The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) offers a dilemma for international political theory. ICRC's success as a humanitarian actor in international conflict is credited to its neutral stance. However, ICRC neutrality is vulnerable to serious challenges regarding its supposed avoidance of the political. ICRC neutrality is commonly dismissed as either illusory or impossible. The problem is not grounded in the principle of neutrality itself, though, but rather in the lack of critical engagement with what it means to be (...) neutral on a humanitarian register. ICRC misreads the demands of neutrality in such ways as to permit both partiality and irresponsibility to its mission. Drawing from Roland Barthes' address of the neutral, I argue that international humanitarianism is possible as a neutral movement but that this neutrality can only be such through vigorous and fundamentally political movement responsible to the goals of human well-being and dignity as questions. (shrink)

FN:s allmänna förklaring om de mänskliga rättigheterna innehåller en katalog över ett antal mänskliga fri- och rättigheter. I den här uppsatsen argumenterar jag för att det krävs en kvantifierad deontisk logik för att förstå den logiska formen hos flera av de normer som uttrycks i denna förklaring. Jag kommer att gå igenom ett antal argument som intuitivt är giltiga, men som inte kan bevisas i klassisk logik. Därefter kommer jag att visa hur dessa argument kan formaliseras och bevisas med hjälp (...) av kvantifierad deontisk logik. Diskussionen ger stöd åt uppfattningen att vi behöver en kvantifierad deontisk logik för att analysera många typer av normativa uttryck och kastar också förhoppningsvis nytt ljus över hur vissa centrala utsagor i FN:s allmänna förklaring bör tolkas och vilken logisk form de har. (shrink)

In this paper we show that there are "E₀ many" orbit inequivalent free actions of the free groups Fn. 2 ≤ n ≤ ∞ by measure preserving transformations on a standard Borel probability space. In particular, there are uncountably many such actions.

Fibronectin (FN) is a multi‐functional extracellular matrix protein required for cell adhesion and migration, blood clotting, wound healing, and oncogenic transformation. The functional complexity is paralleled by structural diversity in that multiple forms of FN are generated by cell type‐specific alternative splicing. In the rat, up to 12 different combinations of the three alternatively spliced segments (EIIIA, EIIIB, and the V region) are produced. What effects do these segments have on FN function? Recently, progress has been made in the identification (...) of specific activities for the three Variants of the V region, V120, V95, and V0. FN‐mediated cell adhesion, FN synthesis and secretion, and incorporation into blood clots are differentially affected by these isoforms. These results suggest that cellular behavior is modulated by environmental cues provided by different types and proportions of alternatively spliced FN variants. (shrink)

Nylig igangsatte FN Post-2015, sin nye utviklingsagenda. Sentralt er en global kamp for bedret helse, hvor det å leve et menneskeverdig liv står i sentrum. Imidlertid er forståelsen av selve helsebegrepet omstridt. Noen mener at det bør knyttes an til jus og menneskerettigheter, mens andre foreslår etikk og menneskeverd. Dette hviler i sin tur på motstridende menneskesyn i den globale helseetiske diskursen, nemlig mennesket som enten autonomt eller avhengig. I artikkelen analyserer jeg denne debatten ut fra det jeg hevder er (...) Martha Nussbaums globale helseetikk, som baseres på hennes kapabilitetstilnærming så vel som begrep om ‘helse som livskvalitet’. Min konklusjon er at Nussbaums normative begrunnelse for Post-2015 ut fra et kroppslig forankret menneskeverd er det mest overbevisende av de to konkurrerende svarene.Nøkkelord: global helseetikk, Martha Nussbaum, menneskeverd, menneskerettigheter, post-2015English summary: Living a dignified life - Martha Nussbaum's global health ethicsThe UN recently launched Post-2015, which is its new development agenda. Central here is the global struggle for improved health, in which what it takes to live a dignified life is stressed. However, the understanding of the notion of health is disputed. Some believe that it should be linked to law and the human rights, while others suggest ethics and human dignity. Which in turn rests on conflicting stands in the global health ethical discourse regards to the view of humanity, namely either as autonomous or dependent. In the paper I analyse this discourse, in which my point of departure is Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as well as her concept of health as life quality. This I read exactly as a global health ethics. Thus, I conclude that between the two competing answers, Nussbaum’s normative justification for Post-2015 on the basis of bodily grounded human dignity is the most convincing.Keywords: global health ethics, Martha Nussbaum, human dignity, human rights, Post-2015. (shrink)

These lectures [FN#1: Delivered at the 32nd Anniversary of the Theosophical Society held at Benares, on Dec. 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th, 1907.] are intended to give an outline of Yoga, in order to prepare the student to take up, for practical purposes, the Yoga sutras of Patanjali, the chief treatise on Yoga. I have on hand, with my friend Bhagavan Das as collaborateur, a translation of these Sutras, with Vyasa's commentary, and a further commentary and elucidation written in the (...) light of Theosophy.[FN#2: These have never been finished or printed.] To prepare the student for the mastering of that more difficult task, these lectures were designed; hence the many references to Patanjali. They may, however, also serve to give to the ordinary lay reader some idea of the Science of sciences, and perhaps to allure a few towards its study. Annie Besant. (shrink)

Suppose that fn is a sequence of nonnegative functions with compact support on a locally compact metric space, that T is a nonnegative linear functional, and that equation imageT fn < T f0. A result of Bishop, foundational to a constructive theory of functional analysis, asserts the existence of a point x such that equation imagefn < f0. This paper extends this result to arbitrary Hausdorff spaces, and gives short proofs using nonstandard analysis. While such arguments used are not themselves (...) constructive, they can illuminate where the difficulty lies in finding the point x. An algorithm for constructing x is then given, with a nonstandard proof that the algorithm converges to a correct value. (shrink)

A core question of contemporary social morality concerns how we ought to handle racial categorization. By this we mean, for instance, classifying or thinking of a person as Black, Korean, Latino, White, etc.² While it is widely FN:2 agreed that racial categorization played a crucial role in past racial oppression, there remains disagreement among philosophers and social theorists about the ideal role for racial categorization in future endeavors. At one extreme of this disagreement are short-term eliminativists who want to do (...) away with racial categorization relatively quickly (e.g. Appiah, 1995; D’Souza, 1996; Muir, 1993; Wasserstrom, 2001/1980; Webster, 1992; Zack, 1993, 2002), typically because they view it as mistaken and oppressive. At the opposite end of the spectrum, long-term conservationists hold that racial identities and communities are beneficial, and that racial categorization —suitably reformed —is essential to fostering them (e.g. Outlaw, 1990, 1995, 1996). While extreme forms of conservationism have fewer proponents in academia than the most radical eliminativist positions, many theorists advocate more moderate positions. In between the two poles, there are many who believe that racial categorization is valuable (and perhaps necessary) given the continued existence of racial inequality and the lingering effects of past racism (e.g. Haslanger, 2000; Mills, 1998; Root, 2000; Shelby, 2002, 2005; Sundstrom, 2002; Taylor, 2004; Young, 1989). Such authors agree on the short-term need for racial categorization in at least some domains, but they often differ with regard to its long-term value. (shrink)

Relying on a range of now-familiar thought-experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. (Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state-consciousness, which contrasts with creature-consciousness, or perceptual-consciousness. The different forms of state-consciousness include various kinds of access-consciousness, both first-order and higher-order--see Rosenthal, 1986; Block, 1995; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000. Phenomenal consciousness is the property that mental states have when it is like something to possess them, or when they have subjectively-accessible feels; (...) or as some would say, when they have qualia (see fn.1 below).) Others have thought that we can undermine the credibility of those thought-experiments by allowing that we possess purely recognitional concepts for the properties of our conscious mental states. This paper is concerned to explain, and then to meet, the challenge of showing how purely recognitional concepts are possible if there are no such things as qualia--in the strong sense of intrinsic (non-relational, non-intentional) properties of experience. It argues that an appeal to higher-order experiences is necessary to meet this challenge, and then deploys a novel form of higher-order thought theory to explain how such experiences are generated. (shrink)

Relying on a range of now‐familiar thought‐experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. (Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state‐consciousness, which contrasts with creature‐consciousness, or perceptual ‐consciousness. The different forms of state‐consciousness include various kinds of access‐consciousness, both first‐order and higher‐order–see Rosenthal, 1986; Block, 1995; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000. Phenomenal consciousness is the property that mental states have when it is like something to possess them, or when they have subjectively‐accessible (...) feels; or as some would say, when they have qualia (see fn. l below).) Others have thought that we can undermine the credibility of those thought‐experiments by allowing that we possess purely recognitional concepts for the properties of our conscious mental states. This paper is concerned to explain, and then to meet, the challenge of showing how purely recognitional concepts are possible if there are no such things as qualia–in the strong sense of intrinsic (non relational, non‐intentional) properties of experience. It argues that an appeal to higher‐order experiences is necessary to meet this challenge, and then deploys a novel form of higher‐order thought theory to explain how such experiences are generated. (shrink)

This volume is presented in honour of Heinz Post, who founded a distinc tive and distinguished school of philosophy of science at Chelsea College, University of London. The 'Chelsea tradition' in philosophy of science takes the content of science seriously, as exemplified by the papers presented here. The unifying theme of this work is that of 'Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics', after the title of a classic and seminal paper by Heinz Post, published in 1971, which is reproduced in this volume (...) with the kind permission of the editors and publishers of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Described by Paul Feyerabend in Against Method as "brilliant" and " . . . a partial antidote against the view which I try to defend" (1975, p. 61, fn. 17), this paper, peppered with illustrative examples from the history of science, brings to the fore some of Heinz Post's central concerns: the heuristic criteria used by scientists in constructing their theories, the intertheoretic relationships which these criteria reflect and, in particular, the nature of the correspondence that holds between a theory and its predecessors (and its suc cessors). The appearance of this volume more than twenty years later is an indica tion of the fruitfulness of Post's contribution: philosophers of science continue to explore the issues raised in his 1971 paper. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the reconstruction of the implicit logic of Plato’s Par-menides. The reconstructed logic, F, makes it possible to form a new semi-intuitionistic system of logic of predicates, FN. The axioms of Peano Arithmetic (PA) and an axiom of infinity follow from FN. Therefore, FN can be seen as a new attempt at the realization of Frege’s logicist program. Some very strong systems can be seen as other variants of FN, e.g. Leśniewski’s ontology. The hypothesis from Parmenides (...) II contains proof of the existence of the two highest principles, i.e. the One and the Dyad, their mutual relationship, their relations to other things, and the reasoning regarding the mutual relationship follows some exact formal rules. Six types of Plato’s negation of a predicate are defined. The system is a first-order logic with non-classical negation of a predicate (local negation) that is non-definable by classical sentential negation. Therefore, the implicit logic of Plato’s Parmenides differs from classical syllogistics (formed in the Łukasiewicz’s style) as well as from the classical predicate calculus. (shrink)

This paper has aimed to remedy a neglect of multi-party disputes by addressing how those involved in a two-party argument may collaborate with others who are co-present. Collaboration is a complex phenomenon. In the first place, we have seen that disputes, although initially produced by two parties, do not consist simply of two sides. Rather, given one party's displayed position, stance, or claim, another party can produce opposition by simply aligning against that position or by aligning with a counterposition. This (...) means that parties can dispute a particular position for different reasons and by different means. It is therefore possible for several parties to serially oppose another's claim without achieving collaboration. A second complexity, then, is just that collaboration is a negotiated phenomenon. For example, while it is possible for an outside party to produce an uninvited alignment display that is sympathetic to an already-stated position in a two-party dispute, the party whose position it supports can agree or disagree with that display. Thus, outsiders' uninvited alignment displays that occur subsequent to those of the insiders or principals in a two-party dispute must be considered as collaboration offers, which can be accepted or rejected. But that is not the end of it, for an outside party can offer alignments that now align with a principal party's position and then, addressing a different aspect of the principal's talk, align against it. Finally, in addition to being offered, collaboration can also be solicited. A principal in a two-party dispute solicits collaboration by inviting an outsider to display an alignment favorable to inviter's own position or to participate in a joint activity that supports that stance. Such solicits can be accepted, rejected, or, again, handled in such a way as to exhibit neutrality. Argumentative collaboration, in short, is a specific, momentary, and delicate state of affairs that is also an organized, technical achievement.The fact that the subjects for this study were children has become submerged in the formal analysis of alignment structures and collaboration. Thus, following this research, two directions can be pursued. One would be to ask how children's arguments differ from those occurring among adults. A reasoned answer would be that matters of substance or content may distinguish disputes among youthful persons from those occurring among older ones, while the forms of disputing remain relatively invariant (Maynard, 1985a, 1985b). In other words, by studying multi-party disputes among first-grade children, we learn about the structure of collaboration as a generic phenomenon among at least practitioners of standard English no matter what their age. This claim can be sustained in part because the analysis presented here depends upon deriving a priori conventional relations between utterances, rather than statistical relations between variables (Coulter, 1983). We have not examined exogenous influences — which would include the age characteristics of participants — on disputes, but rather the endogenously-produced structure of argumentative discourse. Still, the claim that patterns of collaboration are generic to children and adults can be examined with further research on multi-party disputes among different age groups.Another, more radical, research orientation, would be to consider, in any social arena where the members are identified as children, how it is that such a ‘membership category’ (Sacks, 1972) is relevant. If that query is made, then research on ‘children's arguments’ would involve investigating formal practices for exhibiting the accountable category ‘children’ as much as it would mean describing the ways that disputing is done. Those who have studied children's arguments, in Pollner's (1979) terms, have treated ‘children’ as a social fact, a ‘thing,’ rather than as a socially organized meaning, or ‘ing.’To attend to the -ing of things involves a radical modification of the attitude of daily life, for it requires attending to the processes of constitution in lieu of the product thus constituted (Pollner, 1979: 253, fn. 11).In short, we have treated arguments as the important event without also seeing how it is that the category ‘children’ is constituted as a recognizable feature of and within the research setting. (shrink)

In The Future of Human Nature, Jürgen Habermas raises the question of whether the embryonic genetic diagnosis and genetic modification threatens the foundations of the species ethics that underlies current understandings of morality. While morality, in the normative sense, is based on moral interactions enabling communicative action, justification, and reciprocal respect, the reification involved in the new technologies may preclude individuals to uphold a sense of the undisposability of human life and the inviolability of human beings that is necessary for (...) their own identity as well as for reciprocal relations. Engaging with liberal bioethics and Catholic approaches to bioethics, the article clarifies how Habermas’ position offers a radical critique of liberal autonomy while maintaining its postmetaphysical stance. The essay argues that Habermas’ approach may guide the question of rights of future generations regarding germline gene editing. But it calls for a different turn in the conversation between philosophy and theology, namely one that emphasizes the necessary attention to rights violations and injustices as a common, postmetaphysical starting point for critical theory and critical theology alike. In 2001, Jürgen Habermas published a short book on questions of biomedicine that took many by surprise.[1] To some of his students, the turn to a substantive position invoking the need to comment on a species ethics rather than outlining a public moral framework was seen as the departure from the “path of deontological virtue,”[2] and at the same time a departure from postmetaphysical reason. Habermas’ motivation to address the developments in biomedicine had certainly been sparked by the intense debate in Germany, the European Union, and internationally on human cloning, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, embryonic stem cell research, and human enhancement. He turned to a strand of critical theory that had been pushed to the background by the younger Frankfurt School in favor of cultural theory and social critique, even though it had been an important element of its initial working programs. The relationship of instrumental reason and critical theory, examined, among others, by Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse and taken up in Habermas’ own Knowledge and Interest and Theory of Communicative Action became ever-more actual with the development of the life sciences, human genome analysis, and genetic engineering of human offspring. Today, some of the fictional scenarios discussed at the end of the last century as “science fiction” have become reality: in 2018, the first “germline gene-edited” children were born in China.[3] Furthermore, the UK’s permission to create so-called “three-parent” children may create a legal and political pathway to hereditary germline interventions summarized under the name of “gene editing.”In this article, I want to explore Habermas’ “substantial” argument in the hope that philosophy and theology become allies in their struggle against an ever-more reifying lifeworld, which may create a “moral void” that would, at least from today’s perspective, be “unbearable”, and for upholding the conditions of human dignity, freedom, and justice. I will contextualize Habermas’ concerns in the broader discourse of bioethics, because only by doing this, his concerns are rescued from some misinterpretations.[1] Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature.[2] Ibid., 125, fn. 58. 8[3] Up to the present, no scientific publication of the exact procedure exists, but it is known that the scientist, Jiankui He, circumvented the existing national regulatory framework and may have misled the prospective parents about existing alternatives and the unprecedented nature of his conduct. Yuanwu Ma, Lianfeng Zhang, and Chuan Qin, "The First Genetically Gene‐Edited Babies: It's “Irresponsible and Too Early”," Animal Models and Experimental Medicine ; Matthias Braun, Meacham, Darian, "The Trust Game: Crispr for Human Germline Editing Unsettles Scientists and Society," EMBO reports 20, no. 2. (shrink)

This article is an explication and defense of Kant’s view that ‘imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself’ (Critique of Pure Reason, A120, fn.). Imagination comes into perception at a far more basic level than Strawson allows, and it is required for the constitution of intuitions (= sense experiences) out of sense impressions. It also plays an important part in explaining how it is possible for intuitions to have intentional contents. These functions do not involve the application of contents, (...) and I offer a schematic account of how they arise from preconceptual synthesis. (shrink)

Carl Gillett Department of Philosophy Northern Illinois University Suppose that scientists discover a high level property G that is prima facie multiply realized by two sets of lower level properties, F1, F2, …, Fn, and F*1, F*2, …, F*m. One response would be to take this situation at face value and conclude that G is in fact so multiply realized. A second response, however, would be to eliminate the property G and instead hypothesize subtypes of G, G1 and G2, and (...) say that G1 is uniquely realized by F1, F2, …, Fn, and that G2 is uniquely realized by F*1, F*2, …, F*m. This second response would eliminate a multiply realized property in favor of two uniquely realized properties.[1] Clearly these are two logically possible responses to this type of situation, so when faced with it how do scientists respond in real cases? This is a matter of providing a descriptively adequate account of actual scientific practice. In support of the view that scientists opt for the “eliminate-and-split” strategy, one might propose that it is illustrated by the way scientists responded in the case of memory. Once upon a time, it was thought that there existed a single kind of memory. With the advance of science, however, it was discovered that it is possible to perform certain sorts of brain lesions that would lead to the selective loss of certain memory functions, while certain other sorts of brain lesions would lead to selective loss of certain other memory functions. These neurobiological dissociation experiments, one might say, support the view that, instead of a single overarching type of memory, there are distinct subtypes of memory, procedural memory and declarative memory. Thus, generalizing from this example, it might be suggested that the eliminate-and-split strategy is always the approach of scientists in such cases. We believe that this argument is based upon serious oversimplifications. To begin with, note that there is the assumption that scientists treat all discoveries about differences in realizers in the same way.. (shrink)

A varietyV satisfies a strong Malcev condition ∃f1,…, ∃fnθ where θ is a conjunction of equations in the function variablesf1, …,fnand the individual variablesx1, …,xm, if there are polynomial symbolsp1, …,pnin the language ofVsuch that ∀x1, …,xmθ is a law ofV. Thus a strong Malcev condition involves restricted second order quantification of a strange sort. The quantification is restricted to functions which are “polynomially definable”. This notion was introduced by Malcev [6] who used it to describe those varieties all of (...) whose members have permutable congruence relations. The general formal definition of Malcev conditions is due to Grätzer [1]. Since then and especially since Jónsson's [3] characterization of varieties with distributive congruences there has been extensive study of strong Malcev conditions and the related concepts: Malcev conditions and weak Malcev conditions.In [9], Taylor gives necessary and sufficient semantic conditions for a class of varieties to be defined by a Malcev condition. A key to the proof is the translation of the restricted second order concepts into first order concepts in a certain many sorted language. In this paper we show that, given this translation, Taylor's theorem is an easy consequence of a result of Tarski [8] and the standard preservation theorems of first order logic. (shrink)

The population of Campobasso Province shows a level of inbreeding that is distinct from most Italian rural populations, regardless of their geographic location (Fr=0·0040; Fn=0·0102; Ft=0·0142). The genetic structure of the ItalianGreeks of Reggio Calabria Province is similar to other Italians of Campobasso Province (Fr=0·0041; Fn=0·0127; Ft=0·0168). The Italian–Greeks of Lecce Province show random mating, and their inbreeding is in fact very low (Fr=0·0038; Fn=0·0024; Ft=0·0062).

We investigate computability theoretic and topological properties of spaces of orders on computable orderable groups. A left order on a group G is a linear order of the domain of G, which is left-invariant under the group operation. Right orders and bi-orders are defined similarly. In particular, we study groups for which the spaces of left orders are homeomorphic to the Cantor set, and their Turing degree spectra contain certain upper cones of degrees. Our approach unifies and extends Sikora’s [28] (...) investigation of orders on groups in topology and Solomon’s [31] investigation of these orders in computable algebra. Furthermore, we establish that a computable free group Fn of rank n>1 has a bi-order in every Turing degree. (shrink)

A survey of consanguineous marriages in Japan was conducted on 1 September 1983, by questionnaires. The total number of couples surveyed was 9225. They were chosen from six widely different areas and the inbreeding coefficients from isonymy and pedigrees were estimated for each area. Random inbreeding remained constant with the marriage year whereas total (F) and non-random (Fn) inbreeding from isonymy and inbreeding from pedigrees ([alpha]) decreased with the marriage year in each area. Estimates of genetic microdifferentiation from surnames were (...) obtained; estimates of the reduced variance indicated low microdifferentiation (0·000014-0·000081) in five areas and a higher value in Fukue City (0·0004). The ratio of FST (the average within-group apriori kinship) to [alpha]-value ranged from 0·42 in Kawanishi City to 3·9 in Minobu-Cho. (shrink)

Krynicki, M. and M. Mostowski, Decidability problems in languages with Henkin quantifiers, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 58 149–172.We consider the language L with all Henkin quantifiers Hn defined as follows: Hnx1…xny1…yn φ iff f1…fnx1. ..xn φ, ...,fn). We show that the theory of equality in L is undecidable. The proof of this result goes by interpretation of the word problem for semigroups.Henkin quantifiers are strictly related to the function quantifiers Fn defined as follows: Fnx1…xny1…yn φ iff fx1…xn φ,...,f). (...) In contrast with the first result we show that the theory of equality with all quantifiers Fn is decidable.We also consider decidability problems for other theories in languages L and L. (shrink)

Are corporations morally defensible sorts of entities? How might we go about showing that they are? Thomas Donaldson offers us the most detailed contractarian justification for the moral defensibility of corporations. In this paper I show how we can significantly develop this sort of justification to yield a more compelling contractarian justification, though one that is importantly conditional. The primary points I take up in this paper are these:1. The question Donaldson poses to generate his contract is not quite as (...) simple as may appear. The sort of transformation we need to consider is more complex than the sort Donaldson describes.2. Partly because of considerations that arise in discussing the first point, the contract we are considering is a more conditionalagreement. The terms of the agreement will vary depending on the kind of state we are assuming prevails. The sort of contract we wantto draw up is at least a three-way contract: between society, productive organizations and the state. The sort of agreement we reach will have the following form: society a agrees to allow productive organizations of type b to exist if we assume state c will do various things (d1 to dn), productive organizations will do various things (e1 to en) and members of society will do various things (f1 to fn). Importantly, if state c is not doing d1 to dn, productive organizations may not be morally defensible.3. The terms of the contract that can be derived would benefit from the introduction of some of Rawls’s apparatus.4. When we consider the right questions, with more of the background institutions filled in, and when we include some more social contract apparatus, we get a better contract which fills in for us not only the obligations of business but, importantly, many obligationsfor government as well. (shrink)

In this paper we consider classes of finite structures where we have good control over the sizes of the definable sets. The motivating example is the class of finite fields: it was shown in [1] that for any formulain the language of rings, there are finitely many pairs (d,μ) ∈ω×Q>0so that in any finite fieldFand for any ā ∈Fmthe size |ø(Fn,ā)| is “approximately”μ|F|d. Essentially this is a generalisation of the classical Lang-Weil estimates from the category of varieties to that of (...) the first-order-definable sets. (shrink)

„Descartes, der größte Demokrat“ (Tocqueville 2010, 700, FN e). Auch wenn dieser Satz nicht den Weg in die Endfassung des zweiten Bandes der Démocratie gefunden hat, so fasst er doch wahrscheinlich besser als jeder andere (und es gibt deren so gut wie keine) Tocquevilles Ansichten über seinen Landsmann René Descartes und dessen Philosophie zusammen. Das erste Kapitel, in dem „die philosophische Methode der Amerikaner“ vorgestellt wird, zeigt, wieso die Philosophie Descartes’ – mit der sich Tocqueville vermutlich 1834, zusammen mit seinem (...) Freund Kergorlay, eingehender befasst hatte (OC XIII, 1, 384–389) – einen derart großen Erfolg in Amerika hat, obwohl die allerwenigsten Amerikaner Descartes kennen, geschweige denn seine Werke, allen voran den berühmten Discours de la méthode, gelesen haben. (shrink)

George Boolos has argued that the iterative conception of set justifies most, but not all, the ZFC axioms, and that a second conception of set, the Frege-von Neumann conception (FN), justifies the remaining axioms. This article challenges Boolos's claim that FN does better than the iterative conception at justifying the axioms in question.

In this article, we investigate the political theology of populism and look at the case of the Front National. Considering the writings of Carl Schmitt and Ernesto Laclau, we trace the logical core of Schmitt’s political theology and show how it is integrated into theories of the political and Laclau’s theory of populism. We argue that the theologico-political core of populism is the simultaneous disavowal and imposition of mediation and that this stance leads to an increasing formalism. Looking at the (...) discourse of the FN on the notion of laïcité, we find that this theologico-political structure explains how the party is able to link traditionally left- and right-wing motives in its discourse. Finally, we show how in FN’s discourse, the formalist tendency of populism, which Laclau has theoretically explicated, has become overt and must be understood as part of politics, not as a universal and tran-historical logic of the political. This suggests, we argue pace Laclau, that we ought to consider both t... (shrink)

By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35). These, he argues, are the laws that properly direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability to make empirical judgments about particular (...) works of art. These presuppositions are sensible rather than intellectual because on Kant’s view, all intellection that considers objects of any kind, whether abstract or concrete, must at base connect to actual, material objects with which we come into direct contact; and this we can do only through sensibility (A 19/B 33). Thus the following discussion explores what Kant claims must be true of us in order to make the sorts of aesthetic judgments we make, rather than any particular class or quality of aesthetic judgments itself. On Kant’s view, what must be true of us in order to make aesthetic judgments is not different from what must be true of us in order to make any other kind of judgment about empirical objects. (shrink)

In a number of publications A.N. Prior considered the use of what he called ‘metric tense logic’. This is a tense logic in which the past and future operators P and F have an index representing a temporal distance, so that Pnα means that α was true n -much ago, and Fn α means that α will be true n -much hence. The paper investigates the use of metric predicate tense logic in formalising phenomena ormally treated by such devices as (...) multiple indexing or quantification over times. (shrink)

We can imagine a human operator playing a game of one-upmanship against a programmed computer. If the program is Fn, the human operator can print the theorem Gn, which the programmed computer, or, if you prefer, the program, would never print, if it is consistent. This is true for each whole number n, but the victory is a hollow one since a second computer, loaded with program C, could put the human operator out of a job.... It is useless for (...) the `mentalist' to argue that any given program can always be improves since the process for improving programs can presumably be programmed also; certainly this can be done if the mentalist describes how the improvement is to be made. If he does give such a description, then he has not made a case. (shrink)

In a recent article for this journal, Morten Magelssen argues that the right to conscientious objection in healthcare is grounded in the moral integrity of healthcare professionals, a good for both professionals and society. In this paper, I argue that there is no right to conscientious objection in healthcare, at least as Magelssen conceives of it. Magelssen’s conception of the right to conscientious objection is too expansive in nature. Although I will assume that there is a right to conscientious objection, (...) it does not extend to objections that are purely religious in nature.[i][1] Thus, this right is considerably more restricted than Magelssen thinks. In making my case, I draw on John Rawls’s later work in arguing for the claim that conscientious objection based on purely religious considerations fails to benefit society in the appropriate way. [1]: #fn-1. (shrink)

Antallet sultne i verden har økt, selv om det kan diskuteres om det i dag er en høyere eller lavere andel som lider under sult enn for seks år siden – før matprisøkningen. Alle er uansett enige om at det samlet sett produseres nok mat i verden til at alle kan få dekket sine ernæringsbehov. Artikkelen viser at to hovedretninger i debatten om matproduksjon står mot hverandre. Den dominerende retningen fokuserer primært på matsikkerhet, forstått som økt matproduksjon og økt handel (...) med mat. Den andre retningen argumenterer for at interessene og rettighetene for de mest sårbare må ha forrang i politiske prioriteringer, og at de sårbare sikres best med en strategi basert på menneskerettigheter. Artikkelen drøfter landfordeling, økt bruk av genteknologi i landbruket og nedbygging av handelshindre for landbruksprodukter. Industrialisering av landbruket og liberalisering av handelen med landbruksvarer kan gi gode resultater på makronivå – på kort sikt. Dersom målet er å fremme situasjonen for de mest sårbare og samtidig møte klimautfordringene er løsningen en nedenfra-tilnærming, som til nå er blitt ignorert av de fleste stater.Nøkkelord: retten til mat, matsikkerhet, klima, Verdens handelsorganisasjon, FNs tusenårsmålEnglish summary: The struggle over food intake and food productionThe number of hungry persons in the world has increased – although it is debatable whether there is currently a higher or lower proportion of suffering from hunger than six years ago – before the food price increases. All agree that the overall production of food in the world is adequate for everyone's nutritional needs. The article demonstrates that there are two main approaches in the debate on food production. The dominant approach focuses primarily on food security, understood as increased food production and increased food trade. The other approach argues that the interests and rights of the most vulnerable must prevail, and that improvements for the vulnerable are best ensured with a strategy based on human rights. The article analyzes land distribution, increased use of genetic technology in agriculture and reduction of trade barriers for agricultural products. Industrialization of agriculture and the liberalization of trade in agricultural products can provide good results at the macro level – in the short term. If the goal is to promote the situation of the most vulnerable and at the same time addressing climate change, the solution is a bottom-up approach, which until now has been ignored by most states. (shrink)

Le Front national, en se revendiquant du populisme, s'inscrit dans une mouvance très répandue en Europe, qui pourrait se caractériser par le refus de la médiation, l'appel au peuple contre les élites. Mais la méfiance envers un personnel politique considéré comme corrompu est, par exemple, aussi fréquente dans l'électorat d'extrême gauche. L'électeur du FN se distingue plutôt par son ethnocentrisme, son rejet des autres. Et populiste n'est pas nécessairement synonyme de « populaire ». La catégorie sociale la plus défavorisée, celle (...) des ouvriers, est plus représentée dans l'électorat du PC ou des Chasseurs que dans celui du FN, qui fait de meilleurs scores chez les artisans, les industriels et les professions libérales. Les milieux populaires se singularisent d'abord par leur abstentionnisme. L'extrême droite est donc à la fois moins «populiste» et moins «populaire» qu'il n'y paraît.The National Front's claim to be populist makes it part of very widespread movement in Europe, which could be characterized by the refusal of mediation, the call to the people against the elite. But mistrust towards a political personnel considered as corrupt is, for example, also widespread in the electorate of extreme left. The voter of the FN is characterized rather by his ethnocentrism, his rejection of the others. And populist is not necessarily synonymous with "popular". The most disadvantaged social category, that of the workmen, is more represented in the electorate of the PC or the Hunters that in the FN, which makes better scores by the craftsmen, the industrialists and the liberal professions. The popular classes are distinguished initially by their abstentionism. The extreme right is thus at the same time less "populist" and less "popular" than it does appear. (shrink)