In this paper I challenge the notion that a healthy and resilient coral is (in all cases) a fast‐growing coral, and by inference, that a reef characterised by a fast trajectory toward high coral cover is necessarily a healthy and resilient reef. Instead, I explain how emerging evidence links fast skeletal extension rates with elevated coral‐algae (symbiotic) respiration rates, most‐often mediated by nutrient‐enlarged symbiont populations and/or rising sea temperatures. Elevated respiration rates can act to reduce the autotrophic capacity (photosynthesis:respiration ratio) (...) of the symbiosis. This restricts the capacity of the coral host to build and maintain sufficient energy reserves (e.g. lipids) needed to sustain essential homeostatic functions, including sexual reproduction and biophysical stress resistance. Moreover, it explains the somewhat paradoxical scenario, whereby at the ecological instant before the reef‐building capacity of the symbiosis is lost, a reef can look visually at its best and be accreting CaCO3 at its maximum. (shrink)

The consideration of ‘mutual benefits’ and partner cooperation have long been the accepted standpoint from which to draw inference about the onset, maintenance and breakdown of the coral‐algae endosymbiosis. In this paper, I review recent research into the climate‐induced breakdown of this important symbiosis (namely ‘coral bleaching’) that challenges the validity of this long‐standing belief. Indeed, I introduce a more parsimonious explanation, in which the coral host exerts a ‘controlled parasitism’ over its algal symbionts that is akin to an enforced (...) domestication arrangement. Far from being pathogenic, a range of well‐established cellular processes are reviewed that support the role of the coral host as an active ‘farmer’ of the energy‐rich photoassimilates from its captive symbionts. Importantly, this new paradigm reposes the deleterious bleaching response in terms of an envelope of environmental conditions in which the exploitative and captive measures of the coral host are severely restricted. The ramification of this new paradigm for developing management strategies that may assist the evolution of bleaching resistance in corals is discussed. (shrink)

In this paper, we reflect on current notions of engineering practice by examining some of the motives for engineered solutions to the problem of climate change. We draw on fields such as science and technology studies, the philosophy of technology, and environmental ethics to highlight how dominant notions of apoliticism and ahistoricity are ingrained in contemporary engineering practice. We argue that a solely technological response to climate change does not question the social, political, and cultural tenet of infinite material growth, (...) one of the root causes of climate change. In response to the contemporary engineering practice, we define an activist engineer as someone who not only can provide specific engineered solutions, but who also steps back from their work and tackles the question, What is the real problem and does this problem “require” an engineering intervention? Solving complex problems like climate change requires radical cultural change, and a significant obstacle is educating engineers about how to conceive of and create “authentic alternatives,” that is, solutions that differ from the paradigm of “technologically improving” our way out of problems. As a means to realize radically new solutions, we investigate how engineers might deploy the concept of praxis, which raises awareness in engineers of the inherent politics of technological design. Praxis empowers engineers with a more comprehensive understanding of problems, and thus transforms technologies, when appropriate, into more socially just and ecologically sensitive interventions. Most importantly, praxis also raises a radical alternative rarely considered—not “engineering a solution.” Activist engineering offers a contrasting method to contemporary engineering practice and leads toward social justice and ecological protection through problem solving by asking not, How will we technologize our way out of the problems we face? but instead, What really needs to be done? (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper we define two logics, KLn and BLn, and present tableau-based decision procedures for both. KLn is a temporal logic of knowledge. Thus, in addition to the usual connectives of linear discrete temporal logic, it contains a set of unary modal connectives for representing the knowledge possessed by agents. The logic BLn is somewhat similar; it is a temporal logic that contains connectives for representing the beliefs of agents. In addition to a complete formal definition of the (...) two logics and their decision procedures, the paper includes a brief review of their applications in AI and mainstream computer science, correctness proofs for the decision procedures, a number of worked examples illustrating the decision procedures, and some pointers to further work. (shrink)

what is now the mainstream view as to the best way forward in the dream of engineering reliable software systems out of autonomous agents. The way of using formal logics to specify, implement and verify distributed systems of interacting units using a guiding analogy of beliefs, desires and intentions. The implicit message behind the book is this: Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) can be a respectable engineering science. It says: we use sound formal systems; can cite established philosophical foundations; and will (...) be able to build reliable and flexible software systems. (shrink)

Norms have been widely enacted in human and agent societies to regulate individuals’ actions. However, although legislators may have ethics in mind when establishing norms, moral values are only sometimes explicitly considered. This paper advances the state of the art by providing a method for selecting the norms to enact within a society that best aligns with the moral values of such a society. Our approach to aligning norms and values is grounded in the ethics literature. Specifically, from the literature’s (...) study of the relations between norms, actions, and values, we formally define how actions and values relate through the so-called value judgment function and how norms and values relate through the so-called norm promotion function. We show that both functions provide the means to compute value alignment for a set of norms. Moreover, we detail how to cast our decision-making problem as an optimisation problem: finding the norms that maximise value alignment. We also show how to solve our problem using off-the-shelf optimisation tools. Finally, we illustrate our approach with a specific case study on the European Value Study. (shrink)

Rational agents are important objects of study in several research communities, including economics, philosophy, cognitive science, and most recently computer science and artificial intelligence. Crudely, a rational agent is an entity that is capable of acting on its environment, and which chooses to act in such a way as to further its own best interests. There has recently been much interest in the use of mathematical logic for developing formal theories of such agents. Such theories view agents as practical reasoning (...) systems, deciding moment by moment which action to perform next, given the beliefs they have about the world and their desires with respect to how they would like the world to be. In this article, we survey the state of the art in developing logical theories of rational agency. Following a discussion on the dimensions along which such theories can vary, we briefly survey the logical tools available in order to construct such theories. We then review and critically assess three of the best known theories of rational agency: Cohen and Levesque's intention logic, Rao and Georgeff's BDI logics, and the KARO framework of Meyer et al. We then discuss the various roles that such logics can play in helping us to engineer rational agents, and conclude with a discussion of open problems. (shrink)

As they are conventionally formulated, Boolean games assume that players make their choices in ignorance of the choices being made by other players – they are games of simultaneous moves. For many settings, this is clearly unrealistic. In this paper, we show how Boolean games can be enriched by dependency graphs which explicitly represent the informational dependencies between variables in a game. More precisely, dependency graphs play two roles. First, when we say that variable x depends on variable y, then (...) we mean that when a strategy assigns a value to variable x, it can be informed by the value that has been assigned to y. Second, and as a consequence of the first property, they capture a richer and more plausible model of concurrency than the simultaneous-action model implicit in conventional Boolean games. Dependency graphs implicitly define a partial ordering of the run-time events in a game: if x is dependent on y, then the assignment of a value to y must precede the assignment of a value to x; if x and y are independent, however, then we can say nothing about the ordering of assignments to these variables—the assignments may occur concurrently. We refer to Boolean games with dependency graphs as partial-order Boolean games. After motivating and presenting the partial-order Boolean games model, we explore its properties. We show that while some problems associated with our new games have the same complexity as in conventional Boolean games, for others the complexity blows up dramatically. We also show that the concurrency in partial-order Boolean games can be modelled using a closure-operator semantics, and conclude by considering the relationship of our model to Independence-Friendly logic. (shrink)

This volume represents an advanced, comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of the field of rational agency as it stands today. It covers the philosophical foundations of rational agency, logical and decision-theoretic approaches to rational agency, multi-agent aspects of rational agency and a number of approaches to programming rational agents. It will be of interest to researchers in logic, mainstream computer science, the philosophy of rational action and agency, and economics.

Photography’s initial claim to represent has been derived from a privileging of the visible world, which, it might be argued, is reinforced by the limited visibility of the camera. The proliferations of utilitarian photographies, therefore, are necessarily also the elimination of the non-visible. Such a notion of visibility, when contested, might provide the starting point for a reconception of the photographic in which the apparently indexical medium is filtered through alternative relationships to representation, transparency and, ultimately, even the discourse of (...) realism. This article proposes that an alternative conception of realism might sceptically underline the limitation of the photographic apparatus in relating to but also limiting the world. (shrink)

Photography’s initial claim to represent has been derived from a privileging of the visible world, which, it might be argued, is reinforced by the limited visibility of the camera. The proliferations of utilitarian photographies, therefore, are necessarily also the elimination of the non-visible. Such a notion of visibility, when contested, might provide the starting point for a reconception of the photographic in which the apparently indexical medium is filtered through alternative relationships to representation, transparency and, ultimately, even the discourse of (...) realism. This article proposes that an alternative conception of realism might sceptically underline the limitation of the photographic apparatus in relating to but also limiting the world. (shrink)

We present an introductory survey of temporal and dynamic logics: logics for reasoning about how environments change over time, and how dynamic processes affect their environments.We begin by introducing the historical development of temporal and dynamic logic, starting with the seminal work of Prior. This leads to a discussion of the use of temporal and dynamic logic in computer science. We describe LTL, CTL, and PDL; three key formalisms used in computer science for reasoning about programs, and illustrate how these (...) formalisms may be used in the formal specification and verification of computer systems.We then discuss interval temporal logics.We conclude with some pointers for further reading. (shrink)

Branching-time temporal logics have proved to be an extraordinarily successful tool in the formal specification and verification of distributed systems. Much of their success stems from the tractability of the model checking problem for the branching time logic CTL, which has made it possible to implement tools that allow designers to automatically verify that systems satisfy requirements expressed in CTL. Recently, CTL was generalised by Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman in a logic known as "Alternating-time Temporal Logic". The key insight in (...) ATL is that the path quantifiers of CTL could be replaced by "cooperation modalities", of the form $\langle \langle \Gamma \rangle \rangle $, where Γ is a set of agents. The intended interpretation of an ATL formula $\langle \langle \Gamma \rangle \rangle \varphi $ is that the agents Γ can cooperate to ensure that φ holds. In this paper, we extend ATL with knowledge modalities, of the kind made popular in the work of Fagin, Halpern, Moses, Vardi and colleagues. Combining these knowledge modalities with ATL, it becomes possible to express such properties as "group Γ can cooperate to bring about φ iff it is common knowledge in Γ that ψ". The resulting logic -- Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic -- shares the tractability of model checking with its ATL parent, and is a succinct and expressive language for reasoning about game-like multiagent systems. (shrink)

Branching-time temporal logics have proved to be an extraordinarily successful tool in the formal specification and verification of distributed systems. Much of their success stems from the tractability of the model checking problem for the branching time logic CTL, which has made it possible to implement tools that allow designers to automatically verify that systems satisfy requirements expressed in CTL. Recently, CTL was generalised by Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman in a logic known as Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). The key insight (...) in ATL is that the path quantifiers of CTL could be replaced by cooperation modalities, of the form , where is a set of agents. The intended interpretation of an ATL formula is that the agents can cooperate to ensure that holds (equivalently, that have a winning strategy for ). In this paper, we extend ATL with knowledge modalities, of the kind made popular in the work of Fagin, Halpern, Moses, Vardi and colleagues. Combining these knowledge modalities with ATL, it becomes possible to express such properties as group can cooperate to bring about iff it is common knowledge in that . The resulting logic — Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) — shares the tractability of model checking with its ATL parent, and is a succinct and expressive language for reasoning about game-like multiagent systems. (shrink)

Although the change of beliefs in the face of new information has been widely studied with some success, the revision of other mental states has received little attention from the theoretical perspective. In particular, intentions are widely recognised as being a key attitude for rational agents, and while several formal theories of intention have been proposed in the literature, the logic of intention revision has been hardly considered. There are several reasons for this: perhaps most importantly, intentions are very closely (...) connected with other mental states—in particular, beliefs about the future and the abilities of the agent. So, we cannot study them in isolation. We must consider the interplay between intention revision and the revision of other mental states, which complicates the picture considerably. In this paper, we present some first steps towards a theory of intention revision. We develop a simple model of an agent’s mental states, and define intention revision operators. Using this model, we develop a logic of intention dynamics, and then investigate some of its properties. (shrink)

We define a multi-modal version of Computation Tree Logic (CTL) by extending the language with path quantifiers $E^\delta $ and $E^\delta $ where δ denotes one of finitely many dimensions, interpreted over Kripke structures with one total relation for each dimension. As expected, the logic is axiomatised by taking a copy of a CTL axiomatisation for each dimension. Completeness is proved by employing the completeness result for CTL to obtain a model along each dimension in turn. We also show that (...) the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is no harder than the corresponding problem for CTL. We then demonstrate how Normative Systems can be conceived as a natural interpretation of such a multi-dimensional CTL logic. (shrink)

We define a multi-modal version of Computation Tree Logic ( ctl ) by extending the language with path quantifiers E δ and A δ where δ denotes one of finitely many dimensions, interpreted over Kripke structures with one total relation for each dimension. As expected, the logic is axiomatised by taking a copy of a ctl axiomatisation for each dimension. Completeness is proved by employing the completeness result for ctl to obtain a model along each dimension in turn. We also (...) show that the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is no harder than the corresponding problem for ctl. We then demonstrate how Normative Systems can be conceived as a natural interpretation of such a multi-dimensional ctl logic. (shrink)

Understanding the flow of knowledge in multi-agent protocols is essential when proving the correctness or security of such protocols. Current logical approaches, often based on model checking, are well suited for modeling knowledge in systems where agents do not act strategically. Things become more complicated in strategic settings. In this paper we show that such situations can be understood as a special type of game – a knowledge condition game – in which a coalition “wins” if it is able to (...) bring about some epistemic condition. This paper summarizes some results relating to these games. Two proofs are presented for the computational complexity of deciding whether a coalition can win a knowledge condition game with and without opponents (Σ2P-complete and NP-complete respectively). We also consider a variant of knowledge condition games in which agents do not know which strategies are played, and prove that under this assumption, the presence of opponents does not affect the complexity. The decision problem without opponents is still NP-complete, but requires a different proof. (shrink)

Coalitional games raise a number of important questions from the point of view of computer science, key among them being how to represent such games compactly, and how to efficiently compute solution concepts assuming such representations. Marginal contribution nets , introduced by Ieong and Shoham, are one of the simplest and most influential representation schemes for coalitional games. MC-nets are a rulebased formalism, in which rules take the form pattern → value, where “pattern ” is a Boolean condition over agents, (...) and “value ” is a numeric value. Ieong and Shoham showed that, for a class of what we will call “basic” MC-nets, where patterns are constrained to be a conjunction of literals, marginal contribution nets permit the easy computation of solution concepts such as the Shapley value. However, there are very natural classes of coalitional games that require an exponential number of such basic MC-net rules. We present read-once MC-nets, a new class of MC-nets that is provably more compact than basic MC-nets, while retaining the attractive computational properties of basic MC-nets. We show how the techniques we develop for read-once MC-nets can be applied to other domains, in particular, computing solution concepts in network flow games on series-parallel networks. (shrink)

A fundamental problem in game theory is the possibility of reaching equilibrium outcomes with undesirable properties, e.g., inefficiency. The economics literature abounds with models that attempt to modify games in order to avoid such undesirable properties, for example through the use of subsidies and taxation, or by allowing players to undergo a bargaining phase before their decision. In this paper, we consider the effect of such transformations in Boolean games with costs, where players control propositional variables that they can set (...) to true or false, and are primarily motivated to seek the satisfaction of some goal formula, while secondarily motivated to minimise the costs of their actions. We adopt preparation sets as our basic solution concept. A preparation set is a set of outcomes that contains for every player at least one best response to every outcome in the set. Prep sets are well-suited to the analysis of Boolean games, because we can naturally represent prep sets as propositional formulas, which in turn allows us to refer to prep formulas. The preference structure of Boolean games with costs makes it possible to distinguish between hard and soft prep sets. The hard prep sets of a game are sets of valuations that would be prep sets in that game no matter what the cost function of the game was. The properties defined by hard prep sets typically relate to goal-seeking behaviour, and as such these properties cannot be eliminated from games by, for example, taxation or subsidies. In contrast, soft prep sets can be eliminated by an appropriate system of incentives. Besides considering what can happen in a game by unrestricted manipulation of players’ cost function, we also investigate several mechanisms that allow groups of players to form coalitions and eliminate undesirable outcomes from the game, even when taxes or subsidies are not a possibility. (shrink)

Collected and edited by Noah Levin -/- Table of Contents: -/- UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION 1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (Noah Levin) 2 What is Ethics and What Makes Something a Problem for Morality? (David Svolba) 3 Letter from the Birmingham City Jail (Martin Luther King, Jr) 4 A Defense of Affirmative Action (Noah Levin) 5 The Moral Issues of Immigration (B.M. Wooldridge) 6 The Ethics of (...) our Digital Selves (Noah Levin) -/- UNIT TWO: TORTURE, DEATH, AND THE “GREATER GOOD” 7 The Ethics of Torture (Martine Berenpas) 8 What Moral Obligations do we have (or not have) to Impoverished Peoples? (B.M. Wooldridge) 9 Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing (Nathan Nobis) 10 An Argument Against Capital Punishment (Noah Levin) 11 Common Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob) 12 Better (Philosophical) Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob) -/- UNIT THREE: PERSONS, AUTONOMY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND RIGHTS 13 Animal Rights (Eduardo Salazar) 14 John Rawls and the “Veil of Ignorance” (Ben Davies) 15 Environmental Ethics: Climate Change (Jonathan Spelman) 16 Rape, Date Rape, and the “Affirmative Consent” Law in California (Noah Levin) 17 The Ethics of Pornography: Deliberating on a Modern Harm (Eduardo Salazar) 18 The Social Contract (Thomas Hobbes) -/- UNIT FOUR: HAPPINESS 19 Is Pleasure all that Matters? Thoughts on the “Experience Machine” (Prabhpal Singh) 20 Utilitarianism (J.S. Mill) 21 Utilitarianism: Pros and Cons (B.M. Wooldridge) 22 Existentialism, Genetic Engineering, and the Meaning of Life: The Fifths (Noah Levin) 23 The Solitude of the Self (Elizabeth Cady Stanton) 24 Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Douglas E. Hill) -/- UNIT FIVE: RELIGION, LAW, AND ABSOLUTE MORALITY 25 The Myth of Gyges and The Crito (Plato) 26 God, Morality, and Religion (Kristin Seemuth Whaley) 27 The Categorical Imperative (Immanuel Kant) 28 The Virtues (Aristotle) 29 Beyond Good and Evil (Friedrich Nietzsche) 30 Other Moral Theories: Subjectivism, Relativism, Emotivism, Intuitionism, etc. (Jan F. Jacko). (shrink)

We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We prove that the logic is decidable, and give a (...) complete axiomatization. To demonstrate the value of the logic, we show in particular how it can be applied to the problem of determining whether a social choice function is strategy-proof. (shrink)

We address the issue of manipulating games through communication. In the specific setting we consider (a variation of Boolean games), we assume there is some set of environment variables, the values of which are not directly accessible to players; the players have their own beliefs about these variables, and make decisions about what actions to perform based on these beliefs. The communication we consider takes the form of (truthful) announcements about the values of some environment variables; the effect of an (...) announcement is the modification of the beliefs of the players who hear the announcement so that they accurately reflect the values of the announced variables. By choosing announcements appropriately, it is possible to perturb the game away from certain outcomes and towards others. We specifically focus on the issue of stabilisation: making announcements that transform a game from having no stable states to one that has stable configurations. (shrink)

Qualitative coalitional games (QCGs) were introduced as abstract formal models of goal-oriented cooperative systems. A QCG is a game in which each agent is assumed to have some goal to achieve, and in which agents must typically cooperate with others in order to satisfy their goals. In this paper, we show how it is possible to reason about QCGs using Coalition Logic (CL), a formalism intended to facilitate reasoning about coalitional powers in game-like multiagent systems. We introduce a correspondence relation (...) between QCGs and interpretations for CL, which defines the circumstances under which a CL interpretation correctly characterises a QCG. The complexity of deciding correspondence between QCGs and interpretations for CL is shown to vary from being tractable up to Πp 2-complete, depending on the representation chosen for the QCG and interpretation. We then show how various properties and solution concepts of QCGs can be characterised as CL formula schemes. The ideas are illustrated via a detailed worked example, in which we demonstrate how a model checker can be deployed to investigate whether a particular system has the properties in question. (shrink)

Although the change of beliefs in the face of new information has been widely studied with some success, the revision of other mental states has received little attention from the theoretical perspective. In particular, intentions are widely recognised as being a key attitude for rational agents, and while several formal theories of intention have been proposed in the literature, the logic of intention revision has been hardly considered. There are several reasons for this: perhaps most importantly, intentions are very closely (...) connected with other mental states—in particular, beliefs about the future and the abilities of the agent. So, we cannot study them in isolation. We must consider the interplay between intention revision and the revision of other mental states, which complicates the picture considerably. In this paper, we present some first steps towards a theory of intention revision. We develop a simple model of an agent’s mental states, and define intention revision operators. Using this model, we develop a logic of intention dynamics, and then investigate some of its properties. (shrink)

We add a limited but useful form of quantification to Coalition Logic, a popular formalism for reasoning about cooperation in game-like multi-agent systems. The basic constructs of Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL) allow us to express such properties as “every coalition satisfying property P can achieve φ” and “there exists a coalition C satisfying property P such that C can achieve φ”. We give an axiomatisation of QCL, and show that while it is no more expressive than Coalition Logic, it is (...) nevertheless exponentially more succinct. The complexity of QCL model checking for symbolic and explicit state representations is shown to be no worse than that of Coalition Logic, and satisfiability for QCL is shown to be no worse than satisfiability for Coalition Logic. We illustrate the formalism by showing how to succinctly specify such social choice mechanisms as majority voting, which in Coalition Logic require specifications that are exponentially long in the number of agents. (shrink)

Although normative systems, or social laws, have proved to be a highly influential approach to coordination in multi-agent systems, the issue of compliance to such normative systems remains problematic. In all real systems, it is possible that some members of an agent population will not comply with the rules of a normative system, even if it is in their interests to do so. It is therefore important to consider the extent to which a normative system is robust, i.e., the extent (...) to which it remains effective even if some agents do not comply with it. We formalise and investigate three different notions of robustness and related decision problems. We begin by considering sets of agents whose compliance is necessary and/or sufficient to guarantee the effectiveness of a normative system; we then consider quantitative approaches to robustness, where we try to identify the proportion of an agent population that must comply in order to ensure success; and finally, we consider a more general approach, where we characterise the compliance conditions required for success as a logical formula. We furthermore introduce a logic for specifying properties of norm compliance in general and norm robustness in particular. (shrink)

We define a multi-modal version of Computation Tree Logic (ctl) by extending the language with path quantifiers E δ and A δ where δ denotes one of finitely many dimensions, interpreted over Kripke structures with one total relation for each dimension. As expected, the logic is axiomatised by taking a copy of a ctl axiomatisation for each dimension. Completeness is proved by employing the completeness result for ctl to obtain a model along each dimension in turn. We also show that (...) the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is no harder than the corresponding problem for ctl. We then demonstrate how Normative Systems can be conceived as a natural interpretation of such a multi-dimensional ctl logic. (shrink)

This volume is a collects papers originally presented at the 7th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT), held at the University of Liverpool in July 2006. LOFT is a key venue for presenting research at the intersection of logic, economics, and computer science, and this collection gives a lively and wide-ranging view of an exciting and rapidly growing area.

Since it was first proposed by Moses, Shoham, and Tennenholtz, the social laws paradigm has proved to be one of the most compelling approaches to the offline coordination of multiagent systems. In this paper, we make four key contributions to the theory and practice of social laws in multiagent systems. First, we show that the Alternating-time Temporal Logic (atl) of Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman provides an elegant and powerful framework within which to express and understand social laws for multiagent systems. (...) Second, we show that the effectiveness, feasibility, and synthesis problems for social laws may naturally be framed as atl model checking problems, and that as a consequence, existing atl model checkers may be applied to these problems. Third, we show that the complexity of the feasibility problem in our framework is no more complex in the general case than that of the corresponding problem in the Shoham–Tennenholtz framework (it is np-complete). Finally, we show how our basic framework can easily be extended to permit social laws in which constraints on the legality or otherwise of some action may be explicitly required. We illustrate the concepts and techniques developed by means of a running example. (shrink)

Causal reasoning and game-theoretic reasoning are fundamental topics in artificial intelligence, among many other disciplines: this paper is concerned with their intersection. Despite their importance, a formal framework that supports both these forms of reasoning has, until now, been lacking. We offer a solution in the form of (structural) causal games, which can be seen as extending Pearl's causal hierarchy to the game-theoretic domain, or as extending Koller and Milch's multi-agent influence diagrams to the causal domain. We then consider three (...) key questions: i) How can the (causal) dependencies in games - either between variables, or between strategies - be modelled in a uniform, principled manner? ii) How may causal queries be computed in causal games, and what assumptions does this require? iii) How do causal games compare to existing formalisms? To address question i), we introduce mechanised games, which encode dependencies between agents' decision rules and the distributions governing the game. In response to question ii), we present definitions of predictions, interventions, and counterfactuals, and discuss the assumptions required for each. Regarding question iii), we describe correspondences between causal games and other formalisms, and explain how causal games can be used to answer queries that other causal or game-theoretic models do not support. Finally, we highlight possible applications of causal games, aided by an extensive open-source Python library. (shrink)

Since it was first proposed by Moses, Shoham, and Tennenholtz, the social laws paradigm has proved to be one of the most compelling approaches to the offline coordination of multiagent systems. In this paper, we make four key contributions to the theory and practice of social laws in multiagent systems. First, we show that the Alternating-time Temporal Logic (atl) of Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman provides an elegant and powerful framework within which to express and understand social laws for multiagent systems. (...) Second, we show that the effectiveness, feasibility, and synthesis problems for social laws may naturally be framed as atl model checking problems, and that as a consequence, existing atl model checkers may be applied to these problems. Third, we show that the complexity of the feasibility problem in our framework is no more complex in the general case than that of the corresponding problem in the Shoham–Tennenholtz framework (it is np-complete). Finally, we show how our basic framework can easily be extended to permit social laws in which constraints on the legality or otherwise of some action may be explicitly required. We illustrate the concepts and techniques developed by means of a running example. (shrink)

We add a limited but useful form of quantification to Coalition Logic, a popular formalism for reasoning about cooperation in game-like multi-agent systems. The basic constructs of Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL) allow us to express such properties as "every coalition satisfying property P can achieve φ" and "there exists a coalition C satisfying property P such that C can achieve φ". We give an axiomatisation of QCL, and show that while it is no more expressive than Coalition Logic, it is (...) nevertheless exponentially more succinct. The complexity of QCL model checking for symbolic and explicit state representations is shown to be no worse than that of Coalition Logic, and satisfiability for QCL is shown to be no worse than satisfiability for Coalition Logic. We illustrate the formalism by showing how to succinctly specify such social choice mechanisms as majority voting, which in Coalition Logic require specifications that are exponentially long in the number of agents. (shrink)

Qualitative Coalitional Games are a variant of coalitional games in which an agent's desires are represented as goals that are either satisfied or unsatisfied, and each choice available to a coalition is a set of goals, which would be jointly satisfied if the coalition made that choice. A coalition in a QCG will typically form in order to bring about a set of goals that will satisfy all members of the coalition. Our goal in this paper is to develop and (...) study logics for reasoning about QCGs. We begin by introducing a logic for reasoning about “static” QCGs, where participants play a single game, and we then introduce and study Temporal QCGs , i.e., games in which a sequence of QCGs is played. In order to represent and reason about such games, we introduce a linear time temporal logic of QCGs, called ℒ. We give a complete axiomatisation of ℒ, use it to investigate the properties of TQCGs, identify its expressive power, establish its complexity, characterise classes of TQGCs with formulas from our logical language, and use it to formulate several solution concepts for TQCGs. (shrink)

The process of rationally revising beliefs in the light of new information is a topic of great importance and long-standing interest in artificial intelligence. Moreover, significant progress has been made in understanding the philosophical, logical, and computational foundations of belief revision. However, very little research has been reported with respect to the revision of other mental states, most notably propositional attitudes such as desires and intentions. In this paper, we present a first attempt to formulate a general framework for understanding (...) the revision of mental states. We develop an abstract belief-desire-intention model of agents, and introduce a notion of rationality for this model. We then present a series of formal postulates characterizing the processes of adding beliefs, desires, and intentions, updating costs and values, and removing beliefs, desires, and intentions. We also investigate the computational complexity of several problems involving the abstract model and comment on algorithms for revision. (shrink)

We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We prove that the logic is decidable, and give a (...) complete axiomatization. To demonstrate the value of the logic, we show in particular how it can be applied to the problem of determining whether a social choice function is strategy-proof. (shrink)

We define a multi-modal version of Computation Tree Logic (ctl) by extending the language with path quantifiers E δ and A δ where δ denotes one of finitely many dimensions, interpreted over Kripke structures with one total relation for each dimension. As expected, the logic is axiomatised by taking a copy of a ctl axiomatisation for each dimension. Completeness is proved by employing the completeness result for ctl to obtain a model along each dimension in turn. We also show that (...) the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is no harder than the corresponding problem for ctl. We then demonstrate how Normative Systems can be conceived as a natural interpretation of such a multi-dimensional ctl logic. (shrink)

Understanding the flow of knowledge in multi-agent protocols is essential when proving the correctness or security of such protocols. Current logical approaches, often based on model checking, are well suited for modeling knowledge in systems where agents do not act strategically. Things become more complicated in strategic settings. In this paper we show that such situations can be understood as a special type of game – a knowledge condition game – in which a coalition “wins” if it is able to (...) bring about some epistemic condition. This paper summarizes some results relating to these games. Two proofs are presented for the computational complexity of deciding whether a coalition can win a knowledge condition game with and without opponents (Σ2P-complete and NP-complete respectively). We also consider a variant of knowledge condition games in which agents do not know which strategies are played, and prove that under this assumption, the presence of opponents does not affect the complexity. The decision problem without opponents is still NP-complete, but requires a different proof. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes”Cristiano Castelfranchi (bio) and Maria Miceli (bio)Keywordsgrief, suffering, attachment, agent architectureThis paper is significant in many respects: its approach (the design-based analysis); its proposed architecture; its description of grief; and its self-control/perturbance theory. We would offer some remarks on each of these aspects.AI: Back to the FutureAfter some years of crisis, AI seems now to have recovered its original challenging attitude (...) and its identity. In particular all the original ambitions of AI have been renewed under the label of “autonomous agents” (see, for example, Russell and Norvig 1995; Wooldridge and Jennings 1995). This paper and its authors are good representatives of this challenging attitude. Of course, the AI appearing at century’s end is different from, say, the AI of the 1980s. AI systems and models are now conceived for reasoning and acting in open unpredictable worlds, with limited and uncertain knowledge, in real time, with bounded (both cognitive and material) resources, with hybrid architectures, interfering—either co-operatively or competitively—with other systems. The new password for the AI of the 1990s is interaction (Bobrow 1991): interaction with an evolving environment; among several, distributed and heterogeneous artificial systems in a network; with human users; and among humans through computers.This renewed AI, however different though it is in some ways, can be understood as returning to its original aim of modeling “intelligence”: not only static and isolated sub-functions of intelligence but the integrated and pragmatic functioning of autonomous agent architectures as against algorithms. Our renewed AI, based on architectures, can again have important exchanges with other (psychological and social) sciences. This paper is a good example of the fruitful cross-fertilization of ideas which may result from such exchanges. It was indeed just this which originally gave rise to cognitive science.The ArchitectureThe proposed architecture, although quite speculative, and—as the authors themselves emphasize—very much a first sketch, is directly relevant to this new AI. In fact, recent research efforts in the agent-architecture domain are focused exactly on the problem of “goal dynamics” [End Page 129] or “motive processing,” which is the core of this architecture, and on the problem of integrating reactivity and deliberation. Compared with current AI architectures (for example, BDI systems) it is important to note that this “motive-processing” architecture is not yet formalized or implemented to the same extent. On the other hand, it is more interesting from a psychological point of view, and is already able to give us some important insights into human emotions, in particular those emotions (like grief) that involve all or total loss of control of management processes.The Report-Based Analysis of GriefThe report-based description of grief provides a persuasive and rich basis for both modeling and discussing the model. The relevant features of this emotion are well characterized with reference to the self-control problem and motive-processing (though, as we shall see, to use grief as an example of those emotions that involve all or total loss of control of thought processes may provide a partially distorted view of grief itself). In particular, we would stress the relevance of the “intrusive” character of grief-related contents; the rejection of certain beliefs due to the psychic pain they cause; the coping strategies people describe; and the second order motivations related to the control of the emotional state. We believe that psychological models especially of these aspects are usually less specific and explanatory.Let us now try to synthesize some criticisms one could advance of this analysis. We will first address two core notions of the model—perturbance and self-control—and then consider more specifically the treatment of grief.PerturbanceThis notion is potentially very interesting, unless it is reduced to an information processing perspective (e.g., perturbance of attentive processes). An information processing perspective is much more limited than a motive-processing one—at least in the limitative sense of the term, as it is generally used in the psychology of cognitive processes—and is in our view insufficient for understanding human emotions and their role. This limiting interpretation of perturbance fails... (shrink)

Presented here is a review of the book by Michael Wooldridge The Road to Conscious Machines: The Story of AI. The book was published in 2021 by Pelican Publishing Company. The book presents a philosophical exploration of the AI-related quest to understand the essence of our minds, ethics, and consciousness. Nonetheless, the book is unconventional as it focuses on failures of past AI programs rather than on AI success stories. The author also indicates the possible pathways to develop new, (...) more efficient AI paradigms. The short technical section at the end of the book offers more in-depth information on topics like Prolog, Bayesian, and deep neural networks. (shrink)