variety of European ways of looking at America also demonstrates the range of forms available to social theory for thinking the social (...) world under conditions of modernity and that this European debate provided some seeds for the current discussion about `multiple modernities'. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the Tractatus classifies names into constant names and variable names. A variable name, via the application of the existential quantifier against the background of picturing, picks out and denotes an unspecified object from the range of objects of the form shown by the relevant variable. A constant name labels an object picked out from a scope of the existential quantifier. I also refute two types of attempts to argue that the Tractarian relation (...) between a name and its meaning is not realist, and to explain why it is more reasonable to hold that it is. (shrink)

This paper articulates and defends a conception of logical form as semantic form revealed by a compositional meaning theory. On this conception, the logical form of a sentence is determined by the semantic types of its primitive terms and their mode of combination as it relates to determining under what conditions it is true. We develop this idea in the framework of truth-theoretic semantics. We argue that the semantic form of a declarative sentence in a language L is revealed by (...) a (canonical) proof of its T- sentence in an interpretive truth theory for L. We give a precise characterization of sameness of logical form between any two declarative sentences in any two languages in terms of the notion of corresponding proofs in interpretive truth theories for the languages. We illustrate the utility of this approach with a number of examples. We then extend the characterization to non-declaratives in a generalization of truth-theoretic semantics that appeals to fulfillment conditions, of which truth conditions are one variety. On this approach, logical forms are not reified, and the notion of sameness of logical form is treated as conceptually basic. We discuss the relation of this conception of logical form to the project of identifying logical constants, reviewing two approaches, one of which takes topic neutrality as central, the other recursion. We argue that the project of identifying logical constants for the purposes of classifying together valid arguments is largely independent of that identifying logical form of sentences, and urge an ecumenical approach to extending talk of logical constants beyond where it is currently well-grounded. (shrink)

Many physicians, anatomists and natural philosophers engaged in attempts to map the seat of the soul during the so-called Scientific Revolution of the European seventeenth century. The history of these efforts needs to be told in light of the puzzlement bred by today's strides in the neurological sciences. The accounts discussed here, most centrally by Nicolaus Steno, Claude Perrault and Thomas Willis, betray the acknowledgement that a gap remained between observable form, on the one hand, and motor and sensory functions, (...) on the other. Observation yielded information about form, but did not guarantee a constant correlation with presumed function, while the mechanisms of sense and movement did not fit in with accounts of action and cognition whose purpose was to place the connection between active body and willful, conscious soul onto a descriptive rather than metaphysical plane. Teleology was now no longer a helpful tool in the disciplines of anatomy and physiology; the consequences of this are still with us. (shrink)

The logic CD is an intermediate logic which exactly corresponds to the Kripke models with constant domains. It is known that the logic CD has a Gentzen-type formulation called LD and rules are replaced by the corresponding intuitionistic rules) and that the cut-elimination theorem does not hold for LD. In this paper we present a modification of LD and prove the cut-elimination theorem for it. Moreover we prove a “weak” version of cut-elimination theorem for LD, saying that all “cuts” (...) except some special forms can be eliminated from a proof in LD. From these cut-elimination theorems we obtain some corollaries on syntactical properties of CD: fragments collapsing into intuitionistic logic. Harrop disjunction and existence properties, and a fact on the number of logical symbols in the axiom of CD. (shrink)

The logical constants are technical terms, invented and precisely defined by logicians for the purpose of producing rigorous formal proofs. Mathematics virtually exhausts the domain of deductive reasoning of any complexity, and it is there that the benefits of this refined form of language are felt. Pragmatic issues may arise — issues concerning the point of making a certain statement — for there will be more or less perspicuous and illuminating ways of presenting proofs in this language, and we may (...) be puzzled or misled when we wonder why the mathematician is taking some particular step. But this is hardly a compulsory topic in the philosophy of language. (shrink)

The perpetual music track is a new concept that describes a condition of constant or near-constant musical imagery. This condition appears to be very rare even among composers and musicians. I present here a detailed self-analysis of musical imagery for the purpose of defining the psychological features of a perpetual music track. I have music running through my head almost constantly during waking hours, consisting of a combination of recently- heard pieces and distant pieces that spontaneously pop into (...) the head. Imagery consists mainly of short musical fragments that get looped repeatedly upon themselves. Corporeal manifestations of imagery occur in the form of unconscious finger movements whose patterns correspond to the melodic contour of the imagined piece. Musical dreams occur every week or two, and contain a combination of familiar and originally- composed music. These results are discussed in light of theories of imagery, consciousness, hallucination, obsessive cognition, and most especially the notion that acoustic consciousness can be split into multiple parallel streams. (shrink)

I offer a novel argument for spacetime substantivalism: We should take the spacetime of general relativity to be a substance because of its active role in gravitational causation. As a clear example of this causal behavior I offer the cosmological constant, a term in the most general form of the Einstein field equations which causes free floating objects to accelerate apart. This acceleration cannot, I claim, be causally explained except by reference to spacetime itself.

The fine structure constant α ≡ e2/ c ≈ 1/137 is one of the fundamental parameters of the standard model of particle physics. There is a long history of attempts to derive the measured value of α from an underlying theory, or exhibit it in the form of a compact mathematical expression [2–4, 6, 8, 14–16]. The most significant advance in this endeavour was made by Dirac, who showed that if magnetic monopoles exist, with magnetic charge μ, then..

In theories of gravity with a positive cosmological constant, we consider product solutions with flux, of the form (A)dS p ×S q . Most solutions are shown to be perturbatively unstable, including all uncharged dS p ×S q spacetimes. For dimensions greater than four, the stable class includes universes whose entropy exceeds that of de Sitter space, in violation of the conjectured “N-bound.” Hence, if quantum gravity theories with finite-dimensional Hilbert space exist, the specification of a positive cosmological (...) class='Hi'>constant will not suffice to characterize the class of spacetimes they describe. (shrink)

In the theory of meaning, it is common to contrast truth-conditional theories of meaning with theories which identify the meaning of an expression with its use. One rather exact version of the somewhat vague use-theoretic picture is the view that the standard rules of inference determine the meanings of logical constants. Often this idea also functions as a paradigm for more general use-theoretic approaches to meaning. In particular, the idea plays a key role in the anti-realist program of Dummett and (...) his followers. In the theory of truth, a key distinction now is made between substantial theories and minimalist or deflationist views. According to the former, truth is a genuine substantial property of the truth-bearers, whereas according to the latter, truth does not have any deeper essence, but all that can be said about truth is contained in T-sentences (sentences having the form: ‘P’ is true if and only if P). There is no necessary analytic connection between the above theories of meaning and truth, but they have nevertheless some connections. Realists often favour some kind of truth-conditional theory of meaning and a substantial theory of truth (in particular, the correspondence theory). Minimalists and deflationists on truth characteristically advocate the use theory of meaning (e.g. Horwich). Semantical anti-realism (e.g. Dummett, Prawitz) forms an interesting middle case: its starting point is the use theory of meaning, but it usually accepts a substantial view on truth, namely that truth is to be equated with verifiability or warranted assertability. When truth is so understood, it is also possible to accept the idea that meaning is closely related to truth-conditions, and hence the conflict between use theories and truth-conditional theories in a sense disappears in this view. (shrink)

This chapter seeks to shed light on the origins, nature and scope of Hobbesian amity. It explores Hobbes's stance on two concepts – sociability and friendship – that a long tradition of writers, inspired by Aristotle, have employed to explain why and how people form bonds and live peacefully in political associations. The association that Hobbes postulated between friendship, power, and contract filled some readers with indignation. In the Aristotelian tradition, the concept of friendship helped explain the transition from the (...) family to the village and finally to the polis. The chapter argues that the “constancy” of amity among Hobbesian citizens does not derive from reciprocity of love or care but from a shared understanding of the Leviathan's function and the joint endeavor to support its accomplishment. The Leviathan provides the conditions of mutual trust and positive disposition that make friendship possible, and not vice versa. (shrink)

It is argued, on the basis of ideas derived from Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Husserl's Logical Investigations, that the formal comprehends more than the logical. More specifically: that there exist certain formal-ontological constants (part, whole, overlapping, etc.) which do not fall within the province of logic. A two-dimensional directly depicting language is developed for the representation of the constants of formal ontology, and means are provided for the extension of this language to enable the representation of certain materially necessary relations. The (...) paper concludes with a discussion of the relationship between formal logic, formal ontology, and mathematics. (shrink)

In order to resolve the cosmological constant problem, the notion of reference frame is re-examined at the quantum level. By using a quantum non-linear sigma model (Q-NLSM), a theory of quantum spacetime reference frame is proposed. The underlying mathematical structure is a new geometry endowed with intrinsic second central moment (variance) or even higher moments of its coordinates, which generalizes the classical Riemannian geometry based on only first moment (mean) of its coordinates. The second central moment of the coordinates (...) directly modifies the quadratic form distance which is the foundation of the Riemannian geometry. At semi-classical level, the second central moment introduces a flow which continuously deforms the Riemannian geometry driven by its classical Ricci curvature, which is known as the Ricci flow. A generalized equivalence principle of quantum version is also proposed to interpret the new geometry endowed with at least second moment. As a consequence, the spacetime is stabilized against quantum fluctuation, and the cosmological constant problem is resolved within the framework. With an isotropic positive curvature initial condition, the long flow time solution of the Ricci flow exists, the accelerating expansion universe at cosmic scale is an observable effect of the spacetime deformation of the normalized Ricci flow. A deceleration parameter − 0.67 consistent with measurement is obtained by using the reduced volume method introduced by Perelman. Effective theory of gravity within the framework is also discussed. (shrink)