Étudier l’essence et les manifestations de l’amour maternel dans la Grèce ancienne permet la mise en évidence de la complexité de la notion de philia. Les mères grecques éprouvent en effet pour leur progéniture des sentiments qui relèvent à la fois d’une nature instinctive et d’une élaboration conditionnelle qui repose sur des attitudes et des gestes. Le corps, le sang, le lait, sont autant d’éléments biologiques, « d’humeurs », qui nourrissent la part naturelle des affects maternels. Si Platon et (...) Aristote se sont avant tout évertués à discuter le caractère inné ou acquis de l’affectation parentale, les poètes tragiques ont projeté sur la scène théâtrale un spectre large de sentiments familiaux, où la haine maternelle côtoie l’amour pourtant infanticide, et où le souci intéressé des hommes qui n’ont pas engendré d’enfant (apais) croise la détresse des pères violemment privés de leurs rejetons. En ce sens, les Grecs ont pensé avec autant de nuances l’existence et la formation des affects maternels et paternels. (shrink)

Étudier l’essence et les manifestations de l’amour maternel dans la Grèce ancienne permet la mise en évidence de la complexité de la notion de philia. Les mères grecques éprouvent en effet pour leur progéniture des sentiments qui relèvent à la fois d’une nature instinctive et d’une élaboration conditionnelle qui repose sur des attitudes et des gestes. Le corps, le sang, le lait, sont autant d’éléments biologiques, « d’humeurs », qui nourrissent la part naturelle des affects maternels. Si Platon et (...) Aristote se sont avant tout évertués à discuter le caractère inné ou acquis de l’affectation parentale, les poètes tragiques ont projeté sur la scène théâtrale un spectre large de sentiments familiaux, où la haine maternelle côtoie l’amour pourtant infanticide, et où le souci intéressé des hommes qui n’ont pas engendré d’enfant croise la détresse des pères violemment privés de leurs rejetons. En ce sens, les Grecs ont pensé avec autant de nuances l’existence et la formation des affects maternels et paternels. (shrink)

Biophilia is a concept that has been much utilized as a foundation for an environmental or “land” ethic. E.O. Wilson characterizes it as a genetic disposition that links human survival to valuing living systems. J. Baird Callicott argues that human sentiments are naturally directed to all living systems and beings and this sentiment has evolutionary value. This author contends that if biophilia is to be a viable foundation for such an ethic, it must be conceived more abstractly and broadly (...) as an interconnecting feature of biotic systems. The foundation for such a conception can be found in Aristotle’s ethics, wherein his discussion of friendship, philia, can provide a theory of interspecies obligation. Although Aristotle’s focus in the Nicomachean Ethics is human relations, he makes it clear that this sentiment can be felt towards other living beings. This paper develops a broader conception of philia that includes interspecies relationships and then reconceives the modern concept of biophilia as a form of interspecies philia. It goes on to argue, using Aristotle’s theory of obligation as reciprocity within friendship, that such a re-conception of biophilia might provide another approach to founding an environmental ethic on a theory of sentiment. (shrink)

This is a volume of four studies on Plato and Aristotle by one of the best of the young French specialists on ancient philosophy. The most important paper is perhaps the first, in which Brague attempts to refute the traditional interpretations of Timaeus 37d5ff., according to which time is a moving image of eternity. I can merely give his conclusion here, which is that the moving heavens are an image of the eternal, and that there is an image of the (...) moving heavens, but not of the eternal. Next in interest, for this reviewer, is the second study, "L'isolation du sage. Sur un aspect du mythe de Politique." The reference is to the Eleatic Stranger's myth of the reversed cosmos. M. Brague focuses his attention on the passage from 271d3-6 and, in a manner that defies summary, combines philological Spitzfindigkeit and philosophical phronesis to arrive at two main conclusions: whereas the purpose of politics is to safeguard the minimal conditions of philosophical contemplation, the tasks of government cannot be included in philosophy; the highest activity of this same god, when he does not govern, is contemplation. Hence god is characterized by a "duality" of activity, not simplifiable into a unity. Two further studies follow, one on the Aristotelian formula ὁ ποτὲ ὄν the other on the priority of οὐσία with respect to time in Metaphysics Z 1. In the first, Brague analyzes the "centrifugal" force by which time advances, as the "now of nows,": by ejecting at once past and future. In the second, Brague concludes that "that which is first with respect to the ousia is also first with respect to the logos. But the converse is not true. That which is first with respect to the logos is not necessarily first with respect to the ousia. This has important consequences, among them that we speak of the predicates of ousia via logos; hence the priority of ousia to its predicates is established by logos."--Stanley Rosen, Pennsylvania State University. (shrink)

Chapter I: The background to Aristotle's theory is provided by Aristophanes' Clouds in the debate between the traditionalists and Socratics on moral education. Aristotle steers a middle course between the old and new educations, preserving on the one hand, the role of filial ties in the transmission of values, and on the other, the importance of practical reason in providing a critical assessment of attachments. ;Chapter II: Here I argue against a common reading of Aristotle that views moral training as (...) merely a matter of habituation and practice whereby certain skills become second-nature. I propose instead that moral training is a training of "right pleasures and pains", or attachments to certain ends and objects of value. These I argue are transmitted through antecedent attachments to family. ;Chapter III: A theory of the development of character requires an analysis of emotions and desires constitutive of character. Aristotle regards emotions as intentional, where by intentional he means directed at certain objects regarded by an agent selectively, as the result of certain beliefs, perceptions, and phantasia. Thus, emotions have desiderative and cognitive elements, and training is directed at each. ;Chapter IV: Another aspect of moral training is paideia through music and tragedy. Both ensure for the transmission of a common core of cultural values, and thus extend training beyond the family to the city. At the heart of this paideia is the notion of mimesis. In music, mimesis is a process is one of association, whereby the pleasurable quality of music reinforces an attachment to the characters which music expresses. In tragedy, the identification is more complex. Katharsis through pity and fear requires that we identify not merely with characters, but with choice and actions and deliberations which lead to them. ;Chapter V: I conclude by studying Aeschylus' Oresteia as a tragedy which illustrates the notion of identification, as well as Aristotle's general belief that moral training takes place within the family. Through tragedy we see the complexities that develop within philia, and are forced, through pity and fear, to examine our own filial sentiments and obligations. (shrink)

Résumé — II s’agit ici de montrer que la mimèsis tragique chez Aristote a un sens éthique, dans la mesure où elle donne à réfléchir sur les conditions du bonheur humain. En effet, en montrant des personnages soumis aux vicissitudes de la fortune, elle donne à réfléchir sur la contingence du bonheur, que la vertu ne suffit pas à assurer. En ce sens, la mimèsis tragique est le pendant de l’Éthique à Nicomaque qui définit les conditions morales du bonheur. Ce (...) sens éthique de la tragédie peut déboucher sur une portée éthique, dans la mesure où la connaissance qu’elle procure de la condition humaine et du hasard qui règne sur la vie des hommes s’oppose à toute hubris en faisant prendre conscience au spectateur de la fragilité du bonheur. Dès lors, on peut dire que le sens éthique de la tragédie selon Aristote est d’abord intellectuel, mais qu’il peut avoir du coup une portée pratique. La différence entre Platon et Aristote sur ce point vient de la différence de leurs conceptions éthiques : pour Platon en effet, et contrairement à son disciple, la condition nécessaire et suffisante du bonheur est la vertu, de telle sorte que la mimèsis tragique, en tant qu’elle présente des hommes soumis à des malheurs sans pour autant avoir nécessairement commis une faute, donne une fausse idée du bonheur. C’est pourquoi chez Platon la tragédie ne peut donner un enseignement éthique, contrairement à ce qui se passe chez Aristote. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.2 (2001) 151-176 [Access article in PDF] Beyond the Comedy and Tragedy of Authority: The Invisible Father in Plato's Republic Claudia Baracchi They say that, when asked who the noble are, Simonides answered: those with ancestral wealth. --Aristotle, fr. 92 Rose When the victor of the mule-race offered him only a small recompense, Simonides would not compose a poem, for he could not endure poetizing in (...) honor of half-asses; but on being offered an adequate amount he wrote, "Greetings, daughters of storm-footed horses!" Yet, they were daughters of the asses also. --Aristotle, Rhet. 1405b Socrates was driving them to agree that the same man could know how to compose both comedy and tragedy and that a skillful tragic poet could also be a comic poet. They were thus driven, though hardly following and getting drowsy; Aristophanes fell asleep first and, as day was breaking, Agathon also. --Plato, Symp. 223d Introductory remarks What follows is a reading of Plato's Republic in the light of Aristophanes' Clouds. More precisely, what is here offered is the bare outline of such a reading--a set of preliminary notes that, by illuminating the inceptive stages of the Republic (especially book 1), constitutes a propaedeutic to the interpretation of the Platonic dialogue as a whole. Questions that one would typically be expected to raise in this context, questions regarding the relation of philosophy to poetry, the nexus between the Aristophanean and the Platonic Socrates, or Aristophanes' comedy in connection with the fate of the historical Socrates, will here remain unaddressed or will be touched upon only marginally (and obliquely). Far from accidental, this qualified [End Page 151] silence reflects a certain reluctance simply to take up these issues in their time-honored formulations and to speak under the force of their dictation. In this way, perhaps (and only perhaps), motifs of the Platonic discourse that would otherwise remain almost imperceptible if not altogether inaccessible--despite their pervasiveness--may come to show themselves.Leo Strauss wrote that Plato's Socrates may be seen, at least in part, as "a reaction or response to the Aristophanean Socrates" (1966, 316 n 20). The present study articulates the suggestion that the dialogue on the Republic may be understood as a response to Aristophanes' Clouds. Indeed, we shall see how the dialogue makes its own the problems delineated in the comedy, how it rewrites them, and how it unfolds in an attempt to address them. In spite of its remoteness from the tone and mode of the comedy, the Platonic text offers a meticulously punctual, even contrapuntal transcription of the main thematic features of the Clouds--as if an infinitely compelling provocation were to be found there, calling for thinking. The philosophical venture seems to be called forth and stem from such ground--as if comedy were the matter (indeed, the subject matter) of philosophy.Emerging from this interpretive approach to the Republic is the centrality of the figure of paternity, namely, of authority and instituted power. The Clouds depicts fatherhood in its dejection and loss of credibility. What this caricatured remnant of paternity signals is the simultaneous collapse of the orders of the divine, of ancestral authority, and of legality. This is the plexus of problems taken up in the Platonic dialogue.But the question of decay and the dying of the city mark the opening of the dialogue in a rather inconspicuous, even unapparent way. In the Republic, all terms are reversed. Indeed, the rendition of paternity one finds in the Republic is virtually opposite to the risible father of the comedy. Here, a dignified old man commanding respect seems to safeguard the integrity of the family, and hence the stability of the polis, both in its intrapolitical-juridical structures (regulating communal interaction) and in its relation to the gods, to its beyond. Yet, in spite of this inversion, it will become apparent that paternal authority has become an empty simulacrum. Simultaneously, the relation to the gods has become mere commerce, ancestral authority is invoked as a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.2 (2001) 151-176 [Access article in PDF] Beyond the Comedy and Tragedy of Authority: The Invisible Father in Plato's Republic Claudia Baracchi They say that, when asked who the noble are, Simonides answered: those with ancestral wealth. --Aristotle, fr. 92 Rose When the victor of the mule-race offered him only a small recompense, Simonides would not compose a poem, for he could not endure poetizing in (...) honor of half-asses; but on being offered an adequate amount he wrote, "Greetings, daughters of storm-footed horses!" Yet, they were daughters of the asses also. --Aristotle, Rhet. 1405b Socrates was driving them to agree that the same man could know how to compose both comedy and tragedy and that a skillful tragic poet could also be a comic poet. They were thus driven, though hardly following and getting drowsy; Aristophanes fell asleep first and, as day was breaking, Agathon also. --Plato, Symp. 223d Introductory remarks What follows is a reading of Plato's Republic in the light of Aristophanes' Clouds. More precisely, what is here offered is the bare outline of such a reading--a set of preliminary notes that, by illuminating the inceptive stages of the Republic (especially book 1), constitutes a propaedeutic to the interpretation of the Platonic dialogue as a whole. Questions that one would typically be expected to raise in this context, questions regarding the relation of philosophy to poetry, the nexus between the Aristophanean and the Platonic Socrates, or Aristophanes' comedy in connection with the fate of the historical Socrates, will here remain unaddressed or will be touched upon only marginally (and obliquely). Far from accidental, this qualified [End Page 151] silence reflects a certain reluctance simply to take up these issues in their time-honored formulations and to speak under the force of their dictation. In this way, perhaps (and only perhaps), motifs of the Platonic discourse that would otherwise remain almost imperceptible if not altogether inaccessible--despite their pervasiveness--may come to show themselves.Leo Strauss wrote that Plato's Socrates may be seen, at least in part, as "a reaction or response to the Aristophanean Socrates" (1966, 316 n 20). The present study articulates the suggestion that the dialogue on the Republic may be understood as a response to Aristophanes' Clouds. Indeed, we shall see how the dialogue makes its own the problems delineated in the comedy, how it rewrites them, and how it unfolds in an attempt to address them. In spite of its remoteness from the tone and mode of the comedy, the Platonic text offers a meticulously punctual, even contrapuntal transcription of the main thematic features of the Clouds--as if an infinitely compelling provocation were to be found there, calling for thinking. The philosophical venture seems to be called forth and stem from such ground--as if comedy were the matter (indeed, the subject matter) of philosophy.Emerging from this interpretive approach to the Republic is the centrality of the figure of paternity, namely, of authority and instituted power. The Clouds depicts fatherhood in its dejection and loss of credibility. What this caricatured remnant of paternity signals is the simultaneous collapse of the orders of the divine, of ancestral authority, and of legality. This is the plexus of problems taken up in the Platonic dialogue.But the question of decay and the dying of the city mark the opening of the dialogue in a rather inconspicuous, even unapparent way. In the Republic, all terms are reversed. Indeed, the rendition of paternity one finds in the Republic is virtually opposite to the risible father of the comedy. Here, a dignified old man commanding respect seems to safeguard the integrity of the family, and hence the stability of the polis, both in its intrapolitical-juridical structures (regulating communal interaction) and in its relation to the gods, to its beyond. Yet, in spite of this inversion, it will become apparent that paternal authority has become an empty simulacrum. Simultaneously, the relation to the gods has become mere commerce, ancestral authority is invoked as a... (shrink)

Nous pouvons tous, je crois, reconnaître la justesse de la thèse d'Aristote à l'effet que le véritable raisonnement pratique a pour résultat non pas une simple croyance à propos du caractère désirable, ou même du caractère obligatoire, d'un acte, mais plutôt l'initiation effective d'une action. Cette thèse donne lieu à une énigme : comment la délibération, archétypiquement une inférence propositionnelle rationnelle , peut-elle logiquement aboutir à un acte ? L'action présuppose la motivation, mais la motivation est une force appétitive active, (...) et non pas une proposition concernant le désir ou le caractère désirable d'un acte . La raison pratique n'est pas similaire aux substances qui peuvent manifestement être mélangées les unes aux autres, mais elle est censée constituer une fusion normative régie par des principes — le choix est un appétit délibéré , comme le dit Aristote. Comment ceci est-il possible ? Les premiers pas vers une réponse peuvent être trouvés à un endroit surprenant : chez Kant. Dans la Métaphysique des Moeurs , Kant présente une théorie du désir comme appétit pour un objet par le biais d'une idée non-sensorielle de cet objet, et ce, par opposition à une inclination , un appétit direct basé sur la sensation. Kant emploie cette notion du désir pour expliquer à la fois la volonté et la possibilité d'une action accomplie par devoir : la volonté appartient à la faculté de désirer, et le devoir est l'action motivée par un désir pour un acte par le biais d'une idée appropriée de cet acte. Kant nomme notre susceptibilité à ce type de désir laquelle constitue une condition nécessaire à la moralité le sentiment moral . Ce sentiment rend compte du caractère pratique de la délibération morale et de son rapport au plaisir et à la douleur pratiques d'une façon qui aurait, je crois, plu à Aristote. Le devoir est donc un exemple d'un appétit délibératif . Ce schème kantien n'est pas simplement intéressant d'un point de vue historique : il s'accorde remarquablement bien avec certains travaux récents en psychologie motivationnelle et hédonique.We all can, I think, appreciate the justness of Aristotle's view that genuine practical reasoning ends not in a mere belief about the desirability, or even obligatoriness, of an act, but in the actual initiation of action. This yields a puzzle: how can deliberation, archetypically a rational, propositional inference , logically terminate in an act? Action presupposes motivation, yet motivation is an active appetitive force, not a proposition about desire or desirability . Unlike substances can obviously be mixed together, but practical reason is supposed to a principled, normative fusing — choice is deliberated appetite , as Aristotle puts it. How is this possible? The beginnings of an answer can be found in a surprising place: Kant. In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant gives a theory of desire as appetite for an object through a non-sensory idea of it, in contrast to inclination , a sensation-based direct appetite. Kant uses this notion of desire to explain both will and the possibility of action from duty : will belongs to the faculty of desire, and duty is action motivated by a desire for an act through an appropriate idea. Kant terms our susceptibility to this sort of desire moral feeling , a necessary condition for morality. It accounts for the practicality of moral deliberation, and its linkage to practical pleasure and pain, in a way Aristotle would, I think, have found congenial. Duty, then, is an example of deliberated appetite . The Kantian scheme is not merely of historical interest: it fits surprisingly well with recent work in motivational and hedonic psychology. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to elucidate certain difficulties in the text of the Eryxias and to make the author's position as a thinker clearer than it has hitherto been. The Eryxias is a work which has suffered severely from excessive partisanship. While German and Dutch scholars of the eighteenth century appear to have valued it highly—a great deal too highly—as a work of enlightened ethical purpose, the scholarship of the nineteenth century was almost unanimous in condemning it as (...) an inept imitation of Plato's early writings. It soon became apparent, however, that it was not a mere imitation. The economist Hagen recognized in it traces of Stoic doctrine and proceeded somewhat hastily to the conclusion that the author was ‘a Stoic … who expressed the sentiments of his school in the form of a Platonic dialogue.’ Otto Schrohl of Göttingen, whose thesis is the most considerable work on the subject, is less emphatic in claiming the author as a Stoic, but nevertheless traces most of his ideas to Stoic and Cynic origins. This view is modified but retained in its essentials by Professor Souilhé in the Budé edition of Plato. While stressing the importance of the Platonic element, he agrees that the author's point of view has been influenced by Stoic and Cynic teaching, the influence of Cynicism being in his opinion predominant. (shrink)

Celebrated as the equal to the great philosophers of old, namely Plato and Aristotle, whom – as Cassiodorus put it – he taught to speak Latin better than they spoke Greek, Boethius aspired to fully emancipate Roman culture from its Greek models through translations and exegesis so faithful they would leave nothing more to be desired from the original. The essay focuses on Boethius philhellenism, without complexes insofar as it had little to do either with the mixed feelings of his (...) Roman predecessors or with the plundering agenda of his Christian contemporaries. Special attention is paid to the close relationship Boethius established between word for word translations and multi-layered commentaries which he thought of and – albeit partially – carried out as part of the same scholarly endeavour. Devoid of literary pretentions as well as free from aspirations to autonomy, Boethius literal rendering and scrupulous interpretation were meant to be completely self-sufficient. Together they stand out as both the most innovative and the most conservative features of his ambitious cultural project. -/- Célébré comme l’égal des grands philosophes du passé, auxquels il aurait appris à parler Latin mieux qu’ils ne parlaient Grec, Boèce a caressé le rêve d’une émancipation radicale de la culture romaine vis-à-vis des modèles grecs qu’il se proposait de traduire et interpréter assez fidèlement pour que la comparaison avec les sources ne soit plus nécessaire. De son effort de livrer un Aristote et un Platon latins à la hauteur des originaux grecs, nous étudions l’étroite solidarité qui relie la traduction mot-à-mot des textes grecs et la restitution scrupuleuse de leur sens. Cette double tâche, que Boèce a conçue et menée d’un seul tenant, nous est dès lors apparue comme le reflet d’un philhellénisme sans complexes, tout aussi éloigné des sentiments ambivalents que nourrissaient vis-à-vis des hellènes ses devanciers romains que des efforts visant à domestiquer l’héritage classique auxquels se livraient certains de ses contemporains de même confession que lui. Affranchis de tout rêve d’autonomie, les traductions et les commentaires de Boèce se conçoivent comme parfaitement autosuffisants. Ensemble ils constituent ce qu’il y a à la fois de franchement novateur et de profondément conservateur dans son projet de faire parler Latin les sources grecques. (shrink)

Cet article discute le thème de l’autochtonie – essentiellement athénienne – en l’intégrant dans la logique du discours patriotique qui est la sienne. La prise en compte des exigences de ce type de discours tout à fait particulier, de même que la prise en compte du renouvellement du regard sur les identités sexuées qu’ont permis les études « genre », permettent aujourd’hui de proposer une interprétation différente de celle de Nicole Loraux. Celle-ci comprenait, dans sa lecture du Ménexène de Platon, (...) le mythe de l’autochtonie comme un « transfert » des compétences reproductives féminines sur un espace tenu par les hommes seuls, façon pour eux de déposséder les femmes de leur « puissance » et de penser la reproduction sans elles. Après avoir montré que les Grecs pensaient généralement la procréation comme une opération mixte et souvent équitablement partagée, surtout dans la tradition littéraire qui précède Aristote, je développe l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’usage du motif de la terre mère est une façon de construire un attachement contraignant au territoire civique. Il ne procéderait donc pas d’une lutte des sexes et d’une peur des hommes envers la puissance des femmes, mais serait l’instrument politique qui, à l’intérieur d’une société patrilinéaire où règne la « domination masculine », permet de susciter une relation particulièrement étroite avec le territoire habité.The earth mother: a reading through gender and patriotic rhetoric. This article tackles the issue of autochtony – mainly Athenian autochtony – fitting it more than has been traditionally the case into the logic of patriotic discourse from which it emerges. Taking into account the demands of this type of very particular discourse, together with the new perspectives on sexed identities made possible by gender studies, allows us today to offer an interpretation that is different from Nicole Loraux’s examining Plato, Menexenus. She understood the myth of autochtony as a “transference” of female reproductive competences to the civic land, an exclusive possession of men and a way for them to dispossess women of their power and to consider reproduction without women. After demonstrating that for the Greeks, mainly in the pre-Aristotelician tradition, males and females were usually equally concerned with the operation of procreation, I will suggest that the use of the mother earth theme is a way of constructing a constraining bond between citizens and their civic territory. This bond does not arise from the sex struggle or even from male fear of female power but, in the context of a patrilineal society dominated by males, it is the political instrument for the alienation of citizens from the land they inhabit. (shrink)

Book III of Aristotle’s De caelo does not feature the Platonic concept of χώρα as a main protagonist. Through mere scarce allusions, Aristotle tends to treat it as just another concept of matter, reminiscent in many respects of those of Presocratic philosophers. In this paper, I argue that this biased presentation should be interpreted as Aristotle’s implicit refusal to acknowledge the role of the χώρα in Plato’s reform of participation, which is expounded in the Timaeus. I refer this refusal to (...) Aristotle’s complex epistemological and methodological criticisms of Platonic paradigmatism. Reconstructing this implicit dialogue between Plato and Aristotle also sheds a new light on the stakes and consistency of book III of De caelo, which had remained elusive in earlier approaches. I suggest that book III does not aim to propose a consistent account of the four elements or of generation, but to build a new Aristotelian framework as an answer to the aporiai of Plato’s Timaeus. (shrink)

The title theme is explored in seven chapters, five of which are revisions of previously published papers. As sketched in the introduction, the central claim is that the dialogues not only always present their explicit themes in a context of "finitude, limitation or negation", but also depict three different responses to such finitude, "domination, submission, or an acknowledgment of the finitude which transforms it into possibility", of which the latter is to be preferred. Moreover, subsequent chapters argue that this mode (...) of presentation is a form of irony which is not merely a literary device or a tactic of political prudence or of pedagogical method, but a reflection of a core tenet of Platonic philosophy, that is, that while the whole has an arche which is in principle intelligible, the finitude and erotic character of human nature render any complete or adequate grasp of that arche humanly impossible. Consequently, the philosophic enterprise, insofar as it is engaged in a necessarily unsuccessful striving for an unattainable goal, partakes of certain elements of tragedy, including the tragic sense that such striving is somehow ennobling. Yet insofar as it yields to the temptation to believe that its goal is attainable, it runs the risk of turning comic in its ignorance of its own limitations. Hence it seems to be self-knowledge about its own finitude which makes the philosophic life finally neither tragic nor comic. (shrink)

Abstract Most histories of philosophy make us believe, that there is a line of thought from the Greeks on until today. This impression should be checked by this article. At first we contrast some pros and cons of the view that philosophy in general has a history. Then we come back to the question, if Plato or / and Aristotle are really the founders of historiography in philosophy. As test-piece we take the passage in the centre of Plato's Sophist, which (...) shows that the references to past thinkers don't have the purpose to inform us historically, but, first, to continue the current dialogue about being, second, to lead us to the aporie about being, which allows a fresh start for this question. A glance at the doxographies of Aristotle shows (we have a look at that of De Anima), that they have the same target in view, namely to reveal the fundamental opinions of being in a respective world. This way the “history of philosophy” becomes an account of succeeding worlds and the related reflection on it. – This article is an extended version of a short lecture held in Geneva, 15. sept. 2016, within the scope of the Symposium of the Schweizerische Philosophische Gesellschaft. Unfortunately it was not accepted for publication. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Plato’s and Aristotle’s contrasted treatment of the “Good itself ” and its relation to the human good. Contrary to a common view, Aristotle does not attack the very concept of a Good itself, but rather Plato’s interpretation of it as the Idea of the Good. One of his central criticisms is that such an Idea would have no practical use. By an analysis of the Philebus, I try to show why and how this Idea does (...) have such a use in Plato, but in a way which could not satisfy his pupil, because for Aristotle, the Good itself must be an ultimate end which must have a direct efficiency on the whole world, without any need of the mediation of knowledge. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle shows that such an end can be identified with a purely active intelligence, which he names God. Although this Good itself is absolutely necessary and thus cannot be a “practical good” in Aristotle’s terms, its contemplation by human intelligence can be, because it is for its part contingent. I conclude in assessing the main consequences of Plato’s and Aristotle’s different views of the Good itself on their philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

Les Barbares intéressent-ils les philosophes? Dans les textes de Platon et d’Aristote, ils forment rarement un objet autonome de réflexion et c’est le plus souvent au détour d’une question anthropologique (la relation à l’autre), politique (la relation à l’ennemi) ou économique (la relation au serviteur) qu’ils sont mentionnés. Le recours dans ces divers contextes au concept de nature permet de mesurer les écarts entre les perspectives et les styles des deux penseurs. Pour Platon, si la nature peut à la rigueur (...) marquer de son sceau l’antagonisme qui oppose les entités politiques, elle ne peut fixer entre les cultures et les races des différences et des hiérarchies stables, l’esclavage restant une nécessité de fait. Pour Aristote en revanche, les Barbares sont bien par nature les meilleurs candidats à la servitude et l’hégémonie grecque est le pendant légitime de leur infériorité morale et politique. (shrink)

This paper considers the use of myth in the Platonic dialogues. It seeks to demonstrate that Plato takesup the task of rewriting the old myths, not in order to clarify the real truth about ancient tales, but to make thosetales serve higher—ethical—ends. Thus Plato makes a valiant effort to replace the old "truths" in order to displaceand overcome ethically dangerous assumptions in the old tales. But I shall demonstrate that, despite the changesin mythical content, the old tropes endure in the (...) new form and the dangerous elements of myth persist. Theelements of myth that I consider to be most dangerous are the motifs of "fallenness" and the irredeemably tragic dimension of earthly existence . These mythologems endure despite the new imagery that seeks to overcome them and they continue to breed a "nostalgia" of loss and tragic origins. This is the archaic infection that I see as the spawning ground of ritualistic patterns of human behaviour that are essentially violent. The infection is sublimated but carried alongin new contextual forms in Platonic myth, concealed but dynamically present. The persistence of these dangerous elements, in my reading, signal the failure of the Platonic project of purification—a failure most clearly evidenced in the tragic character of Eros and in the impotence of the philosopher in the city—indeed in Socrates' being ever atopos with regard to the city and missing even from the lofty perches reserved for the philosopher and the lover . There is no place forSocrates—for the truly just and good man—in the real cities down under the heavens. No place for him in theupper world of lofty contemplations. Without him, wealth and power and honour will ever rule the human scene and justice will be the ideal of simple fools.1That is the essential tragedy of the human condition as it re-emerges in the Platonic corpus. (shrink)

"The unexamined life is not worth living." Socrates's ancient words are still true, and the ideas sounded in Plato's Dialogues still form the foundation of a thinking person's education. This superb collection contains excellent contemporary translations selected for their clarity and accessibility to today's reader, as well as an incisive introduction by Erich Segal, which reveals Plato's life and clarifies the philosophical issues examined in each dialogue. The first four dialogues recount the trial execution of Socrates--the extraordinary tragedy that changed (...) Plato's life and so altered the course of Western though. Other dialogues create a rich tableau of intellectual life in Athens in the fourth century B.C., and examine the nature of virtue and love, knowledge and truth, society and the individual. Resounding with the humor and astounding brilliance of Socrates, the immortal iconoclast, these great works remain powerful, probing, and essential. (shrink)

Book Review of Paul Ricœur, Être, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote. Cours professé à l’université de Strasbourg en 1953-1954. Texte vérifié et annoté par Jean-Louis Schlegel , (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2011), 348 pp.

De 1805 à 1830, Hegel professe neuf séries de cours sur l’histoire de la philosophie. Explorant et méditant les pensées de ses prédecesseurs, il en nourrit sa pensée et les éclaire en retour de la sienne. A ce titre, K.L. Michelet, à qui l’on doit la restitution de ces leçons à partir des notes de Hegel et de celles de ses auditeurs, voit dans ce texte « la meileure clé pour la compréhension de son œuvre ».C’est par le berceau de (...) la philosophie, la Grèce, que Hegel commence son exploration de l’histoire de la philosophie. Divisant la pensée grecque en trois périodes , il s’agit pour lui de partir du « commencement de la pensée philosophante » pour aboutir au stade où « l’idée prend la forme de la totalité ».Achevant la présentation de cette première période, le troisième tome des Leçons traite des pensées de Platon et d’Aristote. (shrink)

Résumé: Cet article inédit reconstruit systématiquement les conceptions platoniciennes et aristotéliciennes du mouvement (sa nature, son statut physique et théologique, ses différentes formes). Les ressemblances et divergences des deux systèmes sont ensuite examinées, en insistant sur leur contribution à l’évolution ultérieure de la physique, avec laquelle la méthode négative de la physique platonicienne s’avère plus en affinité que le réalisme aristotélicien du sensible, qui est fondé sur une division du monde physique en deux règnes.

Dans sa Politique (II, 2-4), Aristote a sévèrement critiqué la communauté des biens et celle des femmes et des enfants défendues par Platon au livre V de la République. En République, 462a-465b, Socrate soutient notamment que la communauté des gardiens sera cimentée par l’amitié, à quoi Aristote objecte que cette amitié ne peut être qu’une amitié « diluée » du fait même des mesures communautaires préconisées par Socrate (Politique, II, 4). Cet article commence par examiner les arguments d’Aristote à l’encontre (...) de la philia entre les gardiens et montrent qu’ils ne tiennent pas compte du long processus de maturation psychologique dans lequel consiste l’éducation des gardiens. L’un des objectifs de leur éducation est en effet de cimenter leurs relations réciproques par la philia, en modifiant radicalement le sens qu’ils se font de l’idée de propriété. Cette forme intense de philia est ensuite comparée à l’amitié civique dont Socrate affirme qu’elle relie gardiens et producteurs par delà leur place respective dans la hiérarchie sociale de la cité idéale. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Achilles and Hector: The Homeric HeroBryan R. WarnickAchilles and Hector: The Homeric Hero, by Seth Benardete. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2005, 140 pp., $17.00 cloth, $10.00 paper.Seth Benardete (1930-2001) was one of the twentieth century's premiere scholars of the classical world. His prominence was largely due to his technical excellence in both ancient philosophy and classical philology, a rare combination that allowed him to become, as (...) Harvey Mansfield has written, "Our greatest student of the relation between poetry and philosophy."1 He wrote groundbreaking discussions of Greek literature (especially the tragedies) and the Platonic dialogues. His work culminated in his study of The Odyssey, The Bow and the Lyre (1997), a book that compared the plot of epic poetry to the development of a Platonic dialogue.Before Benardete achieved lasting fame, however, he was a doctoral student at the University of Chicago, working with Leo Strauss and the Committee on Social Thought and developing friendships with people like Allan Bloom. The writing of his dissertation is the stuff of scholarly legend. According to the story, it developed from a pile of nonsensical notes on the Iliad to a work of budding genius in four weeks. This dissertation, "Achilles and Hector: The Homeric Hero," was published in St. John's Review in 1985, and it has now been reprinted so that we can examine for ourselves the significance of Benardete's early work.As the title suggests, Benardete's dissertation looks at the theme of heroism in Homer, focusing on the Iliad. He examines the relationships between the poem's smallest parts and its largest themes. The book is divided into two sections. In the first section, Benardete grapples with how the small components of the Iliad, the epithets and similes, work together meaningfully to inform the larger heroic themes of the epic. The second section examines Homer's view of the tragic hero through an analysis of the plot. The analytic skill exhibited in both sections is fascinating: some parts of the study are brilliant, others strained, but none are boring.Benardete's purpose in the first section, he says, is to "vindicate the epithets" (135). This vindication is necessary because, as scholarship on the oral nature of the Homeric epics has developed, the significance of the smaller components has seemed to diminish. The epithets and similes have come to be seen as mere crutches for the oral poet; they are linguistic tools whose characteristics allow them to be plugged into Homer's unrelenting dactylic hexameter whenever a particular rhythmic pattern is needed. The poet uses the epithet of "swift-footed" Achilles, then, not so much because he particularly wants to say something meaningful about Achilles' swiftness, but because the particular rhythmic pattern of the epithet is a handy way to complete a line of poetry. The meaning of things like the epithets in any particular moment, it has seemed to many, should therefore be taken with a grain [End Page 115] of salt. In contrast, Benardete wants to argue that each particular use of an epithet has a significant meaning that informs, and even constructs, the epic's larger themes (for Benardete's purposes, the theme of heroism).Benardete's success in this goal is somewhat uneven, as even he later came to realize. A few of his conclusions appear rather stretched and neglect to consider the whole in the analysis of the parts. For example, Benardete looks at the Trojan epithets megathymoi ("great spirited") and hippodamoi ("tamers of horses") and finds them to be two manifestations of a constant Trojan character. One epithet is for the activities of war (megathymoi), the other one for peace (hippodamoi). But for Benardete, they both say the same thing about the constantly emotional, almost animalistic nature of Homer's Trojans, who are perfectly defined by passionate warfare: "The Trojans are more readily affected than the Achaeans, who can remove their armor and be different in peace than in war: but the Trojans cannot so easily shake off their temper" (21). While certainly interesting, such an analysis neglects to take into account prominent scenes like the one in which Astyanax, Hector... (shrink)

Bergson raconte que pour remédier à l'insufisance de l'évolutionnisme de Herbert Spencer, il s'était d'abord tourné vers l'histoire de la philosophie depuis ses origines. Il dut alors se rendre à l'évidence, dit-il, que, pas plus que celui de Spencer, aucun des systèmes n'avait tenu compte du temps réel. On avait étudié les propriétés de l'espace pour appliquer directement ensuite ses conclusions au temps en se contentant de remplacer l'idée de juxtaposition par celle de succession. Ainsi serait né ce que Bergson (...) appelle le temps homogène ou temps-espace auquel la durée concrète échappe tout à fait. (shrink)

What authority do Plato and Aristotle possess in Late Antiquity, specifically for Olympiodorus of Alexandria? According to a current widespread view, the relationship of all Neoplatonists to the two Greek philosophers can be captured by two assumptions : the harmony between the two thinkers and the superiority, even the infallibility, of Plato. The present study first clarifies this notion of harmony in the light of the pedagogical context of the late commentaries and the principle of truth as unity underlying them, (...) and secondly shows that the notion of infallibility hardly applies to Olympiodorus, given the Socratic conception he has of his own exegetical practice and some features of his actual practice. (shrink)

En el Lisis Sócrates se presenta ante Hipótales como experto en cuestiones eróticas (tà erotiká). Demostrará ante el joven amante “cómo hay que dirigirse al amado” para ganar su afecto. Así, se embarcará en una conversación con Lisis y Menéxeno acerca de la naturaleza del phílos la cual conducirá a una aporía que, prima facie, parece condenar el diálogo al fracaso; pero el estado aporético al que arriba la conversación con los niños permitirá estimular la reflexión filosófica de Lisis y (...) Menéxeno. El presente trabajo no busca establecer una definición de qué sea la amistad (philía) o el amigo (phílos), sino resaltar la práctica misma de preguntas y respuestas, la dialéctica (dialégesthai) como actividad amistosa entre philoi que persiguen el más alto bien. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the way Aristotle makes use of the methods Plato labelled as "dialectic". After suggesting a unified interpretation of Plato’s dialectic, I show that Aristotle makes room for them not inside the context of demonstrative science, but at the level of the investigation concerning the principles of such a science. These principles are, for the most part, definitions; and Plato’s dialectical methods are designed to search for and obtain definitions. Although Aristotle, contrary to Plato, seems to (...) distinguish between dialectic and philosophy, he relates both to the same capacity, and he suggests that their methods are identical up to a certain point. Moreover, the cognitive state corresponding to dialectic is, for Aristotle as for Plato, intelligence (nous). Nevertheless, there remain important differences between Plato and Aristotle on this issue: while the dialogical dimension of dialectic is for Plato constitutive of philosophy and implies that the philosophical thought is a perpetual motion, it is according to Aristotle what distinguishes dialectic from philosophy, which must for its part come to a rest; and while philosophy presupposes a rupture with sensation according to Plato, Aristotle envisages it in continuity with sensible experience. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Schopenhauer's Platonism The Feeling of the Sublime The Values of Tragedy Concluding Remarks References.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:189 HUME'S MORAL ONTOLOGY* My concern here is the claim, made in my recent book, that Hume is a moral realist. In general terms I would describe this book as one of several that represent a sustained effort to consider Hume within an eighteenth-century context, an effort to see him not as a timeless figure, or to treat him as a brilliantly successful contemporary of ourselves, but as a (...) brilliant eighteenth-century philosopher responding to eighteenth-century issues with, for all his timelessness, eighteenth-century conceptual tools and 2 from an eighteenth-century perspective. It would be hopelessly naive to suppose that any of us can view Hume without any historical distortion, but it is equally naive to read Hume, as he is often read, without historical sensitivity. Furthermore, such insensitivity closes us off from what is uniquely valuable about Hume, for, instead of seeing his writings as the consequence of his unique efforts to confront and answer the philosophical questions posed to him, the historically insensitive read into him their own questions and their own answers. The past studied as an echo of the present is of little interest (and none of that intrinsic), nor can there be much value in the study of those who saw but through a glass, darkly, the truths now so apparent to us. Our intellectual past is important to us because it is different from our intellectual present, and not because it seconds what we presume already to know. I was entirely serious, then, when I said that both the plausibility, and the very meaning of my claim that Hume is a common-sense moralist or a moral realist depends upon considering this claim — and, consequently, Hume — within a particular philosophical context. It will not do to suppose that moral realism 190 is a term with an eternal, unchanging, and Platonic connotation, and then to reject my suggestion outright because Hume was, as I would certainly agree, virtually without sympathy for anything revealing a tincture of Platonism. Philosophical terms as well as philosophical issues are historical, changing entities; it is those who think or act otherwise who smuggle 4 Platonism into the discussion. Doubtless, however, some of the misunderstanding to which I refer is my own responsibility. I can join Hume in saying "I have found by experience, that some of my expressions have not been so well chosen, as to guard against all 5 mistakes in the readers," and so I shall here offer some clarifications of my view. I. To begin, I wish to bring together in one place evidence of the significant qualifications I put on my claim about Hume's moral realism. Taken together, these remarks show that my position is consistent with the widely held (and generally correct, I would say) view that Hume is in one highly important sense a naturalist, and that I ascribe to him a realism that is neither Platonic, Scholastic, Cartesian, nor Hutchesonian: A. If naturalism is thought to be the view "that the whole of the universe or experience may be accounted for by a method like that of the physical sciences," then Hume must certainly be called a naturalist because of his efforts to extend the "experimental Method of Reasoning into moral Subjects".... Hume is a naturalist in that he sought to produce coherent philosophical explanations without the slightest recourse to supernatural entities or transcendental principles... an obvious example of this kind of naturalism... is his attempt to explain moral values as derived from human nature or from, that is, human beings as constituted and active in the world (DH 15-16). 191 B. By no stretch of the imagination can Hume be supposed to have borrowed this providential aspect of Hutcheson's thought, not even in morals (DH 54; also see p. 93). C I submit that /Hume/ holds that vice and disapprobation are not identical and that moral qualities are not merely sentiments but, rather, the objective correlates of sentiments. /Footnote:/ No rash conclusions should be drawn from this claim about objective correlates. I do not suggest that virtue and vice are objects in the ordinary sense (physical objects), or that they are transcendently existing qualities of... (shrink)