In this wide-ranging book the author presents his critique of the contemporary portrayal of cognition, an analysis of the conceptual foundations of cognitive science and a proposal for a new concept of the mind. Shanon argues that the representational account is seriously lacking and that far from serving as a basis of cognitive activity, representations are the products of such activity. He proposes an alternative view of the mind in which the basic capability of the cognitive system is not the (...) manipulation of symbols but rather action in the world. His book offers a different outlook on the phenomenon of consciousness and presents a new conception of psychological theory and explanation. This revised second edition includes a new Postscript. (shrink)

To the memory of Alan White The idea of mental representation occupies a rather prominent place in much contemporary discussion, both in philosophy and cognitive science, and not as a particularly controversial idea either. My reflections here, however, are intended to douse much of that discussion with some cold water. I should emphasize at the outset that I have no problems at all with the very idea of mental representation. What I find quite unsatisfactory is the philosophical or (...) doctrinal underpinning of much current theorising about it. Anyway, I shall suggest that talk of mental representation needs at least to be supplemented with, if not actually replaced by, a distinct notion of mental presentation , which cannot be reduced to it. But I start with the notion of an impression. (shrink)

To the memory of Alan WhiteThe idea of mental representation occupies a rather prominent place in much contemporary discussion, both in philosophy and cognitive science, and not as a particularly controversial idea either. My reflections here, however, are intended to douse much of that discussion with some cold water. I should emphasize at the outset that I have no problems at all with the very idea of mental representation. What I find quite unsatisfactory is the philosophical or doctrinal (...) underpinning of much current theorising about it. Anyway, I shall suggest that talk of mental representation needs at least to be supplemented with, if not actually replaced by, a distinct notion of mental presentation, which cannot be reduced to it. But I start with the notion of an impression. (shrink)

Conceptual atomists argue that most of our concepts are primitive. I take up three arguments that have been thought to support atomism and show that they are inconclusive. The evidence that allegedly backs atomism is equally compatible with a localist position on which concepts are structured representations with complex semantic content. I lay out such a localist position and argue that the appropriate position for a non-atomist to adopt is a pluralist view of conceptual structure. I show several ways in (...) which conceptual pluralism provides an advantage in satisfying the empirical and philosophical demands on a theory of conceptual structure and content. (shrink)

Frank Mitjans is an architect who has worked in London since 1976. He was introduced to the significance of the figure of St. Thomas More by Andrés Vázquez de Prada, author of the biography, Sir Tomás Moro, Lord Canciller de Inglaterra. In 1977 Vázquez de Prada invited Mitjans to visit with him the Thomas More Exhibition at the National Portrait Gallery, which stimulated his interest in representations of More, his family and his friends. Since August 2002 he has given many (...) presentations and talks on the topography of More’s London to groups of students and other interested people in Britain, Ireland, and Sweden. Frank Mitjans, architecte qui travaille à Londres depuis 1976, fut initié au personnage de Saint Thomas More par Andrés Vázquez de Prada, auteur de la biographie Sir Tomás Moro, Lord Canciller de Inglaterra. En 1977 Vázquez de Prada l’invita à l’accompagner dans sa visite de l’exposition Thomas More à la National Portrait Gallery, évènement qui aiguisa son intérêt pour les représentations de More, de sa famille et de ses amis. Depuis août 2002 il a régulièrement fait des présentations et des exposés à des groupes d’étudiants et d’autres en Grande-Bretagne, Irlande et Suède au sujet de la topographie du Londres de Thomas More. The recent exhibitions of the works of Holbein in London and Basel, and scholarly publications such as Holbein and England, have rekindled interest in the Portrait of Thomas More and his Family, and in the late sixteenth-century versions of Holbein’s presumed lost original. The present paper analyses the differences between the sixteenth-century versions and Holbein’s 1527 composition sketch, and concludes that the sketch is a more reliable witness to Holbein’s lost painting than the later versions, as well as the only authentic witness to More’s intentions; though anything we learn from the drawing must be checked against what we know from More’s letters and writings and other biographical data. From the later versions, however, and in particular from the references to Seneca on them, we can learn about those who commissioned them and England’s peculiar historical circumstances. (shrink)

Resumen En este trabajo se desarrolla una aproximación epistemológica a las significaciones sociales, comprendidas como una entidad central que urde la composición simbólica de la realidad. Para ello, se despliega un trabajo teórico y reflexivo con el objetivo de esclarecer las tres significaciones sociales que aquí se establecen: imaginarios sociales, representaciones sociales y re-presentaciones discursivas. Al mismo tiempo, se procura presentar una taxonomía en planos de significación, correspondiente a las particularidades y ámbitos de acción de los imaginarios sociales (plano profundo), (...) representaciones sociales (plano medio de transición) y re-presentaciones discursivas (plano superficial). Este trabajo epistémico, que aporta en la clarificación conceptual de las tres nociones tratadas, ofrece un sustento teórico para futuras investigaciones y una nueva forma de abordar las significaciones sociales. Abstract In this work, an epistemological approach to social meanings is developed, understood as a central entity that weaves the symbolic composition of reality. To do this, a theoretical and reflective work is deployed with the aim of clarifying the three social meanings established here: social imaginaries, social representations, and discursive re-presentations. At the same time, it seeks to present a taxonomy in planes of meaning, corresponding to the particularities and fields of action of social imaginaries (deep plane), social representations (middle plane of transition) and discursive re-presentations (superficial plane). This epistemic work, which contributes to the conceptual clarification of the three notions discussed, offers theoretical support for future research and a new way of approaching social meanings. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the indirect realists’ recourse to mental representations does not allow them to account for the possibility of hallucination, nor for the presentational character of visual experience. To account for the presentational character, I suggest a kind of intentionalism that is based on the interdependency between the perceived object and the embodied perceiver. This approach provides a positive account to the effect that genuine perception and hallucination are different kinds of states. Finally, I offer a (...) tentative suggestion as to how a hallucinatory experience may still be mistaken for a genuine perceptual experience. (shrink)

An early, very preliminary edition of this book was circulated in 1962 under the title Set-theoretical Structures in Science. There are many reasons for maintaining that such structures play a role in the philosophy of science. Perhaps the best is that they provide the right setting for investigating problems of representation and invariance in any systematic part of science, past or present. Examples are easy to cite. Sophisticated analysis of the nature of representation in perception is to be (...) found already in Plato and Aristotle. One of the great intellectual triumphs of the nineteenth century was the mechanical explanation of such familiar concepts as temperature and pressure by their representation in terms of the motion of particles. A more disturbing change of viewpoint was the realization at the beginning of the twentieth century that the separate invariant properties of space and time must be replaced by the space-time invariants of Einstein's special relativity. Another example, the focus of the longest chapter in this book, is controversy extending over several centuries on the proper representation of probability. The six major positions on this question are critically examined. Topics covered in other chapters include an unusually detailed treatment of theoretical and experimental work on visual space, the two senses of invariance represented by weak and strong reversibility of causal processes, and the representation of hidden variables in quantum mechanics. The final chapter concentrates on different kinds of representations of language, concluding with some empirical results on brain-wave representations of words and sentences. (shrink)

Chisholm held that some states of ourselves are self-presenting and provide a stopping place in the quest for justification. The justification we have for accepting that we are in those states is transparent to us in a way that enables us to answer questions about justification. Representation enables us to apprehend such self-presenting states through themselves in a representational loop. It is a loop of exemplarization wherein the state is used as an exemplar to represent the kind of state (...) it is. The result is that the representation of the state provides the subject with a kind of representation that loops back onto itself escaping the bondage of stratified mentality. This form of representation by exemplarization is shown to resolve problems and paradoxes concerning subjectivity, consciousness and the self raised by the writings of Hume, Kierkegaard, Ferrier, Sartre and Frank Jackson. (shrink)

It is argued that a number of important, and seemingly disparate, types of representation are species of a single relation, here called structural representation, that can be described in detail and studied in a way that is of considerable philosophical interest. A structural representation depends on the existence of a common structure between a representation and that which it represents, and it is important because it allows us to reason directly about the representation in order (...) to draw conclusions about the phenomenon that it depicts. The present goal is to give a general and precise account of structural representation, then to use that account to illuminate several problems of current philosophical interest — including some that do not initially seem to involve representation at all. In particular, it is argued that ontological reductions (like that of the natural numbers to sets), compositional accounts of semantics, several important sorts of mental representation, and (perhaps) possible worlds semantics for intensional logics are all species of structural representation and are fruitfully studied in the framework developed here. (shrink)

Psychological studies of touch and blindness have been fraught with controversy. Within this field there remains an important theoretical divide. Many researchers have taken a cognitive approach to the study of touch and blindness, relating these to higher order processes, such as memory and concept formation. Others adopt a theoretical perspective, arguing that it not necessary to consider the 'internal representation' of the stimuli, when investigating touch - thus people make use of information from the physical biomechanical properties of (...) their limbs as they assess the physical properties of objects. In addition, psychologists differ in the relative importance they place on the modality of sensory stimulation for subsequent perceptual experiences. Some psychologists argue that touch can do many of the things that are accomplished by vision, and claim that the mode of sensory stimulation is not critically important for perception, arguing that much information can be obtained through non-visual modalities. Others suggest that there are important consequences of a lack of visual experience, arguing for the importance of multiple forms of sensory input for conceptual development. New to the Debates in Psychology series, Touch, Representation, and Blindness brings together the leading investigators in these areas, each presenting the evidence for their side of the debate. An introductory chapter sets the theoretical and historical stage for the debate, and a concluding chapter draws together the different views and ideas set forth by the contributors, summarizing and resolving the discussion. (shrink)

Democracy has been a flawed hegemony since the fall of communism. Its flexibility, its commitment to equality of representation, and its recognition of the legitimacy of opposition politics are all positive features for political institutions. But democracy has many deficiencies: it is all too easily held hostage by powerful interests; it often fails to advance social justice; and it does not cope well with a number of features of the political landscape, such as political identities, boundary disputes, and environmental (...) crises. Although democracy is valuable it fits uneasily with other political values and is in many respects less than equal to the demands it confronts. In this volume prominent political theorists and social scientists present original discussions of such central issues. Democracy's Values deals with the nature and value of democracy, particularly the tensions between it and such goods as justice, equality, efficiency, and freedom. (shrink)

A. M. Pitts in [Pi] proved that HA op fp is a bi-Heyting category satisfying the Lawrence condition. We show that the embedding $\Phi: HA^\mathrm{op}_\mathrm{fp} \longrightarrow Sh(\mathbf{P_0,J_0})$ into the topos of sheaves, (P 0 is the category of finite rooted posets and open maps, J 0 the canonical topology on P 0 ) given by $H \longmapsto HA(H,\mathscr{D}(-)): \mathbf{P_0} \longrightarrow \text{Set}$ preserves the structure mentioned above, finite coproducts, and subobject classifier, it is also conservative. This whole structure on HA op (...) fp can be derived from that of Sh(P 0 ,J 0 ) via the embedding Φ. We also show that the equivalence relations in HA op fp are not effective in general. On the way to these results we establish a new kind of duality between HA op fp and a category of sheaves equipped with certain structure defined in terms of Ehrenfeucht games. Our methods are model-theoretic and combinatorial as opposed to proof-theoretic as in [Pi]. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to understand the functional role of mental representations and intentionality in skilled actions from a systems related perspective. Therefore, we will evaluate the function of representation and then discuss the cognitive architecture of skilled actions in more depth. We are going to describe the building blocks and levels of the action system that enable us to control movements such as striking the tennis ball at the right time, or grasping tools in manual action. (...) Based on this theoretical understanding the measurement of mental representations and related research results concerning mental representation in skilled action are presented in an overview. This leads to the question how mental representations develop and change during learning. Finally, to consolidate the functional understanding of mental representation in skilled action and interaction, we provide examples how to use the measurement of mental representation in humans to inform technical systems. (shrink)

Publications in contemporary science journals often include figures like graphs, diagrams, photographs, and MRIs, which are presented as support for the hypothesis the author is defending. As a first step to explaining how figures contribute to confirmation, I present an account of visual representation and use examples to show how the visual format is involved in the support those figures provide the authors’ conclusions. I then show that attempts to explain what figures contribute to scientific arguments without analyzing them (...) as visual representations will not succeed. (shrink)

A collection of essays by friends, students, and colleagues on Max Wartofsky's 65th birthday. Reflecting Wartofsky's own interests, topics discussed in this text range from the arts and sciences, to ethics and history, from the Enlightenment, through the 19th century to the present day.

When it is spoken of scientific representations it is often understood that science can offer "only" representations but does not enable us to know reality. This tenet is the inheritance of a gratuitous and inconsistent presupposition that affected modern philosophy during almost two centuries, according to which we know our representations and not things, and we have to find warranties in order to believe that such representations correspond to reality. The present paper analyzes this presupposition, shows its inconsistency and, through (...) a discourse regarding the relations between thought and ontology, between sense and reference of the intellectual constructions, between abstract encoding of properties and concrete exemplification of the same by means of operational criteria of reference, justifies the cognitive purport of scientific representations, including the mathematical representations of physical phenomena. (shrink)

Habits usually come in the form of skilled action. Then, accurately explaining the nature of habitual actions requires to say something on skilled actions. Here we focus on the debate on skilled actions in the philosophical literature informed by motor neuroscience. The main question in the literature is whether practical knowledge can be reduced to propositional knowledge and, if not, how these different forms of knowledge can be related when skilled motor performance is in play. But this, ipso facto, also (...) represents a crucial question in the case of habitual actions. In this respect, we suggest that skilled action performance at the basis of habitual actions is the result of an information processing that is shared, within the motor brain, by both epistemic and practical states (of which we specify the nature and the relation). We offer a description of how this information processing works, so as to shed new light on how to conceive habitual skilled action, while also taking into account the practical mode of access to the epistemic states about this action. (shrink)

This book is an important collection of new essays on various topics relating to realism and its rivals in metaphysics, logic, metaethics, and epistemology. The contributors include some of the leading authors in these fields and in several cases their essays constitute definitive statements of their views. In some cases authors write in response to the essays of other contributors, in other cases they proceed independently. Although not primarily historical this collection includes discussions of philosophers from the middle ages to (...) the present day, from Aquinas to Wittgenstein. No one seriously interested in questions about realism, whether as a general philosophical outlook or as a particular position within specific debates, can afford to be without this collection. (shrink)

One oft the most fascinating abilities of humans is the ability to become conscious of the own physical and mental states. In this systematic investigation of self-consciousness, a representational theory is developed that is able to distinguish between different levels of self-consciousness. The most basic levels are already present in such simple animals as ants. From these basic forms, which are also relevant for adult human self-consciousness, high-level self-consciousness including self-knowledge can arise. Thereby, the theory is not only able to (...) integrate developmental considerations but also to sharply distinguish different aspects of the complex phenomenon self-consciousness. Pathological breakdowns of these different aspects, as they can be found in schizophrenia, are explained by specific impairments on different levels of self-representation. In this way, the work shows that a naturalistic theory of self-consciousness is possible, if the analysis starts with very simple and basic mechanisms instead of starting on the »top of the iceberg«. (shrink)

We present a cognitive-physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that phenomenal concepts do not differ from other types of concepts. When explaining the peculiarities of conscious experience, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual representations and their interaction with general conceptual structures. We utilize Jerry Fodor’s psycho- semantic theory to formulate our view. We compare and contrast our view with that of Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, who, using Dretskean psychosemantic theory, arrived at a solution different from (...) ours in some ways. We have suggested that the representational atomism of certain sensory experiences plays a central role in reconstructing the epistemic gap associated with conscious experience, still, atomism is not the whole story. It needs to be supple- mented by some additional principles. We also add an account of introspection, and suggest some cognitive features that might distinguish representational atoms with phenomenal character from those without it. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that narrative representations can provide knowledge in virtue of their narrativity, regardless of their truth value. I set out the question in section 1, distinguishing narrative cognitivism from aesthetic cognitivism and narrative representations from non-narrative representations. Sections 2 and 3 argue that exemplary narratives can provide lucid phenomenological knowledge, which appears to meet both the epistemic and narrativity criteria for the narrative cognitivist thesis. In section 4, I turn to non-narrative representation, (...) focusing on lyric poetry as presenting a disjunctive objection: either lucid phenomenological knowledge can be reduced to identification and fails to meet the epistemic criterion, or lucid phenomenological knowledge is provided in virtue of aesthetic properties and fails to meet the narrativity criterion. I address both of these problems in sections 5 and 6, and I close with a tentative suggestion as to how my argument for narrative c.. (shrink)

The concept of representation is a problematic one. So is that of resemblance or similarity. But both concepts can be clarified via a modification of Wittgenstein's notion of a "family-resemblance." I shall introduce an extended version of that notion, specifically relevant to representational objects, after presenting some arguments which show the need for it.

The terms 'reference', 'representation', and 'perception', have not been univocally used. This thesis provides a new theory which explains reference, representation and perception by showing that each has primary and derived forms, related more-or-less recursively. -/- The primary forms are located in a simple model which is based on the structure of a computer. The structure presented is a 'minimal' model, that is, the smallest structure in which the simplest kinds of reference, representation, and perception occur. -/- (...) An analogical relation constructed between the simple model and a person in the world provides an account of the simplest forms of, and an explanation for the derived forms of each. The relation presented sheds light on our corresponding ordinary notions and shows that they can all be explained or accounted for entirely within the cause-effect paradigm. -/- In effect, this thesis presents the 'essence' of each of reference, representation, and perception. (shrink)

How does human agency relate to the good? According to a thesis with ancient pedigree, the connection is very tight. Known as “the Guise of the Good” (GG), it states that human action or motivation to act, of some special kind or another, is only possible insofar as the agent performs or is motivated to perform the act because of the good she sees in so acting. But how might agents see their actions as good? Recent research in moral psychology, (...) the philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences suggests that affective states may play a deep role in cognition and action as representations of value: for instance, pain may represent an injury as bad for one. This dissertation begins by defending just such an evaluationist account of unpleasant pain from an objection, and then develops and defends an affect-based version of GG. The first part of the dissertation (Chapter 2) considers a foundational problem for an evaluationist theory of affect. The theory is motivated by its ability to make sense of our aversive intentional responses to pain as responses to value, but the shooting the messenger objection charges that it is unable to make sense of our aversive behavior to the sensations themselves. I propose a solution to this problem on behalf of the evaluationist: when we introspect our pains we also turn our emotional distress inwards, enabling it to represent our pains as bad. One crucial question GG theorists must face is just what the good of GG is. Chapter 3 argues that, lest the thesis be too weak, it must hold that actions must appear to their agents to meet a standard of practical reason. The chapter then shows how the intelligibility motivation for GG can lead naturally to the view that the standards so presented are shared publicly. Chapter 4 argues against the standard understanding of GG in terms of essentially evaluative desires and contends that it should be replaced by hard-line affectivism, the view that GG is true because actions are based on affective states that represent there as being reason for those actions. (shrink)

This article presents an approach to understanding human spatial competence that focuses on the representations and processes of spatial cognition and how they are integrated with cognition more generally. The foundational theoretical argument for this research is that spatial information processing is central to cognition more generally, in the sense that it is brought to bear ubiquitously to improve the adaptivity and effectiveness of perception, cognitive processing, and motor action. We describe research spanning multiple levels of complexity to understand both (...) the detailed mechanisms of spatial cognition, and how they are utilized in complex, naturalistic tasks. In the process, we discuss the critical role of cognitive architectures in developing a consistent account that spans this breadth, and we note some areas in which the current version of a popular architecture, ACT-R, may need to be augmented. Finally, we suggest a framework for understanding the representations and processes of spatial competence and their role in human cognition generally. (shrink)

“Utterances and thoughts have content: They represent (actual or imaginary) states of affairs.” This is the opening statement of François Recanati’s most sustained work on kinds of representation, Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta (2000) and it presents the core phenomenon which it is the task of the philosophy of language to explain. A primary function of language and thought, though not their only function, is to represent how things are or might be. As well as descriptively representing entities, properties, and (...) states of affairs in the world, our thoughts and utterances may metarepresent other linguistic or mental representations and to several levels of representational embedding. For a full understanding of how language represents (and metarepresents) we need to understand how each of the different kinds of expression in the language contributes to the proposition or thought expressed by a particular utterance. Over the last century, the philosophy of language has swung between two poles in addressing the representational properties of natural human language. Broadly speaking, at the one pole are those whose main focus is on the language system itself, rather than its users, and who emphasize the semantic power of the system, while at the other pole are those for whom it is speakers, specifically their mental states, and what they do with words that is fundamental. The two different orientations naturally lead to different ways of conceiving of the roles of semantics and pragmatics in language use. One manifestation of the division is the opposition between the ‘literalist’ view according to which the proposition expressed by an utterance of a sentence is entirely mandated by components of the sentence and the ‘contextualist’ view according to which what is said often goes beyond what is linguistically anchored. From his earliest work on pragmatics, specifically on speech acts and explicit performatives (1979, 1981, 1987), Recanati has taken a non-literalist position, which he has developed over the past 20 odd years, culminating in the publication of his latest book, Literal Meaning (2004a).. (shrink)

This article seeks to contribute to the debate on how political representation can promote democracy by analysing the Chamber in the Square, which is a component of legislative theatre. A set of techniques devised to democratise representative governments, legislative theatre was created by Augusto Boal when he was elected a political representative in 1993. After briefly reviewing Nadia Urbinati’s understanding of democratic representation as a diarchy of will and judgement, I partially endorse Hélène Landemore’s criticism and contend that (...) if representation is to be democratic, citizens’ exchange of opinions in the public sphere should be invested with the power not only to judge, but also to decide political affairs. By opening up a space where the represented can judge, decide, and contest the general terms of the bills representatives present in the assembly, the Chamber in the Square harnesses political representation to democracy. (shrink)

In what follows, I will concentrate on the type of temporality which structures Wittgenstein's method of a perspicuous representation, or of a synoptic overview (übersichtliche Darstellung). I will argue that the temporal order which applies to (giving) a perspicuous representation is best to be described as retroactivity, deferred action or afterwardness (Nachträglichkeit), a concept which calls into question the ordinary conception of time as a linear and irreversible process as well as of a clear break between present and (...) past. First, I will turn to Sigmund Freud and the way he developed the concept of Nachträglichkeit or retroactivity in some of his case-studies. The basic idea here is that the meaning or content of a past experience is constituted by repeating it in a different or disguised way. I will then argue that the relation between a perspicuous representation and what is made perspicuous is best interpreted as a relation of Nachträglichkeit. This interpretation also accounts for the involvement of the subject in the object made perspicuous—as it is stressed by Wittgenstein and illustrated by his discursive method. (shrink)

It is a thankless task to have to reply to Professor Murray Krieger’s “Retrospective.” Qui s’excuse, s’accuse, and since I cannot ask my readers to embark on their own retrospective of my writings and test them for consistency, I have little chance of restoring my reputation in their eyes. Hence I would have been happier to leave Professor Krieger to his agonizing, if he did not present himself the “spokesman” for a significant body of theorists who appear to have acclaimed (...) my book on Art and Illusion without ever having read it. The followers of this school of criticism—of which Professor Krieger is a prominent member—had apparently convinced themselves that the book lent support to an aesthetics in which the notions of reality and of nature had no place. They thought that I had subverted the old idea of mimesis and that all that remained were different systems of conventional signs which were made to stand for an unknowable reality. True, professor Krieger admits that I never endorsed such an interpretation of my views, and he even concedes that there are passages in Art and Illusion which contradict such an out-and-out relativism, but he wants to convince his readers that these contradictions lead precisely to the ambiguities he now proposes to analyse.If he were right that the book encourages such a misreading, all I could do would be to express my regrets for having failed to make myself sufficiently clear. Luckily I can draw comfort from the fact that unlike these literary critics, the leading archaeologist of this country, Professor Stuart Piggott, had no difficulty at all in discerning my meaning and profiting from my arguments. In his Walter Neurath Memorial Lecture of 1978, entitled Antiquity Depicted: Aspects of Archaeological Illustration, the author did me the honour of taking a statement from my book as his starting point. It is the passage at the end of part I in which I recapitulate the content of the first two chapters:What matters to us is that the correct portrait, like the useful map, is an end product on a long road through schema and correction. It is not a faithful record of a visual experience but the faithful construction of a relational mode.Neither the subjectivity of vision nor the sway of conventions need lead us to deny that such a model can be constructed to any required degree of accuracy. What is decisive here is clearly the word “required.” The form of a representation cannot be divorced from its purpose and the requirements of the society in which the given visual language gains currency.1 1. E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts, 1956 , p. 90. E. H. Gombrich was director of the Warburg Institute and Professor of the History of the Classical Tradition at the University of London from 1959 to 1976. His many influential works include The Story of Art, Art and Illusion, Meditations on a Hobby Horse, The Sense of Order, Ideals and Idols, The Image and the Eye, and, most recently, Tributes. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry include “The Museum: Past, Present and Future and “Standards of Truth: The Arrested Image and the Moving Eye”. (shrink)

David Lewis (1974, 1994/1999) proposed to reduce the facts about mental representation to facts about sensory evidence, dispositions to act, and rationality. Recently, Robert Williams (2020) and Adam Pautz (2021) have taken up and developed Lewis’s project in sophisticated and novel ways. In this paper, we aim to present, clarify, and ultimately object to the core thesis that they all build their own views around. The different sophisticated developments and defenses notwithstanding, we think the core thesis is vulnerable. We (...) pose a dilemma by considering the two sides of a current epistemological controversy over the relation between evidence and rational belief: permissivism vs. uniqueness. As we argue, the prospects for the Lewisian project look dim when either supposition is clearly made. (shrink)

Social representations research has tended to focus upon the representations that groups have in relation to some object. The present article elaborates the concept of social representations by pointing to the existence of “alternative representations” as sub-components within social representations. Alternative representations are the ideas and images the group has about how other groups represent the given object. Alternative representations are thus representations of other people's representations. The present article uses data from Moscovici's analysis of the diffusion of psychoanalysis to (...) examine how people engage with alternative representations. It is demonstrated that there can be more or less dialogical relations with alternative representations. The analysis concludes by considering seven “semiotic barriers” which work to neutralise the dialogical potential of alternative representations, thus on the one hand enabling groups to talk about the views of others, while, on the other hand, remaining unchallenged by those views. (shrink)

_Abstract_: The significance of neuroscientific findings for the analysis of central problems in cognitive science has long been a matter of debate. Recent developments in cognitive neuroscience have reignited this discussion, especially with regard to the study of cognitive representations and cognitive processes. The present paper focuses on multivariate analyses, a class of neuroscientific methods that promises to shed new light on the neural bases of cognitive representations. Multivariate approaches are both powerful and increasingly used. Yet, we argue that their (...) successful application in neuroscience requires significant theoretical and methodological clarification. After providing a preliminary assessment of the pros and cons of multivariate methods, we claim that their successful application crucially depends on how we conceptualize the relationships between representations, cognitive processes, and neural data, in other words, on the cognitive ontology we use to describe the human mind. Our discussion also highlights some general strengths and weaknesses of neuroscientific contributions to the program of classical cognitive science. _Keywords_: Cognitive Process; fMRI; Multivariate Analysis; Marr’s Three Levels of Analysis; Cognitive Ontology _Rappresentazioni e processi: quale ruolo per i metodi multivariati nelle neuroscienze cognitive?_ _Riassunto_: La rilevanza dei risultati neuroscientifici per quanto riguarda i problemi centrali delle scienze cognitive è motivo di discussione. Recenti sviluppi nelle neuroscienze cognitive hanno rianimato tale dibattito, in particolare rispetto allo studio delle rappresentazioni e dei processi cognitivi. Il presente articolo si focalizza sull’analisi multivariata, un insieme di metodi neuroscientifici che si promettono di studiare le basi neurali delle rappresentazioni cognitive. Nonostante le potenzialità e l’uso pervasivo degli approcci multivariati, in questo lavoro sosteniamo che prima di poter valutare il loro effettivo contributo nello studio delle rappresentazioni cognitive sia necessaria una chiarificazione teorica e metodologica. Dopo una discussione preliminare dei vantaggi e degli svantaggi dei metodi multivariati, evidenziamo come una loro efficace applicazione dipenda in maniera sostanziale da come viene intesa la relazione tra rappresentazioni, processi cognitivi e dati neurali o, in altre parole, dall’ontologia cognitiva che impieghiamo per descrivere la mente umana. Il presente lavoro affronta inoltre i generali punti di forza e gli elementi critici rispetto al contributo della ricerca neuroscientifica nel programma delle scienze cognitive classiche. _Parole chiave_: Cognitive Process; fMRI; Multivariate Analysis; Marr’s Three Levels of Analysis; Cognitive Ontology. (shrink)

This paper explores how consideration of the notions of naturalness and eligibility, which have played an increasingly significant role in contemporary metaphysics, might impact on the study of truth. In particular, it aims to demonstrate how taking such notions seriously may be of benefit to ‘representational’ theories of truth by showing how the naturalness of truth on a representational account provides a response to the ‘Scope Problem’ presented by Lynch (2009).

MV-algebras stand for the many-valued Łukasiewicz logic the same as Boolean algebras for the classical logic. States on MV-algebras were first mentioned [20] in probability theory and later also introduced in effort to capture a notion of `an average truth-value of proposition' [15] in Łukasiewicz many-valued logic. In the presented paper, an integral representation theorem for finitely-additive states on semisimple MV-algebra will be proven. Further, we shall prove extension theorems concerning states defined on sub-MV-algebras and normal partitions of unity (...) generalizing in this way the well-known Horn-Tarski theorem for Boolean algebras. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the traditional anti-intellectualist claim that a form of knowing how to Φ (e.g., knowing how to play the guitar) exists that entails the ability to Φ (play the guitar), and that this knowledge cannot be reduced to propositions (such as ‘S knows a way _w_ to Φ’, where _w_ is a means of Φing). I also argue that S can know how to Φ in the absence of the ability to Φ, and for this knowledge (...) to be likewise irreducible to propositions. This is made possible when one distinguishes between type and token actions. Moreover, I contend that type and token actions, and one’s ability to engage in them, are differentiated at the level of motor representations. Motor representations provide an alternate means of grading knowledge how to that presented by Carlotta Pavese, insofar as this form of gradable knowledge is likewise irreducible to propositions. (shrink)

In recent decades, advances in the life sciences have created an unprecedentedly detailed picture of heredity and the formation of the phenotype where clusters of simplistic reductionist and deterministic views and interpretations have begun to lose ground to more complex and holistic notions. The developments in gene regulation and epigenetics have become a vivid emblem of the ongoing ‘softening’ of heredity. Despite this headway, the outlook and rhetoric widely popular in the twentieth century favoring the ‘gene’ in the ‘genegenetic plasticityphenotypeenvironment’ (...) tetrad have not been successfully tackled but continue to exist in parallel with a new, equally monochromatic, viewpoint championing genetic plasticity. An examination of epigenetics and its presentation in the public sphere, open to a conversation with the social disciplines and philosophy, could address this dichotomy and contribute to the discourse. This article outlines key biological aspects of epigenetics and discusses the language, presentation and wider resonance of this field of life science research. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to investigate what epistemic role, if any, do appeals to representations play in cognitive neuroscience. I suggest that while at present they seem to play something in between a minimal and a substantive explanatory role, there is reason to believe that representations have a substantial contribution to the construction of neuroscientic explanations of cognitive phenomena.

It is a commonplace that “the map is not the territory.” The phrase goes back to Alfred Korzybski, while the insight—formulated by insisting on an apparent triviality—is surely older and has received poetical expressions from Lewis Carroll and Jorge Luis Borges among others. The difference between map and territory is a difference of categories and is at the base of the representation relation. Hence maps play a prominent role in the discourse about representation which takes place in a (...) number of disciplines and from different perspectives. Three of them are of special interest for the present paper.One influential view has been put forward by historian of art Ernst Gombrich in his classical lecture on.. (shrink)

A model is presented that addresses both the distribution and comprehension of different forms of referring expressions in language. This model is expressed in a formalism (Kamp & Reyle, 1993) that uses interpretive rules to map syntactic representations onto representations of discourse. Basic interpretive rules are developed for names, pronouns, definite descriptions, and quantified descriptions. These rules are triggered by syntactic input and interact dynamically with representations of discourse to establish reference and coreference. This interaction determines the ease with which (...) coreference can be established for different linguistic forms given the existing discourse context. The performance of the model approximates that observed in studies of intuitive judgments of grammaticality and studies using online measures of language comprehension. The model uses the same basic interpretive mechanisms for coreference within and between sentences, thereby linking the domain traditionally studied by generative linguists to domains that have been of concern primarily to psychologists and computational linguists. (shrink)

The article focuses on Intranet technology as the result of overlapping negotiations among social actors inside organizations. Such negotiations are aimed at establishing and embedding specific relations and representations of work, communication, and learning into the technological artifact. Two case studies are presented to analyze practices and processes of implementation and use of the Intranet. The fieldwork, carried out in two companies in Italy and the United Kingdom, shows how specific contexts and organizational histories can affect such processes. Despite the (...) “optimistic” imagery associated with Intranet technology and the high expectations about its communicative and economic efficiency, the article points out many constraints in the process of implementation and use. Company history and culture, skills and work groups, and use of other technologies and media are relevant factors to account for the current use of the two systems and their low degree of integration into everyday working and communicative practices. (shrink)