As all past philosophies superseded religion, their systems were established on the basis of comprehending a true human essence. As Marx pointed out, after first elaborating various concepts of religion, politics, morality, legal philosophy, and aesthetics, philosophers then kowtowed and became the slaves to those very concepts. Such a condition should be completely altered. From the time when Marx voiced these criticisms and placed "man" at the center of world history, while also pointing out that establishing the position of (...) the subject is proof of human freedom—that is, of human essence—and from the time when Marx emphasized that the real human world, including various social relations, ideological states, and the natural world "possessed by man," is the product of human creativity and a human manifestation formed in history and developed historically, and that man should and can emancipate himself from all that, all previous notions of the human essence became outdated and were no longer worth being seriously debated. From that time on, the philosophy of "man" has transcended the realm of speculative philosophy and gained unprecedented significance both in practice and in reality, and has become an active, initiating force in the modern socialist movement. (shrink)

Michel Haar argues that Heidegger went too far in transferring all traditional properties of man to being.

Much of recent ethics has been thoroughly formalistic in character. In the first place it has confined itself to the investigation of the general logical properties of møral discourse and has largely ignored the broad psychological context of motives and purposes in which that kind of discourse has its life. Secondly, it has sought to distinguish the field of discourse that it takes as its subject-matter in a formalistic way, in terms of such properties as its universalisability, its autonomy and (...) its overridingness, without reference to the concrete and specific human interests with which moral discourse is connected and which it might serve to promote. (shrink)

Much of recent ethics has been thoroughly formalistic in character. In the first place it has confined itself to the investigation of the general logical properties of møral discourse and has largely ignored the broad psychological context of motives and purposes in which that kind of discourse has its life. Secondly, it has sought to distinguish the field of discourse that it takes as its subject-matter in a formalistic way, in terms of such properties as its universalisability, its autonomy and (...) its overridingness, without reference to the concrete and specific human interests with which moral discourse is connected and which it might serve to promote. (shrink)

Michel Haar argues that Heidegger went too far in transferring all traditional properties of man to being. Haar examines what is left, after this displacement, not only of human identity, but perhaps more importantly, of nature, life, embodiment—of the flesh of human existence. This sensitive yet critical reading of Heidegger raises such issues in relation to questions of language, technology, human freedom, and history. In doing so, it provides a compelling argument for the need to rethink what it means to (...) be human. (shrink)

... nos aeternos esse. (II, 252, 4) In his doctrine of the eternity of the human mind, Spinoza defines man. The meaning of man is realized in that ordering ...

One of the fundamental struggles in corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the uncertainty and inherent contradictions that stem from a company being an individual legal entity and a community of persons. The authors contend that CSR has departed from the essence of “social responsibility.” The paper is a commentary on CSR, presented as two frameworks rooted in individualism—The Merchant Trade (the strategic view of CSR) and The White Man’s Burden (self-righteous CSR heroism that assumes the shackles of responsibility normally (...) offered by others). Both, however, contradict the essence of “social responsibility” pitting individual against community, business against society, and economic needs and realities versus ethical reflection. The authors present a model that advocates a more moderate and realistic approach to CSR that goes back to the essence of social responsibility. (shrink)

Patientia, the virtue of enduring physiological pain, poses a problem for Roman elite masculinities. The male body is supposed to be unpenetrated, but when pain is inflicted the body is often cut and pierced. This paper looks at literary and philosophical representations of the moral exemplar Mucius Scaevola to see how Roman writers and philosophers deal with this dilemma.

This edited collection of original research represents the first substantial English-language overview of the current in late Soviet philosophy known as the 'activity approach'.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Substance Being the Same As Its Essence in Metaphysics Z 6: The Pale Man ArgumentNorman O. Dahlin general Aristotle’s account of substance in the Categories is clear. Primary substances, the basic constitutents of the world, are independently existing individuals, paradigm examples of which are particular living organisms. However, the later use to which Aristotle puts matter and form provides him with two new candidates for primary substance.1 (...) A reconsideration of substance is in order, and Aristotle begins it in Metaphysics Z. The status of matter soon becomes clear. It can’t be substance because it isn’t a “this” and separate (Z 3, 1029a26–28). The status of form, however, is another story. Aristotle argues in Z 6 that substances are the same as their essences. While the evidence isn’t unequivocal, Z 4, 10, 11, and 15 take essence to be form, where form is universal. Z 13, however, argues that no universal is substance. Aristotle thus appears caught in an inconsistency. Substance is universal form because it is the same as universal form; however, no universal is substance. This and other problems have led to as wide a variety of interpretations of Metaphysics Z as one will find of any philosophical text. Virtually all of them end up attributing to Aristotle one of [End Page 1] three views about substance—substances are universal forms, particular forms, or composites of matter and form.2This paper takes a first step in a project that promises to remove the above inconsistency while allowing but not requiring Aristotle to take concrete particular substances (composite substances involving both matter and form) to be substances. The project looks at the first of the three claims that lead to the above apparent inconsistency and asks whether the sameness relation in it should be understood as identity or a weaker relation that could hold between concrete particular substances and their universal essences. It is the latter possibility that promises to avoid the above contradiction. If concrete particular substances can be the same as their universal essences, then the essences of substances can be universals without necessarily turning substances into universals. Nevertheless, granting this possibility wouldn’t require Aristotle to take concrete particular substances to be substances. Forms of concrete particular substances will also be the same as their essences in this weaker sameness relation, and considerations other than those at work in Z 6 could still lead Aristotle to rule out concrete individuals as substances.1Although Aristotle has standardly been interpreted as arguing in Z 6 that substances are identical with their essences,3 two considerations allow the question of this paper to be raised. [End Page 2]The first is the variety of uses to which Aristotle puts such notions as the same (tauto) or one (hen). Aristotle’s concern in Z 6 is with whether certain things are or are not the same (tauto), one (hen), or one and the same (hen kai auto and to auto kai hen) as their essences.4 He argues that kata sumbebēkos legomena (things said to be what they are with respect to an accident) are not the same as their essences, but that kath’ hauta legomena (things said to be what they are with respect to themselves), a class of things that includes substances,5 are the same as their essences. However, when Aristotle says that one thing and another are the same or one, there is more than one kind of claim he can be making. Some of them apply to things that are identical; others do not.For example, things can be the same in number, species, and genus. A doublet and a cloak are the same in number, a man and another man are the same in species, and a man and a horse are the same in genus.6 Although a doublet and a cloak are identical, a man and another man, and a man and a horse, are not.Things can also be accidentally the same, or the same in definition, substance, or essence,7 where these two ways of being the same cut across the previous ways of being the same. For example... (shrink)

The thesis of Haar's book is that Heidegger puts progressively more weight on the exclusive agency of being as his writings develop, whereas Haar holds that man should be recognized as having greater initiative. The book is a reading of the Heideggerian corpus, beginning with a significantly voluntaristic interpretation of Being and Time and ending with a study of later texts in which Haar claims human individuality risks total effacement.

Man will never be virtuous, until his interests instruct him to be so. So long as these shall even so much as seem opposed to his virtue, he will inevitably pursue the former and renounce the latter. That which must be done, is to clear from his mind the horrible mists and fogs of prejudice--bid him no longer worship the cold prescriptions of policy, for the warm principles of justice--to free his soul from the fetters of authority--to remit and exalt (...) him to himself--to let him seek, by the light of his conscience alone, in the joyous, genial climate of his own free spirit, for all the rules of his conduct. Then, and not till then, will he be virtuous and happy.--(PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The operation of the human intellect is twofold, however; first, simple perception, 'simple apprehension,' the 'simple gaze of indivisibles' and second, composition and division or judgment. In considering the principles of human knowledge it is therefore necessary to distinguish simple principles from complex principles or axioms. It is evident, however, that being is absolutely first of all complex as well as incomplex principles. "That which first falls under apprehension is being, the understanding of which is included in all things whatsoever (...) man apprehends. Therefore, the first indemonstrable principle is the same cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, which is based on the constitutive intelligibility of being and non-being: and on this principle all others are based.". (shrink)

This chapter discusses one way to understand one of Spinoza's most vital, controversial concepts – essence – and attempts to show how this interpretation of essence illuminates and animates the basic precepts of his political theory. It shows that the radical metaphysics of the Ethics are the beating heart of Spinoza's ethical and political prescriptions. The chapter considers how the knowledge of essences of singular things, scientia intuitiva, is the key to the method by which an individual achieves (...) freedom, virtue, and beatitudo. An idea that involves the unity of the formal and actual essence of a thing in the finite intellect is the object of the third kind of knowledge. Unity, for Spinoza, is a critical theme underlying his metaphysics, his epistemology, and his politics. For Spinoza, man can only achieve wisdom hand‐in‐hand with freedom, that is, hand‐in‐hand with his fellow man. (shrink)

The essence оf the Christian dogma by Erich Fromm. In the article is widely considered the dynamics of religious beliefs Erich Fromm. For the first time a comparative analysis of all Fromm’s work relating to the theme of religion. Fromm devoted to the search itself and society in faith quite a lot of time because such research is very important and requires a recess in the nature of some of the world’s religions, including Christianity. Questions and countermeasures manifestations of (...) humanism and authoritarian Christianity, its historical evolution and ideals throw a kind of challenge to the outstanding philosopher, and forced him to work on this complex issue almost all his life. Dogma Erich Fromm developed so that initially there was an idea of the man who became God, and turned on the idea of God became man. The concept of the Old Testament prophets world extend beyond relationships between people, harmony should prevail between man and nature. Peace between man and nature is harmony between them. Erich Fromm permanently broke with Judaism in ‘26 and has since considered himself a Christian. But Christianity Fromm, his understanding of God, the role of Christ in history, the interpretation of the evolution of ideas and Savior is surprising for its boldness. (shrink)

"Originally published in 1845, this digest of thirty lectures by one of Germany's most influential humanist philosophers extends the critique expounded in The Essence of Christianity (1841) to religion as a whole." The main thrust of Feuerbach's analysis of religion is aptly summed up in the original subtitle to this work: "God the Image of Man. Man's Dependence upon Nature the Last and Only Source of Religion." Feuerbach reviews key aspects of religious belief and in each case explains them (...) as imaginative elaborations of the primal awe and sense of dependence that humans experience in the face of nature's power and mystery. Rather than man being created in the image of God, the situation is quite the reverse: "All theology is anthropology," he says, and "the being whom man sets over against himself as a separate supernatural existence is his own being.". (shrink)

“Know thyself!” This dictum in the Upanishads is also that of the Greeks 2000 years later. But what is meant by “know” and by “self” is different. The Biblical counsel, “Know thyself as created in the image of God,” also reminds us that man’s conception of himself is influenced by his conception of his relation to his ultimate environment. In fundamental terms, there is no East and West when reflective men ask: What is the essence of man? I cannot (...) in this paper pay adequate respect to certain historic approaches to the answer, but they are in mind as I develop a personalistic, temporalistic view of man. (shrink)

“Know thyself!” This dictum in the Upanishads is also that of the Greeks 2000 years later. But what is meant by “know” and by “self” is different. The Biblical counsel, “Know thyself as created in the image of God,” also reminds us that man’s conception of himself is influenced by his conception of his relation to his ultimate environment. In fundamental terms, there is no East and West when reflective men ask: What is the essence of man? I cannot (...) in this paper pay adequate respect to certain historic approaches to the answer, but they are in mind as I develop a personalistic, temporalistic view of man. (shrink)

Exhaustive work on Vīraśaivism; includes commentary in Kannada.

The problem, of man falls into a category of problems of human knowledge that are both ‘eternal’ and ever new. Countless legends, myths, philosophical systems, religious doctrines, scientific conceptions and fantastic visions have been the fruit of man's ungovernable desire to know himself, to know his essence, his purpose in the world, his fate, his future. Not to mention the ingenious hypotheses and Utopian fantasms, scientific truths and galling mistakes, bold projects and cowardly superstitions handed on by human civilization (...) in its Indefatigable search for the ‘magic crystal’ which would at last reveal man's true nature. All periods have made their contribution In this everlasting quest and all have relied on the few parcels of truth gleaned by humanity at earlier stages of development. Our times, the most dramatic and revolutionary of all, are by no means an exception and can be distinguished from the rest only by the exceptional acuity and urgency of the problem. (shrink)

The essence of the Man self-reflection has discovered Materialistic monism with understanding of substance as the reality of all existed, including universal: qualities – continuity, interruptness, corpuscleness, reflection; characteristics – transition from quantity to quality and vice versa, unity and struggle of opposites, denial of denial, unity of substance; states – rest, development, form, motion; processes – physical, chemical, biological, mental. The Materialistic monism consists of the unity of methodological, theoretical, sociological, statistical and practical levels of cognition, mastered by (...) the Man through five known historical ways of the vital activity. Each successive historical period of life is characterized by more perfect forms of the Man bodiness, his common character and relationships, subject interaction, reflection and consciousness, and hence by it considerable broadening of the boarders of cognition and its set of instruments.Philosophical significance of the levels of cognition consists in their possibility to consider a phenomenon as universal, general, particular, separate and single; stratificated methods of cognition and technologies of penetration into different aspects of the phenomenon essence. The methodological cognition with itsown distinctive methods contains all other methods, thus this unity pretends to be the Modern Philosophy, including monistic, systemic, dialectial, metaphisical and empirical methods of cognition. (shrink)

Granted that God may exist, how may God be defined in our time? Addressing this issue Benjamin Farley explores a variety of belief systems, Western and Eastern, religious and skeptical. Taking an approach that is both critical of religion as well as sympathetic, Farley refuses to shy away from hard questions or to dismiss constructive answers that speak to the human condition. He distinguishes human "intellectual ascent" towards God from humankind's "innate and inner sense" to know and relate to the (...) living God, demonstrating the efforts and rewards of both approaches in Christianity, as well as in Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Zen. Alongside these more obviously "religious" approaches, Farley reviews the methodologies and findings of today's greatest scientific minds, including skeptics such as Hawking, Dawkins, and Wilson, as well as their skeptical forerunners of the past. He argues that belief in God can no more ignore the scientific truth about the universe than science can dismiss the spiritual yearnings and hunger of humanity for purpose, meaning, and its inescapable sense of the presence of God. (shrink)

The rediscovery of the Hellenic philosophy, but also of the Patristic thinking is a typical feature of Thomistic thought, which consists of a new synthesis of Hellenism and Christianity that raises anew the issue of the relation between Christianity and philosophy as a focal point of medieval philosophy. Acknowledgement of Hellenic Patristic thought that focuses primarily on man as an inseparable union of body and soul, joined in a whole, has been a determining factor in the Thomistic approach of being, (...) through the distinction between a person from essence. Through this distinction and because of the Aristotle’s hylomorphism, the notion of ‘person’ is placed in the field of individuality and the unity of the human composite. The metaphysical notion of a person as individual, complemented by the notion of “relation” is directly related to the ontological unity of human nature and is founded upon the metaphysical notion of “essence”. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article pursues the question of the essence of Europe. It does not lie in the religious, cultural and geographical demarcations, but in the openness towards the other. The particular contribution of religion in this could lay in its apocalyptic tradition. This must not be understood as a violent end of history beset by fear. Rather it means the end of all virtual images and identities which serve to mask the fundamental vulnerability of man.

This paper attempts to demonstrate Max Scheler’s anticipation of and continued relevance to a burgeoning trend of essence-based accounts of modality, chief among them being Kit Fine’s landmark 1994 “Essence and Modality.” I argue that Scheler’s account of the material a priori not only anticipates the picture of essence-based modality suggested by Fine, but moreover offers resources with the potential to resolve key challenges for the Finean program. In particular, Fine’s account runs into problems in explaining how (...) formal logical necessities are to be grounded in essences, challenges that put pressure on the essentialist to adopt a non-propositional account of the nature of logical principles. I argue that one such account can be found in Scheler’s notion of the material a priori, according to which all necessary propositional truth is grounded in a realm of experientially given yet a priori "phenomenological facts." After showing the general rapprochement between Scheler’s and Fine’s accounts of regional modality, I then turn to address Scheler’s attempt to ground formal logical principles in essences. On Scheler’s picture, propositions expressing formal logical truths are true in virtue of the domain of essences in two senses: In terms of what Scheler calls objective necessity, they are true insofar as they coincide with the essential facts and interconnections shared by all possible regions of being; In terms of what he calls subjective necessity, they are true in virtue of these same essential facts and interconnections insofar as they have become “functionalized” into law-like patterns of cognition. (shrink)

Aristotle's claim in Metaphysics Z.6 that "each substance is the same as its essence" has long puzzled commentators. For it seems to conflict with two other Aristotelian theses: (1) primary substances are individuals (e.g., Socrates and Callias), and (2) essences are universals (e.g., Man and Horse). Three traditional solutions to this difficulty are considered and rejected. Instead, to make the Z.6 equation consistent with (1) and (2), I propose that it be interpreted to be making something other than a (...) straightforward identity claim. Callias is the same as his essence in the sense that to be identical to Callias is to be the same man as Callias (where Man is the essence of Callias). In general, x is identical to y if, and only if, x and y are the same E (where E specifies the "what it is to be" for x, i.e., the essence of x). So each of Socrates and Callias is the same as his essence, and Man is that essence, but Socrates and Callias are not identical, for they are not the same man. (shrink)

My dissertation is a critical study of Jose Ortega Y Gasset's attempt to reconcile his notion of lived-experience , which is fundamentally immediate experience, with his idea of life as vital-reason. But life as vital reason is, itself, best understood as consisting of life as a rational-existential project. This, in effect is Ortega's manner of fusing idealism and realism. The result of this mediation is to be interpreted as the self-with-things or what amounts to: I-in-the-world. Man is never what he (...) is in his immediacy and therefore he must create his essence through a self-conscious existential project. Thus, Ortega's notion of life as radical reality is the culmination of an underlying dialectic that is present throughout his work. That is, man's self-awareness of his life as a pre-reflective extranatural phenomenon vis-a-vis the material world can only be understood through reflection and therefore never in its immediacy. Therefore I conclude that for Ortega the synthesis of these apparently antithetical notions culminates in a form of subjective idealism given that primacy is necessarily attributed to the self over the external world. Even though I accept the fundamental tenets of his argument concerning the synthesis of Realism and Idealism and Rationalism and Vitalism, I have focused upon the inherent tension that exists in any such reflective endeavor. I believe that due to Ortega's emphasis that all reflection must originate and therefore concern itself with life as phenomenon, his philosophy necessarily gives primacy to the self over the material world . In arguing "Yo Soy Yo Y Mis Circumstancias" Ortega stresses the character of the Rational Vitalism that results from my self-awareness of my life as a problem for reflection that is forged through my necessary dealings with the world. The result of this self-knowledge is the foundation of a metaphysics of life that is best understood as man as radical reality. (shrink)

In this book, one of Italy's most important and original contemporary philosophers considers the status of art in the modern era. He takes seriously Hegel's claim that art has exhausted its spiritual vocation, that it is no longer through art that Spirit principally comes to knowledge of itself. He argues, however, that Hegel by no means proclaimed the "death of art" but proclaimed rather the indefinite continuation of art in what Hegel called a "self-annulling" mode. With astonishing breadth and originality, (...) the author probes the meaning, aesthetics, and historical consequences of that self-annulment. In essence, he argues that the birth of modern aesthetics is the result of a series of schisms—between artist and spectator, genius and taste, and form and matter, for example—that are manifestations of the deeper, self-negating yet self-perpetuating movement of irony. Through this concept of self-annulment, the author offers an imaginative reinterpretation of the history of aesthetic theory from Kant to Heidegger, and he opens up original perspectives on such phenomena as the rise of the modern museum, the link between art and terror, the natural affinity between "good taste" and its perversion, and kitsch as the inevitable destiny of art in the modern era. The final chapter offers a dazzling interpretation of Dürer's _Melancholia_ in the terms that the book has articulated as its own. _The Man Without Content_ will naturally interest those who already prize Agamben's work, but it will also make his name relevant to a whole new audience—those involved with art, art history, the history of aesthetics, and popular culture. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger's explication of Pindar's assertion that ‘to glorify was the essence of poetry’ puts it quite well. He tells us that for Pindar the word does not derive its force from what is already complete in itself. For then man would be glorifying what is already glorious, that which already has the power to impress men. At best the word then would denote an acknowledgment or a confession of being impressed. Instead, he insists, the word denotes the power (...) of making to appear, or to extol a place. 1. (shrink)

"Philosophical anthropology" is a special and extremely comprehensive branch of the history of world science and modern philosophical thought in general. Philosophical anthropology is an important branch of Western philosophical and social thought. Philosophical anthropology, which took its historical roots from ancient Greek philosophy, existed in the later periods of the history of philosophy, acquired a new meaning in German classical philosophy, and became a special trend in the history of philosophy starting from the beginning of the 20th century, is (...) also, in general, a new philosophy of man. It is a philosophical teaching that includes the results of various systems of knowledge about the nature and existence of man in the 20th century Western Europe, mainly in German-language philosophy. In a broader sense, philosophical anthropology is a scientific system consisting of a set of philosophical ideas, concepts, and teachings that focus on man and aim to study him. Philosophical anthropology, which emerged in the late 1920s as a result of Max Scheler's philosophical teaching and was considered a new direction in the history of thought, developed as a branch of non-classical philosophy. (shrink)

book 1. God.--book 2. Meditation.--book 3. Nothingness.--book 4. Death.--book 5. The nature of man.--book 6. Time.--book 7. Philosophical fantasies.--book 8. Ego.--book 9. The cosmic drama.

This volume signals reinvigoration of Russell the public campaigner. The title of the volume is taken from one of his most famous and eloquent short essays and probably the best known of his many broadcasts for the BBC. Man's Peril 1954-55 not only captures the essence of Russell's thinking about nuclear weapons and the Cold War in the mid 1950s, but its extraordinary impact which served to jolt him into political protest once again. The activism of which we glimpse (...) the initial stirrings in this volume continued in various guises more or less without interruption until his death. Russell later became involved with pressure group politics of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the civil disobedience tactics of the Committee of 00. In the writings assembled in this volume, however, he is looking towards the non-aligned states and world scientific opinion as possible brokers of de;tente . Although Russell was becoming increasingly immersed in work for peace, this was not to find him reminiscing about his peace about peace campaigning during the First World War, defending "History As an Art", and attacking the obscurantism of obscenity legislation and the opponents of birth control. (shrink)

The destiny of philosophy is indissociably linked with the destiny of man. Whatever its ultimate aspirations, philosophy remains rooted in man and his self-questioning. It is not merely a reflection on man, but one of his vital activities: an intellectual enterprise which is created and sustained by living philosophers and which is addressed, implicitly or explicitly, to other men. Even if its outer horizons encompass more than the strictly human, its insights remain valid only for humans. Human beings alone can (...) grasp and extend philosophical truth. It is in view of this fundamental fact that Heidegger asks: “What is the meaning of the expression ‘to philosophize’ if the philosophical problematic is such that it finds its abode and its center in the essence of man?” Within the confines of this paper, we shall not attempt to determine what philosophizing is; instead, we shall concentrate on the question of the role of man and self in truth, of which philosophical truth is a paradigm case. We should observe at the outset, however, that it is one thing to hold that philosophical truth is grasped as valid by individual human beings alone and quite another thing to assert that such truth is exclusively the truth of or about such individuals. It may be one of the conditions of philosophical truth that it be true for someone—for the philosopher himself, or for his actual or potential interlocutors—but this does not mean that the scope of philosophy is restricted to explicating man's essence or the sense of a singular human life. Philosophical method itself transcends the particular content of philosophy, as we see clearly in the effort of metaphysics to systematize insight. Yet it remains the case that philosophy finds its primary origin and support in man. (shrink)