Logic arguably plays a role in the normativity of reasoning. In particular, there are plausible norms of belief/disbelief whose antecedents are constituted by claims about what follows from what. But is logic also relevant to the normativity of agnostic attitudes? The question here is whether logical entailment also puts constraints on what kinds of things one can suspend judgment about. In this paper I address that question and I give a positive answer to it. In particular, I advance two logical (...) norms of agnosticism, where the first one allows us to assess situations in which the subject is agnostic about the conclusion of a valid argument and the second one allows us to assess situations in which the subject is agnostic about one of the premises of a valid argument. (shrink)

Why should we avoid incoherence? An influential view tells us that incoherent combinations of attitudes are such that it is impossible for all of those attitudes to be simultaneously vindicated by the evidence. But it is not clear whether this view successfully explains what is wrong with certain akratic doxastic states. In this paper I flesh out an alternative response to that question, one according to which the problem with incoherent combinations of attitudes is that it is impossible for all (...) of those attitudes to be simultaneously knowledgeable. This alternative response explains what is wrong with akratic combinations of attitudes using commonly accepted epistemological theses. The paper still shows how this proposal is able to explain the badness of incoherent combinations involving the absence of attitudes, suspended judgment and credence. These explanations deploy the notions of knowledge and being in a position to know, instead of the notion of responding properly to the evidence. Finally, I suggest that this picture can be generalized to the realm of practical rationality as well. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called ‘Uniqueness Thesis.’ As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified belief to be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work.

This monograph presents the latest findings from a long-term research project intended to identify the physics behind Quantum Mechanics. A fundamental theory for quantum mechanics is constructed from first physical principles, revealing quantization as an emergent phenomenon arising from a deeper stochastic process. As such, it offers the vibrant community working on the foundations of quantum mechanics an alternative contribution open to discussion. The book starts with a critical summary of the main conceptual problems that still beset quantum mechanics. The (...) basic consideration is then introduced that any material system is an open system in permanent contact with the random zero-point radiation field, with which it may reach a state of equilibrium. Working from this basis, a comprehensive and self-consistent theoretical framework is then developed. The pillars of the quantum-mechanical formalism are derived, as well as the radiative corrections of nonrelativistic QED, while revealing the underlying physical mechanisms. The genesis of some of the central features of quantum theory is elucidated, such as atomic stability, the spin of the electron, quantum fluctuations, quantum nonlocality, and entanglement. The theory developed here reaffirms fundamental scientific principles such as realism, causality, locality and objectivity. (shrink)

I reinforce my defense of permissivism about the rationality of doxastic attitudes on the face of a certain body of evidence against criticism published in this journal by Anantharaman. After making some conceptual clarifications, I manage to show that at least one of my original arguments pro-permissivism is left unscathed by Anantharaman's points.

In this paper I deal with epistemological issues that stem from the hypothesis that reasoning is not only a means of transmitting knowledge from premise-beliefs to conclusion-beliefs, but also a primary source of knowledge in its own right. The idea is that one can gain new knowledge on the basis of suppositional reasoning. After making some preliminary distinctions, I argue that there are no good reasons to think that purported examples of knowledge grounded on pure reasoning are just examples of (...) premise-based inferences in disguise. Next, I establish what kinds of true propositions can to a first approximation be known on the basis of pure reasoning. Finally, I argue that beliefs that are competently formed on the basis of suppositional reasoning satisfy both externalist and internalist criteria of justification. (shrink)

A partir de uma revisão bibliográfica do século XVIII, resgataremos elementos que estavam naraiz da concepção universalista de homem desse século, como pertencente ao continuum da natureza.Com recurso aos métodos da antropologia estrutural, analisaremos nosso objeto que está situado nosdomínios do pensamento científico do século XVIII. O principal objetivo consistirá em identificar erecuperar a influência de alguns “mitos” acerca de seres antropomorfos, recuperando a origem dealgumas representações gráficas desses seres. A partir de algumas fontes de Rousseau e seuscontemporâneos, esboçaremos algumas (...) versões desses mitos para, ao final, aplicarmos recursos a queLévi-Strauss recorreu diante de elementos sincrônicos e anacrônicos de sua análise do mitemas. (shrink)

In this paper, I flesh out an account of the inferential basing relation using a theory about how humans reason: the mental models theory. I critically assess some of the notions that are used by that theory to account for inferential phenomena. To the extent that the mental models theory is well confirmed, that account of basing would be motivated on empirical grounds. This work illustrates how epistemologists could offer explications of the basing relation which are more detailed and less (...) empirically risky. (shrink)

Epistemologists take themselves to disagree about whether there are situations where it is rational for one to believe that p and rational for one to believe that one’s evidence does not support p (rational akrasia). The embedded sentence ‘one’s evidence does not support p’ can be interpreted in two ways, however, depending on what the semantic contribution of ‘one’s evidence’ is taken to be. ‘One’s evidence’ might be seen as a sheer indexical or as a descriptive singular term. The first (...) interpretation makes the relevant kind of rational akrasia impossible, whereas the second one makes it possible. But the proposition that is taken to be expressed by ‘one’s evidence does not support p’ by each of these interpretations is not the same. We thus have a rational reconstruction of views that are labeled as being for and against the possibility of rational akrasia according to which they do not really contradict each other. (shrink)

A proposição expressa por “Deus existe”, se é verdadeira ou falsa, ela é ou necessariamente verdadeira/falsa ou não necessariamente verdadeira/falsa. Em outras palavras, se G é capaz de ter um valor de verdade v, então ela é ou necessariamente v ou contingentemente v. por “Deus” eu quero significar um ser sobrenatural, com uma mente poderosa e imaterial que supostamente criou o universo. Certamente existem outros significados que estão vinculados a esse termo em certos contextos, mas os argumentos que eu irei (...) avaliar aqui só fazem sentido sob essa interpretação. (shrink)

Voltaire has presented in his Letters on the English different themes, from religious ethics, literacy, politics, to dramas and science. The letters present us a comparison between England and France. In this parallel we shall present how Voltaire was concerned in evaluate a high standard of taste and refinements. This paper will review some of the last letters of those, which testify about this criterion of taste as a modern point of view. We shall present in Voltaire the eminence of (...) modernity in taste, refinements and on liberty of enjoying the ecstasies of a cosmopolitan life fulfilled with entertainments and luxury. We shall present how Voltaire fought against barbarism in benefit of civilization and some how against religiosity in benefit of an ethic hedonism. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, we argue that the claim that a subject S believes that ϕ on the basis of good reasons cannot be the only type of explanation why S rationally believes that ϕ. Explaining attributions of rationality only by means of the notion of a belief being based on good reasons generates one version of the problem of regress of reasons. In the second part we flesh out a hypothesis according to which some beliefs are (...) rationally held by a subject S in virtue of the fact that S knows how to produce good reasons for holding them. In the third part we offer reasons for accepting the relevant hypothesis, and we argue that it is more successful than foundationalist, coherentist and infinitist theories in explaining the truth of some attributions of epistemic rationality. In the last part we address the problem of the regress of reasons and sketch a solution for it based on our hypothesis. (shrink)

In this paper, we offer an alternative interpretation for the claim that ‘S is justified in believing that φ’. First, we present what seems to be a common way of interpreting this claim: as an attribution of propositional justification. According to this interpretation, being justified is just a matter of having confirming evidence. We present a type of case that does not fit well with the standard concept, where considerations about cognition are made relevant. The concept of cognitive algorithm is (...) presented and explained. Finally, the new reading of ‘S is justified in believing that φ’ is fleshed out. According to this interpretation, being justified in believing that φ is not just a matter of having evidence in favor of φ, but also of having a cognitive algorithm available such that it allows one to form belief in φ on the basis of the relevant evidence. (shrink)

En este trabajo se presenta un aspecto de las posibles relaciones entre “historia” y “acción” en la obra de Kant. Contra lo que usualmente es sostenido en la literatura, la obra de Kant parece mostrar, a partir del aspecto que se analiza aquí, una conexión íntima con algunos de los presupuestos básicos de la concepción hegeliana de la acción, que fundan la sensible concepción social que éste tiene de ella.

Esta obra se concentra en cuatro temas cruciales de la formación de docentes, tanto antes como durante el servicio y en la enseñanza en diferentes áreas y niveles educativos. En primer lugar, se aborda el asunto de las creencias que los docentes tienen sobre el proceso educativo, las cuales parecen influir en la práctica profesional que estos desarrollan y, por lo tanto, deberían recibir la atención explícita de los procesos de formación de docentes que deseen promover prácticas específicas. El segundo (...) tema de la obra es la relación entre la formación de docentes y la política pública que la rige. En particular, se analizan las reformas curriculares implementadas por varias licenciaturas en universidades privadas colombianas, en respuesta a reformas a la normatividad sobre las condiciones de calidad que a las que deben ajustarse todas las licenciaturas del país. El tercer tema analizado es en qué medida los docentes en educación superior van más allá del dominio de su saber disciplinar atribuyendo importancia a la pedagogía, la didáctica y la práctica reflexiva en su propia práctica docente. Finalmente, se discuten aspectos de la formación de docentes relacionados con los procesos vividos y los retos encontrados por los docentes al entrar en la profesión, su socialización en la comunidad docente, sus identidades como maestros y su motivación para ser docentes. Vale la pena señalar que las contribuciones a este libro comparten el uso de metodologías cualitativas y presentan los resultados de historias de vida, entrevistas, observaciones, y análisis documentales, entre otros. (shrink)

Es, quiza, la coleccion mas abierta que existe en cuestiones de etica, aunque se ha ocupado tambien de antropologia, estetica, ontologia, teoria del conocimiento e historia de la filosofia. El primer titulo que se publico en la coleccion fue la gran Historia de la filosofia y de la ciencia en tres volumenes de Ludovico Geymonat. A este le han seguido obras de A. J. Ayer, A. MacIntyre, Ernst Tugendhat, Antoni Domenech, Anna Estany, Agnes Heller, F. Fernandez Buey, Carlos Paris, Emilio (...) Lledo, Manuel Sacristan, John Rawls o Ludwig Wittgenstein. Victoria Camps ha dirigido, ademas, una gran Historia de la etica, en tres volumenes, en la que han colaborado los mejores especialistas espanoles. Manual al dia y de lectura agil y amena sobre valores y conceptos como el de igualdad y prioridad, fundamentales en los estudios de la filosofia de hoy. (shrink)

Eckhart’s doctrine of the bilder is highly original not so much for containing new elements as for the conciliation it achieved among sources at first sight incompatible; these sources can be reduced to three main ones: Plato, Aristotle, and Christian thought. In this paper, I show that Eckhart’s doctrine of the bilder is simultaneously a) an Aristotelian epistemic recreation of Plato’s doctrine of ideas, and b) a Christian ontological recreation of Aristotle’s doctrine of cognition. As such, it is a technical (...) manipulation of these sources, rather than a mystical doctrine. (shrink)

Direct realism in one form or another is gaining traction as an approach to perception. With the hope of bolstering such positions, we offer a framework upon which to base an argument for direct realism in matters of perception. Better yet, we offer an empirically supported framework. The framework on offer is that of ecological psychology. With the framework in place, we then discuss how it can address visual illusions, one of the major challenges facing proponents of direct realism.

resumen Este artículo se ocupa de analizar si la estrategia desplegada por Rawls, a partir de las Conferencias Dewey, le permite superar el carácter comprehensivo que algunos críticos le imputan a su concepción política de la persona. Para ello se describe primero dicha concepción, y luego se revisa..

El autor recorre los diversos mundos de la espiritualidad, desde sus manifestaciones en la vida cotidiana expresadas en las ideas fuerza de amor, de paz, de libertad, hasta su relación con lo trascendente; y nos propone una espiritualidad existencial y un cambio de mentalidad colectiva conducente a ecología del yo que se ancla en la necesidad humana de sentido. Postula finalmente una espiritualidad llevada en una militancia en la vida, que nos sitúa en la profundización interior y la integración, el (...) encuentro de lo individual y lo social, lo inmanente y lo trascendente, el misterio y el compromiso imperativo de cambiar la vida. (shrink)

Thinking without Words provides a challenging new theory of the nature of non-linguistic thought. Many scientific disciplines treat non-linguistic creatures as thinkers, explaining their behavior in terms of their thoughts about themselves and about the environment. But this theorizing has proceeded without any clear account of the types of thinking available to non-linguistic creatures. One consequence of this is that ascriptions of thoughts to non-linguistic creatures have frequently been held to be metaphorical and not to be taken at face value. (...) Bermúdez offers a conceptual framework for treating human infants and non-human animals as genuine thinkers. Whereas existing discussions of thought at the non-linguistic level have concentrated on how such thoughts might be physically realized, Bermúdez approaches the problem by considering what is required in explaining behavior in psychological terms. In developing a positive account of non-linguistic thought he shows how the experimental tools used by developmental psychologists and students of animal behavior can be used to give a precise account of the way in which a human infant or non-human animal is representing the world. Much of the book is devoted to exploring the differences between thinking without words and language-based thinking. Bermúdez argues that there are clear limits to the expressive power of non-linguistic thought. Nonetheless, he identifies primitive analogues at the non-linguistic level that can be used to explain sophisticated non-linguistic behaviors. Thinking Without Words is the first full-length philosophical study of this important topic. It is written with an interdisciplinary readership in mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, and students of animal behavior. (shrink)

Resumen: El objetivo del presente escrito es analizar una confusión epistemológica recurrente en algunas corrientes filosóficas contemporáneas: el sociologismo, que consiste en establecer juicios acerca de la justificación de la ciencia a partir de sus orígenes históricos. En particular, me interesa revisar sus variantes relativistas, que, en sus formas más radicales, llegan a identificar la pretensión de racionalidad y objetividad de la ciencia con los mecanismos de poder. Mediante el análisis argumentativo, mostraré los errores en los que incurren estas vertientes.: (...) This article analyzes a recurrent epistemological confusion in some contemporary philosophical trends, namely, sociologism, which consists on the establishment of judgements on the justification of science based on its historical origins. Specifi cally, I am interested in reviewing its relativistic variants, which, in its most radical forms, get to identify the pretension of rationality and objectivity of science with power mechanisms. By means of an argumentative analysis, I will show the errors these proposals commit. (shrink)

Se estudian las reacciones de los primeros pensadores cristianos frente a la astrología, los antecedentes clásicos en que se basaron, y el posterior aprovechamiento de los símbolos y arquetipos astrológicos por la filosofía y literatura del humanismo cristiano.

During the Mexico-Canda Conference in October 2020 at Western University (Canada) I submitted a draft of a future paper.

Estudio bibliográfico / A bibliographical study of: Ernesto Grassi, Retorica come filosofia. La tradizione umanistica, trad. di Roberta Moroni, a. c. di Massimo Marassi, La Città del Sole, Napoli, 1999, pp. 198 . E.H. Gombrich, Imágenes Simbólicas. Estudios sobre el arte del Renacimiento, 2, versión castellana de Remigio Gómez Díaz, Editorial Debate, Madrid, 2000, pp. 244.

Thought, Reference, and Experience is a collection of important new essays on topics at the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic. The starting-point for the papers is the brilliant work of the British philosopher Gareth Evans before his untimely death in 1980 at the age of 34. Evans's work on reference and singular thought transformed the Fregean approach to the philosophy of thought and language, showing how seemingly technical issues in philosophical semantics are inextricably linked (...) to fundamental questions about the structure of our thinking about ourselves and about the world. The papers, all newly written for this volume, explore different aspects of Evans's philosophical legacy, showing its importance to central areas in contemporary analytic philosophy. The volume includes a substantial introduction that introduces the principal themes in Evans's thought and places the papers in context. (shrink)

The philosophy of technology seems to be in a stagnant condition today, partly due to the lack of communication between several traditions in the field. Whereas science and technology are considered products of society in the STS programs, the approach in Latin American countries is just the opposite: a better society is sought after through the application of science and technology in development plans. A dialogue between these two opposite traditions might prove useful in overcoming stagnation in the field.

This paper discusses theoretical issues concerning Vygotsky’s work that have remained unaddressed in the dominant interpretations of his work, either in the former Soviet psychology or in the dominant Western interpretations. This paper builds on interpretations of Vygotsky’s concepts oriented by the unity of emotional and cognitive processes and focused on the search for new psychical unities on which to build a systemic representation of the human mind. Because Vygotsky did not provide a definite position on such questions, I have (...) centered on the analysis of the consequences of his legacy for the development of a definition of subjectivity from a cultural-historical standpoint. (shrink)