Alexius Meinong developed a notion of defective objects in order to account for various logical and psychological paradoxes. The notion is of historical interest, since it presages recent work on the logical paradoxes by Herzberger and Kripke. But it fails to do the job it was designed for. However, a technique implicit in Meinong's investigation is more successful and can be adapted to resolve a similar paradox discovered by Romane Clark in a revised version of Meinong's Theory of Objects due (...) to Rapaport. One family of paradoxes remains, but it is argued that they are unavoidable and relatively harmless. (shrink)

Alexius Meinong developed a notion of defective objects in order to account for various logical and psychological paradoxes. The notion is of historical interest, since it presages recent work on the logical paradoxes by Herzberger and Kripke. But it fails to do the job it was designed for. However, a technique implicit in Meinong's investigation is more successful and can be adapted to resolve a similar paradox discovered by Romane Clark in a revised version of Meinong's Theory of Objects due (...) to Rapaport. One family of paradoxes remains, but it is argued that they are unavoidable and relatively harmless. (shrink)

This essay is, in the first instance, an exercise in intellectual archaeology. My aim is to bring back into view an idiosyncratic and largely forgotten approach to the theory of judgement that was developed around 1900 by Theodor Lipps, a pioneering but now rather obscure figure from the history of psychology. But I also hope to show that Lipps’ approach to the phenomenon of judgement is not just of antiquarian interest. Accordingly, my second aim is more narrowly philosophical: I propose (...) to assess the adequacy of Lipps’ approach to judgement by testing it against two objections — one phenomenological and one logical. (shrink)

The relation between critical thinking and race prejudice can be made obvious, once we grant that race prejudice cannot be supported by good reasons. For, if, as Harvey Siegel has pointed out, critical thinking is being "appropriately moved by reasons," then holding racially prejudiced beliefs is to believe without being appropriately moved by reasons, thereby being, in this regard at least, an uncritical thinker. A practical corollary of this, for those of us who espouse critical thinking as an educational ideal, (...) is that it is incumbent upon us to speak to the issue of race prejudice, an obvious and glaringly pernicious example of uncritical thought that affects one of, if not the most, central social and ethical issues of our times. (shrink)

This paper is about the efforts the norwegian psychologist Jan Smedslund made in analyzing and checking philosophically his theory called ‘Psycho-logic’. I am going to reconstruct and discuss the debates between Smedslund and several critics, which have been going on since about 1978, mainly in the “Scandinavian Journal of Psychology”. A result will be that the kind of modal logics Smedslund uses — a type with realistic semantics and epistemology — is not the proper one for the analysis (...) of ‘Psycho-logic’. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to develop a comparative analysis of the discursive structures that underlie the socialized formation of the interpretative paradigms of reality. We analyse how both political ideologies and the so-called “conspiracy theories” can be understood starting from the structure and functioning of Marc Augè's ideo-logic, namely the systemic-discursive device that defines the field of all possible sentences defining the real. -/- .

This study proposes a philosophical foundation for a Human Science research approach to psychological phenomena. The author examines the ground and origin of phenomenological thought by returning to the concept of Logos as founded by Heraclitus . The tensions between a descriptive and an interpretive approach to phenomenological research are exposed with the author arguing on behalf of the latter as more properly affirming the logic of "phenomenology" as rooted in the Greek terms . ;Heidegger's conception of language and (...) hermeneutics are examined with the author exposing Heidegger's "creative misreading" of Heraclitus' concept of Logos. The study suggests that a return to Heraclitus reveals Logos to mean "the hidden and logically structuring meaning" underlying a phenomenon. Arguing on behalf of the primacy of the hidden and latent as primordial to a phenomenological conception of Truth, the author suggests that a Human Science research approach to man must assign a key and central role to Freudian concepts and theory in order to do full justice to the human dynamism of man. ;Pondering phenomenological theory of language as developed by Heidegger, the author surveys the philosophical underpinnings of Jacques Lacan's "return to Freud." The author argues Lacan as most rigorously providing a philosophical framework for psychoanalysis and for affirming a phenomenological conception of language as rooted upon Heideggerian ontology and Heraclitus' concept of Logos Ricoeur's work is identified as setting the stage for a hermeneutical research praxis guided and informed by psychoanalytic theory. Ricoeur's theory of interpretation is analyzed, his neglect of the concept of the signifier as developed by Lacan highlighted. Lacan's reading of Freud in particular is argued as providing the Human Sciences with a valuable framework to better guide its research strategies. The author argues on behalf of the relevance of Lacan's conception of the signifier for a hermeneutical research praxis guided and informed by the notion of Logos. The author concludes by suggesting that the Human Sciences, and psychoanalysis and phenomenology by extension, should look to the concepts of lack, absence and death, in order to approach the Being and psychological life of man in a more genuinely depthful way. (shrink)

We live in societies emphasizing security and its complementary side of fear. In this work, I analyze the peripheral messages disseminated in the urban environment, whose function is that of regulating human and collective conduct through orienting specific forms of affective meaning-making. According to the perspective of Cultural Psychology of Semiotic Dynamics, affect and cognition work always together. Affect has the primacy in the relationship with the world and on top of affective distinctions we build conceptual distinctions. Thus, I describe (...) a type of semiotic process I have called “atmos-fear,” that works through the production of empty representamen that frames meaning. The concept of “atmos-fear” could be fruitfully developed to understand phenomena of politics, communication and construction of the Other in contemporary societies, where the dialogical relationship between security and fear is at stake. (shrink)

The present article addresses the logic of the sphere, or the Sphere Model of Consciousness developed by Patrizio Paoletti over three decades of research. M.E.D. Ed., 2002; Flussi, territori, luogo II. M.E.D. Ed., 2002; Fare il punto nave. M.E.D. Ed., 2005; In: Proceedings conference at Leslie and Susan Gonda Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center. Bar Ilan University. Faculty of Neuroscience, Israel, 2007; Osservazione—Quaderni di Pedagogia per il Terzo Millennio, Ed. 3P, 2011; Mediazione—Quaderni di Pedagogia per il Terzo Millennio, Ed. 3P, (...) 2011). The SMC model has been experimentally applied in the educational field and lies at the base of neuroscientific and psychoeducational research conducted by the Paoletti Foundation. In recent years, it has been studied by several researchers in the field of neuroscience. Following a logical-mathematical introduction regarding the properties of the spherical shape, we illustrate for the first time the structuring of the model and its neural foundations. We emphasize the central space of the sphere, defined by the geometric model and highlight its descriptive and heuristic properties in relation to the study of consciousness. Finally, we present educational applications of the model, particularly with respect to the center of the sphere, defined in the current context as the “place of pre-existence.”. (shrink)

The present article addresses the logic of the sphere, or the Sphere Model of Consciousness developed by Patrizio Paoletti over three decades of research. M.E.D. Ed., 2002; Flussi, territori, luogo II. M.E.D. Ed., 2002; Fare il punto nave. M.E.D. Ed., 2005; In: Proceedings conference at Leslie and Susan Gonda Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center. Bar Ilan University. Faculty of Neuroscience, Israel, 2007; Osservazione—Quaderni di Pedagogia per il Terzo Millennio, Ed. 3P, 2011; Mediazione—Quaderni di Pedagogia per il Terzo Millennio, Ed. 3P, (...) 2011). The SMC model has been experimentally applied in the educational field and lies at the base of neuroscientific and psychoeducational research conducted by the Paoletti Foundation. In recent years, it has been studied by several researchers in the field of neuroscience. Following a logical-mathematical introduction regarding the properties of the spherical shape, we illustrate for the first time the structuring of the model and its neural foundations. We emphasize the central space of the sphere, defined by the geometric model and highlight its descriptive and heuristic properties in relation to the study of consciousness. Finally, we present educational applications of the model, particularly with respect to the center of the sphere, defined in the current context as the “place of pre-existence.”. (shrink)

This book is a rationalist critique of the identity theory, oriented by a discussion of Feigl’s significance-reference distinction. Large chapters on the impossibility of identity, on both methodological and empirical grounds, are filled with helpful quotes and clear interpretations of contemporary theories. For Polten dualism is not resolved by language clarification. "Morning star" and "evening star" do not have the same sense, nor do they refer to the same extension. They could not be substituted for one another. "X = Y (...) if and only if X and Y have every property in common.... If I only show one property which is not common between mind and body, the identity theory is disconfirmed," logically. Empirically there are grounds for a dualist position because "... mind and brain are observed to be different." Epistemologically, "... what we do perceive is mind-dependent without exception;" the basis of experience is personal and a pure ego enables us to account for this privileged access. Polten tends to collapse distinctions between logic, epistemology, and ontology to provide a metaphysical overview in the pure ego. "... Object and subject merge, and the experience is one of self-illumination and transparence." His arguments do not justify this metaphysics, but he does make a case, in terms of his criticisms of attempts at reduction, for linguistic and epistemological dualism.—P.S. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Michael Wreen THE LOGIC OF IONESCO'S THE LESSON As men abound in copiousness of language, so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 4 (L a RiTHMETic leads to philology, and philology leads to crime."1 This is both XXthe plot and die pessimism of Ionesco's The Lesson. As the drama unfolds, the spectator watches the world of progress-through-education crumble and a world oflust (...) and murder rise in its ruins. What has gone wrong? In a word, the life oflogic has become the logic oflife. To understand Ionesco's lesson, we must examine the (largely implicit) logic and philosophy of language of his Lesson. Logic, whether die classical syllogistic logic of Aristode, the modern symbolic logic of Russell and Whitehead, or die dialectical logic of Hegel, has two essentia ] components: a syntax, which distinguishes permissible from impermissible combinations and inferences, and a semantics, which allows interpretation and thus fills out the purely formal shell provided by the former. Ionesco's strategy is to show how each of these components as diey have come to be developed philosophically is inadequate to its real content — life, and how, together, they lead, at least metaphorically, to life's devastation. These diree conceptual moments correspond to the three dramatic divisions of the play, marked out by the interruptions of die maid. Ionesco begins with the methodology of logic, syntax, and focuses on arithmetic, which, we are told, "is more a method than a science" (p. 50). Since the time of Descartes, arithmetic, or more generally mathematics, has been the academic discipline par excellence, the study diat all of the empirical sciences have aspired to. So completely has the idea of the mathematical nature of reality impressed itself upon us diat for many people it has acquired the status of an 229 230Philosophy and Literature unquestioned, and even unquestionable, assumption. And for many in this group, including the Professor, it is more dianjust an assumption; it is a way of life. "Let us arithmetize a little," he says to his pupil (p. 51), and his neologism refers not just to a subject matter, arithmetic, but to a way of dealing with subject matters and, ultimately, to a way of dealing with the whole of reality. The noun "arithmetic" has become a verb, and the ascendancy of abstract method has begun. Formal logic, in adi diree of its classic Western forms, is now subjected to sustained and specific criticism. Generally speaking, the Pupil represents Aristotelian and Russellian humanism, a view based on an optimistic belief in man's capacity for direct knowledge, in understanding through analysis by fine distinctions between terms, and in the elimination of paradoxes, both in logic and life. The Professor, again roughly speadcing, represents Hegeliainism, a view based on an optimistic belief in die capacity of reason to unify all oppositions and to overcome, through a higher syndiesis, the fundamentally paradoxical nature of all phenomena, including life itself. Thus, at die level of formal logic and ontology, the Professor amd the Pupil aire diametrically opposed, united only in their uncritical reliatnce upon a method of reason. This philosophical opposition is in turn correlated with a psycho-physical opposition: the Professor is male, old, retiring, and initially lifeless; the Pupil is female, young, forwaurd, amd initiadly vivacious. The confrontation of the two embodied philosophical/ psychological principles over die matter of arithmetic makes dieir opposition manifest and demonstrates, for the first time in the play, die utter inability of bodi philosophical traditions to maintain a grip on reality. This confrontation is also a struggle, one which the fresh, straightforward, vital Pupil begins with great success. She is "magnificent" in addition, and claims she can "count to infinity" — an ability which would vindicate her confident, optimistic belief in man's mental capacities, but an ability, nevertheless, which is logically impossible to possess, since "infinity" is not the name of a particulatrly large number, ais she seems to think. Her claim to understand reveals her as limited and ignorant of the deeper and paradoxical nature of her subject, and thus as in need of further, more abstract lessons. "One must also be able to subtract," die Professor... (shrink)

Study of Tattvacintāmaṇididhiti of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, commentary on Pakṣatā, portion of Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, dealing with the essential nature of proposition (pakṣatā), of Navya Nyāya school in Hindu philosophy.

The present paper deals thus with some fundamental agreements and disagreements between Peirce and James, on crucial issues such as perception and consciousness. When Peirce first read the Principles, he was sketching his theory of the categories, testing its applications in many fields of knowledge, and many investigations were launched, concerning indexicals, diagrams, growth and development. James's utterances led Peirce to make his own views clearer on a wide range of topics that go to the heart of the foundations of (...) psychology and that involve the relationship between perception and logic, between consciousness and the categories, between abstraction and the 'stream of thought'. The idea is to show that Peirce detected important discoveries and insights in the Principles, but felt that James could not make proper use of them because of logical confusions, and also because of his "clandestine" metaphysics. The point in this essay is thus not to look for remains of psychologism in Peirce's writings,13 but to look at Peirce's comments about James's psychology in an attempt to identify where and why Peirce amended James's views. Since the project to provide some insight on Peirce's extensive reading ofJames's Principles of Psycho/.ogy would deserve a full volume, I shall focus here on three occasions where Peirce explicidy commented on Jarnes's Principles. In the first section, I shall consider bis assessment of James's chapter on space, which was published as a series of articles in 1887, in Mind. I shall then turn to the 1891 review of the Principles in The Nation for important complements on perception as inference. In the third section, I shall deal with Peirce's manuscript "Questions on James's Principles"(Rl099). These "Questions" reveal a deep interest in psychological problems and suggest different ways along which Peirce's new advances in the field of the categories, of continuity, and abstraction could provide a proper basis for the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This work is a defense of positivism in social theory: Addis is committed to the view that the substantive concerns of physical and social science are essentially the same. Indeed, he states that an adequate philosophy of society presupposes an adequate philosophy of science. He therefore begins with an analysis of various themes from the latter: causation, the notions of process and closed systems, and determinism. It is in fact a basic presumption of the book that some refined theory of (...) determinism is true. The author argues that all "social objects," such as those posited by Durkheim, are no more than properties of, or relations between, individual social beings. In the course of this argument, he develops a detailed treatment of reduction of the social into the physical sciences. It is his belief that logical analysis of the notion of reduction is essential to an understanding of social theory. Reduction is examined in two phases. First, he elaborates on his contention that social objects reduce to individual human beings. Second, he examines the reduction of socio-historical explanations to psycho-physical laws. He then proceeds to apply the preceding discussions to problems of philosophy of history, the relation of ideas to historical process, freedom and purpose in history, and a critique of "Marxism.". (shrink)

Frege's diatribes against psychologism have often been taken to imply that he thought that logic and thought have nothing to do with each other. I argue against this interpretation and attribute to Frege a view on which the two are tightly connected. The connection, however, derives not from logic's being founded on the empirical laws of thought but rather from thought's depending constitutively on the application to it of logic. I call this view 'psycho-logicism.'.

Charles Sanders Peirce was acknowledged by William James as the founder of pragmatism; however, while James’ appreciation for psychology is well taken into account in his philosophy, the role that psychological inquiry played in Peirce’s thought remains largely unexplored. Few excellent studies indicate Peirce as the first American experimental psychologist (Cadwallader 1974, 1975; Fisch 1986) and as the first to perform a truly modern experiment in psycho-physics (Hacking 1988). Nonetheless, Peirce’s commitment to psycho-physics fails to be fully integrated (...) with the broader project of his philosophy. This integration is crucial to gain a better understanding of the complexity of Peirce’s system of thought and of his position in the psychologistic-antipsychologistic divide. On the logical side, making Peirce’s position on psychology explicit leads to investigating his material logic; on the psychological side, Peirce’s scientific approach to psychology has its theoretical foundation in Kant and further marks the distinction between Peirce’s pragmatism and James’. (shrink)

I read Stefan Collini’s What are Universities For? last week with very mixed feelings. In the past, I’ve much admired his polemical essays on the REF, “impact”, the Browne Report, etc. in the London Review of Books and elsewhere: they speak to my heart. If you don’t know those essays, you can get some of their flavour from his latest article in the Guardian yesterday. But I found the book a disappointment. Perhaps the trouble is that Collini is too decent, (...) too high-minded, has too unrealistically exalted a view about what actually happens in universities which is too coloured by attitudes appropriate to the traditional humanities. And he is optimistic to the point of fantasy if he thinks that people are so susceptible to “the romance of ideas and the power of beauty” that they will want, or can be brought to want, lots and lots of universities in order to promote the ideas (as if they would suppose that the task of “conserving, understanding, extending and handing on to subsequent generations the intellectual, scientific, and artistic heritage of mankind” was clearly ill-served when there were only forty universities in England, as opposed to a hundred and whatever). (shrink)