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  1.  68
    Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology provides a novel account of the structure of epistemic justification. Its central claim builds upon Wittgenstein's idea in On Certainty that epistemic justifications hinge on some basic assumptions and that epistemic rationality extends to these very hinges. It exploits these ideas to address major problems in epistemology, such as the nature of perceptual justifications, external world skepticism, epistemic relativism, the epistemic status of basic logical laws, of the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature, of our (...)
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  2.  48
    Moore and Wittgenstein: scepticism, certainty, and common sense.Annalisa Coliva - 2010 - New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? Answers to these questions are offered through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
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  3.  28
    The Varieties of Self-Knowledge.Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - London: Palgrave.
    This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the (...)
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  4. Disagreement unhinged, constitutivism style.Annalisa Coliva & Michele Palmira - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):402-415.
    Hinge epistemology has to dispel the worry that disagreeing over hinges is rationally inert. Building on a companion piece (Coliva and Palmira 2020), this paper offers a constitutivist solution to the problem of rational inertia by maintaining that a Humean sceptic and a hinge epistemologist disagree over the correct explication of the concept of epistemic rationality. The paper explores the implications of such a solution. First, it clarifies in what sense a disagreement over hinges would be a conceptual disagreement. Secondly, (...)
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  5. What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-14.
    Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus is hard to find. Some think this should lead us to embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know, or justifiably believe, the philosophical views we defend and advance. Most philosophers in the literature fall into one camp or the other: philosophical skepticism or philosophical anti-skepticism. Drawing on the insights of hinge epistemology, this paper proposes another way forward, an intermediate position that appeals both (...)
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  6.  23
    Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.) - 2016 - Boston: Brill.
    In _Hinge Epistemology_, eminent epistemologists investigate Wittgenstein's concept of basic or 'hinge' certainty as deployed in _On Certainty_ and show its importance for mainstream epistemology.
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  7. Error Through Misidentification.Annalisa Coliva - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (8):403-425.
  8. Which Hinge Epistemology?Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):79-96.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 79 - 96 The paper explores the idea of a “hinge epistemology,” considered as a theory about justification which gives center-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of _hinges_. First, some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on Wittgenstein’s texts and more theoretically committed work are put forward. Then, the main problems raised in _On Certainty_ and the most influential interpretative lines it has given rise to so far are presented and discussed. (...)
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  9. Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - forthcoming - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. Routledge.
    This chapter serves as an opinionated introduction to the problem of convergence (that there is no clear convergence to the truth in philosophy) and the problem of peer disagreement (that disagreement with a peer rationally demands suspending one’s beliefs), and some of the issues they give rise to, namely, philosophical skepticism and progress in philosophy. After introducing both topics and surveying the various positions in the literature we explore the prospects of an alternative, hinge-theoretic account.
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  10. Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?Annalisa Coliva - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (1):1-23.
    The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty . It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so-called "naturalist" readings of On Certainty , which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wanting, and recommends to interpret his positive proposal (...)
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  11. Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission: what else?!).Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):235-254.
    In the contemporary expanding literature on transmission failure and its connections with issues such as the Closure principle, the nature of perceptual warrant, Moore’s proof of an external world and the effectiveness of Humean scepticism, it has often been assumed that there is just one kind of it: the one made familiar by the writings of Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. Although it might be thought that one kind of failure is more than enough, Davies has recently challenged this view: (...)
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  12.  49
    Skepticism.Annalisa Coliva & Duncan Pritchard - 2021 - New York, NY: Routledge. Edited by Duncan Pritchard.
    Skepticism is one of the perennial problems of philosophy: from antiquity, to the early modern period of Descartes and Hume, and right through to the present day. It remains a fundamental and widely studied topic and, as Annalisa Coliva and Duncan Pritchard show in this book, it presents us with a paradox with important ramifications not only for epistemology but also for many other core areas of philosophy. In this book they provide a thorough grounding in contemporary debates about skepticism, (...)
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  13. Thought insertion and immunity to error through misidentification.Annalisa Coliva - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):27-34.
    John Campbell (1999) has recently maintained that the phenomenon of thought insertion as it is manifested in schizophrenic patients should be described as a case in which the subject is introspectively aware of a certain thought and yet she is wrong in identifying whose thought it is. Hence, according to Campbell, the phenomenon of thought insertion might be taken as a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental selfascriptions are logically immune to error through misidentification (IEM, hereafter). Thus, if Campbell (...)
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  14.  47
    Relativism (New Problems of Philosophy).Maria Baghramian & Annalisa Coliva - 2004 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge. Edited by Annalisa Coliva.
    Relativism, an ancient philosophical doctrine, is once again a topic of heated debate. In this book, Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva present the recent arguments for and against various forms of relativism. -/- The first two chapters introduce the conceptual and historical contours of relativism. These are followed by critical investigations of relativism about truth, conceptual relativism, epistemic relativism, and moral relativism. The concluding chapter asks whether it is possible to make sense of relativism as a philosophical thesis. -/- The (...)
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  15.  68
    Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on common sense and metaphysical analysis.Annalisa Coliva - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (5):914-934.
    Susan Stebbing is often portrayed as indebted to G. E. Moore for her ideas concerning the relationship between common sense and philosophy and about analysis. By focusing mostly on her article “The...
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  16.  85
    Disagreeing with Myself: Doxastic Commitments and Intrapersonal Disagreement.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):1-14.
    This paper explores the idea of disagreement with oneself, in both its diachronic and synchronic forms. A puzzling case of synchronic intrapersonal disagreement is presented and the paper considers its implications. One is that belief is a genus that comes in two species: as disposition and as commitment. Another is that self-deception consists in a conflict between one's beliefs as dispositions and one's beliefs as commitments. Synchronic intrapersonal disagreement also has implications for the condition that needs to be fulfilled in (...)
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  17. Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright.Annalisa Coliva (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. These newly commissioned papers are divided into four sections, preceded by a substantial Introduction, which places them in the context of the development of Wright's ideas. The distinguished contributors address issues such as the rule-following problem, knowledge of our meanings and minds, truth, realism, anti-realism and relativism, as well as the nature of perceptual justification, the cogency of arguments such as (...)
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  18. How to Commit Moore’s Paradox.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (4):169-192.
    Moore’s paradox is taken to be emblematic of peculiarities in the first person point of view, and to have significant implications for several issues in epistemology, in philosophy of language and mind. Yet, its nature remains elusive. In the first part of the paper, the main kinds of analysis of it hereto proposed in the literature are criticized. Furthermore, it is claimed that there are cases in which its content can be legitimately judged. Close inspection of those cases reveals that (...)
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  19. Moore's Proof, liberals, and conservatives : is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - In Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In the last few years there has been a resurgence of interest in Moore’s Proof of the existence of an external world, which is now often rendered as follows:1 (I) Here’s a hand (II) If there is a hand here, there is an external world Therefore (III) There is an external world The contemporary debate has been mostly triggered by Crispin Wright’s influential—conservative —“Facts and certainty” and further fostered by Jim Pryor’s recent—liberal—“What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”.2 This debate is worth (...)
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  20. Stopping points: ‘I’, immunity and the real guarantee.Annalisa Coliva - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):233-252.
    The aim of the paper is to bring out exactly what makes first-personal contents special, by showing that they perform a distinctive cognitive function. Namely, they are stopping points of inquiry. First, I articulate this idea and then I use it to clear the ground from a troublesome conflation. That is, the conflation of this particular function all first-person thoughts have with the property of immunity to error through misidentification, which only some I-thoughts enjoy. Afterward, I show the implications of (...)
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  21.  73
    Strange bedfellows: on Pritchard’s disjunctivist hinge epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3521-3532.
    The paper discusses some themes in Duncan Pritchard’s last book, Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. It considers it in relation to other forms of Wittgenstein-inspired hinge-epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the proposed treatment of Closure in relation to entailments containing hinges, the treatment of Underdetermination-based skeptical paradox and the avail to disjunctivism to respond to the latter. It argues that, although bold and thought-provoking, the mix of hinge epistemology and disjunctivism Pritchard proposes is not (...)
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  22.  60
    Testimonial hinges.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):53-68.
    The paper presents an extension of the kind of hinge epistemology proposed in Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology (Coliva 2015) to the case of testimonial justification. This extension stems naturally from a reinterpretation of the classic dispute between reductionists and anti-reductionists with respect to testimonial justification. The interesting and novel aspect of that reinterpretation is that it brings to light the deep analogy between that classic dispute and the contemporary debate between so-called “liberals” and “conservatives” with respect to the structure (...)
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  23. Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense.Annalisa Coliva - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):1-12.
  24.  65
    Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.) - 2015 - Boston: De Gruyter.
  25.  16
    You Just Believe That Because... It’s a Hinge.Annalisa Coliva - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:53-71.
    This paper looks at the genealogical challenge encapsulated in the schema “You just believe that because...” through the lens of hinge epistemology. It is claimed that hinges are typically held just because one has been brought up to believe them. It is further claimed that, while fitting into the YJBTB schema, hinges are rationally held when different de facto hinges are taken for granted merely because of one’s position in history. Moreover, they are rationally held if they are de jure (...)
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  26. Introduction: Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):73-78.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 73 - 78 This introduction gives a summary of the content of the special issue _Hinge Epistemology_, grouping the papers in three sections: more exegetical accounts of Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge certainties and their bearing on a theory of justification and knowledge as well as on the topic of external world scepticism; papers critical of the very notion of hinge certainty; and papers that apply the notion to various areas of epistemology and compare (...)
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  27.  34
    Are There Mathematical Hinges?Annalisa Coliva - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):346-366.
    In this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have claimed, Wittgenstein did not maintain that simple mathematical propositions like “2 × 2 = 4” or “12 × 12 = 144,” much like G. E. Moore’s truisms, could be examples of hinge propositions. In particular, given his overall conception of mathematics, it was impossible for him to single out these simpler mathematical propositions from the rest of mathematical statements, to reserve only to them a (...)
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  28.  25
    Hinges in the knowledge economy. on greco’s common and procedural knowledge.Annalisa Coliva - 2023 - Synthese 201 (5):1-18.
    In his “Common knowledge” (2016) and _The Transmission of Knowledge_ (2021), John Greco proposes a novel account of hinge propositions. Central to it is the idea that they are items of common knowledge – that is, of knowledge that is already present in the system, freely available to anyone, without having to figure it out by oneself or having to be taught it by others. As such, they are not subject to any quality control at all. Furthermore, they figure in (...)
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  29. The First Person.Annalisa Coliva - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):416-431.
  30. Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects.Annalisa Coliva - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):101-116.
    In the recent literature on Moore's Proof of an external world, it has emerged that different diagnoses of the argument's failure are prima facie defensible. As a result, there is a sense that the appropriateness of the different verdicts on it may depend on variation in the kinds of context in which the argument is taken to be a move, with different characteristic aims. In this spirit, Martin Davies has recently explored the use of the argument within two different epistemic (...)
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  31. Self-knowledge and commitments.Annalisa Coliva - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):365 - 375.
    In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive (...)
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  32.  2
    Scetticismo: dubbio, paradosso e conoscenza.Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - Roma: Laterza.
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  33. The paradox of Moore's proof of an external world.Annalisa Coliva - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):234–243.
    Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for (...)
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  34. Peacocke's self-knowledge.Annalisa Coliva - 2008 - Ratio 21 (1):13–27.
    knowledge. His proposal relies on the claim that first-order mental..
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  35.  78
    What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein.Annalisa Coliva - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):198-207.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 198 - 207 The paper discusses and presents an alternative interpretation to Penelope Maddy’s reading of G.E. Moore’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies as proposed in her book _What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy_. It connects this discussion with the methodological claims Maddy puts forward and offers an alternative to her therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s _On Certainty_.
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  36.  97
    The Argument from the finer‐grained content of colour experiences A redefinition of its role within the debate between McDowell and non‐conceptual theorists.Annalisa Coliva - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (1):57-70.
    In this paper I address the question of whether the fact that our colour experiences have a finer‐grained content than our ordinary colour concepts allow us to represent should be taken as a threat to theories of the conceptual content of experience. In particular, I consider and criticise McDowell's response to that argument and propose a possible development of it. As a consequence, I claim that the role of the argument from the finer‐grained content of experience has to be redefined. (...)
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  37. Against (neo-Wittgensteinian) entitlements.Annalisa Coliva - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press.
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  38.  49
    Replies.Annalisa Coliva - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):81-96.
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  39. Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing-as.Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - Synthese 186 (1):121-148.
    The paper addresses the issue of human diagrammatic reasoning in the context of Euclidean geometry. It develops several philosophical categories which are useful for a description and an analysis of our experience while reasoning with diagrams. In particular, it draws the attention to the role of seeing-as; it analyzes its implications for proofs in Euclidean geometry and ventures the hypothesis that geometrical judgments are analytic and a priori, after all.
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  40. Truth relativists can't trump moral progress.Annalisa Coliva & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):48-57.
  41.  6
    Peacocke's self‐knowledge.Annalisa Coliva - 2008 - Ratio (Misc.) 21 (1):13-27.
    The paper reviews Christopher Peacocke's account of self‐knowledge. His proposal relies on the claim that first‐order mental states may be given to a subject so as to function as reasons, from his point of view, for the corresponding self‐ascriptions. Peacocke's Being Known elicits two different views of how that may be the case: a given propositional attitude is considered to be conscious if, on the one hand, there is something it is like to have it; and, on the other, if (...)
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  42.  91
    Which “key to all mythologies”* about the self?—A note on where the illusions of transcendence come from and how to resist them.Annalisa Coliva - 2013 - In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge, Regno Unito:
    It is a striking feature of philosophical reflection on the self that it often ends up being revisionary of our commonsensical intuition that it is identical to a living human being with, intrinsically, physical and psychological properties. As is well known, Descartes identified the self with a mental entity, Hume denied the existence of such an entity and Kant reduced it to a transcendental ego—to a mere condition of possibility for experience and thought. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein followed Kant —or, (...)
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  43.  37
    About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication By Manuel García-Carpintero and Stephan Torre.Annalisa Coliva - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):780-784.
    About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication By García-CarpinteroManuel and TorreStephanOxford University Press, 2016, viii + 348 pp.
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  44.  24
    Doubts, Philosophy, and Therapy.Annalisa Coliva - 2021 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45:155-177.
    There is nowadays a tendency, to be dated back to Gordon Baker’s reading, to interpret the later Wittgenstein as proposing a thoroughly therapeutic view of philosophy. Accordingly, he was not dealing with philosophical problems to show how they originated in a misunderstanding of our language. For that would have presupposed his advancing theses about how language works. Rather, his therapeutic method was in the service of liberating philosophers from the kind of intellectual prejudices that would prompt them to ask philosophical (...)
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  45.  82
    On What There Really Is to Our Notion of Ownership of a Thought.Annalisa Coliva - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):41-46.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 41-46 [Access article in PDF] On What There Really Is to Our Notion of Ownership of a Thought Annalisa Coliva JOHN CAMPBELL'S REPLY to my paper aims at reestablishing the point that there are two strands to our notion of ownership of a thought. There are two ways of cashing out this idea. 1 First, one could say that A is the owner (...)
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  46. Wittgensteinian : Looking at the World From the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy.A. C. Grayling, Shyam Wuppuluri, Christopher Norris, Nikolay Milkov, Oskari Kuusela, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Beth Savickey, Jonathan Beale, Duncan Pritchard, Annalisa Coliva, Jakub Mácha, David R. Cerbone, Paul Horwich, Michael Nedo, Gregory Landini, Pascal Zambito, Yoshihiro Maruyama, Chon Tejedor, Susan G. Sterrett, Carlo Penco, Susan Edwards-Mckie, Lars Hertzberg, Edward Witherspoon, Michel ter Hark, Paul F. Snowdon, Rupert Read, Nana Last, Ilse Somavilla & Freeman Dyson (eds.) - 2019 - Springer Verlag.
    “Tell me," Wittgenstein once asked a friend, "why do people always say, it was natural for man to assume that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth was rotating?" His friend replied, "Well, obviously because it just looks as though the Sun is going round the Earth." Wittgenstein replied, "Well, what would it have looked like if it had looked as though the Earth was rotating?” What would it have looked like if we looked at all (...)
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  47.  6
    I concetti: Teorie ed esercizi.Annalisa Coliva - 2004 - Carocci.
  48. Skepticism unhinged.Annalisa Coliva - 2020 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1 (33):7-23.
    The paper explores the anti-skeptical bearing of the kind of hinge epistemology I have developed in Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the moderate account of perceptual justification, the constitutive response put forward against Humean skepticism, and the denial of the unconditional validity of the Closure Principle, which is key in rebutting Cartesian skepticism. Along the way, a comparison with Wittgenstein's own views in on Certainty and with the positions held by other prominent hinge epistemologists, particularly (...)
     
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  49.  32
    In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - In Shyam Wuppuluri & Newton da Costa (eds.), Wittgensteinian : Looking at the World From the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 107-121.
    Hinge epistemology is a family of theories about justification which give centre-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of a “hinge”. In the following, I will first put forward some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on, in particular, Wittgenstein’s texts, and more theoretically committed work, which aims at developing suggestions that can be found in the texts, even though they are not clearly attributable as such to their author. I will then summarize the main tenets of what, to (...)
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  50.  18
    In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - In A. C. Grayling, Shyam Wuppuluri, Christopher Norris, Nikolay Milkov, Oskari Kuusela, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Beth Savickey, Jonathan Beale, Duncan Pritchard, Annalisa Coliva, Jakub Mácha, David R. Cerbone, Paul Horwich, Michael Nedo, Gregory Landini, Pascal Zambito, Yoshihiro Maruyama, Chon Tejedor, Susan G. Sterrett, Carlo Penco, Susan Edwards-Mckie, Lars Hertzberg, Edward Witherspoon, Michel ter Hark, Paul F. Snowdon, Rupert Read, Nana Last, Ilse Somavilla & Freeman Dyson (eds.), Wittgensteinian : Looking at the World From the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 107-121.
    Hinge epistemology is a family of theories about justification which give centre-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of a “hinge”. In the following, I will first put forward some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on, in particular, Wittgenstein’s texts, and more theoretically committed work, which aims at developing suggestions that can be found in the texts, even though they are not clearly attributable as such to their author. I will then summarize the main tenets of what, to (...)
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