We show the decidability of the existential theory of the recursively enumerable degrees in the language of Turing reducibility, Turing reducibility of the Turing jumps, and least and greatest element.

The main result is that for every recursively enumerable existential consistent theory Γ , there exists a finitely presented SQ-universal group H such that Γ is satisfied in every nontrivial quotient of H. Furthermore if Γ is satisfied in some group with a soluble word problem, then H can be taken with a soluble word problem. We characterize the finitely generated groups with soluble word problem as the finitely generated groups G for which there exists a finitely presented (...) group H all of the nontrivial quotients of which embed G. We prove also that for every countable group G, there exists a 2-finitely generated SQ-universal group H such that every nontrivial quotient of H embeds G. (shrink)

Alphonso Lingis's engaging book studies the phenomenological and postphenomenological theories of sexuality of six contemporary French philosophers: Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles ...

In this paper I describe a specific emotional reaction to the fact that we will cease to exist, namely existential dread, and I argue that the B-theory of time, according to which reality contains a four-dimensional spacetime manifold and the present time is metaphysically on a par with past and future times, cannot accommodate it. Some may see this as an advantage of the B-theory; some may see it as a problem for the view. My aim is (...) not to argue either for or against the B-theory, but merely to show that it is incompatible with a certain common emotion. The paper is split into three sections. I begin by introducing existential dread. Next, I show how existential dread fits into a widely accepted theory of emotion according to which emotions are intentional states susceptible of being both intelligible and correct, where an emotion is intelligible if, roughly, it makes sense; and is correct if, roughly, it fits its object. The core of the paper is the third section: in that section, I introduce the B-theory of time and I argue that it is incompatible with existential dread. (shrink)

This article explores existential principles through autoethnographic poetry and narrative reflections. The use of poetry and narrative as tools in qualitative research is explored. Poetry and narratives are shown to be valuable tools for presenting people’s lived experiences of complex existential principles and processes. The use of poetry and narrative in this research is positioned within the traditions of expressive arts and postmodern research methods.

Paradigmatic uses of negative existentials such as ‘Vulcan does not exist’ are problematic because they present the interpreter with a pragmatic paradox: a speaker who uses such a sentence seems to be asserting something that is incompatible with what she presupposes. An adequate solution must therefore explain why we interpret paradigmatic uses of negative existentials as saying something true, even though such uses present us with a pragmatic paradox. I provide such an explanation by analyzing paradigmatic uses of negative existentials (...) as corrections of previous assertions that are judged to suffer from referential presupposition failure. I present the explanation within the framework of a simple version of segmented discourse representation theory. (shrink)

This paper proffers a dialogical theory of decision-making: decision-makers are engaged in two modes of rational decisions, instrumental and existential. Instrumental rational decisions take place when the DM views the self externally to the objects, whether goods or animate beings. Existential rational decisions take place when the DM views the self in union with such objects. While the dialogical theory differs from Max Weber’s distinction between two kinds of rationality, it follows Martin Buber’s philosophical anthropology. The (...) paper expounds the ramifications of the dialogical theory in understanding structures of exchange considering assessments of diverse thinkers. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 23 Heft: 1 Seiten: 125-154.

The existential approach described by Mark Nesti offers a radical alternative to the cognitive-behavioral model which informs most contemporary applied sports psychology. Whereas standard psychological models of athlete behavior would advocate appropriate "mental skills" training such as visualizing the perfect race to help an athlete overcome performance problems, the existential approach will refer to an athletes unique emotional world to find deeper causes of their limitation. These causes may be only very indirectly linked to the athletes sporting life. (...) Existential sports psychology has gone out of phenomenological theory and existential philosophy. Mark Nesti's text is the first book to present an overview of this exciting approach. It contains case studies and a framework for psychologists to apply this approach to their work. (shrink)

Thomas Flynn's work on Sartre and Foucault, the first of a two-volume project, offers a unique opportunity for examining an existential theory of history. It occasions rethinking existential-social categories from the vantage point of the poststructuralist turn. And it contributes to developing existential variants of critical theory. The following questions guide me in each of the three above areas. First, how is human history intelligible, given not only our finite sense of ourselves but also claims (...) that we have reached the end of history? Second, with the poststructuralist eclipse of dialectics, can we render existential categories in social terms and vice versa? Third, critics decry grand theorizing even in fallibilist reason, e.g., of Habermas, while others are worried by the normative deficits of poststructuralist nominalism, e.g., of Foucault. Can existential variants of critical social theory, anticipated before Sartre by Marcuse, split the difference? (shrink)

The class of all Artinian local rings of length at most l is ∀ 2 -elementary, axiomatised by a finite set of axioms Art l . We show that its existentially closed models are Gorenstein, of length exactly l and their residue fields are algebraically closed, and, conversely, every existentially closed model is of this form. The theory Got l of all Artinian local Gorenstein rings of length l with algebraically closed residue field is model complete and the (...) class='Hi'>theory Art l is companionable, with model-companion Got l. (shrink)

Rita Floyd’s "The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization" is an important and insightful book that delineates a theory of just securitization (modified from the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria in just war theory) involving three sets of principles governing the just initiation of securitization, just conduct of securitization, and just desecuritization. This book is a much-needed addition to the security studies and just war scholarship. -/- Here, I explore the potential of (...) Floyd’s just securitization theory (JST) to provide insights into the moral justifiability of non-state groups that are not political entities engaging in resistance against forms of structural violence that pose an existential threat to those groups. Using the case study of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and the threat of white supremacy to African Americans as an illustrative example, I argue that structural forms of violence can meet Floyd’s definition of an objective existential threat, justifying the resort to securitization by groups such as BLM. (shrink)

This article argues for a new way to interpret Dōgen's theory of time, reading the notion of uji as momentary existence, and shows that many notorious difficulties usually associated with the theory can be overcome with this approach, which is also more compatible with some fundamental assumptions of Buddhist philosophy (the non-durational existence of dharmas, the arbitrariness of linguistic designations and the concepts they point to, the absence of self-nature in beings, etc.). It is also shown how this (...) reading leads to an innovative treatment of the concept of selfhood, viewing the self as the active openness of an existent to the surrounding world, with which it is able to identify through a mutual relation with other existents within the existential moment. This argument is supported by an alternative translation in the "momentary mode" of those extracts of the fascicle that introduce or elaborate on Dōgen's key concepts. (shrink)

In a 2019 paper, Hausmann raised a new and interesting problem for Kripke’s account of negative existentials. He argued that Kripke’s account leads to the absurd consequence that anybody who has good reasons to believe that there are no propositions also has good reasons to believe that he or she does not exist. In this paper I propose a modified Kripkean theory, which is invulnerable to a Hausmann-like argument. As will be seen, the modified theory can be squarely (...) justified in light of the key observations behind Kripke’s original proposal. (shrink)

Despite considerable recent attention, important features of Schelling’s famous work, the 1809 treatise On the Essence of Human Freedom, remain under-explored. One of these is the methodological dualism which Schelling advocates at the very start of the text. Schelling aims to weld together into a coherent position a first-person phenomenology of freedom and an explanation achieved by locating freedom within a conceptual system articulating the basic structure of the world. Most interpretations of the Freiheitsschrift, however, concentrate on only one of (...) these approaches, thus foreshortening their understanding of Schelling’s enterprise. The article explores this tendency towards one-sidedness by considering two sophisticated recent interpretations of the work, taking opposite tacks. One, by Markus Gabriel, focuses on the distinctive, self-reflexive metaphysics which Schelling proposes, while the other, by Sebastian Gardner, claims that Schelling’s ontology is extrapolated entirely from his account of our moral consciousness, a procedure pioneered by Kant. The article argues that neither of these interpretations can do full justice to Schelling’s project. Furthermore, although the Freiheitsschrift is not entirely successful, and hence points towards later developments in Schelling’s thinking, its treatment of freedom is superior to the ‘soft naturalism’ pioneered by Peter Strawson, and currently influential across various philosophical traditions. (shrink)

본 논문은 자살을 현존을 넘어서는 ‘무제약적 행위’로 규정하는, 아직 국내에서는 다뤄지지 않은 야스퍼스의 자살론을 철학상담적관점에서 모색하고, 자살에 대한 실존철학적 이해를 도모한 뒤, 철학상담에서 자살위기에 내몰린 내담자를 도울 방안을 모색한다. 본 논문은 내담자로 하여금 자신이 당면한 문제를 비판적으로 성찰하게 한 뒤, 어떤 문제가 계속 살기를 포기하게 만드는지, 그 이유의 정당성을 합리적으로 검토하게 하고, 이를 넘어서서 죽어야할 이유가 아닌, 살아야 할 이유에 대해 질문의 초점을 달리함으로써 새로운 희망과 삶의 의미를 발견할 가능성을 상담자와 함께깊이 반성해봄으로써 자살위기의 내담자를 돕는데 목표를 둔다. 이를 위해 우선 (...) 고대에서부터 현재까지 이어져 온 자살에 대한 다양한 논의들을 몇몇 철학자들을 중심으로 살펴본 뒤, 이러한 이해를 바탕으로 무제약적 행위에 대한 결의론을 통해 실존론적 자살론을 발전시키는 야스퍼스의 철학적 논의를 이어갈 것이다. 그런다음 야스퍼스의 자살론을 철학상담에 적용하여 자살 담론의 지평을 확장해보고자 한다. (shrink)

Let T be a complete first-order theory over a finite relational language which is axiomatized by universal and existential sentences. It is shown that T is almost trivial in the sense that the universe of any model of T can be written $F \overset{\cdot}{\cup} I_1 \overset{\cdot}{\cup} I_2 \overset{\cdot}{\cup} \cdots \overset{\cdot}{\cup} I_n$ , where F is finite and I 1 , I 2 ,...,I n are mutually indiscernible over F. Some results about complete theories with ∃∀-axioms over a finite (...) relational language are also mentioned. (shrink)

This exciting volume brings together leading figures across existential psychology in a clear-sighted guide to its current practice and therapeutic possibilities. Its accessible yet scholarly presentation dispels common myths about existential psychotherapy while demonstrating core methods and innovative techniques as compatible with the range of clinicians' theoretical orientations and practical approaches. Chapters review the evidence for its therapeutic value, and provide updates on education, training, and research efforts in the field, both in the US and abroad. Throughout, (...) class='Hi'>existential psychotherapy emerges as a vital, flexible, and empirically sound modality in keeping with the current-and future-promotion of psychological well-being. Highlights of the coverage include: Emotion, relationship, and meaning as core existential practice: evidence-based foundations. · Meaning-centered psychotherapy: a Socratic clinical practice. Experience processing as an aspect of existential psychotherapy: life enhancement methodology. Structural Existential Analysis (SEA): a phenomenological method for therapeutic work. Experiencing change: an existential perspective. Creating the World Congress for existential therapy. Clarifying and Furthering Existential Psychotherapy will spark discussion and debate among students, therapists, researchers, and practitioners in existential psychology, existential psychotherapy, and allied fields as well as the interested public. It makes a suitable text for graduate courses in existential therapy, psychological theories, and related subjects. (shrink)

This book critically assesses arguments for the existence of the God of classical theism, develops an innovative account of objects’ persistence, and defends new arguments against classical theism. The authors engage the following classical theistic proofs: Aquinas’s First Way, Aquinas’s De Ente argument, and Feser’s Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, Augustinian, Thomistic, and Rationalist proofs. The authors also provide the first systematic treatment of the ‘existential inertia thesis’. By connecting the thesis to relativity theory and recent developments in the philosophy of (...) physics, and by developing a variety of novel existential-inertia-friendly explanations of persistence, they mount a formidable new case against classical theistic proofs. Finally, they defend new arguments against classical theism based on abstract objects and changing divine knowledge. The text appeals to students, researchers, and others interested in classical theistic proofs, the existence and nature of God, and the ultimate explanations of persistence, change, and contingency. (shrink)

The psychotherapeutic technologies of the social sciences and humanities are the result of a long process that has shaped its theory and social and therapeutic practice, as part of a specific cultural and ideological context. The use of these technologies as a fundamental prerequisite has a human factor that determines the implementation of communicative mechanisms within the framework of set goals and objectives. Psychotherapeutic technologies are based on a “theory of the human,” which is not a scientific (...) class='Hi'>theory in the strict sense of the word, but nonetheless allows for empirical and operational interpretation. (shrink)

We study the extension of Feferman’s operational set theory provided by adding operational versions of unbounded existential quantification and power set and determine its proof-theoretic strength in terms of a suitable theory of sets and classes.

Rita Floyd’s The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization is an important and insightful book that delineates a theory of just securitization (modified from the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria in just war theory) involving three sets of principles governing the just initiation of securitization, just conduct of securitization, and just desecuritization. This book is a much- needed addition to the security studies and just war literature. Here, I apply Floyd’s just securitization (...) theory (JST) to the threat posed by white supremacy to African Americans. I argue that white supremacy meets Floyd’s definition of an objective existential threat, potentially justifying the resort to securitization by African Americans. -/- In Section 1, I argue that African Americans constitute a non-state group, before demonstrating in Section 2 that white supremacy poses an objective existential threat to this group, meeting the criterion of just cause in Floyd’s JST. In Section 3, I show that, given the failure of legal challenges and democratic processes to mitigate this threat, African Americans may be justified in resorting to extraordinary measures to combat the threat of white supremacy, including “whatever most reasonable persons would agree constitutes exceptional means and actions ... non-state state groups within states. securitization can take the form of secession, civil disobedience, acts of sabotage and resistance”. Applying Floyd’s JST to the threat of white supremacy demonstrates the value of her approach for thinking about securitization outside the traditional foci of security studies but, as I discuss in my conclusion, also reveals limitations in her theory, particularly in relation to the criterion of reasonable chance of success when applied to non-state groups resisting an unjust state. (shrink)

A small but growing number of studies have aimed to understand, assess and reduce existential risks, or risks that threaten the continued existence of mankind. However, most attention has been focused on known and tangible risks. This paper proposes a heuristic for reducing the risk of black swan extinction events. These events are, as the name suggests, stochastic and unforeseen when they happen. Decision theory based on a fixed model of possible outcomes cannot properly deal with this kind (...) of event. Neither can probabilistic risk analysis. This paper will argue that the approach that is referred to as engineering safety could be applied to reducing the risk from black swan extinction events. It will also propose a conceptual sketch of how such a strategy may be implemented: isolated, self-sufficient, and continuously manned underground refuges. Some characteristics of such refuges are also described, in particular the psychosocial aspects. Furthermore, it is argued that this implementation of the engineering safety strategy safety barriers would be effective and plausible and could reduce the risk of an extinction event in a wide range of possible scenarios. Considering the staggering opportunity cost of an existential catastrophe, such strategies ought to be explored more vigorously. (shrink)

… philosophy must be a practice as much as it is a theory.Leah Kalmanson, Cross-Cultural Existentialism, p. 1In the face of the sheer quantity of life's uncertainties, Leah Kalmanson's Cross-Cultural Existentialism provides more than a novel take on existential theory ; following the mantra of European existentialists that "philosophies are meant to be lived," Cross-Cultural Existentialism introduces the reader to a series of practices central to the Ruist tradition required to make philosophy "a concrete attitude, a way (...) of life". Kalmanson's turn to the East Asian tradition is largely motivated by her assessment that the... (shrink)

The irreducibility thesis -- The facticity of practices -- Constructing practice theory through double hermeneutics -- The trans-subjectivity of social practices -- The dialogical self as thrown projection in practices -- Epilogue -- Bibliography -- Index.

In uttering negative existential sentences, we do not mention but use an empty singular term. A pretense account explains the use in terms of pretense. I argue that our understanding of negative existential statements can be successfully explained by Crimmins’ theory of shallow pretense if it is supplemented and reconstructed properly. First, I explain the notion of shallow pretense and supplement Crimmin’s theory with an Evansian account that we immediately grasp the phenomenology of what is pretended (...) without a conscious effort to imagine the condition under which what is pretended can be true. Thus, shallow pretense does not consist in the counterintuitive meta-representation of the fact of pretense. Second, against the objection to Crimmins’ distinction between utterance truth-condition and modal content that it is ad hoc, I argue that there is good reason to hold the distinction for the semantics of belief reports. Finally, I argue that the distinction has a merit of explaining our intuition about the epistemic possibility associated with our use of an empty singular term. (shrink)

A lucid introduction to the "existential phenomenology" of Martin Heidegger, particularly as developed in his major work, Being and Time, this work focuses on how Heidegger's ideas bear on the central problem in epistemology--that of how we can have objective knowledge. The author constructs fresh arguments clarifying Heidegger's contribution to the theory of knowledge, and shows why Heidegger deemed misguided the search for knowledge of the way things are in themselves.

The article presents an analysis of the existential paradigm of M. Lermontov's creativity in the light of the existential theories of S. Kierkegaard and K. Jaspers, which is considered in the context of the cultural transition in Russian literature of the 1830s-1840s. It is argued that Lermontov radically changed the nature of his literary activity by the mid-1830s, overcoming his own existential ambivalence and abandoning the subjective emotionality and exoticism of his youthful poetry in favor of objective (...) observations and research of the surrounding world. Lermontov was aware of his existential ambivalence and sought to overcome this state in order to achieve cultural integrity, which should be considered as one of his main values. Lermontov's works reflect the concept of integrity as the integration of culture through a set of prevailing norms and ideals, as well as the feeling that this integrity was disintegrating in transitional times. This state of affairs caused a sense of disintegration in Lermontov, which is similar to the borderline situation of Jaspers. Lermontov's works illustrate the loss of cultural ideals with the decline of Romanticism. But rejecting the ideals of Romanticism, Lermontov conveys the feeling that post-Romantic disappointment generated cynicism and distorted thinking. The novel "The Hero of Our Time" has become the embodiment of such shortcomings. Lermontov's works do not belong to romanticism, nor to protorealism, nor to any combination of both. But Lermontov played his transitional role superbly. Not only did he raise questions about Romanticism that realism would later make its own, he also shed light on Romanticism itself and how it was fading. Lermontov showed how difficult it is for an artist who is aware of his own existential ambivalence to create and live in a transitional time devoid of a unifying sense of cultural integration and integrity, illustrating how badly a creative personality needs such integration and integrity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Background Theory of Delusion and Existential PhenomenologyRichard G. T. Gipps (bio) and John Rhodes (bio)KeywordsPhenomenology, psychological explanation, epistemology, schizophreniaSituating and Clarifying the PaperThe commentaries of Nassir Ghaemi and Giovanni Stanghellini help to sketch out the intellectual landscape of philosophical perspectives in psychiatry, and situate our paper within it. A happy convergence between the analytical philosophy perspective from which we were writing, and the existential–phenomenological paradigm (...) described by both authors, is the result. Stanghellini in particular carefully describes three main theories of existential deformations, tracing delusion formation back to either (i) a disturbance of meaning synthesis conceived as a dysfunction of a Husserlian consciousness, (ii) a disturbance of pre-reflective self-consciousness resulting in a kind of paralyzing hyperreflexivity, and (iii) (Stanghellini’s preferred model) a disturbance of embodiment. This final account views delusion as springing from a failure in the subject’s corporeal and praxical being-in-the-world. As the subject’s practical, pre-reflective grip on the world is loosened, so their minds become unconstrained by that understanding and practical rationality immanent within that grip, and thought, now unconstrained, starts to travel through delusional worlds. Stanghellini accordingly views our model as an example of a disembodiment theory, which allows it to overcome the disadvantages of the first two models, which may both, in their own ways, overvalue the rôle of (disturbances of) reflective consciousness in the formation (and delusional deformation) of everyday understanding.Being situated within a preexisting landscape has both its benefits and its disbenefits, the principle example of the latter being the potential assimilation of anything new to what has already been said. Thus, although we are grateful to our commentators for placing us on the larger historical and conceptual map, it may be helpful to briefly rehearse our motivations for drawing on the philosophical ideas of the Bedrock and Background in our theory of delusion. Our paper was primarily motivated by a concern that current, psychologically mainstream, cognitive models of delusion, although helpfully drawing our attention to common reasoning and perceptual deficits in the person with psychosis, fail to adequately account for what is delusional about delusions. It was, in [End Page 321] particular, to account for the certainty with which the deluded person clings to often quite extraordinary beliefs that we drew on the epistemological notion of the background. And although this epistemological notion fits quite neatly with ontological concerns regarding the embodied and praxical character of human existence, it is the particular epistemic rôle that it played in our theory—to do with the extraratiocinative constraint on judgement provided by the Background—that we wish to stress here.We return to this shortly, but first wish to comment briefly on two specific considerations raised by the commentaries. The first concerns Stanghellini’s claim that, for us, “when studying delusions, the focus should be on providing an adequate framework for understanding, rather than providing empirical hypotheses to be tested” (2008, 311–314). It seems to us, however, that both are equally important. What we wished to stress, however, was that empirical hypothesis testing may be led astray if it is not informed by an adequate framework for understanding. For example, most cognitive psychological experiments on delusions concern themselves with the individual’s ability to make appropriate guesses (e.g., regarding the color of beads in a bag), and their tendency to jump to conclusions; they do not concern themselves with the kinds of extraordinary conviction and certainty met with in delusion. The risk run by empirical researchers of cognitive factors in delusion is that a lack of a prior adequate theorization of delusion makes for accounts that are ultimately only of the formation, not of delusion in particular but rather of false or unusual beliefs more generally. An analytical approach, however, can help to explicate the ways in which the psychiatric concept of delusion fails to be adequately characterized by the quite general ‘external criteria’ of delusion (as Jaspers [1963] called them: falsity, stubbornness, uncommon), and aids in the construction of empirical hypotheses this time constrained by an understanding of the true ‘internal criteria’ of psychotic belief. Such an approach helps to spell out the... (shrink)

Available for the first time in English, this work explores a range of mental disorders in the context of Frankl's theory of human motivation. Skillfully translated and featuring extensive annotation, this English language edition remains true to the original while updating assessment and treatment protocols to be compatible with 21st century medicine. As the title suggests, On the Theory and Therapy of Mental Disorders applies a theoretical treatise to the practical treatment of variety of disorders. This long-awaited addition (...) to the body of English language literature introduces Viktor Frankl's clinical insights to a new generation of mental health professionals, and has much to offer to practitioners of all levels of experience. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger’s existential account of care in _Being and Time_ (2010) provides us with an opportunity to reimagine what the proper theoretical grounding of an ethic of care might be. Heidegger’s account of care serves to deconstruct the two primary foundations that an ethic of care is often based upon. Namely, that we are inevitably interdependent upon one another and/or possess an innate disposition to care for fellow humans in need. Heidegger’s account reveals that both positions are founded upon (...) an ontic (meaning factual existence), as opposed to an ontological (which refers to the nature of being), understanding of care. The distinctions between an ontic and ontological understanding of care are significant. Yet, I maintain that they are not completely incompatible. Both Heidegger and care ethicists contend that our existence with others is understood through a relational ontology. Furthermore, there are certain ontological structures from Heidegger which resonate with an ethic of care. Two key existential structures are leaping-ahead and being-guilty. These existential structures are latent in care ethics, and by explicitly revealing them I reinforce the connection between Heidegger’s account and care theory. Lastly, I develop the theoretical foundations of care ethics by proposing an existential ethic of care. (shrink)