The first priority of this response is to address Libet's rebuttal of my reinterpretation of his data. Then, because many authors have commented on various aspects of the debate, the rest of the response is organized in terms of subject matter, not as replies to each individual commentator. First, I reply to an objection expressed by two separate commentators to part of my reinterpretation of those of Libet's data supposedly supporting backward referral. This leads to a brief discussion of the (...) whole concept of backward referral. The relevance of the flash-lag illusion to possible measurement errors in the Libet/Trevena and Miller paradigm is addressed next. Finally, I have a few words to say on the relationship between quantum mechanical ontology and free will. (shrink)

The integration of the global economy has led to an increasingly strong connection between the futures and spot markets of commodities. First, based on one-minute high-frequency prices, this paper applies the thermal optimal path method to examine the lead-lag relationship between Chinese crude oil futures and spot from March 2018 to December 2021. Second, we apply the Mixed Frequency Data Sampling Regression model and indicators such as deviation degree to test the degree of prediction of high-frequency prices in the (...) futures market to the spot market. The experimental results show that the futures markets lead the spot market most of the time, but the lead effect reverses when major events occur; 60-minute futures high-frequency prices are the most predictive of daily spot data; crude oil futures’ predictive power declined after the Covid-19 outbreak and is more predictive when night trading is available. This study has important implications, not only to guide investors but also to provide empirical evidence and valid information for policy makers. (shrink)

DNA replication stress threatens ordinary DNA synthesis. The evolutionarily conserved DNA replication stress response pathway involves sensor kinase Mec1/ATR, adaptor protein Mrc1/Claspin, and effector kinase Rad53/Chk1, which spurs a host of changes to stabilize replication forks and maintain genome integrity. DNA replication forks consist of largely distinct sets of proteins at leading and lagging strands that function autonomously in DNA synthesis in vitro. In this article, we discuss eSPAN and BrdU‐IP‐ssSeq, strand‐specific sequencing technologies that permit analysis of protein localization and (...) DNA synthesis at individual strands in budding yeast. Using these approaches, we show that under replication stress Rad53 stalls DNA synthesis on both leading and lagging strands. On lagging strands, it stimulates PCNA unloading, and on leading strands, it attenuates the replication function of Mrc1‐Tof1. We propose that in doing so, Rad53 couples leading and lagging strand DNA synthesis during replication stress, thereby preventing the emergence of harmful ssDNA. (shrink)

In the flash-lag effect a non-moving object is quickly flashed directly underneath a moving object, which leads us to perceive the non-moving object as “lagging” the moving object, even though the two objects actually occupy the same horizontal position at the time of the flash. In the example above, for instance, a red square moves across a screen. At the midpoint of the red square’s journey from one side to the other, a green square is quickly presented (flashed) just below. (...) Despite the fact that the two stimuli are presented at the same coordinates along the x axis, the stationary square is perceived as behind the moving square. The perceived lag of the flashed stationary object becomes greater when the speed of the moving object is increased and vice versa (Nijhawan 1994). (shrink)

We present a taxonomy of errors in the scientific literature and an account of how the errors are distributed over the categories. We have developed the taxonomy by studying substantial errors in the scientific literature as described in retraction notices published in the journal Science over the past 35 years. We then examine how the sorts of errors that lead to retracted papers can be prevented and detected, considering the perspective of collaborating scientists, journal editors (...) and referees, and readers of the published articles. (shrink)

According to moral error theorists, moral claims necessarily represent categorically or robustly normative facts. But since there are no such facts, moral thought and discourse are systematically mistaken. One widely discussed objection to the moral error theory is that it cannot be true because it leads to an epistemic error theory. We argue that this objection is mistaken. Objectors may be right that the epistemic error theory is untenable. We also agree with epistemic realists that our epistemological claims are not (...) systematically in error. However, this is not because there are robustly normative facts, but rather because the truth of our epistemic claims doesn’t turn on whether there are such facts. Epistemic facts, we argue, are not robustly or categorically normative. Moral error theorists should therefore respond to the objection that their view does not commit them to the epistemic error theory. (shrink)

Medical error is a leading problem of health care in the United States. Each year, more patients die as a result of medical mistakes than are killed by motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS. While most government and regulatory efforts are directed toward reducing and preventing errors, the actions that should follow the injury or death of a patient are still hotly debated. According to Nancy Berlinger, conversations on patient safety are missing several important components: religious voices, traditions, (...) and models. In After Harm, Berlinger draws on sources in theology, ethics, religion, and culture to create a practical and comprehensive approach to addressing the needs of patients, families, and clinicians affected by medical error. She emphasizes the importance of acknowledging fallibility, telling the truth, confronting feelings of guilt and shame, and providing just compensation. After Harm adds important human dimensions to an issue that has profound consequences for patients and health care providers. (shrink)

The paper examines Kant’s self-criticism to the account of hypothetical imperatives given in the "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals". Following his corrections in the introductions to the third "Critique", the paper traces the consequences of that change in his later writings, specifically with regard to the status of prudence. I argue that the revision of the account of hypothetical imperatives leads to differentiate, and ultimately separate, two functions in prudence: the setting of ends through maxims, and the pragmatic rules (...) establishing means to reach those ends. Accordingly, I furthermore argue, there is ultimately no genuine structural distinction between the rules of prudence and skill. The only difference lies in the domain in which prudence unfolds, that is, the field of human relations, and in the relevant cognitions. (shrink)

Despite the fact that many of our beliefs are justified by perceptual experience, there is relatively little exploration of the connections between epistemic justification and perceptual content. This is unfortunate since it seems likely that some views of justification will require particular views of content, and the package of the two might be quite a bit less attractive than either view considered alone. I will argue that this is the case for epistemic internalism. In particular, epistemic internalism requires a view (...) of perceptual content that results in an error theory of perception. This, in turn, hobbles the internalist’s account of perceptual justification. While there are various stages along the way at which one can resist the argument, each one will involve significant commitments that highlight heretofore unacknowledged connections between justification and content. Even if the internalist is willing to make these moves and resist the argument, the argument reveals a novel way for the epistemic externalist to resist one of internalism’s main arguments. (shrink)

Barnett and Block claim that Bagus and Howden support indirectly the concept of market failure. In this paper, we show that maturity mismatching in an unhampered market may imply entrepreneurial error but cannot be considered a market failure. We demonstrate why fractional-reserve banking leads to business cycles even if there is no central bank and why maturity mismatching does not per se lead to clusters of errors in a free market. Finally, in contrast to the examples provided by (...) Barnett and Block, we assure that maturity mismatching does not imply the creation of two incompatible contracts due to the fungible nature of money. (shrink)

Grzegorz W. Kolodko, one of the world's leading authorities on economics and development policy and a key architect of Poland's successful economic reforms, applies his far-reaching knowledge to the past and future of the world economy, introducing a framework for understanding our global situation that transcends any single discipline or paradigm. Deploying a novel mix of scientific evaluation and personal observation, Kolodko begins with a brief discussion of misinformation and its perpetuation in economics and politics. He criticizes the simplification of (...) complex economic and social issues and investigates the link between developments in the global economy and cultural change, scientific discoveries, and political fluctuations. Underscoring the necessity of conceptual and theoretical innovation in understanding our global economic situation, Kolodko offers a provocative study of globalization and the possibility of coming out ahead in an era of worldwide interdependence. Deeply critical of neoliberalism, which sought to transfer economic control exclusively to the private sector, Kolodko explores the virtues of social-economic development and the new rules of the economic game. He concludes with a look at our near and distant future, questioning whether we have a say in its making. (shrink)

Grzegorz W. Kolodko, one of the world's leading authorities on economics and development policy and a key architect of Poland's successful economic reforms, applies his far-reaching knowledge to the past and future of the world economy, introducing a framework for understanding our global situation that transcends any single discipline or paradigm. Deploying a novel mix of scientific evaluation and personal observation, Kolodko begins with a brief discussion of misinformation and its perpetuation in economics and politics. He criticizes the simplification of (...) complex economic and social issues and investigates the link between developments in the global economy and cultural change, scientific discoveries, and political fluctuations. Underscoring the necessity of conceptual and theoretical innovation in understanding our global economic situation, Kolodko offers a provocative study of globalization and the possibility of coming out ahead in an era of worldwide interdependence. Deeply critical of neoliberalism, which sought to transfer economic control exclusively to the private sector, Kolodko explores the virtues of social-economic development and the new rules of the economic game. He concludes with a look at our near and distant future, questioning whether we have a say in its making. (shrink)

In order to reduce the dimensionality of parameter space and enhance out-of-sample forecasting performance, this research compares regularization techniques with Autometrics in time-series modeling. We mainly focus on comparing weighted lag adaptive LASSO with Autometrics, but as a benchmark, we estimate other popular regularization methods LASSO, AdaLASSO, SCAD, and MCP. For analytical comparison, we implement Monte Carlo simulation and assess the performance of these techniques in terms of out-of-sample Root Mean Square Error, Gauge, and Potency. The comparison is assessed with (...) varying autocorrelation coefficients and sample sizes. The simulation experiment indicates that, compared to Autometrics and other regularization approaches, the WLAdaLASSO outperforms the others in covariate selection and forecasting, especially when there is a greater linear dependency between predictors. In contrast, the computational efficiency of Autometrics decreases with a strong linear dependency between predictors. However, under the large sample and weak linear dependency between predictors, the Autometrics potency ⟶ 1 and gauge ⟶ α. In contrast, LASSO, AdaLASSO, SCAD, and MCP select more covariates and possess higher RMSE than Autometrics and WLAdaLASSO. To compare the considered techniques, we made the Generalized Unidentified Model for covariate selection and out-of-sample forecasting for the trade balance of Pakistan. We train the model on 1985–2015 observations and 2016–2020 observations as test data for the out-of-sample forecast. (shrink)

Error theories about practical deontic judgements claim that no substantive practical deontic judgement is true. Practical deontic judgements are practical in the sense that they concern actions, and they are deontic in the sense that they are about reasons, rightness, wrongness, and obligations. This paper assumes the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements in order to examine its ramifications. I defend three contentions. The first is that, if so-called fitting-attitude analyses of value fail, the truth of some (...) substantive evaluative judgements would not be threatened by the fact that no substantive practical deontic judgment is true. Secondly, in light of the truth of these evaluative judgements, the best thing we could do is to continue to make practical deontic judgements despite the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements. My third contention is that, if some evaluative judgements are unaffected by an error theory about practical deontic judgements, then such an error theory will eventually lead us to some version of consequentialism. (shrink)

Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal (...) of the task, leading to a characteristic pattern of errors. Specifically, participants were asked to memorize two types of novel facts: quantified facts about sets of kind members and generic facts about entire kinds. Moreover, half of the facts concerned properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind, and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic. We predicted that—because of the hypothesized bias—participants would spontaneously generalize the quantified facts to the corresponding kinds, and would do so more frequently for the facts about generalizable properties. In turn, these generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified-to-generic memory errors for the generalizable properties. The results of four experiments supported this prediction. Moreover, the same generalizable-versus-idiosyncratic difference in memory errors occurred even under cognitive load, which suggests that the hypothesized bias operates unnoticed in the background, requiring few cognitive resources. In sum, this evidence suggests the presence of a powerful bias to draw generalizations about kinds. (shrink)

The Bayesian theory is outlined and its status as a logic defended. In this it is contrasted with the development and extension of Neyman-Pearson methodology by Mayo in her recently published book (1996). It is shown by means of a simple counterexample that the rule of inference advocated by Mayo is actually unsound. An explanation of why error-probablities lead us to believe that they supply a sound rule is offered, followed by a discussion of two apparently powerful objections to (...) the Bayesian theory, one concerning old evidence and the other optional stopping. (shrink)

In simulation-based learning environments, 'unexpected' phenomena often work as counterexamples which promote a learner to reconsider the problem. It is important that counterexamples contain sufficient information which leads a learner to correct understanding. This paper proposes a method for creating such counterexamples. Error-Based Simulation (EBS) is used for this purpose, which simulates the erroneous motion in mechanics based on a learner's erroneous equation. Our framework is as follows: (1) to identify the cause of errors by comparing a learner's answer (...) with the problem-solver's correct one, (2) to visualize the cause of errors by the unnatural motions in EBS. To perform (1), misconceptions are classified based on problem-solving model, and related to their appearance on a learner's answers (error-identification rules). To perform (2), objects' motions in EBS are classified and related to their suggesting misconceptions (error-visualization rules). A prototype system is implemented and evaluated through a preliminary test, to confirm the usefulness of the framework. (shrink)

The inflation of Type I error rates is thought to be one of the causes of the replication crisis. Questionable research practices such as p-hacking are thought to inflate Type I error rates above their nominal level, leading to unexpectedly high levels of false positives in the literature and, consequently, unexpectedly low replication rates. In this article, I offer an alternative view. I argue that questionable and other research practices do not usually inflate relevant Type I error rates. I begin (...) with an introduction to Type I error rates that distinguishes them from theoretical errors. I then illustrate my argument with respect to model misspecification, multiple testing, selective inference, forking paths, exploratory analyses, p-hacking, optional stopping, double dipping, and HARKing. In each case, I demonstrate that relevant Type I error rates are not usually inflated above their nominal level, and in the rare cases that they are, the inflation is easily identified and resolved. I conclude that the replication crisis may be explained, at least in part, by researchers’ misinterpretation of statistical errors and their underestimation of theoretical errors. (shrink)

Theoretical arguments and empirical investigations indicate that a high proportion of published findings do not replicate and are likely false. The current position paper provides a broad perspective on scientific error, which may lead to replication failures. This broad perspective focuses on reform history and on opportunities for future reform. We organize our perspective along four main themes: institutional reform, methodological reform, statistical reform and publishing reform. For each theme, we illustrate potential errors by narrating the story of (...) a fictional researcher during the research cycle. We discuss future opportunities for reform. The resulting agenda provides a resource to usher in an era that is marked by a research culture that is less error-prone and a scientific publication landscape with fewer spurious findings. (shrink)

We seem to directly perceive external things. But can we? According to the time‐lag argument, we cannot. What we directly perceive happens now. There is a time‐lag between our perceptions and the external things we seem to directly perceive; these external things happen in the past; thus, what we directly perceive must be something else, for example, sense‐data, and we can only at best indirectly perceive other things. This paper examines the time‐lag argument given contemporary metaphysics. I argue that this (...) argument is not as compelling as it may initially seem. First, it denies that what we directly perceive can ever be what it seems to be; second, it conflicts with the current physical conception of time, relativity theory. This latter point leads to a more general one: the argument's force depends on a particular metaphysical conception on time, presentism, which is controversial in contemporary metaphysics of time. Given the alternative conception, eternalism, the argument is much less compelling. The overall argument of this paper, then, is that, if one wishes to hold that we directly perceive external things, we should subscribe to the latter view of time, i.e., eternalism. (shrink)

Perception of the external world is an essential part of the animal (including human) life, both as a source of knowledge and as a way to survive. Medieval authors accepted this view, and despite general concerns about the reliability of the senses in the acquisition of certain and objective knowledge, they thought that for the most part our perceptual system gets things right when it comes to the perceptual features of things—but not always. Our article focuses on thirteenth- and fourteenth-century (...) philosophical discussions of illusions and other types of perceptual errors. Reception of incorrect information, misjudgments concerning perceptual objects, the binding problem, and similar cases that explain perceptual errors will be analyzed. We discuss what might be called medieval Aristotelian/Avicennian theories of perception and the internal senses (drawing mainly from Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas), as well as the so-called perspectivist accounts of perception, especially that by Alhacen. Finally, we take up a debate between Peter Auriol and his critics, which contains elements that can be seen as precursors of later skeptical worries. The concern here is that, just like in contemporary discussions leading to disjunctivism, the absence of a secure way to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical perception leads to a general worry about the reliability of our experience of the world. (shrink)

In the last few decades the role played by models and modeling activities has become a central topic in the scientific enterprise. In particular, it has been highlighted both that the development of models constitutes a crucial step for understanding the world and that the developed models operate as mediators between theories and the world. Such perspective is exploited here to cope with the issue as to whether error-based and uncertainty-based modeling of measurement are incompatible, and thus alternative with one (...) another, as sometimes claimed nowadays. The crucial problem is whether assuming this standpoint implies definitely renouncing to maintain a role for truth and the related concepts, particularly accuracy, in measurement. It is argued here that the well known objections against true values in measurement, which would lead to refuse the concept of accuracy as non-operational, or to maintain it as only qualitative, derive from a not clear distinction between three distinct processes: the metrological characterization of measuring systems, their calibration, and finally measurement. Under the hypotheses that (1) the concept of true value is related to the model of a measurement process, (2) the concept of uncertainty is related to the connection between such model and the world, and (3) accuracy is a property of measuring systems (and not of measurement results) and uncertainty is a property of measurement results (and not of measuring systems), not only the compatibility but actually the conjoint need of error-based and uncertainty-based modeling emerges. (shrink)

This paper claims as erroneous the current widespread representation of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) as primarily condemning as intrinsically bad actions involving intentional harm. The DDE's Four Conditions are in fact used solely for justifying certain intrinsically good actions with both intended good and unintended bad effects. Though contemporary writers assign a minor justificatory role to the DDE this is incompatible with their attribution to it of a primary prohibitive role. Not only is the conduct cited by these (...) writers as justifiable under the DDE so morally innocuous as to require no justification, but any attempt to justify it by appeal to the DDE leads to incoherence. We finally suggest reasons for this misinterpretation in current concerns with the structure of deontological moral theories. (shrink)

Darwinian evolutionary theory has two key terms, variations and biological selection, which finally lead to survival of the fittest variant. With the rise of molecular genetics, variations were explained as results of error replications out of the genetic master templates. For more than half a century, it has been accepted that new genetic information is mostly derived from random error-based events. But the error replication narrative has problems explaining the sudden emergence of new species, new phenotypic traits, and genome (...) innovations as a sudden single event. Meanwhile, it is recognized that errors cannot explain the evolution of genetic information, genetic novelty, and complexity. Now, empirical evidence establishes the crucial role of non-random genetic content editors, such as viruses, diversity generating retroelements, and other RNA networks, to produce new genetic information, complex regulatory control, inheritance vectors, genetic identity, immunity, new sequence space, evolution of complex organisms, and evolutionary transitions. (shrink)

Recent work has demonstrated that academic research faces serious challenges. Incentives to defend publishable ideas often lead researchers astray. Despite their tendency to produce error, efforts to publish erroneous results typically help a researcher's career. In addition, errors often arise from seemingly innocent methodological assumptions that allow researchers to believe their research is sound. This article discusses this research, as well as research into difficulties facing epistemic rationality caused by nonepistemic incentives. It then applies the lessons of this (...) research to philosophical practice. It explains why philosophy likely suffers from these problems. It then provides an example of a widely shared methodological assumption that allows such research to be pursued and regularly published. It claims that the significance philosophers place on arguments is inappropriate, and that typical evaluations of philosophical arguments involve an instance of the base-rate fallacy. It concludes by discussing whether or not this article is self-defeating. (shrink)

Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge (...) that underlies the new require- ment provides a better account of inexact knowledge and higher-order knowledge than both Williamson’s and Halpern’s. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to find out whether ethical leadership has an impact on employees’ organizational identification and the perceptions of organizational politics moderate this process. To this end, to ensure triangulation on findings, two separate researches were made. First, a cross-sectional survey was conducted on 137 employees who worked at the head office of a private bank in Istanbul using self-report questionnaires. Second, 2 years later, a time-lagged survey was conducted on 119 employees who worked at the (...) same organization. Hierarchical regression analyses were performed on the collected data from studies 1 and 2. Findings of both studies indicated that ethical leadership resulted in organizational identification slightly more weakly in employees who perceived organizational politics. Drawing on findings, new researches investigating impacts of organizational politics on managerial processes in other organizations may be conducted in the future. Moreover, organizational leaders, who realized the adverse consequences of organizational politics, may take precautions against such tactics. Finally, findings may be noteworthy, because this research is believed to be the first to investigate empirically the moderating role of organizational politics in the association between ethical leadership and employees’ organizational identification. (shrink)

Ordinary moral thought often commits what social psychologists call 'the fundamental attribution error '. This is the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent's distinctive character traits. In fact, there is no evidence that people have character traits in the relevant sense. Since attribution of character traits leads to much evil, we should try to educate ourselves and others to stop doing it.

The thesis addresses the issues of error through misidentification and immunity to error through misidentification in relation to the problem of the first person. First, it provides an explanation of error through misidentification. Secondly, it shows that there are two possible ways of understanding immunity to error through misidentification. It is then argued that the first understanding of immunity to error through misidentification leads to what is labelled "the trilemma about the self". That is to say, either we provide an (...) explanation of immunity to error through misidentification, but we subscribe to two contentious metaphysical views about the self-the Cartesian and the Idealist; or else we hold the view that the self is identical with a human being, but we have no explanation of immunity to error through misidentification. It is then shown that in order to solve the trilemma, a different understanding of immunity to error through misidentification must be offered. After discussing various possible understandings of immunity to error through misidentification, a sound account of it is finally provided. Moreover, it is shown how non-inferential, introspection-based mental self-ascriptions can comply with it, in such a way that they turn out to be logically immune to error through misidentification. Finally, by drawing on Evans' and Peacocke's accounts of the possession conditions of the first person concept-in which IEM I-judgements play a central role-, it is shown that it is a concept of a human being who thinks of herself as such. Hence, our first person concept is firmly anti-Cartesian and anti-Idealist. As a consequence, it is maintained that not only is there no need to hold the Cartesian and the Idealist metaphysics of the self in order to explain why some I-judgements can be immune to error through misidentification, but it is also argued that one can no longer be either Cartesian or Idealist. For that would expose one to conceptual incoherence. (shrink)

Let us now examine one of these radical positions, say, the sceptical one first. According to this, since error is a fact, we may as well treat every perception as erroneous, only undetected so far and so accepted as true. But if we accept error as a fact we must also accept truth as such, for an error cannot be known as one unless we know something as true. When one says one mistook a rope for a snake one must (...) know the rope truly, otherwise there can be no mistake. One may think erroneously, "I am apparently seeing a rope but it may be that I am only imagining it, just as I imagined the snake; I may be mistaking something else for a rope." But then one must also see that as the rope is thus doubted, the unreality of the snake must also be doubted, for it is against the rope as real that the snake becomes unreal. And now one would have to say, "Perhaps I am imagining this rope which might really be the snake I thought I imagine." But in this state of oscillation one cannot pronounce any judgment at all, and so cannot assert anything about the truth and falsity of any perception. The original perception proving false leads one, through analogy, to doubt the latter perception. But if there is a doubt regarding the falsity of the original perception, there cannot be a legitimate doubt regarding the validity of the later one. More generally we may say that if one doubts one's perceptions of certain objects on the ground that some perceptions regarding these had proved false in the past, this doubt logically involves the possibility of those perceptions, rejected as false being true. So that though one may psychologically take up the attitude of doubt with respect to every perception, this attitude has no rational backing. If, however, one doubts certain objects of perception because some other perceptions e.g., snakes) proved false, one has only a weak analogy and is, moreover, forced to doubt all perceptions, including those which proved certain perceptions false, thereby starting the original doubt. But then the reasoning given above which will dispel this doubt will have to be applied. So that this doubt cannot be rationally justified. The argument that since certain perceptions have proved false therefore every one of them may prove so is, after all, a very weak one. A perception is false only when it is falsified by a true one, and we cannot doubt a perception unless it is so falsified. (shrink)

In his paper, Jakob Hohwy outlines a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction-error minimization, which he claims has the potential to profoundly alter our understanding of mind and cognition. One manner in which our understanding of the mind is altered, according to PEM, stems from the neurocentric conception of the mind that falls out of the framework, which portrays the mind as “inferentially-secluded” from its environment. This in turn leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. (...) Focusing on this aspect of Hohwy’s argument, we first outline the key components of the PEM framework such as the “evidentiary boundary,” before looking at why this leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. We will argue that although Hohwy may be correct to reject specific theses of embodied cognition, others are in fact implied by the PEM framework and may contribute to its development. We present the metaphor of the “body as a laboratory” in order to highlight wha... (shrink)

A diploid human genome contains approximately six billion nucleotides. This enormous amount of genetic information can be replicated with great accuracy in only a few hours. However, because DNA strands are oriented antiparallel while DNA polymerization only occurs in the 5′ → 3′ direction, semi‐conservative replication of double‐stranded DNA is an asymmetric process, i.e., there is a leading and a lagging strand. This provides a considerable opportunity for non‐random error rates, because the architecture of the two strands as well as (...) the DNA polymerases that replicate them may be different. In addition, the proteins that start or finish chains may well be different from those that perform the bulk of chain elongation. Furthermore, while replication fidelity depends on the absolute and relative concentrations of the four deoxyribonucleotide precursors, these are not equal in vivo, not constant throughout the cell cycle, and not necessarily equivalent in all cell types. Finally, the fidelity of DNA synthesis is sequence‐dependent and the eukaryotic nuclear genome is a heterogeneous substrate. It contains repetitive and non‐repetitive sequences and can actually be considered as two subgenomes that differ in nucleotide composition and gene content and that replicate at different times. The effects that each of these asymmetries may have on error rates during replication of the eukaryotic genome are discussed. (shrink)

Based on instructions people can form task representations that shield relevant from seemingly irrelevant information. It has been documented that instructions can tie people to a particular way of performing a task despite that in principle a more efficient way could be learned and used. Since task shielding can lead to persistence of inefficient variants of task performance, it is relevant to test whether individuals with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder – characterized by less task shielding – are more likely and (...) quicker to escape a suboptimal instructed variant of performing a task. The paradigm used in this online study builds on the observation that in many environments different covarying features could be used to determine the appropriate response. For instance, as they approach a traffic light, drivers and pedestrians monitor the color and/or the position of the signal. Similarly, we instructed participants to respond to the color of a stimulus without mentioning that color covaried with the position of the stimulus. In order to assess whether with practice participants would use the non-instructed feature position to an increasing extent, we compared reaction times and error rates for standard trials to trials in which color was either ambiguous or did not match the usual covariation. Results showed that the covariation learning task can be administered online to adult participants with and without ADHD. Performance differences suggested that with practice ADHD participants might increase attention to non-instructed stimulus features. Yet, they used the non-instructed covarying stimulus feature to a similar extent as other participants. Together the results suggest that participants with ADHD do not lag behind in abandoning instructed task processing in favor of a learned alternative strategy. (shrink)

We first deal with a few preliminary matters and discuss what-if any-distinct impact belief in moral error theory should have on our moral practice. Second, we describe what is involved in giving an answer to our leading question and take notice of some factors that are relevant to what an adequate answer might look like. We also argue that the specific details of adequate answers to our leading question will depend largely on context. Third, we consider three extant answers to (...) our leading question: fictionalism, conservationism, and abolitionism. Of these three, conservationism seems most promising. However, conservationism leaves pertinent questions unanswered. In order to provide answers to these questions, and ultimately to provide an answer to our leading question, conservationism needs to be supplemented, yielding an account we call “negotiationism.” This final proposal is not neat and tidy, but it might work reasonably well in the moral environment in which error theorists are likely to find themselves. (shrink)

Non-classical science gives a very specific answer to the question of scientific errors and their epistemological value. But for all the specificity of this answer, it casts light on a problem that remains with us century after century, the historically constant problem of truth and error—one of the most fundamental problems of knowledge. At first sight, these two poles have always stood opposite each other, like good and evil, beauty and ugliness. But moral and aesthetic theories have long since (...) left behind this initial conception, and shown that the two polar concepts are in fact inseparable. As regards truth and error, their indivisibility has only become apparent in the context of non-classical science. Truth has ceased to be the absolute contradiction of error. Contemporary science finds it to be something relative, inseparable from its opposite pole. But the non-classical, retrospective approach, a re-evaluation of the past of science in the light of its present, and indeed even more in the light of its prognosis, its future, allows one to see that scientific truths that are adequate for the object of knowledge always reflect only one side of the objective world, a world which has an infinite number of sides. The irreversible process that leads from relative error to relative truth has an absolute character: an irreversible process of generalization, concretization and complication of a Weltanschauung that more accurately reflects the infinite complexity of life. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Augustine’s response to two Socratic statements: his exhortation for us to know ourselves, and his claim that he knows only that he knows nothing. Augustine addresses these statements in many works, but I focus in particular on his discussion of error in Contra Academicos, and his account of self-knowing (and not-knowing) in De Trinitate (DT). -/- For Augustine, error can occur in at least four distinct ways, and one of his main purposes in Contra Academicos (...) is to show that having an overly narrow view of error, focused on only one of those ways—namely, approving a falsehood as a truth—too easily leads to skepticism. He argues instead that erring can be a sin both of commission and of omission, and that failing to assent when one should assent is just as problematic as assenting when one should not. In both Contra Academicos and De Trinitate, Augustine extends his position by exploring the ways in which one can achieve epistemic certainty. But in doing this, he also offers scattered remarks about how one recognizes that one has not yet achieved certain knowledge, and thus about how one can know that one does not know. It is here that Augustine’s views are the most muddled, since he simultaneously claims that we (as humans in this life) are ignorant in many fundamental ways, that knowledge of something requires knowledge of that thing as a whole, and that nevertheless we can know ourselves, which obviously involves knowing that we do not know. It is to this puzzling group of claims that the remainder of the paper is addressed. (shrink)

An attention shift from a stationary to a changing object has to occur in feature space, in order to bind these stimuli into a unitary percept. This time-consuming shift leads to the perception of a changing stimulus further ahead along its trajectory. This attentional framework is able to accommodate the flash-lag effect in its multiple empirical manifestations.

This paper examines the suggestion that infinitivaltoomission errors in English-speaking children can result from competition between two constructions (Kirjavainen et al., First Language 29: 313–339, 2009a). Kirjavainen et al. suggested that the acquisition of two (or more) constructions (e.g., WANT-X and WANT-to) for verbs takingto-infinitival complement clauses can lead to infinitivaltoomissions, reflecting the relative frequencies of the constructions in the input. In the present study we analysed 13 English children's corpora to determine whether the presence of a variety (...) of utterance types in the immediate discourse context preceding WANT-to-VP (e.g.,I want to eat it) and erroneous *WANT-zero-VP (e.g., *I want__drink it) constructions was associated with infinitivaltoproduction/omission. This was done separately for the children's own and their interlocutors' discourse utterances. The data show that the occurrence of WANT-toand WANT-X constructions in the prior discourse was associated with differing proportions of infinitivaltoprovision in the WANT-to/zero-VP construction. This together with Kirjavainen et al.'s (First Language 29: 313–339, 2009a) data suggests that children are learning at least two constructions for the verb WANT, that competition contributes to infinitivaltoomissions, and that the strength of competing representations is affected by overall input frequencies and the preceding discourse. (shrink)

Medical errors are the third leading cause of death in the United States, and there is growing consensus that medical errors should be discussed after they occur. This essay argues that potential errors should be discussed with patients as well in the informed consent process prior to treatment. While physicians don’t have the obligation to tell patients to go to physicians and hospitals that would present less potential for error, patients should be told of increased risks compared (...) to other options, and be guided through the data on physician and hospital rankings. Suggestions are given to improve this informed consent process. (shrink)