The experimental method is designed to secure the reliable attribution of causal relationships by means of controlled comparison across conditions. Doing so, however, depends upon the reduction of uncertainties and inconsistencies in the process of comparison; and this poses particularly significant challenges for the behavioral and social sciences because they work with human subjects, whose malleability and complexity often interact in unexpected ways with experimental manipulations, thus resulting in unpredictable behavior. Drawing on the Science and Technology Studies perspective and one (...) of our authors’ experiences in experimental work, this paper examines how experimental social scientists manage to establish objectivity and standardization in the face of vagaries arising from working with human subjects. In identifying experimental researchers’ solutions to this challenge, we draw on methodological discussions among applied social scientists as naturally occurring data, through which we show how some seemingly mundane practices play essential roles in extracting patterns out of otherwise unpredictable behaviors in the lab. Closely examining such strategies, we reveal the inherent instabilities in the experimental method when adopted in the social sciences and discuss their methodological implications. In conclusion, we make tentative suggestions for escaping the kinds of methodological impasses which we have identified. (shrink)

This article aims at achieving a detailed qualitative vision of the chronic disease in the adolescent population and its specific issues. To that end, a first-person experiential research based on significant events regarding healthcare pathways was developed. Six interviews were conducted with three practitioners. The results of this researchallow us to identify spaces of configuration in terms of parenthood, of therapeutic alliances and of negotiating care strategies between teenagers, parents and professionals.Which co-construction spaces should be built with the teenagers in (...) conflict or in rupture or with the suffering parents? Which positions should be adopted by practitioners to avoid or postpone chronicity? (shrink)

In his early experimental work with Suppes, Davidson adopted rationality assumptions, not as necessary constraints on interpretation, but as practical conceits in addressing methodological problems faced by experimenters studying decision making under uncertainty. Although the content of their theory has since been undermined, their methodological approach—a Galilean form of methodological rationalism—lives on in contemporary psychological research. This article draws on Max Weber’s verstehen to articulate an account of Galilean methodological rationalism; explains how anomalies faced by Davidson’s early experimental (...) work gave rise to his later, canonical claims about rationality and interpretation; and reclaims this Galilean framework for use in contemporary psychological research. (shrink)

A new translation by Martin Hammond of Xenophon's Memorabilia and Apology of Socrates, with introduction and notes by Carol Atack, in the Oxford World's Classics series. -/- ISBN: 9780198856092 -/- 'Who would you say knows himself?' -/- In 399 BCE Socrates was tried in Athens on charges of irreligion and corruption of the young, convicted, and sentenced to death. Like Plato, an almost exact contemporary, in his youth Xenophon (c. 430-c. 354 BCE) was one of the circle of (...) mainly upper-class young Athenians attracted to Socrates' teaching. His Memorabilia is both a passionate defence of Socrates against those charges, and a kaleidoscopic picture of the man he knew, painted in a series of mini-dialogues and shorter vignettes, with a varied and deftly characterized cast—entitled and ambitious young men, atheists and hedonists, artists and artisans, Socrates' own stroppy teenage son Lamprocles, the glamorous courtesan Theodote. Topics given Socrates' characteristic questioning treatment include education, law, justice, government, political and military leadership, democracy and tyranny, friendship, care of the body and the soul, and concepts of the divine. Xenophon sees Socrates as above all a supreme moral educator, coaxing and challenging his associates to make themselves better people, not least by the example of how he lived his own life. Self-knowledge, leading to a reasoned self-control, was for Socrates the essential first step on the path to virtue, and some found it uncomfortable. The Apology is a moving account of Socrates' behaviour and bearing in his last days, immediately before, during, and after his trial. (shrink)

Concern has been raised that segregation of girls and boys into separate classes leads to increased gender stereotyping. We tested this in a sample of 365 seventh-grade students attending a junior high school that offers both gender-segregated (GS) and co-educational classes. It was found that for both boys and girls, the more GS classes they took in the fall, the more gender stereotyped they were in their responding in the spring (controlling for initial levels of gender stereotyping). We concluded that (...) GS likely heightens the salience of gender in the classroom thereby reinforcing and increasing gender stereotypes. As such, we argue that GS is a misguided approach to addressing any educational difficulties girls and boys might be having. (shrink)

Objective Cluster randomised trial (CRT) investigators face challenges in seeking informed consent from individual patients (cluster members). This study examined associations between reporting of patient consent in healthcare CRTs and characteristics of these trials. Study design Consent practices and study characteristics were abstracted from a random sample of 160 CRTs performed in primary or hospital care settings that were published from 2000 to 2008. Multivariable logistic regression was used to examine associations between reporting of patient consent and methodological characteristics, as (...) well as publication features such as date and journal of publication. Results 82 (53.8%) of 160 studies reported obtaining informed consent from individual patients. Reporting of patient consent was independently and positively associated with: smaller cluster size, the evaluation of experimental interventions targeted at patients, data collection from individual patients, publication later than 2004 and publication in higher-impact journals. Conclusions Reporting of consent practices in published CRTs should be improved. Consent practices in published CRTs appear to be related to the type of interventions under study, as well as journal impact and trends in research ethics practices. These findings will inform best practices in trial conduct and ethics review, remediation of errors in consent practices and ethics review and the development of regulatory guidance for CRTs. (shrink)

In this paper, I reconstruct Davidson’s explanation of first person authority and criticize it in three main points: (1) The status of the theory is unclear, given that it is phenomenologically inadequate. (2) The theory explains only that part of the phenomenon of first person authority which is due to the fact that no two speakers speak exactly the same idiolect. But first person authority might be a more far-reaching phenomenon than this. (3) Davidson’s argument depends on the (...) claim that “not getting one’s words wrong” is the same as “knowing what one’s words mean”. I argue that the two are not the same. In conclusion, I sketch some alternatives to Davidson’s account. I argue that the most promising one attempts to explain first person authority by examining how we acquire second-order beliefs. A well-known remark of Evans’s proves useful for such an account. (shrink)

Wahrheitstheorien sind ein zentraler Bestandteil von Davidsons semantischem Programm zur Erklärung von Interpretation. Deflationäre Wahrheitskonzeptionen hingegen schreiben dem Wahrheitsprädikat eine minimale explanatorische Funktion zu. Die Frage der Vereinbarkeit dieser beiden Positionen bildet den Kern dieser Untersuchung. Eine Antwort wird durch eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Unvereinbarkeitsargumenten und durch eine systematische Betrachtung der Funktion eines deflationären Wahrheitsprädikats anhand von axiomatischen Wahrheitstheorien gegeben. Letztlich wird dafür argumentiert, dass nichts gegen die fruchtbare Anwendbarkeit einer deflationären Wahrheitstheorie innerhalb von Davidsons semantischem Programm spricht.

Reasons for action is a widely employed methodology in practical philosophy, and especially in moral philosophy. Reasons are facts that explain and justify actions. But, conceptually, if reasons were causes, incontinent actions would be impossible. When an agent ranks an evaluation about what to do as his best judgement, it entails that he has a reason for acting as that judgement prescribes. But when an agent acts incontinently, he acts in accordance to an intention that is not aligned with his (...) best evaluative judgement. Yet, if the agent’s best evaluative judgement provides him a reason for action, this reason should also be his strongest reason, and therefore, the strongest cause. How then can it be possible that an agent incontinently acts according to a reason of inferior causal strength? In this paper, I analyze how Davidson’s argument for the possibility of incontinent actions interacts with his causal theory of actions. I argue that Davidson’s proposal does not fully respect the two principles of intentional rationality, that he himself claims to be compelling. Lastly, I sketch some initial steps that might be helpful to drawing more precise conceptual distinctions in terms of the rationality of incontinent actions. (shrink)

Relationships are central to enacting person‐centred care of the older person with cognitive impairment. A fuller understanding of relationships and the role they play facilitating wellness and preserving personhood is critical if we are to unleash the productive potential of nursing research and person‐centred care. In this article, we target the acute care setting because much of the work about relationships and older people with cognitive impairment has tended to focus on relationships in long‐term care. The acute care setting is (...) characterized by archetypal constraints which differentiate it from long‐term care, in terms of acuity and haste, task‐orientated work patterns and influence from “the rule of medicine,” all of which can privilege particular types of relating. In this article, we drew on existing conceptualizations of relationships from theory and practice by tapping in to the intellectual resources provided by nurse researchers, the philosophy of Martin Buber and ANT scholars. This involved recounting two examples of dyadic and networked relationships which were re‐interpreted using two complementary theoretical approaches to provide deeper and more comprehensive conceptualizations of these relationships. By re‐presenting key tenets from the work of key scholars on the topic relationships, we hope to hasten socialization of these ideas into nursing into the acute care setting. First, by enabling nurses to reflect on how they might work toward cultivating relationships that are more salutogenic and consistent with the preservation of personhood. Second, by stimulating two distinct but related lines of research enquiry which focus on dyadic and networked relationships with the older person with cognitive impairment in the acute care setting. We also hope to reconcile the schism that has emerged in the literature between preferred approaches to care of the older person with cognitive impairment, that is person‐centred care versus relationship‐centred care by arguing that these are complementary rather than mutually exclusive and can be brought together in one theoretical framework acknowledging personhood as relational in essence. (shrink)

In their discussions and criticisms of the idea that language use is essentially a matter of following rules, Davidson and Cavell both invoke as counterexamples instances of intelligible linguistic innovation. Davidson’s favorite examples are malapropisms. Cavell focuses instead on what he calls projections. This paper clarifies some important differences between malapropisms and projections, conceived as paradigmatic forms of linguistic innovation. If malapropisms are treated as exemplary it will be natural to conclude, with Davidson, that a shared practice, (...) be it rule-governed or not, matters only instrumentally – as something that may enhance but is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful communication. By contrast, if Cavellian projections are seen as exemplary, a shared practice will be conceived not only as essential to the possibility of meaningful linguistic innovation, but as already permeated by the sort of creativity of which projections are only particularly striking examples. It is also argued that malapropisms are not particularly convincing as counterexamples to the sort of view Davidson wants to reject. Cavellian projections, on the other hand, are powerful as counterexamples, and reflecting on the nature of their inventiveness is crucial to understanding and seeing the plausibility of Cavell’s own conception of language. (shrink)

We find three related holisms in Davidson's work: the holism that Quine brought to bear against the analytic–synthetic distinction, which arises due to the interdependence of meaning and belief; a holism of belief itself that Quine dubbed the “web of belief,” and a parallel holism of meaning. These holisms are plausible in spite of recent arguments against them. They are also important. As Davidson showed, they supply a much needed justification for Quine's Principle of Charity; and because this (...) is so, holism played a crucial, though little noticed, role in his charity‐based argument against relativism in “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” However, he did not adequately render the relativist's idea of an alternative, and this led him to conflate two quite distinct theses as a single, third dogma of empiricism: the relativist's thesis that languages may be true but not translatable, and the skepticism‐generating thesis that we have only mediated epistemic access to reality. (shrink)

The “ontological turn” is a recent movement within cultural anthropology. Its proponents want to move beyond a representationalist framework, where cultures are treated as systems of belief that provide different perspectives on a single world. Authors who write in this vein move from talk of many cultures to many “worlds,” thus appearing to affirm a form of relativism. We argue that, unlike earlier forms of relativism, the ontological turn in anthropology is not only immune to the arguments of Donald (...) class='Hi'>Davidson’s “The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” but it affirms and develops the antirepresentationalist position of Davidson’s subsequent essays. (shrink)

In this interview for the TCS website, Angelo Martins Jr interviews Professor Julia O’Connell Davidson about her recent book, Modern Slavery: The Margins of Freedom. The interview further discusses some of the most prominent topics examined by O’Connell Davidson’s book, such as her understanding of modern slavery and her critique on how anti-slavery movements, NGOs and right-wing and social democratic media and politicians have mistakenly appropriated and used the term. The interview further considers some of the global contemporary (...) social, political and economic issues, such as ‘the refugee crisis’, border control, citizenship and global socio-economic inequalities. (shrink)

Richard Rorty has argued that Donald Davidson can be classified as a neopragmatist. To this end, Rorty has tried to show that Davidson's views share important similarities with those of Peirce, James, and Dewey. Davidson, for his part, has tended to resist Rorty's attempts to classify his views in this way. Interestingly, the reasons for Rorty's classification and the reasons for Davidson's resistance share a common trait: an appeal to the elimination of the dualism of conceptual (...) scheme and experiential content on the basis of an assumed background of shared beliefs. According to Rorty, Davidson's background of shared beliefs is closely related to the notion of funded experience found in those thinkers often. (shrink)

In 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' Donald Davidson attacks a picture of language which, he says, is prevalent among philosophers and linguists. Davidson's criticism, even if correct, is not radical enough. The common irregularities of everyday language, such as malapropisms, nicknames, and slips of the tongue, not only imply that linguistic meanings are not governed by conventions that are learned in advance of occasions of interpretation, but undermine the very idea that linguistic meaning can be accounted for in (...) terms of systematic meaning-theories. Davidson continues to hold that Tarskian truth-definitions should play a central role in philosophical accounts of language, but if the goal is to describe rather than to improve or otherwise change language, we must give up the aspiration towards theoretical systematicity altogether. In this connection, Davidson's approach is compared with those of Quine and Wittgenstein. It is argued that Davidson's unwillingness to give up the notion that meaning is systematic is best explained in terms of his vacillating between treating meaning-theories as mere representations of the linguistic abilities of a speaker and seeing them as playing a more substantial role in communication. (shrink)

O artigo trata da discussão travada entre Donald Davidson e os defensores do materialismo redutivo em torno da alegada “ineficácia causal” do mental que a doutrina da superveniência implica. Para defender sua posição, a da eficiência causal particular do mental, Davidson lançará mão da distinção entre “relações causais” e “explicações causais” . Sem ela Davidson seria obrigado a aceitar “o princípio da exclusão causal-explanatória” introduzido por Kim e, consequentemente, abandonar o não-reducionismo característico de seu monismo anômalo e (...) da tese da superveniência do mental em relação ao físico. (shrink)

This is the best collection of essays on Rorty’s philosophy that has been published in the last decade. It will be of great interest not only to Rorty specialists but to anyone concerned with the difficulties contemporary analytic philosophy faces in its search for a viable self-understanding. The contributors are Barry Allen, Akeel Bilgrami, Jacques Bouveresse, Robert Brandom, James Conant, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, Jürgen Habermas, John McDowell, Hilary Putnam, Bjørn Ramberg, and Michael Williams. Rorty himself has also written (...) an essay, plus individual and fairly extensive replies to each of his critics. (shrink)

Il n’est pas facile de voir quel est l’objectif de ce livre. Au chapitreI, Rivenc annonce que ce qui l’intéresse est le lien chez Davidson entre le format d’une théorie de la signification pour les langues naturelles et le thème de l’interprétation radicale qui serait à l’œuvre dans tout échange linguistique. En fait, Rivenc ne dit à peu près rien sur ce lien. Son livre consiste plutôt en une suite de critiques disparates du programme de Davidson, qu’il emprunte (...) à différents commentateurs de celui-ci. L’auteur omet de présenter les réponses à ces critiques qu’ont données les sympathisants de l’approche davidsonienne, et n’essaie pas de tirer des leçons plus générales de ces critiques concernant la sémantique des langues naturelles. (shrink)

During the last several years, we have witnessed a reopening of questions concerning National Socialism whose full scope and implications have yet to be determined. The Historikerstreit has provoked new discussions of the problem of the specificity or uniqueness of Auschwitz. While raising general methodological issues about the nature of historical explanation and understanding, the Historikerstreit has also revolved around specific questions concerning the role of moral concepts and memory in assessing National Socialism.1 Disclosures about Paul de Man’s wartime writings (...) and further examination of Martin Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism have led to broader consideration of the relations among philosophy, theory, and politics, and have forced us to rethink the problem of intellectual responsibility with renewed urgency.2 These and related topics were at the center of a major international conference, “Nazism and the Final Solution,” organized by Saul Friedländer last April, which took as its organizing theme the limits of ethical, aesthetic, and historical representation of the Final Solution.3In light of these continuing discussions, we are publishing two remarkable essays written during the early years of National Socialism. To the often-posed challenge, how could one be expected to respond lucidly to Nazism in the early 1930s?, these essays by Robert Musil and Emmanuel Levinas constitute, by the sheer power of their insights, decisive answers. Although significantly different in approach, these essays show not only that one could recognize the reality of National Socialism as it was coming to power, but indicate further that analyses of permanent value could be formulated virtually from the beginning. Musil and Levinas serve to remind us concretely of the capabilities of the human mind and of its responsibilities—capabilities and responsibilities that even the most severe political circumstances need not overwhelm. 1. For documents from and discussion of the Historikstreit, see the special issue of New German Critique 44 .2. On Paul de Man, see Critical Inquiry 14 : 590-652, and Critical Inquiry 15 : 704-44, 764-873. On Martin Heidegger, see Critical Inquiry 15 : 407-88.3. The proceedings of this conference are forthcoming. Arnold I. Davidson, executive editor of Critical Inquiry and associate professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago, is currently Marta Sutton Weeks Fellow at the Stanford Humanities Center. (shrink)

For a group to be an agent, it must be individuated from its environment and other systems. It must, in other words, be an individual. Despite the central importance of individuality for understanding group agency, the concept has been significantly overlooked. I propose to fill this gap in our understanding of group individuality by arguing that agents are autonomous as it is commonly understood in the enactive literature. According to this autonomous individuation account, an autonomous system is one wherein the (...) constituent processes of the system actively produce and sustain that self-same system, which will run down or fail if any of these constituent processes cease. This definition of autonomy provides us with a precise and operational account of the individuality of group agents. I will then compare this account to those of Carol Rovane and Raimo Tuomela to argue that it offers the best explanation of what kinds of groups are group agents. (shrink)

Davidson claims that a creature that has spent its entire life in isolation cannot have thoughts. His two reasons for this claim are that interaction with another creature is required to locate the cause of the creature's responses, and that linguistic communication is necessary to acquire the concept of objective truth, which is itself required in order to have thoughts. I argue that, at best, these two reasons imply that in order to have thoughts a creature must be capable (...) of participating in triangulation, not that it must have already participated in triangulation. I then argue that triangulation doesn't solve the ambiguity problem; that is, it doesn't entail that a being's thoughts and utterances are about distal objects rather than proximal patterns of stimulation. Fortunately, ambiguity, like other forms of indeterminacy, doesn't entail that we cannot have thoughts. /// Davidson afirma que una criatura que ha pasado su vida entera aislada no puede tener pensamientos. Aduce dos razones para esto: que se requiere la interacción con otra criatura para localizar la causa de las respuestas de la criatura, y que la comunicación lingüística es necesaria para adquirir el concepto de verdad objetiva, que a su vez es necesario para tener pensamientos. Argumento que, en el mejor de los casos, estas dos razones implican que para tener pensamientos una criatura debe ser capaz de participar en una triangulacion, no que ya debe haber participado en ella. Arguyo, además, que la triangulación no resuelve el problema de la ambigüedad, esto es, no implica que lo que un ser piensa y dice sea acerca de objetos distantes, más que de patrones de estimulacion próximos. Por fortuna, la ambigiiedad, como otras formas de indeterminación, no implica que no podamos tener pensamientos. (shrink)

According to Larry Hickman, John Dewey’s general philosophical project of analyzing and critiquing human experience may be understood in terms of technological inquiry (Hickman 1990, 1). Following this, I contend that technology provides a model for Dewey’s analysis of language and meaning, and this analysis suggests a treatment of linguistic metaphor as a way of meeting new demands of experience with old tools of a known and understood language. An account of metaphor consistent with Dewey’s views on language and meaning (...) avoids a strict dualism of literal meaning and metaphorical meaning as well as the explanatory shortcomings of a nondualistic theory like that found in Donald Davidson’s well-known paper ”What Metaphors Mean” (1978).2 A Deweyan explanation of. (shrink)

Donald Davidson holds that intentional concepts are not reducible to physical or dispositional ones. This is due, he claims, to the constitutive role of normativity in the principles that govern the application of intentional concepts. According to Davidson, the specific way in which norms of rationality and coherence are mobilised by our interpretative principles sets mental concepts off from those of the natural sciences. I agree with Davidson on the irreducibility of the mental. However, I show that (...) irreducibility is due not to the normative character of intentional concepts, but to holism and the flexibility of interpretative principles. I then consider three arguments that Davidson has put forth to support the irreducibility of intentional properties on the basis of their normative character, and show that none of them goes through. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Meaning and Communication: Semantics and Pragmatics Meaning, Science, and Philosophy: Semantics and Metasemantics Semantics as a Philosophical Project Approaches to Questions in Philosophy of Language Two Programs in Philosophy of Language: Davidson and Grice The Problem of Meaning without Use.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction: Questions of Meaning Theories of Meaning Language, Mind and Metaphysics: Questions of Priority Semantic Theories: Davidson's Programme Analysing the Concept of Meaning: Grice's Programme Pragmatics: Conversational Implicature and Relevance Theory.

With a few notable exceptions formal semantics, as it originated from the seminal work of Richard Montague, Donald Davidson, Max Cresswell, David Lewis and others, in the late sixties and early seventies of the previous century, does not consider Wittgenstein as one of its ancestors. That honour is bestowed on Frege, Tarski, Carnap. And so it has been in later developments. Most introductions to the subject will refer to Frege and Tarski (Carnap less frequently) —in addition to the pioneers (...) just mentioned, of course— , and discuss the main elements of their work that helped shape formal semantics in some detail. But Wittgenstein is conspicuously absent whenever the history of the subject is mentioned (usually briefly, if at all). Of course, if one thinks of Wittgenstein’s later work, this is obvious: nothing, it seems, could be more antithetic to what formal semantics aims for and to how it pursues those aims than the views on meaning and language that Wittgenstein expounds in, e.g., Philosophical Investigations, with its insistence on particularity and diversity, and its rejection of explanation and formal modelling. But what about his earlier work, the Tractatus (henceforth )? At first sight, that seems much more congenial, as it develops a conception of language and meaning that is both general and uniform, explanatory.. (shrink)

Donald Davidson holds that intentional concepts are not reducible to physical or dispositional ones. This is due, he claims, to the constitutive role of normativity in the principles that govern the application of intentional concepts. According to Davidson, the specific way in which norms of rationality and coherence are mobilised by our interpretative principles sets mental concepts off from those of the natural sciences. I agree with Davidson on the irreducibility of the mental. However, I show that (...) irreducibility is due not to the normative character of intentional concepts, but to holism and the flexibility of interpretative principles. I then consider three arguments that Davidson has put forth to support the irreducibility of intentional properties on the basis of their normative character, and show that none of them goes through. (shrink)