Abstract

In the Aristotelian corpus, the category pros ti (“relation”) is considered mainly in dialectical contexts, in which it is used as a device for finding convenient arguments for a given conclusion. Nevertheless, Arisotle shows some specific concern for the ontological status of relative terms. That occurs mainly in discussing Platonic issues, such as the nature of the first principles and the separation of the Forms. In fact, the standard definition of pros ti : “things that are what they are of something” (ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται) was coined by Plato. Within an ontology that makes substance the paradigm of reality, there are two alternative strategies in order to deal with relative terms. Plato explored the possibility of making otherness a disinct and self-subsistent type of reality; Aristotle, on the contrary, reduces relative terms to properties, or even properties of properties, of his basic ontological objects, i.e. substances.