There are two possible realist defense strategies against the pessimistic meta-induction and Laudan’s meta-modus tollens: the selective strategy, claiming that discarded theories are partially true, and the discontinuity strategy, denying that pessimism about past theories can be extended to current ones. A radical version of discontinuity realism is proposed by Gerald Doppelt: rather than discriminating between true and false components within theories, he holds that superseded theories cannot be shown to be even partially true, while present best theories are demonstrably (...) completely true. I argue that this position, running counter both the cumulativity of science and fallibilism, is untenable; it cannot account for the success of past theories, nor for the failures of current theories, and rather than shutting the door to the pessimistic historical objections it opens it wide. The best strategy, instead, joins the selective idea there was both some truth and some falsity in discarded theories, like in current ones, with the moderate discontinuity idea that the truth rate in present best theories is much greater than in past ones. (shrink)

A realist interpretation of successful science is defended against a historical induction to the ultimate failure of current science from the failure of theories which once excelled by current standards. The defense requires (1) restrictions on the forms of success which realism, by its own lights, must explain, (2) referential stability through theory changes where the rejected theory achieves such success, and (3) degrees of truth for scientific statements.

To resolve the impasse between skeptic, idealist and positivist as to whether or not historical inquiry can be objective, an affirmative answer is argued by exposing, clarifying and challenging the common presupposition: the thesis of scientific value neutrality. The argument applies a more explicit version of the Braithwaite— Churchman-Rudner position to history and thus challenges the prevalent claim that history, unlike the law, has but one goal, the establishment of truth about the past. The important yet neglected residual issue concerns (...) what 'objectivity' means when inquiry (historical or scientific) is construed as a goal-directed activity controlled by epistemic and pragmatic utilities. (shrink)

An epistemological break occurred in historical discourse between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries; it is exemplified in the collections of Alexandre Lenoir and Alexandre du Sommerard in the Musée de Cluny. Foucault and later Hayden White identified this break as a transition from the classic to the romantic episteme. The classic eighteenth -century relationship between the historical object and the historical text tended to be reductionist and mechanistic while the nineteenth-century form was more integrated and organic. White treated these (...) relations as modes of discourse and referred to their typological forms as tropes. He referred to the classic and romantic tropes as metonymy and synecdoche, respectively. Lenoir's "metonymic" collection includes as many objects of a period as possible within a space. Du Sommerard, on the other hand, displayed the objects "synecdochically" within a space designed not only to contain them, but to explain their role in the past. (shrink)

The problem of historical objectivity repays study to counter the subjectivism of the neo-romantics and the arbitrary factual structures of recondite specialization. The ancients did not develop a theoretical distinction between objective and subjective in their conception of his tory. In the Renaissance, individualism impinged on the ancients' conception, but no philosophic view of historical objectivity evolved. The history-minded eighteenth century likewise failed to provide the necessary philosophical categories of historical understanding, though with Voltaire an approach- to them emerged. The (...) solution to the problem came only with the Kantian and post-Kantian concern with the epistemological problems of transcendentalism, especially from Humboldt's notion of ideas as inner forms of historical manifestations. These tendencies found their summation in Hegel's philosophy of history. Among other Hegelian insights, the concept of the realization of a concrete, objective reason in our subjective understanding solved the problem of how philosophical, i.e., objectively true, knowledge of history is possible. (shrink)

An introduction to the contemporary epistemology and philosophy of histography of Bernard Lonergan. A comparative analysis of Lonergan's perspective on objectivity in historical knowledge, perspectivism, and the deconstructionist approaches of metahistorians. Beards argues the relevance of Lonergan's contributions to current debates.

1. A recent writer, who would have it that Biblical history is not so much an impartial or purely factual account of events as a series of edifying proclamations, protests that the objective writing of history is never feasible, since the historian who testifies to some event invariably reflects his own particular standpoint; the further away he is from the event, and the more personally interested he and his generation are in the issue, the more subjective his account is apt (...) to be. This attempt to gather dogmatic figs off skeptical thistles rests upon the mistaken idea that what is called historical knowledge is a residual awareness of once present doings, growing ever fainter and more garbled as the transmission lengthens. Actually it is an acquired awareness of past doings. The historian’s task is not the clerkly compilation of pieces of tradition, i.e., reminiscences of outstanding events handed down orally, and excerpts from memoirs, i.e., an author’s written recollections of his own actions and experiences, of people whom he met, and of affairs to which he was close, if not a party. The historian treats tradition and memoirs not as history but as evidence of history, evidence being anything lying to hand from which the past can be reconstructed. Historiography was set on the path of a systematic and critical study when Herodotus of Halicarnassus made bold to scout some traditional tale and ended his own account of the affair with the words “These, then, are the facts as they appear to me.” If the historian could only serve up, spiced or unspiced, reports that had reached him, his fare would indeed be suspect, and even the agreement of historians would not wash away the taint of fabrication, but, as Napoleon Buonaparte suggested, would merely render history a fable convenue. The past which the critical historian unfolds, however, is what he has come to think for himself really happened. (shrink)

The article discusses the origin of the split between common sense and the scientific view of the world, which took lace at the beginning of the modern age. More specifically, it shows how Galileo...

The author presents the argument that historical objectivity is developed through diverse viewpoints, hermeneutical understanding and scientific explanation, and formalized as scientific research and historical writing.

In this paper, I outline a reductio against Stanford’s “New Induction” on the History of Science, which is an inductive argument against scientific realism that is based on what Stanford (2006) calls “the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). From the supposition that Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is cogent, and the parallel New Induction on the History of Philosophy (Mizrahi 2014), it follows that scientific antirealism is not worthy of belief. I also show that denying a key (...) premise in the reductio only forces antirealists who endorse Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science into a dilemma: either antirealism falls under the axe of Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science or it falls under the axe of the New Induction on the History of Philosophy. (shrink)

In Objectivity, Daston and Galison argue that scientific objectivity has a history. Objectivity emerged as a distinct nineteenth-century “epistemic virtue,” flanked in time by other epistemic virtues. The authors trace the origins of scientific objectivity by identifying changes in images from scientific atlases from different periods, but they emphasize that the same history could be narrated using different sorts of scientific objects. One could, for example, focus on the changing uses of “type specimens” in biological taxonomy. Daston :153–182, 2004) (...) indeed provides a detailed account of the history of the type specimen which purports to show this. I argue that this attempt hinges on a conceptual confusion and therefore fails. I show that the actual history of the type specimen does not reinforce the account of epistemic virtues from Objectivity, but rather threatens to subvert it. (shrink)

The extensive research in logic conducted by using concepts and methods of game theory as documented in this collection of papers, allows to see dialogue logic in a number of new perspectives. This situation may gain further clarity by looking back to the inception of dialogue logic in the late fifties and early sixties.

The extensive research in logic conducted by using concepts and methods of game theory as documented in this collection of papers, allows to see dialogue logic in a number of new perspectives. This situation may gain further clarity by looking back to the inception of dialogue logic in the late fifties and early sixties.

A critique of Collingwood's re-enactment concept.

The debate over the relationship between political practice and theory is as old as political science itself. The study of ideology, this article contends, offers a unique opportunity to explore the nexus of social phenomena and political philosophy, provided the study is launched from a new perspective. Instead of undertaking another exercise in the endless effort to define the concept of ideology, this analysis emphasizes the objects of ideology. It thereby exposes, first of all, that historically analysts of ideology (...) have ineptly assumed they were studying the same concept -- ideology -- whereas in fact they used the same term to refer to significantly different political phenomena. Second, the genealogy of the objects of ideology discloses the changing terrain of political reality since the Enlightenment. Three moments in the history of 'ideology' are identified as heuristic devices: ideology as a function of class (eighteenth-nineteenth centuries), ideology as a function of (totalitarian) regimes (early twentieth century), and in the aftermath of the 'end of ideology' debate, ideology as a social discourse (1960s onward). Third, the role of the analyst is therewith also transformed: from a scientist, to a critical historian of ideas, to a political agent of social change. The inevitable embeddedness of political theory in changing political praxis urges a new dialogue between empirical and theoretical political scientists. (shrink)

Many contemporary historians and philosophers are dissatisfied both with the accounts traditional analytic philosophers have given of the epistemological dimensions of historical studies and also with the ways many continental philosophers more recently have brushed aside the need for any such accounts. Yet no one has yet proposed a unified research program that could serve as the central focus for a better epistemologically-oriented approach. Such a research program would not only address epistemological problems from a perspective that would be of (...) methodological interest to historians but would also be directly responsive to fundamental motivations people have for caring about historical studies in the first place. The main purpose of this review essay is to sketch and then illustrate the main outlines of such a research program.Basic to this research program is the recognition that the overwhelmingly central epistemological complication that arises in the attempt to say what happened in the past and what it means that it happened is that there are always competing ways to interpret evidence. The problem is to discover which among these competing interpretations is best, which involves, among other things, discovering which among them is most likely to be true. Strategies are suggested for solving this problem, which, at the limit, would result in the articulation of generally applicable criteria for assessing competing historical interpretations. (shrink)

The historical variation of scientific knowledge has lent itself to the development of historical epistemology, which attempts to historicize the origin and establishment of knowledge claims. The questions I address in this paper revolve around the historicity of the objects of those claims: How and why do new scientific objects appear? What exactly comes into being in such cases? Do scientific objects evolve over time and in what ways? I put forward and defend two theses: First, the (...) ontology of science is so rich and variegated that there are no universally valid answers to these questions. Second, we need a pluralist account of scientific objects, a pluralist metaphysics that can do justice to their rich diversity and their various modes of being and becoming. I then focus on hidden objects, which are supposed to be part of the permanent furniture of the universe, and I discuss their birth and historicity: They emerge when various phenomena coalesce as manifestations of a single hidden cause and their representations change over time. Finally, I examine the conditions under which an evolving representation may still refer to the same object and I illustrate my argument drawing upon the early history of electrons. (shrink)

The claim that the functions of art liable to change over time appears to suggest that any attempt to define art in terms of a limited set of functions will fail. Robert Stecker has offered a functionalist definition which seeks to accommodate this criticism by making the functions which are relevant to an artwork's status those which are 'standard or correctly recognized' for some art form. I argue that Stecker does not offer a clear enough distinction between the 'standard or (...) correctly recognized' and the accidental functions of an art form; that his account of the 'standard or correctly recognized' functions of an art form does not exhaust important artistic functions; and that his proposed definition is neither necessary nor sufficient for an object to count as an artwork. For these reasons I suggest that Stecker's functionalist account of art should be rejected. (shrink)

The mythical scientist in early twentieth-century America cut a lone figure, “impersonal as the chill northeast wind” and “oblivious of everything save his experiment.” He toiled through the night in his laboratory, “a place unimpressive and unmagical save for the constant-temperature bath with its tricky thermometer and electric bulbs,” as if working in the lab were a prayer that promised illumination—“alone, absorbed, [and] contemptuous of academic success and of popular classes,” he knew all about material forces, but he was blind (...) to the vital force that created all others. Accustomed to the “beautiful dullness of long labors,” he remained “illimitably ignorant” of literature, art, and music. He believed that unerring techniques in experimentation, impartial observations, and exquisitely minute calculations would bring progress—a steady march toward the truth. He chose the highest calling in the world because he was “intensely religious—so religious that he will not accept quarter-truths, because they are an insult to his faith.” He was “so devoted to Pure Science . . . that he would rather have people die by the right therapy than be cured by the wrong. Having built a shrine for humanity, he wanted to kick out of it all mere human beings.” This autocratic figure, brilliantly insane and tyrannically honest, embodied the cult of science and objectivity. (shrink)

Mental phenomena and consciousness can be located in sign and in language. Since these latter belong to the objective world of human interaction, consciousness emerges as a part of objectivity. A sign is the product of the interaction between consciousnesses. Thus, admitting the existence of the sign presumes the existence of action. Activity is a social phenomenon; thus, it is objective. It is the objectivization of human needs and desires as production and reproduction of these needs in society. Human consciousness (...) emerges as co-knowing or co-consciousness through linguistic activity. Consciousness as co-knowing emphasizes the genesis of human subjectivity not as a mere assertion but as something the existence of which is to be shown. Consciousness and selfhood, thus, appear as objective, mediating but subjective action. In this view, the self is emancipated consciousness. Therefore, the psyche emerges as the subjective image of objectivity. (shrink)

This book presents 12 original essays on historical and contemporary philosophical discussions of judgment. The central issues explored in this volume can be separated into two groups namely, those concerning the act and object of judgment. What kind of act is judgment? How is it related to a range of other mental acts, states, and dispositions? Where and how does assertive force enter in? Is there a distinct category of negative judgments, or are these simply judgments whose objects are (...) negative? Concerning the object of judgment: How many objects are there of a given judgment? One, as on the dual relation theory of Frege and Moore? Or many as in Russell's later multiple relation theory? If there is a single object, is it a proposition? And if so, is it a force-neutral, abstract entity that might equally figure as the object of a range of intentional attitudes? Or is it somehow constitutively tied to the act itself? These and related questions are approached from a variety of historical and contemporary perspectives. This book sheds new light on current controversies by drawing on the details of the distinct intellectual contexts in which previous philosophers' positions about the nature of judgment were formulated. In turn, new directions in present-day research promise to raise novel interpretive prospects and challenges in the history of philosophy. istorical and contemporary perspectives. This book sheds new light on current controversies by drawing on the details of the distinct intellectual contexts in which previous philosophers' positions about the nature of judgment were formulated. In turn, new directions in present-day research promise to raise novel interpretive prospects and challenges in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Derek Turner believes that a proper interpretation of Arthur Fine’s natural ontological attitude can help to reveal the nature of the difference between «historical» (geology, archeology, forensics) and «empirical» (physics, chemistry) sciences. From his point of view, the apparent asymmetry between these sciences is a consequence of different understanding of the possibilities to «manipulate» the objects of study and the role played by background theories. In our opinion, Turner’s concept is a good example of how profound and inviting the (...) instrumentalistic concept of science could be. First, it is «reflexive» in the sense that it constrained other instrumentalist theories (B. Fraassen’s constructive empiricism deeply flawed). And secondly, it is «constructive» – the emphasis that «the strength of arguments for or against scientific realism can vary depending on the scientific context» quite unexpectedly leads to the fact that «ideographic / nomothetic division is not very helpful», and to the fact that «epistemic disadvantage, but the same epistemic status». Reflections on the book: Turner D. Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate. Cambridge University Press, 2007. (shrink)

In this paper, we would show how the logical object “square of opposition”, viewed as semiotic object, has been historically transformed since its appearance in Aristotle’s texts until the works of Vasiliev. These transformations were accompanied each time with a new understanding and interpretation of Aristotle’s original text and, in the last case, with a transformation of its geometric configuration. The initial textual codification of the theory of opposition in Aristotle’s works is transformed into a diagrammatic one, based on a (...) new “reading” of the Aristotelian text by the medieval scholars that altered the semantics of the O form. Further, based on the medieval “Neo-Aristotelian” reading, the logicians of the nineteenth century suggest new diagrammatic representations, based on new interpretations of quantification of judgements within the algebraic and the functional logical traditions. In all these interpretations, the original square configuration remains invariant. However, Nikolai A. Vasiliev marks a turning point in history. He explicitly attacks the established logical tradition and suggests a new alternation of semantics of the O form, based on Aristotelian concepts that were neglected in the Aristotelian tradition of logic, notably the concept of indefinite judgement. This leads to a configurational transformation of the “square” of opposition into a “triangle”, where the points standing for the O and I forms are contracted into one point, the M form that now stands for particular judgement with altered semantics. The new transformation goes beyond the Aristotelian logic paradigm to a new “Non-Aristotelian” logic, i.e. to paraconsistent logic, although the argumentation used in support of it is phrased in Aristotelian style and the context of discovery is foundational. It establishes a bifurcation point in the development of logic. No unique logic is recognized, but different logics concerning different domains. One branch of logic remains to be the “Neo-Aristotelian” one, while the new logic is “Non-Aristotelian”. (shrink)

Are mathematical objects affected by their historicity? Do they simply lose their identity and their validity in the course of history? If not, how can they always be accessible in their ideality regardless of their transmission in the course of time? Husserl and Foucault have raised this question and offered accounts, both of which, albeit different in their originality, are equally provocative. Both acknowledge that a scientific object like a geometrical theorem or a chemical equation has a history because (...) it is only constituted in and transmitted through history. But they see that history as a part of its ideality, so that, although historical, a scientific object retains its identity as one and the same object. (shrink)

Judging from the contemporary debate in the philosophy of history, philosophers seem to think of history as an important but also as a very peculiar discipline. They cannot make up their minds on how exactly to describe the epistemic status of historical knowledge or how exactly to situate history among human activities ranging from the arts to the natural sciences.1 The difficulty of philosophically accounting for the character of history goes back to the very beginning of history as a professional (...) discipline within academia in the 19th century. In order to be given the title of a science history had to prove that its knowledge is as objective and rigorous as the knowledge gained by the natural sciences. Yet philosophers and historians recognized that its domain of human agency and human institutions was particularly ill suited to fit the model of methodological monism demanded by the ruling positivist conception of the natural sciences. They nevertheless suggested that history should still be regarded as a worthy member of the scientific community, because its own method of empathetic reenacting or "reliving" the experiences and thoughts of past agents allows it to acquire objective knowledge of the past. (shrink)

Body theory is the work of historians, sociologists, philosophers, and other scholars in the past twenty to twenty-five years that explicitly focuses on the body, especially on sexuality and gender. The body is seen as an ideological surface on which history and politics inscribe their truths. It is, in short, a corporeal epistemology standing in opposition to all the old cognitive epistemologies (e.g., Descartes, Locke, and modern analytic thought as a whole). Régimes of power are known through the way they (...) oppress, manipulate, and construct the human body. Body theory includes the work of Michel Foucault, Thomas Laquer, and feminist scholars such as Hélène Cixous, Laura Mulvey, and Elaine Showalter. This work is carried on, by and large, in the methodological atmosphere of a constructivist notion of gender, sexuality, social ideas, and the self. (shrink)

Debates about individual responsibility for climate change revolve mainly around individual mitigation duties. Mitigation duties concern future impacts of climate change. Unfortunately, climate change has already caused important harms and it is foreseeable that it will cause more in the future, in spite of our best efforts. Thus, arguably, individuals might also have duties related to those harms. In this paper, I address the question of whether individuals are obligated to provide compensation for climate related harms that have already occurred. (...) I explore two possible strategies to answer that question. The straightforward strategy answers in the affirmative. Two approaches embrace this strategy: the ‘ecological citizenship’ approach and the benefits-based approach. I challenge those two approaches and rule out an affirmative answer. The alternative strategy answers in the negative but provides a way to respond to why currently living individuals should pay for burdens created for past individuals. Two possible approaches embrace this alternative: the community-based approach and my own state-based benefits approach. I will argue that individual duties do not fall under the realm of compensatory justice, but they have nonetheless a duty to bear compensatory burdens allocated to their states. (shrink)

The focus of this volume, which collects both recent and now-classic essays, is the historical emergence of concepts and objects, through new uses of words and ...