How can we ever judge about the truth of a scientific theory? Ostensibly it seems to be no problems concerning such a judgement. Each scientific theory is expressed by a set of statements, formulated in a definite language; and we know, in principle, to ascertain whether a sentence is true or false, If we take any formula, say in the first order predicate calculus, no matter how complex, and if we know its interpretation, i.e. the appropriate finite domain of individuals, (...) functions, and truth values of the atoms entering the formula, then we immediately come to know whether our formula is true or false. It is admitted by analogy, that if we come to know the truth values of the basic theory statements, then we can judge if a given theory is true or false. It can be shown, however, that there exists no similar reliable prescription [1]. Let me comment on this in some more detail. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Building upon the "preliminary conception of Phenomenology" introduced by Heidegger in Section II of the Introduction to Sein und Zeit,1 one ...

Bioethical Dilemmas through Patristic Thought Content Type Journal Article Pages 32-37 Authors Archimandrite Makarios Griniezakis, St. George Monastery of Epanosifis, Heraklion, Crete, Greece Journal Human Reproduction & Genetic Ethics Online ISSN 2043-0469 Print ISSN 1028-7825 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 2 / 2002.

This is an anthology. Each contributor discusses an aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy considered still relevant in the context of current philosophy.

Aim of the article is to present our research dealing with virtual reality modeling and education activities. It involves a chain of development steps: taking pictures of objects, collecting information, creation of 3D models and panoramas, setting up the interactive virtual reality environment along with educational support and testing the user experience with students. Methodology/methods of work: the creation of 3D models and panoramas is done by taking pictures of real objects and using them as textures. The education materials are (...) created as interactive presentations and the usability testing of these presentations should be planned. Scientific goal is to measure the quality of interaction by this education support in order to derive rules testing effectiveness of support, interactive applications and presentations. Findings: 3D models and other educational support materials may be created voluntarily by teachers. The open source library for many different models should be created by whole community provided suitable interfaces of modeling tools will be arranged. Conclusions: Complex educational and interactive materials including virtual reality and panoramas are satisfactory when combined with easy 3D models that are made from taken pictures, which could be made by teachers themselves and/or open communities by existing cameras. (shrink)

In this paper we try to give some further evidence concerning the chronology of Palamas’ treatise Contra Beccum. Taking into consideration different parameters, external and internal, we incline to think that this treatise was composed – or, at least, reworked – in 1355, approximately at the same period when Palamas published the second edition of his Logoi apodeiktikoi.

This a special issue collecting papers on the philosophy of logic, written by some young Romanian philosophers, on a variety of topics like the grammar of first-order logic and the axiomatization of evolutionary biology.

Utilizes Heidegger in rethinking common environmental paradigms.

Abstract. The strong similarity between the use of ostension and that of a simple demonstrative to predicate something of an object seems to conflict with equally strong intuitions according to which, while “this” does usually refer to an object, the gesture of holding an object in your hand and showing it to an audience does not refer to the demonstrated object. This paper argues that the problem is authentic and provides a solution to it. In doing so, a more general (...) thought is given support by the approach used. Namely, the thought that our abilities to directly refer to things require some basic referential abilities exhibited in ostension and the use of demonstratives which, in their turn, rest upon our abilities to cooperate in performing non-communicative actions on our environment. Several concepts introduced in order to solve the initial problem can be used to articulate this thought in more detail. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to suggest a new outlook concerning the nature of Zeno’s paradoxes. The attention is directed towards the three famous paradoxes known as “Dichotomy,” “Achilles and the Tortoise,” and “The Arrow.” An analysis of the paradigmatic proposals for a solution shows that an adequate solution has not yet been reached. An answer is provided instead to the question “How Zeno’s paradoxes emerge in their quality of aporiae?,” that is to say in their quality of impasses, (...) of problem situations without an exit, what is the original meaning of the Greek word “aporia.” It is my claim that this is the correct rational approach for solving these conceptual puzzles. In other words, I am not proposing formal solutions by criticizing and/or altering their premises assuming the continuous or discrete nature of space and time, but I try to draw the philosophical attention to the way we possess the phenomenon of motion as a result of the perception of space-time in human experience. (shrink)

My aims here are, firstly, to suggest a minor amendment to R. I. G. Hughes’ DDI account of modeling, so that it could be viewed as a plausible epistemological “model” of how scientific models represent and secondly, to distinguish between two epistemological kinds of models that I call “descriptive” and “constitutive”. This aim is achieved by criticizing Michael Weisberg’s distinction between models and abstract direct representations and by following, at the same time, his own methodological approach for such a distinction.

The aim of this paper is to suggest a new interpretation to the Gettier problem by showing that the standard JTB definition of knowledge is not epistemologically incomplete, being at the same time formally incomplete. The Gettier problem is shown to emerge through the implicit self-application of the JTB definition of knowledge to prove its own incompleteness. A conclusion is drawn, which runs counter to the traditional view that the problem necessarily requires a conceptual amendment of the standard defi nition, (...) in spite of the formal incompleteness of the latter. The Gettier problem is construed to be related to the ancient Meno problem within a contemporary justifi cational discourse. (shrink)