Between 1983 and 1990, at least 163 Western drugs were tested in the GDR. On the basis of archival documentation, relevant literature, and interviews we examined the clinical trials of five drugs more thoroughly; two of these individual case studies are introduced in this article. In the case of the clinical trials of the synthetic human growth hormone Saizen we found extensive trial and patient documentation, which allows for a detailed analysis of ethical aspects such as parent information and informed (...) patient consent. In the case of the clinical trials of the „abortion pill“ Mifepristone for the World Health Organization we uncovered irregularities with regard to the ethical evaluation. However, taken together, we could not find any serious violation of ethical norms in connection with our cases studies. (shrink)

Die Gedenkschrift zu Ehren von Elisabeth und Werner Leinfellner spannt einen Bogen von aktuellen philosophischen Diskursen zum Werk und Leben des 2010 verstorbenen Wissenschaftler-Ehepaares. Fur viele sind beide untrennbar mit der Osterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft (OLWG) und dem Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposien in Kirchberg am Wechsel verbunden. Die Artikel in diesem Band befassen sich mit aktueller Wittgensteinforschung und der Sprachkritik (Mauthner und Wittgenstein) ebenso wie dem Wirken von Elisabeth und Werner Leinfellner. Daruber hinaus geben sie Einblicke in das Werden (...) der OLWG und das osterreichische Geistesleben in der zweiten Halfte des 20. Jhdts. Mitarbeiter des Buches: Marco Bastianelli, Christian Erbacher, Johann Gotschl, Peter Kampits, Christian Kanzian, Peter Keicher, Eckehart Kohler, Camilla R. Nielsen, Klaus Puhl, Mary Snell-Hornby, Ilse Somavilla, Joseph Wang, Anja Weiberg, Paul Weingartner und Franz M. Wuketits. Herausgeber sind Sascha Windholz und Walter Feigl.". (shrink)

This is Werner S. Pluhar's translation of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Urtheilskraft) for Hackett Publications (Indianapolis, Indiana). ISBN 9780872200258 (paperback).

This volume has its already distant or1g1n in an inter national conference on Evolutionary Epistemology the editors organized at the University of Ghent in November 1984. This conference aimed to follow up the endeavor started at the ERISS (Epistemologically Relevant Internalist Sociology of Science) conference organized by Don Campbell and Alex Rosen berg at Cazenovia Lake, New York, in June 1981, whilst in jecting the gist of certain current continental intellectual developments into a debate whose focus, we thought, was in (...) danger of being narrowed too much, considering the still underdeveloped state of affairs in the field. Broadly speaking, evolutionary epistemology today con sists of two interrelated, yet qualitatively distinct inves tigative efforts. Both are drawing on Darwinian concepts, which may explain why many people have failed to discriminate them. One is the study of the evolution of the cognitive apparatus of living organisms, which is first and foremost the province of biologists and psychologists (H. C. Plotkin, Ed. , Learning, Development, and Culture: Essays in Evolu tionary Epistemology, New York, Wiley, 1984), although quite a few philosophers - professional or vocational - have also felt the need to express themselves on this vast subject (F. M. Wuketits, Ed. , Conce ts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology, Dordrecht Boston, Reidel, 1984). The other approach deals with the evolution of science, and has been dominated hitherto by (allegedly) 'naturalized' philosophers; no book-length survey of this literature is available at present. (shrink)

Quality assurance in large terminologies is a difficult issue. We present two algorithms that can help terminology developers and users to identify potential mistakes. We demon­strate the methodology by outlining the different types of mistakes that are found when the algorithms are applied to SNOMED-CT. On the basis of the results, we argue that both formal logical and linguistic tools should be used in the development and quality-assurance process of large terminologies.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Context: Von Foerster’s concept of eigenbehavior can be recognized against the broader context of enactivism as it has been advocated by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, by Noë and recently by Hutto and Myin, among others. This flourishing constellation of ideas is on its way to becoming the new paradigm of cognitive science. However, in my reading, enactivism, putting stress on the constitutive role of action when it comes to mind and perception, faces a serious philosophical challenge when attempting to account (...) for the way we actually perceive our environments, most importantly for the fact that we perceive things or objects. Von Foester’s eigenbehavior is understood here as a concept supposed to take on this challenge. Problem: In this article I tackle the following issues: Enactivism must be able to account for the apparent stability of the perceived world: this is not a realm of a never-ending flux of stimuli; it is a realm of stable things. Enactivism is committed to the anti-Cartesian endeavor seeking to bridge the gap between the inner and the outer; between the subjective and the objective. Now, these two points constrain each other so that one cannot address simply by regarding the apparent stability of things as a projection that springs out of the internal machinery binding inputs with outputs. This is because the very idea of such an internal machinery opposes, i.e., it employs the Cartesian dichotomy. So, enactivism is in need of an account of that would not oppose its anti-Cartesian commitment. Method: I introduce the ontology of location and niche theory, as it has been brought forth by Varzi, Casati, and Smith, and develop it so that it can be used in the philosophy of mind. This is a conceptual, semi-formal philosophical analysis. Results: I shall come up with the idea of object conceived of a product of action, and - drawing on von Foerster’s central idea - as a product of coordination of perceptions. Yet, it is not coordination of stimuli but coordination of cognitive connections. The notion of connection is thus articulated in the article and cast as the central concept in my proposal. Implications: We are able to account for both and (2. The apparent stability of the perceived world is due to the setting up and maintaining of connections between the perceiver and the things perceived, resulting in the establishment of what I call a cognitive niche. Constructivist content: Constructivism, broadly construed, takes, in my reading, a negative stance in the first place. Namely, it opposes what I call the metaphysics of the ready-made world. So, it holds that there is no ready-made reality; however it remains open when it comes to positive claims: a mind-independent reality does not exist at all or it does exist but it is not ready-made and as such it must be brought to completion, so to speak, or enacted, as Varela et al. would say, by a cognitive subject. In this article, I follow the latter and address one specific issue: how the enacted world gains its relatively stable architecture. (shrink)

Die Wissenschaftstheorie der letzten Jahrzehnte sah sich nur allzu leicht und oft zu Recht dem Verdacht ausgesetzt, sie wolle den Wissenschaften Vorschriften machen. Ist die Wissenschaftstheorie ein letzter Versuch der Philosophie, die ihr langst entwachsenen Einzelwissenschaften zu nor­ mieren? Strukturalistische Rekonstruktionen sind der Weg einer Wissenschaftstheorie, die sich deskriptiv versteht und die einen Wissenschaftsbegriff allererst zu gewinnen hofft. (Die Bezeichnung "Strukturalismus" hat sich in der Wissen­ schaftstheorie der letzten Zeit - besonders seit Wolfgang StegmUllers "The Structuralist View of Theories" (1979- (...) fUr den mengentheoretischen Ansatz von Patrick Suppes, Joseph Sneed u.a. eingebUrgert; vgl. Anm. 1 zu Kap. 1.) Die vorliegende Arbeit setzt sich zum Ziel, die Tragweite dieses neuen Ansatzes zu erproben. Dabei richtet sich das Hauptinteresse auf die interdisziplinare Anwendung des strukturalistischen Theorienkonzepts bei der Rekonstruk­ tion empirischer Theorien (Kap. 4 - 6). Die dafUr notigen Mittel werden in Kap. 3 bereitgestellt. Die einleitenden ersten beiden Kapitel sollen den strukturalistischen An­ satz mit moglichst geringem formalen Aufwand verstandlich machen und die Bedeutung abschatzen, die ihm innerhalb der gegenwartigen Wissenschaftsphilosophie zukommt. (shrink)