The paper builds an argument about empathy, kinesthesia, choreography, and power as they were constituted in early eighteenth century France. It examines the conditions under which one body could claim to know what another body was feeling, using two sets of documents – philosophical examinations of perception and kinesthesia by Condillac and notations of dances published by Feuillet. Reading these documents intertextually, I postulate a kind of corporeal episteme that grounds how the body is constructed. And I endeavor to (...) situate this body within the colonial and expansionist politics of its historical moment. (shrink)

Studies on fair-trade consumption have concentrated on economic, demographic, and ethical issues, and research on consumers’ moral emotions and self-orientation is limited. Although consumers’ satisfaction with their consumption has been emphasized in consumer studies and marketing, little substantive empirical research has addressed ethical consumers’ emotional satisfaction and the link between their motivations and happiness. This study focused on ethical consumers who regularly purchase fair-trade coffee to understand their moral emotions and self-orientation as motivations for fair-trade consumption and determine whether (...) class='Hi'>empathy and self-oriented motivations led to their happiness. A survey was conducted on 471 regular purchasers of at least one cup of fair-trade coffee weekly or a pack of fair-trade coffee beans monthly. The survey data were analyzed using partial least squares. The results showed that guilt was positively associated with empathy, which positively influenced self-actualization. Contrary to the proposed hypothesis, empathy did not elicit consumers’ happiness. As expected, narcissism affected self-actualization, which in turn elicited happiness. Happiness was positively associated with customers’ repurchase intentions for fair-trade coffee. The results of this study demonstrate the strong associations of the paths from narcissism to self-actualization, self-actualization to happiness, and self-actualization to repurchase intentions compared to the paths from guilt to empathy, empathy to happiness, and empathy to repurchase intentions. Contrary to common expectations, the results indicate that self-oriented motivations focused on self-actualization rather than moral emotions play key roles in ethical consumers’ happiness with fair-trade consumption. (shrink)

Background Our objective was to evaluate whether the description of a machine learning (ML) app or brain imaging technology to predict the onset of schizophrenia or alcohol use disorder (AUD) influences healthcare professionals’ judgments of stigma, empathy, and compassion. Methods We randomized healthcare professionals (N = 310) to one vignette about a person whose clinician seeks to predict schizophrenia or an AUD, using a ML app, brain imaging, or a psychosocial assessment. Participants used scales to measure their judgments of (...) stigma, empathy, and compassion. Results Participants randomized to the ML vignette endorsed less anger and more fear relative to the psychosocial vignette, and the brain imaging vignette elicited higher pity ratings. The brain imaging and ML vignettes evoked lower personal responsibility judgments compared to the psychosocial vignette. Physicians and nurses reported less empathy than clinical psychologists. Conclusions The use of predictive technologies may reinforce essentialist views about mental health and substance use that may increase specific aspects of stigma and reduce others. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 187-189, July 2022.

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 5, Page 486-493, June 2022.

ArgumentNeuroscience research has created multiple versions of the human brain. The “social brain” is one version and it is the subject of this paper. Most image-based research in the field of social neuroscience is task-driven: the brain is asked to respond to a cognitive (perceptual) stimulus. The tasks are derived from theories, operational models, and back-stories now circulating in social neuroscience. The social brain comes with a distinctive back-story, an evolutionary history organized around three, interconnected themes: mind-reading, empathy, and (...) the emergence of self-consciousness. This paper focuses on how empathy has been incorporated into the social brain and redefined via parallel research streams, employing a shared, imaging technology. The concluding section describes how these developments can be understood as signaling the emergence of a new version of human nature and the unconscious. My argument is not that empathy in the social brain is a myth, but rather that it is served by a myth consonant with the canons of science. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to investigate relationships between care and justice reasoning, dispositional empathy variables and meta‐ethical thinking among 128 students from a university of applied sciences. The measures were Skoe’s Ethic of Care Interview, the Defining Issues Test, Davis’s Interpersonal Reactivity Index and Meta‐Ethical Questionnaire. The results showed that levels of care reasoning were positively related to the post‐conventional schema and negatively related to the personal interest schema in justice reasoning. Age, meta‐ethical thinking, the post‐conventional schema (...) and perspective taking predicted care reasoning. Sympathy was positively related to both modes of moral reasoning among men and predicted their care reasoning. The results point out common elements for care and justice reasoning, underscore the importance of perspective taking for moral reasoning and indicate that the relationship between affective‐based empathy and moral reasoning is gender‐specific and far more complex than previous theories suggest. (shrink)

The story of Turandot originated in the East. It was later transformed into the tale of a merciless princess, and adapted onto the stage. Puccini‟s Turandot has been one of the most frequently restaged operas in the West, but Turandot‟s unreasonable cruelty and abrupt change of character have raised a lot of questions. Since quite a few contemporary playwrights and directors try to interpret Turandot with elements of empathy, this paper analyse the versions of Turandot in the Eastern world (...) in discussion with the Western versions. (shrink)

In Spinoza’s philosophy affects illustrate the way human beings interact with each other and the world, where the necessary meetings with other particular things define their being and its expressions. Most human beings don’t know themselves, are not conscious of their affects and, even less, do they know what the affects of others are. Although, they are by their definition as particular things obliged to exist in society and create a minimum of consensus. According to Spinoza, this consensus is built (...) upon the biological substrate defined by human body’s physiology, through the mechanism of imitation and is supported by empathy. Leading researchers in affective neuroscience argue for a theory of embodied cognition and recent research in neurosciences attributes human capacity for empathy to mirror neurons, recognising in Spinoza’s texts the philosophical roots of current scientific thinking on body, mind and feeling. Keeping in mind the debate concerning how different levels of explanation can be related to each other or how different disciplines can form the context for interpreting neuroscience’s data, we attempt to promote an implicit dialogue between Spinoza’s psychological theory and the neuroscientific findings, supporting that is legitimate and necessary to examine these questions from the point of view of philosophy and formulate new research questions that can promote further theoretical and empirical study of the complex phenomena concerning human nature and society. (shrink)

Emotion and feeling have only in the last decade become analytic concepts in the humanities, reflected in what some have called an “affective turn” in the academy at large. The study of emotion has also found a place in science studies and the history and philosophy of science, accompanied by the recognition that even the history of objectivity depends in a dialectical fashion on a history of subjectivity. This topical issue is a contribution to this larger trend across the humanities (...) and the history of science, and yet is circumscribed by attention to a particular kind of emotion or condition for feeling: one centered not in an individual body, but in the interstices between bodies and things, between selves and others – what we call empathy. (shrink)

The problem I wish to address here is how Edith Stein‘s theory of shared empathy and psychotherapeutic group therapy are required condition for any successful work with patients in medical and clients in philosophical praxis. Moreover, a theory of shared empathy must also account for the arguably more intricate issue of how group members might properly share an own mental domain with its distinctive phenomenology, and its distinctive attitudes toward one another, so that the necessarily self-testimonies of clients (...) does not rest on a previous pathological state. In the following, I aim to offer some steps towards solving this problem. I will do so by outlining what methodology lies behind the theory of shared empathy, and showing how, on the results of a case study, it can be applied in a way whereby it still accommodates all requirements for what counts as valid coherence of self-testimony and successful client’s healing. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of US states have adopted laws that require pregnant women to have an ultrasound examination, and be shown images of their foetus, prior to undergoing a pregnancy termination. In this paper, I examine one of the basic presumptions of these laws: that seeing one’s foetus changes the ways in which one might act in regard to it, particularly in terms of the decision to terminate the pregnancy or not. I argue that mandatory ultrasound laws compel (...) women into a position of moral spectatorship and require them to recognise the foetus as a being for whom they are responsible, particularly through empathic responses to ultrasound images. The approach I propose extends the project of a bioethics of the image and highlights the need for a critical analysis of the political mobilization of empathy in discussions of abortion. (shrink)

In his Enarrationes in Genesin, Martin Luther finds stories of suffering he can ‘hardly read with dry eyes’. Recent scholars attribute profound ethical value to Luther's tears, especially those shed over the suffering of female characters. This article reconsiders the ethical salience of Luther's tears as a demonstration of interpretive empathy by examining his reading of Hagar and its modern reception history. By comparing Luther's reading of the enslaved Hagar to his reading of her master Abraham, it is argued (...) that gender, power and inequality shape the very conditions in which terms like ‘empathy’, ‘charity’ and ‘suspicion’ appear and this, in turn, invites a reconsideration of the ethical responsibilities we incur as we read texts of terror in light of their role in enduring histories of violence. (shrink)

This paper presents a relativistic interpretation of Elizabeth Colson's paradox of empathy and a solution.

In this article, we present two accounts of intersubjectivity in Jaspers and Husserl, respectively. We argue that both can be brought together for a more satisfying account of empathy and communication in the context of psychiatric praxis. But while we restrict ourselves for the most part to this praxis, we also indicate the larger agenda that drives Jaspers and Husserl, despite all disagreement. Here we spell out, in particular, how a phenomenologically inspired account of empathy and intersubjectivity can (...) have larger ramifications for a theory of social life and interaction. Finally, we argue for a ‘relaxed' view concerning the relation between pure and applied phenomenology, such that both can mutually benefit from one another. (shrink)

Within the perception-action framework, the underlying mechanisms of empathy and its related processes of moral behavior need to be investigated. fMRI studies have shown different frontal cortex activation patterns during automatic processing and judgment tasks when stimuli have moral content. Clinical neuropsychological studies reveal different patterns of empathic alterations after dorsolateral versus orbital frontal cortex damage, related to deficient cognitive and emotional processing. These processing streams represent different neural levels and mechanisms underlying empathy.

Social exclusion has a significant impact on cognition, emotion, and behavior. Some behavioral studies investigated how social exclusion affects pain empathy. Conclusions were inconsistent, and there is a lack of clarity in identifying which component of pain empathy is more likely to be affected. To investigate these issues, we used a Cyberball task to manipulate feelings of social exclusion. Two groups participated in the same pain empathy task while we recorded event-related potentials when participants viewed static images (...) of body parts in painful and neutral situations. The results showed early N2 differentiation between painful and neutral pictures in the central regions in both groups. The pattern at the late controlled processing stage was different. Parietal P3 amplitudes for painful pictures were significantly smaller than those for neutral pictures in the social exclusion group; they did not differ in the social inclusion group. We observed a parietal late positive potential differentiation between painful and neutral pictures in both groups. LPP amplitudes were significantly smaller in the social exclusion group than those in the social inclusion group for painful stimuli. Our results indicate that social exclusion does not affect empathic responses during the early emotional sharing stage. However, it down-regulates empathic responses at the late cognitive controlled stage, and this modulation is attenuated gradually. The current study provides neuroscientific evidence of how social exclusion dynamically influences pain empathy. (shrink)

Research only alluded to by Preston & de Waal (P&deW) indicates the disproportionate involvement of some brain regions in the perception and experience of certain emotions. This suggests that the neural substrate of primitive emotional contagion has some emotion-specific aspects, even if cognitively sophisticated forms of empathy do not. Goals for future research include determining the ways in which empathy is emotion-specific and dependent on overt or covert perception.

I flag what seem to me to be some minor concerns about Joel Smith’s definition of empathy, but maybe they are important to someone.

The recognition of the other as subject has achieved a prominent place in contemporary psychoanalysis on both sides of the analytic relationship, but this development has tended to focus on the recognition of who the other is and has been. It is the purpose of this article to add the future, the transcendent experience of the other, to the recognition of the other in the analytic dyad. Heidegger's concept of the “ek-static” will be used to elucidate the human subject as (...) moving beyond him or herself in a continual process of becoming. The result of the peeling back of defenses is not a homunculus waiting to be unearthed, but affective dispositions and desires that have yet to become organized modes of being. It is the purpose of the analytic process to bring this potential to fruition. For this process to take place, the therapist must have a concept of not only who the patient is, but also who she or he is not but may be. It will be suggested that dispositional affects, desires, and passions that emerge when defenses give way provide clues to unformed possibilities that can become ways of being if perceived as such by the therapist. A clinical strategy is proposed in which the analytic space becomes a negative capability for the formation of new ways of being and relating. This idea is illustrated with a clinical example in which the patient's compliant pattern was transcended. (shrink)

The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to expose Friedrich Nietzsche’s critically neglected account of empathic concern. In what follows, I will briefly present the main ideas and purpose of the project, and include necessary background. -/- Since a significant portion of Nietzsche’s work on moral psychology and ethics is directed toward naturalizing and conceptually redefining the metaphysical implications of Arthur Schopenhauer’s account of compassion, I begin by critically examining Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. At its simplest, Schopenhauer’s narrative goes as follows: the (...) phenomenal world is determined and driven by a metaphysical striving and yearning (more clearly, a will-to-live) that can never be satisfied. We have access to this underlying reality of existence, i.e., the thing-in-itself, subjectively, in the inner awareness which we have of our own experience of willing. -/- Unfortunately, the subtleties and nuances of Schopenhauer’s understanding of inner awareness and its centrality within his overall oeuvre have generally been overlooked or underappreciated by scholars. I suspect that the main reason for this problem is that there does not seem to be an adequate account of the relation between representation and willing in Schopenhauer’s system. I offer an in-depth analysis of Schopenhauer’s understanding of inner awareness, as well as demonstrate its significance as the essential precursor to self-knowledge and world-understanding. -/- The thing-in-itself, a term Schopenhauer borrows from Immanuel Kant, signifies a fundamental reality that underlies the apparent diversity and change in the world, a reality that is distinct from what is merely temporal or changeable. Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will has been deeply problematic and puzzling to commentators, because willing and striving is temporal, and no temporal phenomenon can be identical to the thing-in-itself. I distinguish between three distinct views that Schopenhauer formulates about the thing-in-itself, and suggest to understand these three accounts as contrasting but not contradictory views, in other words as different perspectives on the same reality. -/- Next, I examine the theory of empathy that Nietzsche presents in his book, Daybreak, as an alternative to Schopenhauer’s account of compassion, which is solely based on his metaphysics of the will. For Schopenhauer, compassion is associated with an instinctual recognition that beneath our apparent separateness as individuals, we are in fact the expression of the same metaphysical will. Nietzsche moves away from this metaphysical conception and calls, instead, for a naturalistic account in which empathy relies on a sense of psychological closeness and perceived similarity to others, which then results in a feeling of oneness between individuals. Yet, for Nietzsche, this feeling of oneness manifests itself as a sense of being in solidarity with others who share similar experiences, while still recognizing one another’s numerical distinctiveness. -/- Finally, I examine Nietzsche’s assessment of the value of compassion. Nietzsche seems to be critical of all compassion but at times also seems to praise a different form of compassion, which he refers to as ‘our compassion’ and contrasts it with ‘your compassion’. Some commentators have interpreted this to mean that Nietzsche’s criticism is not as unconditional as it may seem–that he does not condemn compassion entirely. I disagree and contend that even though Nietzsche appears to speak favorably of some forms of compassion, he regards all compassion as fundamentally bad. I argue that, for Nietzsche, ‘our compassion’, however regrettable qua compassion it is, may give occasion for a rare and peculiar insight into ‘co-suffering’ with others, which in turn results in overcoming compassion entirely. (shrink)

The doctor-patient relationship is a crucial aspect of primary-care practice Research on associations between quality of care provision and burnout and empathy in a primary care setting could improve this relationship. Cross-sectional study of family physicians and nurses of twenty-two primary care centers in the health district of Lleida, Spain. Empathy and burnout were measured using the Jefferson Physician Empathy Scale and the Maslach Burnout Inventory, while quality of care delivery was evaluated using Quality Standard Indicator scores. (...) JPSE and MBI results were grouped into low, medium, and high scores to analyze associations with QSI scores and sociodemographic variables. The mean QSI score recorded for the family physicians and nurses was 665. Higher, albeit insignificant, QSI scores were observed for practitioners with high burnout. No differences were observed according to level of empathy. The differences with respect to sex, age, and area of practice were not significant. Practitioners with low empathy had higher QSI scores than those with high empathy while those with high burnout had higher scores than those with low burnout. Burnout and empathy did not significantly influence quality of care delivery scores in 22 primary care centers. More studies, however, are needed to investigate the unexpected trend observed that suggests that physicians and nurses with higher levels of burnout provide higher quality care. (shrink)

ᅟThe comment discusses M. Slote's view on empathy as presented in his paper “The Many Faces of Empathy”. It is asked whether three forms of empathy he portrays are three separable concepts or three variants of the same concept of empathy.

After the great enthusiasm about the moral potentialities of empathy of the last thirty years, this phenomenon has been recently called into question, if not openly criticized, by both philosophers and psychologists among whom we find Jesse Prinz or Paul Bloom. This paper aims to show why empathy should not too easily be regarded as useless or even deleterious for morality and to propose a special role for it. In order to reach this goal, I will briefly sketch (...) what I mean with the term empathy and how is this psychological mechanism different from other akin phenomena like compassion. I will then turn my attention to some criticisms that can be made about the role of empathy for morality which show that empathy seems not a necessary element of the three main dimensions of morality, that is moral judgment, moral development and moral conduct. After that, I will try to defend empathy thanks to the identification of some important roles it can play both at a moral and at an epistemological level, in the attempt to demonstrate that empathy is in fact part of the fundamental features of a moral person. (shrink)

HIV stigma, a social-medical problem, continues to confound researchers and health professionals, while undermining outcomes. Empathy may reduce stigma; its absence may predict stigma. This research investigates: How does Kafka’s _Metamorphosis_ advance understandings of HIV stigma in medical health education? _Metamorphosis_ amplifies the sociological-relational mechanisms fostering HIV stigma. It offers a multi-disciplinary, responsive space for ethical, humanistic and clinical inquiry to meet: enabling students to consider how social structures shape health inequities, moral, social experience, and their professional identity within. (...) _Metamorphosis_ may ultimately promote medical health humanities’ social mission—allowing literature to unfold such revelations towards greater equity in health. (shrink)

후설의 생활세계 개념은 다양한 맥락에서 해석될 수 있으나 교육학적인 관점에서의 해석 또한 중요한 의미를 지닌다. 생활세계는 일상적 세계로서 우리에게 경험을 통해 직접적으로 주어지는 세계이지만 한편으로 문명화된 현대인에게는 객관주의적인 과학적 세계관에 의해 은폐되고 왜곡된 채 주어진다는 것이 후설의 설명이다. 따라서 있는 그대로의 생활세계에 접근하고 이를 바라본다는 것 자체가 일종의 태도의 변화이자 인간됨의 변화를 함축한다. 그러므로 생활세계의 주제화는 인간성의 변화 내지 일깨움을 지향하는 교육학적인 함의를 지닌다. 생활세계가 주관 연관적이고 주관성과 불가분리의 상관관계를 맺고 있다는 점에서 생활세계 교육론은 주관성의 영역별 특징에 상응해, 크게 신체적 (...) 주관, 상호주관적 주관, 보편적 주관의 세 층으로 나누어 고찰할 수 있으며, 이를 뒷받침하는 주된 개념이 후설에서는 각각 신체성, 감정이입, 그리고 자유이다. 이러한 관점에서 생활세계 교육론은 신체성, 감정이입에 근거한 감성교육의 측면과 자유를 기반으로 한 도덕교육의 두 측면으로 나뉜다. 그러나 전자는 궁극적으로 후자로 수렴된다는 것이 본 글의 시각이다. 후설의 생활세계 교육론은 곧 개별적 의식이 상호주관적, 보편적 주관성으로 변화, 승화되는 데 초점이 있으며, 보편적 윤리적 주관성의 실현을 지향하는 자유의 교육론이 후설 생활세계 교육론의 최종적 목표로 볼 수 있다. (shrink)

_In Perception, Empathy, and Judgment_ Arne Johan Vetlesen focuses on the indispensable role of emotion, especially the faculty of empathy, in morality. He contends that moral conduct is severely threatened once empathy is prevented from taking part in an interplay with cognitive faculties in acts of moral perception and judgment. Drawing on developmental psychology, especially British "object relations" theory, to illuminate the nature and functioning of empathy, Vetlesen shows how moral performance is constituted by a sequence (...) involving perception, judgment, and action, with an interplay between the agent's emotional and cognitive faculties occurring at each stage. In the powerful tradition from Kant to present-day theorists such as Kohlberg, Rawls, and Habermas, reason is privileged over feeling and judgment over perception, in such a way that basic philosophical questions remain unasked. Vetlesen focuses our attention on these questions and challenges the long-standing assertion that emotions are damaging to moral response. In the final chapter he relates his argument to recent feminist critiques that have also castigated moral theorists in the Kantian tradition for their refusal to recognize a role for emotion in morality. While the book's argument is philosophical, its method and scope are interdisciplinary. In addition to critiques of such philosophers as Arendt, MacIntyre, and Habermas, it contains discussions of specific historical, ideological, and sociological factors that may cause "numbing"—selective or broad-ranging, pathological insensitivity—in humans. The Nazis' mass killing of Jews is studied to illuminate these and other relevant empirical aspects of large-scale immoral action. (shrink)