Abstract

This book is a rationalist critique of the identity theory, oriented by a discussion of Feigl’s significance-reference distinction. Large chapters on the impossibility of identity, on both methodological and empirical grounds, are filled with helpful quotes and clear interpretations of contemporary theories. For Polten dualism is not resolved by language clarification. "Morning star" and "evening star" do not have the same sense, nor do they refer to the same extension. They could not be substituted for one another. "X = Y if and only if X and Y have every property in common.... If I only show one property which is not common between mind and body, the identity theory is disconfirmed," logically. Empirically there are grounds for a dualist position because "... mind and brain are observed to be different." Epistemologically, "... what we do perceive is mind-dependent without exception;" the basis of experience is personal and a pure ego enables us to account for this privileged access. Polten tends to collapse distinctions between logic, epistemology, and ontology to provide a metaphysical overview in the pure ego. "... Object and subject merge, and the experience is one of self-illumination and transparence." His arguments do not justify this metaphysics, but he does make a case, in terms of his criticisms of attempts at reduction, for linguistic and epistemological dualism.—P.S.