When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John (...) F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory. (shrink)

Since Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory of games, the debate among social scientists, economists, mathematicians, and social philosophers about what kind of theory it is has not ended. Some think that it is a new interdiscipline, some that it is a mere accumulation of gametheoretical models, such as utility theory, competitive, cooperative, collective choice models, and so on. Most of them agree that the models of game theory deal with isolated, single, and independent specific societal interactions between individuals who wish to (...) maximize their gains and minimize their losses within prescribed constraining rules. (shrink)

When von Neumann’s and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory — a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John (...) F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discoveries is not over. The recent advances of today’s game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modern game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its “rationality.” Morgenstern dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, “conflict theory” instead of “game theory.”. (shrink)

Es wird gezeigt, daß Schlicks physikalischer Denkansatz in der Erkenntnislehre sich wesentlich vom sprachanalytischen Denkansatz in der analytischen Wissenschafts- und Erkenntnistheorie unterscheidet. In der Schlickschen Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie fällt, für gewisse implizit definierte Strukturen, der Gegensatz von analytisch und synthetisch weg, wodurch Schlick in schärfsten Gegensatz sowohl zur Kantischen Wissenschaftsphüosophie, wie auch zu der des Wiener Kreises gerät. Auch die anthropologische Fundierung von Schlicks Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie unterscheidet diese wesentlich von der des Wiener Kreises. Schlick hat ein originelles eigenes Bild (...) der Wissenschaften und eüie eigene Wissenschaftstheorie geschaffen, die im weitesten Umfange in der phliosophischen Tradition steht und diese sogar entscheidend umgewandelt hat. (shrink)

Es wird gezeigt, daß Schlicks physikalischer Denkansatz in der Erkenntnislehre sich wesentlich vom sprachanalytischen Denkansatz in der analytischen Wissenschafts- und Erkenntnistheorie unterscheidet. In der Schlickschen Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie fällt, für gewisse implizit definierte Strukturen, der Gegensatz von analytisch und synthetisch weg, wodurch Schlick in schärfsten Gegensatz sowohl zur Kantischen Wissenschaftsphüosophie, wie auch zu der des Wiener Kreises gerät. Auch die anthropologische Fundierung von Schlicks Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie unterscheidet diese wesentlich von der des Wiener Kreises. Schlick hat ein originelles eigenes Bild (...) der Wissenschaften und eüie eigene Wissenschaftstheorie geschaffen, die im weitesten Umfange in der phliosophischen Tradition steht und diese sogar entscheidend umgewandelt hat. (shrink)