A theory of instrumental and existential rational decisions: Smith, Weber, Mauss, Tönnies after Martin Buber
Theory and Decision 90 (1):147-169 (2021)
AbstractThis paper proffers a dialogical theory of decision-making: decision-makers are engaged in two modes of rational decisions, instrumental and existential. Instrumental rational decisions take place when the DM views the self externally to the objects, whether goods or animate beings. Existential rational decisions take place when the DM views the self in union with such objects. While the dialogical theory differs from Max Weber’s distinction between two kinds of rationality, it follows Martin Buber’s philosophical anthropology. The paper expounds the ramifications of the dialogical theory in understanding structures of exchange considering assessments of diverse thinkers.
Similar books and articles
Moral Conditions for Methodologically Rational Decisions.Jan F. Jacko - 2018 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 111:209–223.
Advice for the Steady: Decision Theory and the Requirements of Instrumental Rationality.Johanna Thoma - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
The Locality and Globality of Instrumental Rationality: The Normative Significance of Preference Reversals.Brian Kim - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4353-4376.
Rationality and Cognition: William N. Eskridge, Jr.William N. Eskridge - 1997 - Legal Theory 3 (2):101-103.
Transformative Decisions.Kevin Reuter & Michael Messerli - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (6):313-335.
The Double Wave of German and Jewish Nationalism: Martin Buber’s Intellectual Conversion.Peter Šajda - 2020 - Human Affairs 30 (2):269-280.
Rational Decision Making as Performative Praxis: Explaining Rationality’s Éternel Retour.Laure Cabantous & Jean-Pascal Gond - 2011 - Organization Science 22 (3):573-586.
Locally Rational Decision-Making.Richard M. Shiffrin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):175-175.
Never the Twain Shall Meet? How Narrativism and Experience Can Be Reconciled by Dialogical Ethics.Anton Froeyman - 2015 - History and Theory 54 (2):162-177.
We Can Make Rational Decisions to Have a Child: On the Grounds for Rejecting L.A. Paul’s Arguments.Meena Krishnamurthy - 2015 - In Richard Vernon Sarah Hannan & Samantha Brennan (eds.), Permissible Progeny. Oxford University Press.
Hume's Non-Instrumental and Non-Propositional Decision Theory.Robert Sugden - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):365-391.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
The information inelasticity of habits: Kahneman’s bounded rationality or Simon’s procedural rationality?Elias L. Khalil - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-40.
References found in this work
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith.Adam Smith - 1976 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited.Mark Granovetter - 1983 - Sociological Theory 1 (1983):201-233.
Fraternity: Why the Market Need Not Be a Morally Free Zone.Luigino Bruni - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):35-64.