This chapter contains sections titled: What Is Technology? Explicit Knowledge and Tacit Knowledge References and Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Definitions of “Technology” Problems of Culture Dilemmas of Determinism References and Further Reading.

The first half of the book concentrates on key definitions and epistemological issues, including an overview of philosophy as applied to technology, a definition of technology, and an examination of technology as it relates to practical and ...

Two factors, medical science's growing control over the timing of death and the increasingly desperate need for organs, have led to a reopening of the debate about the definition of death and have forced a consideration of aspects of the determination of death that had never been addressed before. Without the pressing need for organs, the definition of death would have remained on the back shelf, the conversation of a few interested philosophers or theologians. This article examines some new questions (...) raised by medical technology and the frantic search for new, morally acceptable sources of human organs over the past thirty years. This examination concludes that death itself is a social construct and that, in a pluralistic society such as ours, a conclusive definition of death or determination of the moment of death is out of the reach of both medical science and philosophy. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to draw out and make explicit the assumptions made in the treatment of technology within business ethics. Drawing on the work of Freeman (1994, 2000) on the assumed separation between business and ethics, we propose a similar separation exists in the current analysis of technology and ethics. After first identifying and describing the separation thesis assumed in the analysis of technology, we will explore how this assumption manifests itself in the current literature. A different (...) stream of analysis, that of science and technology studies (STS), provides a starting point in understanding the interconnectedness of technology and society. As we will demonstrate, business ethicists are uniquely positioned to analyze the relationship between business, technology, and society. The implications of a more complex and rich definition of lsquotechnologyrsquo ripple through the analysis of business ethics. Finally, we propose a pragmatic approach to understanding technology and explore the implications of such an approach to technology. This new approach captures the broader understanding of technology advocated by those in STS and allows business ethicists to analyze a broader array of dilemmas and decisions. (shrink)

The paper aims to examine the construction, circulation, and transformation of knowledge about man (anthropological knowledge) in human-technology interaction in the 20th century. The analysis focuses on the prerequisites of the industrial working world and its implicit knowledge about human beings. However, the basis and starting point of technical adaptation is usually ignored: The concepts of “man” and the anthropological knowledge gained experimentally from a anthropocentric designed interface. Based on the concept of an intuitive interface design this problem will be (...) investigated. The questions posed by this article as well as the objectives associated with them open up an interdisciplinary framework between philosophy of technology, philosophical anthropology and history of science given that they not only focus – by means of historical reconstruction – on historical changes in technological developments. They also address the issue of generation and transformation of anthropological knowledge in the definitions and interactions of “man” and “technology”. (shrink)

Purpose. The study is aimed at a philosophical analysis of the state of humanity’s readiness for technological singularity, the definition of the concept of postbiology and the investigation of ways to bring the population to a new, qualitatively higher level of existence. Theoretical basis. The author analyzes the level of public consciousness and the features of its cooperation with technological world. Due to the inability of most modern people to cope with changes effectively, the author questions humanity’s readiness for the (...) postbiological stage of evolution of our species. Based on the analysis of the ideas of authoritative futurists of our time, the author explores the prospects of Ukrainian society in the postbiological future. Originality. The author not only analyzes the challenges that humanity faces during its transition to a new type of civilization, but also explores the obstacles that hinder this process directly in the Ukrainian society. The author proves that the ideas of transhumanism and going beyond the human biology should not be postulated without a moral context. In addition, the scientific study proposes a number of projects designed to improve the educational institutions that are responsible for the intellectual and spiritual development of the individual. Conclusions. Postbiology can become both, a new qualitatively higher stage of the human species evolution and the collapse of humaneness. Along with overcoming human biology, there will be the destruction of moral guidelines, social and legal systems. In order to prevent total chaos and catastrophe, technological development must be complemented by appropriate developments of new norms that can balance society. (shrink)

The definition of death was clearer one hundred years ago than it is today. People were declared dead if diagnosed with permanent cessation of both cardio‐circulatory function and respiratory function. But the definition has been muddled by the development of new technologies and interventions—first by cardiopulmonary resuscitation and ventilators, which were introduced in the mid‐twentieth century, and now by extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, which creates the ability to keep oxygenated blood circulating, with or without a beating heart or functioning lungs. In (...) Defining Death: The Case for Choice, Robert Veatch and I argue that the definition of death should focus on “what change in a human being is so fundamental that we can say the individual is no longer with us as a member of the human community bearing rights such as the right not to be killed.” We assert that this decision is a normative issue about which different stakeholders may believe that different changes are fundamental, and we therefore propose that the optimal policy solution may be to allow stakeholders to choose their own definition within a reasonable range of options. There are three caveats that need to be highlighted regarding this approach. (shrink)

A recurring concern within contemporary philosophy of language has been with the ways in which speakers can be illocutionarily silenced, i.e. hindered in their capacity to do things with words. Moving beyond the traditional conception of silencing as uptake failure, Mary Kate McGowan has recently claimed that silencing may also involve other forms of recognition failure. In this paper I first offer a supportive elaboration of McGowan’s claims by developing a social account of speech act performance, according to which the (...) success of an illocutionary act is not only a function of the intentions of and the conventions deployed by the speaker, but partly depends on how the act is recognized or taken up by the hearer. I then provide a comprehensive definition of illocutionary silencing and spell out what it means for it to occur in a systematic manner. (shrink)

: Research in genomics, human cloning, and transgenic technology has challenged bioethicists and scientists to rethink the definition of human beings as a species. For example, should the definition incorporate a genetic criterion and how does the capacity to genetically engineer human beings affect the definition of our species? In considering these contemporary bioethical dilemmas, we revisit an ancient source, the Talmud, and highlight how it provides specific biological, cultural, and genetic criteria to define the human species.

Fighting the tools of our nature: technology in the popular imagination -- Beyond common sense: technology by definition -- All is one but not for all: technology as an object encountered in the world -- Brushing against reality: technological interactions require knowledge -- What everything knows: technologies as an embodiment of knowledge.

While there has been much interest in this topic, no generally accepted definition of dual use has been forthcoming. As a contribution to this issue, it is maintained that three related kinds of things comprise the category of dual use: research, technologies and artefacts. In regard to all three kinds, difficulties are identified in making clear distinctions between those that are and are not dual use. It is suggested that our classification should take account of actual capacities and willingness to (...) make use of these objects for ‘bad ends’ and not the mere possibility that this could be done, and here three ‘contextual factors’ are identified. A (provisional) definition is proposed that takes account of threats and risks. (shrink)

Research in genomics, human cloning, and transgenic technology has challenged bioethicists and scientists to rethink the definition of human beings as a species. For example, should the definition incorporate a genetic criterion and how does the capacity to genetically engineer human beings affect the definition of our species? In considering these contemporary bioethical dilemmas, we revisit an ancient source, the Talmud, and highlight how it provides specific biological, cultural, and genetic criteria to define the human species.

The inquiry into the moral status of artificial intelligence (AI) is leading to prolific theoretical discussions. A new entity that does not share the material substrate of human beings begins to show signs of a number of properties that are nuclear to the understanding of moral agency. It makes us wonder whether the properties we associate with moral status need to be revised or whether the new artificial entities deserve to enter within the circle of moral consideration. This raises the (...) foreboding that we are at the gates of an anthropological crisis: the properties bound to moral agency have been exclusively possessed in the past by human beings and have shaped the very definition of being human. In this article, I will argue that AI does not lead us to an anthropological crisis and that, if we adhere to the history and philosophy of technology, we will notice that the debate on the moral status of AI uncritically starts from an anthropology of properties and loses sight of the relational dimension of technology. First, I will articulate three criteria for analyzing different anthropological views in philosophy of technology. Second, I will propose six anthropological models: traditional, industrial, phenomenological, postphenomenological, symmetrical, and cyborg. Third, I will show how the emergence of AI breaks with the dynamics of increased relationality in the history and philosophy of technology. I will argue that this aspect is central to debates about the moral status of AI, since it sheds light on an aspect of moral consideration that has been obscured. Finally, I will reject entirely relational approaches to moral status and propose two hybrid possibilities for rethinking it. (shrink)

In the United States, single individuals and LGBTQ couples who wish to conceive biological children are considered to be “socially infertile” due to their relationship status. Due to the high cost of infertility treatments and inadequate insurance coverage, the socially infertile has minimal access to assisted reproductive technology. Under the current medical definitions of infertility, even in states with infertility insurance mandates, only heterosexual couples with physiological infertility are covered for ART. It is well documented that infertility interferes with (...) many aspects of the human experience and reduces the quality of life for involuntarily childless individuals regardless of whether the infertility is physiologically or socially based. Physiological infertility was initially considered to be a private issue before being recognized as a medical diagnosis and has since legitimized heterosexual couples’ access to ARTs. The medical diagnosis of infertility not only affirms that their intention to conceive biological children is justifiable but also confirms that it is a condition that can and should be treated with current medical interventions. Expanding the current definition of infertility to include social infertility will elevate it to a treatable medical condition, justifying the use of ART for such individuals and potentially alleviating the negative impacts of infertility. Thus, states with infertility insurance mandates should provide the same infertility coverage to socially infertile individuals as physiologically infertile heterosexual couples. (shrink)

This essay reviews different definitions and models of technological singularity. The models range from conceptual sketches to detailed endogenous growth models, as well as attempts to fit empirical data to quantitative models.

There are at least two assumptions which, except for very few occasions, have not been discussed by philosophers who have written on the metaphysics of technological objects. The first assumption is that to be a technology is an absolute matter and that all technological objects are equally technological. The second assumption is that the property of being technological is abstracted from existing things which happen to have this property in common. I appeal to the definition of technological objects as problem-solving (...) physical instruments to show that things can be technological to different degrees, and that the property of being technological is more fundamental than being a technology. (shrink)

In this article, I deal with a conceptual issue concerning the framework of two special sciences: artificial intelligence and synthetic biology, i.e. the distinction between the natural and the artificial (a long-lasting topic of history of scientific though since the ancient philosophy). My claim is that the standard definition of the “artificial” is no longer useful to describe some present-day artificial sciences, as the boundary between the natural and the artificial is not so sharp and clear-cut as it was in (...) the past. Artificial intelligence and synthetic biology, two disciplines with new technologies, new experimental methods, and new theoretical frameworks, all need a new, more specific, and refined definition of (the) “artificial”, which is also related to the use of the synthetic method to build real world entities and in open-ended (real or virtual) environments. The necessity of a new definition of the artificial is due to the close relationship of AI and synthetic biology with biology itself. They both are engineering sciences that are moving closer and closer, at least apparently, towards (natural) biology, although from different and opposite directions. I show how the new concept of the artificial is, therefore, the result of a new view on biology from an engineering and synthetic point of view, where the boundary between the natural and the artificial is far more blurred. From this, I try to formulate a brand-new, more useful definition for future understanding, practical, and epistemological purposes of these two artificial sciences. (shrink)

Internationally, there are reports of adverse health effects (AHE) in the environs of industrial wind turbines (IWT). There was multidisciplinary confirmation of the key characteristics of the AHE at the first international symposium on AHE/iwt. The symptoms being reported are consistent internationally and are characterized by crossover findings or a predictable appearance of signs and symptoms present with exposure to IWT sound energy and amelioration when the exposure ceases. There is also a revealed preference of victims to seek restoration away (...) from their homes. This article identifies the need to create a case definition to establish a clinical diagnosis. A case definition is proposed that identifies the sine qua non diagnostic criteria for a diagnosis of adverse health effects in the environs of industrial wind turbines. Possible, probable, and confirmed diagnoses are detailed. The goal is to foster the adoption of a common case definition that will facilitate future research efforts. (shrink)

This article traces conceptualizations of technology from narrow definitions to a broader understanding that encompasses the larger social and environmental context within which technology operates. In doing so, the associated social and environmental drivers and impacts of technology are identified and conclusions are drawn for the roles of technology and technology change in achieving sustainability.

This paper examines the vital role played by electron microscopy toward the modern definition of viruses, as formulated in the late 1950s. Before the 1930s viruses could neither be visualized by available technologies nor grown in artificial media. As such they were usually identified by their ability to cause diseases in their hosts and defined in such negative terms as “ultramicroscopic” or invisible infectious agents that could not be cultivated outside living cells. The invention of the electron microscope, with magnification (...) and resolution powers several orders of magnitude better than that of optical instruments, opened up possibilities for biological applications. The hitherto invisible viruses lent themselves especially well to investigation with this new instrument. We first offer a historical consideration of the development of the instrument and, more significantly, advances in techniques for preparing and observing specimens that turned the electron microscope into a routine biological tool. We then describe the ways in which the electron microscopic images, or micrographs, functioned as forms of new knowledge about viruses and resulted in a paradigm shift in the very definition of these entities. Micrographs were not mere illustrations since they did the work for the electron microscopists. Drawing extensively on primary publications, we adduce the role of the new instrument in understanding the so-called eclipse phase in virus multiplication and the unexpected spinoffs of data from electron microscopy in naming and classifying viruses. Thus, we show that electron microscopy functioned not only to provide evidence, but also arguments in facilitating a reordering of the world that it brought into the visual realm. (shrink)

This paper examines the vital role played by electron microscopy toward the modern definition of viruses, as formulated in the late 1950s. Before the 1930s viruses could neither be visualized by available technologies nor grown in artificial media. As such they were usually identified by their ability to cause diseases in their hosts and defined in such negative terms as “ultramicroscopic” or invisible infectious agents that could not be cultivated outside living cells. The invention of the electron microscope, with magnification (...) and resolution powers several orders of magnitude better than that of optical instruments, opened up possibilities for biological applications. The hitherto invisible viruses lent themselves especially well to investigation with this new instrument. We first offer a historical consideration of the development of the instrument and, more significantly, advances in techniques for preparing and observing specimens that turned the electron microscope into a routine biological tool. We then describe the ways in which the electron microscopic images, or micrographs, functioned as forms of new knowledge about viruses and resulted in a paradigm shift in the very definition of these entities. Micrographs were not mere illustrations since they did the work for the electron microscopists. Drawing extensively on primary publications, we adduce the role of the new instrument in understanding the so-called eclipse phase in virus multiplication and the unexpected spinoffs of data from electron microscopy in naming and classifying viruses. Thus, we show that electron microscopy functioned not only to provide evidence, but also arguments in facilitating a reordering of the world that it brought into the visual realm. (shrink)

Contemporary advanced technology seems to raise new and fundamental questions as it apparently provides a human subject with an infinite range of incoming possibilities. Accordingly, research on the implications of technology is massive and splits into hard critics and faithful supporters. Yet, technological activities cannot be defined in terms of their products alone. Indeed, every technological behaviour unfolds the very same tension against what would have been naturally impossible, in absence of that same behaviour. Thus, the debate on technology appears (...) to be independent from any level of technological sophistication, and so its roots can be traced back in the dawn of Western thought. In this article, I argue that the faithful and sceptic views today at stake on hard-technology can be explained as a revival of the twofold attitude towards demons, developed in the history of Western thought. I show how demons have always embodied the human natural limits and the incomprehensible aspects of reality. Exactly as in the case of demons, hard-technology is now seen as a fearful destroyer of both nature understood as a complex system and human naturalness or as a trustful way to save humanity from decay, which complements what is naturally imperfect and, then, perfectible. Yet, none of these irreducible approaches opens a satisfactory path towards the solution of the contemporary issues on technology. On the contrary, by drawing upon ancient Greek neutral demonology the debate on technology may be definitively returned to its teleological and ethical dimension. (shrink)

From 2012 to 2015 I was the first Eugene H. Fram Chair in Applied Critical Thinking at Rochester Institute of Technology, in Rochester, NY. To the best of my knowledge it is the only such endowed position devoted solely to this at a major North American university. It was made possible by a generous 3 million dollar gift from an anonymous alumnus who wished to honor a retired faculty member who had taught for 51 years. The honoree was revered for (...) his devotion to Bloom’s taxonomy and his academic rigor, which infused case studies and the Socratic method. A primary motivation for the chair was a belief that an alarming number of college graduates lack the necessary critical thinking skills in order to advance successfully in their careers. My responsibilities included collaborative leadership, advocacy and oversight for critical thinking across the entire campus. It provided a unique opportunity to reflect on the current state of critical thinking instruction–very broadly construed, as well as to examine its specific role at RIT, an institution with its own unique history, mission, and character. (shrink)

Most definitions of death – whether cardiopulmonary, whole brain and brain stem, or just upper brain – include an irreversibility condition. Cessation of function is not enough to declare death. Irreversibility should be limited to an organism's ability to ‘restart’ itself after vital organs have ceased to function. However, this would mean that every hour people who cannot be revived without the intervention of medical personnel and their technology are coming back from the dead. However, the alternative of irreversibility (...) being dependent upon technology will lead to even more counterintuitive results such as: some people are dead at a particular time and place, but others in more technologically advanced eras and locations are alive despite their being in identical physical states; in the future, millions of cryogenically frozen human beings could spend centuries in a non–dead state because of the future technological breakthroughs; or large numbers of ‘frozen’ people are dead for aeons but coroners are not able to declare them so because they are unaware of what biological conditions science will never be able to reverse. So death should be defined only in non–relational biological terms with a self–starting condition similar to that once advocated by Lawrence Becker. (shrink)

The article gives a definition of the technical and economic potential of the application of the deforming broaching process. Research of the consequences of introducing deforming broaching into technological processes at manufacturing enterprises is carried out on the basis of application of system resource and matrix approach. On the basis of the performed researches, a methodological basis for the economic evaluation of the results of applying deforming broaching on the pro-duction has been developed. The article has improved the well-known scientific (...) and methodological foundations for the determination of technical and economic results of the application of deforming broaching due to the complex identifica-tion of production-organizational decisions - in technical and forms of evaluation in economic spheres. The developed approach gives an opportunity to more accu-rately assess the economic effect of introducing deforming broaching on the min-ing, metallurgical and machine building industries. It can be used to assess the economic effect of introducing other process parts processing. (shrink)

The introduction of respiratory machines in the 1950s may have saved the lives of many, but it also challenged the notion of death itself. This development endowed “machines” with the power to form a unique ontological creature: a live body with a “dead” brain. While technology may be blamed for complicating things in the first place, it is also called on to solve the resulting quandaries. Indeed, it is not the birth of the “brain-dead” that concerns us most, but rather (...) its association with a web of epistemological and ethical considerations, where technology plays a central role. The brain death debate in Israel introduces highly sophisticated religious thought and authoritative medical expertise. At focus are the religious acceptance and rejection of brain death by a technologically savvy group of rabbis whose religious doctrine––along with a particular form of religious reasoning––is used to support the truth claims made from the scientific community but challenge the ways in which they are made credible. In our case, brain death as “true” death is made religiously viable with the very use of technological apparatus and scientific rhetoric that stand at the heart of the scientific ethos. (shrink)

The following text presents a revised and extended version of the public defence of my Ph.D. thesis, which I presented at the Faculty of Social Sciences on 18 th November 2005, Copenhagen University. The thesis applies and develops theoretical perspectives from Science and Technology Studies – especially Actor-Network Theory – on the empirical field of primary education. This field has not prior been approached by these theories. Based on ethnographic field studies the thesis presents and compares what I call spatial (...) imaginaries of interactions of humans and learning materials in a traditional classroom and in a computer lab. The study describes and discusses the forms of knowledge and the forms of presence performed through these socio-material interactions. The study thus contributes a definition of materialities that takes the understanding of technology in education beyond the dominant humanist approach to schooling. (shrink)

The article delves into the conceptual frameworks surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) by juxtaposing it with natural intelligence and delineating the correlated notions. It enumerates the issues propelling the discourse on the explored topics. The author proposes a bifurcation between two polar concepts of artificial intelligence. The first is dubbed “imitative,” where AI is perceived in relation to natural intelligence as its technical recreation, capable of not only emulating but significantly outstripping its natural counterpart. A prerequisite for embodying this concept is (...) understanding natural intelligence; three approaches are examined: (a) acknowledging the lack of a precise understanding of natural intelligence, (b) exploring it from a biological perspective, and (c) analyzing it from a psychological perspective. The author articulates their own interpretation of natural intelligence, portraying it as a multifaceted amalgam of cultural, historical, social, and anthropological elements. From this vantage point, natural intelligence emerges not merely as a natural formation (thereby, discussions about the laws governing its function and evolution are warranted), but also as an “extra-natural” formation, its existence dictated by randomness and uniqueness, meaning natural intelligence evolves in a “singular” manner. In the context of comparing natural and artificial intelligence, the discussion encompasses several issues: the feasibility of the control of natural intelligence processes, the structure of neural networks, the superiority of computer programs in chess, the use of neural networks to write academic papers, and so forth. The conclusion posits that given artificial intelligence, despite its complexity, remains a technical invention orchestrated and brought to fruition by humans as a tool; society, if inclined to bestow AI with autonomy for tackling specific tasks, ought to do so prudently to prevent self-detriment and retain the ability to curtail or utterly revoke such autonomy. (shrink)

Technologies of democracy are instruments based on material apparatus, social practices and expert knowledge that organize the participation of various publics in the definition and treatment of public problems. Using three examples related to the engagement of publics in nanotechnology in France (a citizen conference, a series of public meetings, and an industrial design process), the paper argues that Science and Technology Studies provide useful tools and methods for the analysis of technologies of democracy. Operations of experiments and public demonstrations (...) can be described, as well as controversies about technologies of democracy giving rise to counter-experiments and counter-demonstrations. The political value of the analysis of public engagement lies in the description of processes of stabilization of democratic orders and in the display of potential alternative political arrangements. (shrink)

This paper aims at considering the conceptual status of feeding and eating disorders (FEDs). Now that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) has changed the classification and some relevant criteria of FEDs, it is particularly relevant to evaluate their psychiatric framework and their status as mental disorders. I focus my efforts on addressing only one specific question: Do FEDs fit the DSM-5 general definition of mental disorder? In DSM-5 a mental disorder is defined as a syndrome that (...) reflects adysfunctionand is usually associated with significantdistress or disability. More importantly, there is an explicit statement saying thatallmental disorders listed in the manual must meet the requirements highlighted by the general definition. Thus, I evaluate whether or not FEDs are really meant to reflect a dysfunction and are usually associated with significant distress or disability. (shrink)

During the last hundred years medical language has been influenced by scientific and technological progress. As a result uncertainty in medical communication is increasing. This may have serious consequences not only for health care delivery but also for medical science. Disease classification, assessment of the validity of epidemiological investigations and comparison of the results of various investigations are examples of what will become less secure. The purpose of the article is to emphasise a main source of uncertainty — the problem (...) of interpreting definitions. Two issues of interpretation are explored. One concerns the logical status of a statement and the other the function of a statement. It is concluded that the security of medical language can be increased through the elucidation of the logical status and functions of statements making up medical concepts. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Definitions of Technological Artifacts Technological Artifacts in Philosophy References and Further Reading.