The perplexing nature of time has been more contemplated, speculated, written, and debated about over the ages than virtually any other subject, with the possible exception of religion. Yet time seems more elusive than the vast majority of other metaphysical concepts. Time remains mysterious, for we lack an understanding of time at a basic physical level. Concepts of time in theories of modern physics and time as found in contemporary western analytic philosophy are discussed.

The Concept of Time presents the reconstructed text of a lecture delivered by Martin Heidegger to the Marburg Theological Society in 1924. It offers a fascinating insight into the developmental years leading up to the publication, in 1927, of his magnum opus Being and Time, itself one of the most influential philosophical works this century. In The Concept of Time Heidegger introduces many of the central themes of his analyses of human existence which were subsequently (...) incorporated into Being and Time, themes such as Dasein, Being-in-the-world, everydayness, disposition, care, authenticity, death, uncanniness, temporality and historicity. Starting out by asking: What is time?, Heidegger proceeds to radicalise the concept of time and our relation to it, ending with the question: Are we ourselves time? Am I time? (shrink)

The aim of this analysis was to examine the concept of time to rejuvenate and extend existing narratives of time within the nursing literature. In particular, we hope to promote a new trajectory in nursing research and practice which focuses on time and person‐centred care, specifically of older people with cognitive impairment hospitalized in the acute care setting. We consider the explanatory power of concepts such as clock time, process time, fast care, slow care (...) and time debt for elucidating the relationship between ‘good care’ and ‘time use’. We conclude by offering two additional concepts of time, plurotemporality and person‐centred time (PCT) which we propose will help advance of nursing knowledge and practice. Nurse clinicians and researchers can use these alternative concepts of time to explore and describe different temporal structures that honour the patient's values and preferences using experiential, observation‐based nursing research approaches. (shrink)

In this chapter we argue that our concept of time is a functional concept. We argue that our concept of time is such that time is whatever it is that plays the time role, and we spell out what we take the time role to consist in. We evaluate this proposal against a number of other analyses of our concept of time, and argue that it better explains various features of (...) our dispositions as speakers and our practices as agents. (shrink)

Investigates The Concept Of Time, Juxtaposes The Mystery Of Time In Ancient Thought, The Varied Experience Of Time In Cosmological, Cultural, Historical, Spiritual Memory And Knowledge. Deals With In Vedic And Post Vedic Periods-The Concept Of Time In Jainism, Buddhism, Pre Kaliyuga And Kaliyuga Eras And Examins The Significance Of Application Of Time In Rituals, Festiviities According To Dharma Sastras To The Historical And Modern Man. The Volume As It Stands Now With Six (...) Chapters Begins With An Introduction On The Concept Of Time In Ancient India. Investigating The Concept Pf Time The Author Juxtaposes The Awareness Of The Mystery Of Time In Ancient Thought, The Varied Experiences Of Time In Cosmological, Cultural, Historical, Spiritual Memory And Knowledge. Prestantation On The Notion Of Time In Diverse Philosophical Systems Especially The Indian One Was Discussed At Length. The Mention Of Time In Vedas, Time As Fundamental And Very Important In The Process Of Evolution, Time As Above Everything Else, Even Above God As The Actual Existence Of Beings, Cultic Time, Etc., Is Made. The Transmigration From The Cultic Time Of The Vedas To The Interiorized Time Of Upanisads, Comparision Of Time In Mahabharata, The Puranic Conception Of Time As The Moment Identical With The Unit Of Change Of Gunas Etc., Are Discussed. (shrink)

Kant's concept of time forms an integral part of his mature system of transcendental idealism. That system is a critical response to his predecessors' treatments of time and related issues. Hence, a proper assessment of Kant's understanding of time requires an elaboration of its distinctive historical and systematic matrix. The aim of the dissertation is to examine critically Kant's mature conception of time in light of both the historical factors that shaped it and the role (...) it plays in Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism. ;The most important discussion shaping Kant's thought on time is the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence . The relevance of the Correspondence to Kant's mature view of time has, however, been overlooked by many commentators. The reason for this neglect can be traced in part to a misinterpretation of the question underlying the first antinomy in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason . According to that misinterpretation, the first antinomy revolves around the question whether time itself is finite or infinite. The correction of this mistaken, but common interpretation paves the way for a main task of this dissertation, namely, to reconstruct with historical and systematic accuracy the relation between the issue in the Correspondence underlying the first antinomy and Kant's concept of time. ;The dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter One examines the particular issue discussed in the Correspondence which had the greatest impact on Kant's notion of time, namely, the question whether time is absolute, as Clarke and the Newtonians held, or whether it is relational, as Leibniz held. Chapter Two explores how the concept of time in Kant's "Inaugural Dissertation" is influenced by this dispute between Leibniz and Clarke. Chapter Three considers the concept of time and its role in Kant's fully developed transcendental idealism, as articulated in the Critique of Pure Reason. Particular attention is paid to the "Transcendental Aesthetic" and the first antinomy. Finally, Chapter Four critically examines a central assumption of Kant's concept of time that he shares with his predecessors: the infinity of time. It is argued that this assumption overlooks the metaphysical significance of the "moving" present. (shrink)

There have been very few studies of the Daoist conception of time in either the West or the East. The only explicit study on this topic in the English literature is David Chai’s (2014). Chai maintains that “human measured time” manifested in myriad things in the Daoist universe is merely a mental construction, whereas the authentic time is cosmological time, which consists of neither an A-series (which is ordered by non-reducible pastness, presentness, and futurity) nor a (...) B-series (which is ordered by earlier-than relations) but something without order and directionality. In this paper, I start with Daoist texts (i.e., Dao De Jing and Zhuangzi) about fundamental reality and time. I then explain and analyze Chai’s interpretations of these texts. Lastly, I argue that Chai’s interpretations violate an important Daoist principle. In addition, the idea that human measured time is merely a mental construction is not the best available interpretation of the texts. (shrink)

Are past, present and future objective features of reality? What is an instant of time? Could time pass if nothing changed? In this book, the author attempts to show how considerations in the philosophy of logic and language are needed to settle these and other well-known issues. Part I deals with the debate over whether time is 'tensed' or 'tenseless'. Various problems are spelt out for the 'tenseless' view, and it is argued that the issue ends up (...) hinging upon whether a genuinely tenseless language is conceivable. Part II has to do with periods and instants. The semantics of dates and of duration-terms are examined, and the notion of a durationless instant attacked. In Part III, the connections between time, change and causation are discussed. A criterial approach to the meanings of certain key temporal terms is adopted, yielding answers to a number of traditional metaphysical issues about time. (shrink)

Augustine’s analysis of time in Book XI of Confessions represents for Ludwig Wittgenstein a good example of a philosophical question. In dealing with such theme, his thought undergoes relevant changes. In the Philosophical Remarks, written more than 10 years after the drafting of the Tractatus, the Austrian philosopher holds that the essence of the world can be expressed in the grammar of language. Philosophy as “custodian” of grammar can grasp the essence of the world by excluding nonsensical combinations of (...) signs. Philosopher, however, are often “tempted” to straightly describe the nature of the world, producing logical-grammatical paradoxes. An example of such a temptation is offered by the attempt to take hold of the essence of time using propositions like “only the present experience has reality.” The logical mistake hidden in this proposition lies in the bad use of the adjectival word “present” that would lose its everyday use and functional role in the language. Only comparing the term “present” with the background of other words referring to time experiences like “past,” “future,” and so on, we are able to understand the true sense of it. Engaging in a grammatical investigation into the notion of time helps us to dispel the different uses of it staving off logical muddles. Wittgenstein makes, in his lecture held at Cambridge in 1932–1933, a relevant distinction between what he calls “memory-time” and “information-time.” If the first can be understood as a now-centered system mostly expressed by indexical sentences or as an arrangement relied on memory, and therefore inadequate to give any external physical criteria for time measurements, the second clearly refers to a public chronology, implemented by clocks, calendars, diaries, and so on. Grammatical misconceptions, however occur when we are “tyrannized” by a metaphor and not able to “move outside of” it. The Austrian philosopher makes no secret of preferring a characterization of time that rejects a truth-functional interpretation. As for the notion of “game” in the Philosophical Investigations, it is impossible to have something like a common denominator shared by every sentence involving time. (shrink)

This collection of articles is an important milestone in the history of the study of time conceptions in Greek and Roman Antiquity. It spans from Homer to Neoplatonism. Conceptions of time are considered from different points of view and sources. Reflections on time were both central and various throughout the history of ancient philosophy. Time was a topic, but also material for poets, historians and doctors. Importantly, the contributions also explore implicit conceptions and how language influences (...) our thought categories. (shrink)

This article focuses on the two types of conception of time, namely, the time of history and the time of ethics. The former is a conception of time that one views or situates one’s lifetime in or with history, whereas the latter a time of our personal lifetime interrupted by the intervention of the other and the accompanied ethical significance. This article argues that Classical Confucianism has interesting specifications of these two conceptions of time. (...) In particular, it shows a correspondence and interaction between the two. Then, it is not difficult to catch up with what our tradition has been aiming at through ethical practices, and the tradition in turn prompts us to be ethical. (shrink)

What is time? What is its beginning, if we may speak of a beginning? All these questions are not stimulated by a crypto-metaphysical need, but by the epistemological approach itself. It is enough here to think of Ilya Prigogine, who has made of the concept of time the main task of his scientific and philosophical research. In this horizon, we must accept what Stephen Hawking himself said about the beginning and the end of time, in physic-cosmological (...) meaning, as we can accept the meaning of experienced time, which stands in the evolution of our history, which begins with us, coincides with the origin of our biological time, or of our biological times, to end with the end of our biological history on a macroscopic scale. Our evolutionary history is, of course, underlined by experienced time, the charioteer of our changes, but in a dialectical relation with chronological, chronometric, chronosophic times, in a relation of one among many, which produces states of suffering. But it does not make this evolutionary history less interesting. So, at the end of our journey, at least the consciousness of being “inhabitants” of time and bearers of change appears, and this occurs whether we have behind us big cataclysms or thermic Death. (shrink)

The article discusses the process of switching temporal regimes in Soviet culture at the turn of the 1920s - and during the 1930s on the material of architecture. The concepts of time in constructivism and neoclassicism are compared since the struggle between them determined the main vectors of artistic development in the reconstruction period. The author analyzes the discourse of the official position in relation to the main trends in the development of architecture in the context of the periodization (...) of socialist construction and elicits the reasons for supporting the reference to the classical heritage. The change of political agenda set new requirements for architecture as the most important way of social representation. The new society - socialism - was interpreted in constructivism, which was the leading direction of 1920s architecture, in the modus of the future. In the neoclassicism of the 1930s, socialism was placed in the modus of the present. Constructivism was aimed at the pragmatics of restoring social fabric and solving current problems, as well as at constructing a future society and human. At the end of the first five-year plan, the authorities set other goals for culture in general and architecture in particular: the representation of achievements and the expression of the greatness of socialist construction. Neoclassicism was called upon to perpetuate the present state of affairs in the modus of real perfection and superiority of Soviet socialism over any other formats of social life. Between the time of creation and the time of completion, there is formed a gap that must be hidden. As a way of hiding the temporal gap were chosen classical principles of form-making and examples of the Renaissance and Russian classicism, that were designed to convincingly demonstrate, on the one hand, the possibility of accelerating and compressing time, the swiftness of achieving the ideal, and on the other hand, tp depreciate innovations, make the idea of the movement of time into the future unnecessary. The theory of the leading neoclassicist I. Zholtovsky is discussed as an alternative to the utopian interpretation of time in constructivism, as materializing the mythological time, in which the source and end of creation are given simultaneously in the modus of eternity. (shrink)

John Ellis McTaggart defended an idealistic view of time in the tradition of Hegel and Bradley. His famous paper makes two independent claims (McTaggart1908): First, time is a complex conception with two different logical roots. Second, time is unreal. To reject the second claim seems to commit to the first one, i.e., to a pluralistic account of time. We compare McTaggarts views to the most important concepts of time investigated in physics, neurobiology, and philosophical phenomenology. (...) They indicate that a unique, reductionist account of time is far from being plausible, even though too many conceptions of time may seem unsatisfactory from an ontological point of view. (shrink)

This volume provides a comprehensive historico-doctrinal analysis of the transformation of the concept of time in the transition from the medieval debate to ...

Pseudo-Archytas.--Iamblichus.--Proclus.--Damascius.--Simplicius.--Plutarch.--Tatian.

The article explores the meaning and usages of "communicative and cultural memory" in the context of "mental maps". It looks particularly at theories which, on the basis of constructed symbolic divisions, connote a "lasting Balkan/European reality". The explication focuses on the content considered by these theories as specifically Balkan understanding of the concepts of Space and Time. U tekstu se razmatraju znacenja i razlicite primene sadrzaja "komunikativnog i kulturnog pamcenja u kontekstu savremenih "mentalnih mapa" i posebno teorija koje na (...) konstrukcijama simbolickih podela sugerisu "trajnu balkansku realnost". Razmatranje je ograniceno na deo sadrzaja koji ovim teorijama koristi kao argumentacija za tezu "specificno balkanskog" ili "specificno srpskog" razumevanja kategorija vremena i prostora. (shrink)

Generally, it is common knowledge that humans have the same time, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 31 days a month, 365 days per year, but most of them do not know how to manage time and manage it to be something useful and effectively. That is because many people do not have the discipline in filling time. Those days are filled with things that are not directed, even worse is that filling the time (...) of his or her life with things that damage life. Even though wasting time is not unwise because it is a waste of the opportunity God has given and the time that has passed will not return, meaning that if the opportunity is not used, then the opportunity will be lost. How important is to redeem the time, especially for contemporary Christian leaders because all must be accountable to God. This study uses a research library. Library research is a literature study that is carried out by using relevant and available reading sources related to the topics discussed in the research. Books or journal articles related to the topics discussed are used as sources of reading to better understand time management and its application at the personal and organisational levels. From the various reading sources used, the writer develops this scientific article, including giving comments or critical comments that are conveyed in various parts of the writing, especially in the conclusions. (shrink)

The author is convinced that the key of Heidegger’s critical relationship toward Hegel’s philosophy can be found in the interpretation of the problem of time. This is why he deals with the analysis of the basic outlines of Heidegger’s criticism of Hegel’s concept of time, where he believes this criticism to be problematic considering its starting point, as well as the concrete analysis of the respective parts of Hegel’s work. What is problematic in Heidegger’s critical viewpoint, which (...) he starts from, is the intention to find a link between spirit and time. Still, with this mission, the substance of Hegel’s philosophy is misunderstood. (shrink)

I Ricœur's account of the distinction between phenomenological and cosmological time My theme concerns the notions of time and space in Ricœur's thought with special emphasis on its relation to Phenomenology. As I understand it, in Temps et récit and again in La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli Ricœur proposes an opposition between subjective/phenomenological time and objective/cosmological time. In La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli he introduces a parallel distinction between lived space and geometrical space. We can state Ricœur's position (...) in Husserlian terms and say that he is developing different regional ontologies, while I shall argue in these remarks that a certain fundamental ontology is required which will unify these different notions of space and different notions of time. Cosmic time is characterised by Ricœur as constituted by the distinction between earlier and later and by a general notion of the instant. The phenomenological notion of time is characterised by the distinction between the past and the future and its privileged instant is the present. In the third part of Temps et récit Ricœur argues for the autonomy of each notion. This autonomy is a necessary step in developing a third notion of historical time as a bridge between these two notions, the cosmic and the phenomenological. (shrink)

The topic to be addressed in this paper, that is, the distinction between the “concept” of time and the being of the clock, divides into two parts: first, in the debate between Albert Einstein and Henri Bergson, one discovers the ground for the diverging concepts of time characterized by physics in its opposing itself to philosophy. Bergson’s durée or “duration” in opposition to Einstein’s ‘physicist’s time’ as ‘public time,’ one can argue, sets the terms for (...) Martin Heidegger’s extending, his ontological analysis of Da-sein, as human being-in-the-world. Second, in this the ‘concept of time’ gives way to the analysis of the ‘being of the clock.’ What is this being of the clock that makes evident the fundamental temporality of Da-sein? This question is rehearsed in Division Two of Being and Time. My claim is that the fundamental insight into the nature of time revealed by the encounter between Bergson and Einstein is that time extemporizes itself. Temporality “is” not a being but a process that temporalizes itself, precisely because it “is not.”. (shrink)

In the early lecture of 1924, entitled “The Concept of Time,” Heidegger inaugurated a programme that formed the backbone of the initial question of his magnum opus, Being and Time (1927). He begins by saying, in a singularly Augustinean tone..

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

Temporality represents the most important and difficult question of phenomenology: decisive for its idea of phenomenon and consciousness. What means that time is the appearing itself, so not a time of consciousness but the consciousness itself: this is the phenomenological question about the origin of time. Composed in three decades approximately—from 1904 to 1934—Husserlian contributions phenomenology of temporality constitutes the most extensive corpus about this matter in the canon of occidental philosophy. They lead in three main directions (...) and correspond to the same number of periods of their development: the mathesis of intentional manifolds, the metaphysics of individuality, the theory of temporal self-constitution. After the description of the phases, the sources and the internal articulations, the paper makes room for a brief and essential glossary of phenomenology of temporality, made up of some of the most considerable and aporetic notions: the retention, and its bond with protention, individuality and its elusive essence, the flow and the stream. Lastly, the paper inspects and examines some of the most remarkable critics to phenomenology of temporality, from Heidegger to Derrida, from Bergmann to Lévinas, in order to demonstrate how leading was its role in the whole philosophy of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Theodore Kisiel's outstanding translation premits English-speaking readers to appreciate the central importance of this text in the development of Heidegger's thought.

Through a comparison between phenomenology and quantum physics, the paper aims to show that naturalising phenomenology can also mean bringing it into a critical and fruitful relationship with some of the most complex and fundamental questions of contemporary physics, thus showing both the truly ever-open potential of Husserlian and Heideggerian thinking and the need for the sciences to receive a theoretical light without which they risk remaining either magical, arbitrary and esoteric knowledge or technical, reductionist and epistemologically sterile.

As we speak about time in the context of everyday life, we have no problem with what we mean by time. We take time as given. Different kinds of theories of development rely on the ordinary concept of time. Time is a sequence of instants, and we are moving along from the past to the future, from birth to death. Moving in time also means development. It does not take into account how a (...) human being is in the time. It flattens our view of human life and cannot describe our manifold being. According to theories of development, if a child does not behave in a certain instant as the theories expect, there must be a problem with that child or she has not developed as well as others. Heidegger uses terms like time-space, temporality and ecstases of time. The question of time is of the same kind as the question of Being. We are in the world and in time in the same way. We all have experience of time, how it sometimes goes quickly and sometimes very slowly. Time is not experienced as moments one after another. It is time-space. Time-space means that time has three dimensions and it consists of the ecstatical opening up of the future, the past and the present. In this article, I will open up the question how the traditional understanding of time and the ecstatic understanding of time understand children differently. What does it mean that little children live exclusively in the present? (shrink)

This paper empirically investigates one aspect of the folk concept of time by testing how the presence or absence of directedness impacts judgements about whether there is time in a world. Experiment 1 found that dynamists, showed significantly higher levels of agreement that there is time in dynamically directed worlds than in non-dynamical non-directed worlds. Comparing our results to those we describe in Latham et al., we report that while ~ 70% of dynamists say there is (...) time in B-theory worlds, only ~ 45% say there is time in C-theory worlds. Thus, while the presence of directedness makes dynamists more inclined to say there is time in a world, a substantial subpopulation of dynamists judge that there is time in non-directed worlds. By contrast, a majority of non-dynamists judged that there was time in both growing block worlds and C-theory worlds, with no significant differences between the means. Experiment 2 found that when participants are only presented with non-dynamical worlds—namely, a directed world and a non-directed world—they report significantly higher levels of agreement that there is time in B-theory worlds. However, the majority of participants still judge that there is time in C-theory worlds. We conclude that while the presence of directedness bolsters judgements that there is time, most people do not judge it to be necessary for time. (shrink)

This paper aims to revisit a debated issue concerning the formation of the “conception of time” in Plotinus’ treatise On Eternity and Time. Over the last several years, studies have drawn attention to the fact that ennoia (“conception”) in Plotinus does not always refer to the existence of an innate notion in the soul, but that it can also refer to a conception that is formed empirically. However, it is unclear whether this holds true also for the conception (...) of time. My claim is that, far from attributing an empirical origin to the formation of the ennoia of time, Plotinus is committed to distinguishing the ennoia of number, which measures times, from the ennoia of time in the proper sense. However, just as it is necessary to distinguish essential time from its manifestation, measured by the movements of the heavenly bodies, we must also distinguish the innate notion of essential number, which the soul naturally possesses in itself, from the notion of arithmetical number, obtained through the observation of discrete quantities. This paper thus proposes to read Enn. 3.7(45).12 in connection with the analyses developed in Enn. 6.6(34).4, which concern the ennoia of number. (shrink)