El objetivo del presente artículo es doble. En primer lugar, mostrar con claridad cual es la estructura formal de la obra De causa Dei contra Pelagiurn et de virtute causarui’n de Thomas Bradwardine. brillante pensador del siglo xiv, de fecunda influencia en su siglo y en los posteriores. En segundo lugar, profundizar en el estudio del método, que podríamos denominar matemático, utilizado por Bradwardine en esta obra, intentando mostrar los motivos que le llevaron a estructuraría así y lo (...) que esto supone.The aims of tbis article are two. The first is to sliow what is dic structure of dic fon in dic more important book of Thomas Bradwardine’s work: De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarunt Bradwardine was a brilliantthinker of dic XIV century, who hada prolific influence in that century andin later ones. The second is to study dic method he used in ibis work, trying to show wby Bradwardine structured «De causa Dei» so, and its consecuences. (shrink)

For many of Spinoza's contemporaries and predecessors the very notion of causa sui was utterly absurd, akin to a Baron Munchausen attempting to lift himself above a river by pulling his hair up. This chapter examines Descartes’ engagement with the notion of causa sui, and shows that Spinoza understood the causation of causa sui as efficient, and not formal, causation. Proving the existence of God was the stated aim of Descartes’ Third Meditation. Descartes’ response to Caterus (...) is pretty simple: he denies that efficient causation must be spread in time. Descartes’ surprising response to Caterus drew the attention of Antoine Arnauld, the author of the Fourth Set of Objections, and, at the time, a doctoral student of theology at the Sorbonne. The young Spinoza must have watched Descartes’ struggle with the notion of causa sui with great interest. (shrink)

The very first line of Spinoza’s magnum opus, the Ethics, states the following surprising definition: By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing [Per causam sui intelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujus natura non potest concipi, nisi existens]. As we shall shortly see, for many of Spinoza’s contemporaries and predecessors the very notion of causa sui was utterly absurd, akin to a Baron Munchausen (...) attempting to lift himself above a river by pulling his hair up. How can a thing cause itself into existence, if before the causal activity, the cause did not exist at all? Indeed, in one of his earliest works, Spinoza himself claimed: “No thing, considered in itself, has in itself a cause enabling it to destroy itself (if it exists), or to make itself [te konnen maaken] (if it does not exist)” (KV II 26|I/110/14-16). Moreover, in other early works, Spinoza refers to God as an “uncreated thing” (TIE §97) or “uncreated substance” (CM II 1|I/237/20), and not as a cause-of-itself as in the Ethics. What made Spinoza desert the common, traditional, view of God as the uncaused first cause, or uncreated substance, and adopt instead the apparently chimerical notion of God as causa sui? A very likely explanation for this development suggests that Spinoza’s rationalism, his commitment to the principle that everything must have a reason both for its existence and for its non-existence – a commitment stated clearly both in the Ethics (see, for example, E1p8s2 and E1p11d2), and in Spinoza’s other writings (see, for example, Ep. 34 (IV/179/29)) – made him realize that the notion of an uncreated, or uncaused, thing is of no use for him: if everything must have a cause, then the first cause, or the most fundamental being, must be a cause-of-itself. All this is well and good, but we should not let Spinoza off the hook so easily, for the immediate question which arises now is whether Spinoza is not simply cheating his readers. Does Spinoza have a reason – i.e., argument – that could convince us that causa sui is indeed a more adequate characterization of God and not merely an opportunistic and ad hoc façade for the good old uncaused cause? While there are many important questions surrounding Spinoza’s notion of causa sui, it is the last question which will be the focus of this short chapter. In the first part of this chapter, we study, briefly, Descartes’ engagement with the notion of causa sui. In the second part, I show that Spinoza understood the causation of causa sui as efficient, and not formal, causation. The third and final part will attempt to locate precisely the alleged problem with the notion of causa sui, and consider how could Spinoza defend the intelligibility of this notion. Regrettably, limitations of space will force us to leave the examination of Spinoza’s closely related notion of being-conceived. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause, de Suarez à LeibnizSteven NadlerVincent Carraud. Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause, de Suarez à Leibniz. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002. Pp. 573. € 42,00.Over the last two decades, there has been a good deal of outstanding work on the problem of causation in early modern philosophy. Some of it has been devoted to first-order (...) questions: for example, on whether this or that thinker allows for real causal activity among finite substances (and which ones). Other studies, by contrast, have focused on second-order questions, especially the proper formulation of the causal principle itself. Vincent Carraud's book is primarily concerned with second-order questions, although it does have something to say with respect to first-order questions as well. But the depth and breadth of this study makes it much more than just another entry in the ongoing discussion over who thought what about causality among the early moderns. Carraud has a large and complex story to tell: the development of the principle of sufficient reason in the seventeenth century. In particular, he wants to know which philosophers can truly be said to have adopted that principle in its most rigorous formulation. It is both a philosophical and a historical story, and it appears in what is surely one of the most important and interesting books in early modern philosophy in recent years.Carraud directs our attention to a particular phrase that originates with Descartes but then seems to reappear (in various forms) throughout the period: causa sive ratio, "cause or reason." Every term in the phrase is subject to interpretation, of course—'cause,' 'reason' and especially 'or'—and the thesis it embodies (and a philosopher's attitude toward it) is a function of how those terms are to be understood. Carraud's interest is in what this phrase can tell us about how a select group of philosophers (primarily Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche and Leibniz) regard the relationship between causality and intelligibility.The story begins with Suarez, the late sixteenth-century Scholastic. Suarez's contribution to the rise of the principle of sufficient reason is modest but crucial. He privileges efficient causation over all of the other Aristotelian varieties. While he still grants some explanatory role for formal, material and final causes, they have lost their status as "true" causes for Suarez; in fact, they qualify as causes only by analogy with efficient causation. As Carraud reads Suarez, the ratio causae belongs properly only to the efficient cause, since it alone can provide the reason for the existence and being of a thing.It is Descartes, however, who occupies the central role—both historically and philosophically—in Carraud's story. For it is he who truly effects the ultimate reduction (or, as Carraud puts it, unicité) of causality. In the Cartesian scheme, all but efficient causes are banished. Moreover, the efficient cause of an effect is now defined as the sufficient cause, one that explains why the effect is as it is. "La primauté et l'absoluité de la cause lui viennent de ce qu'elle rend raison de l'effet... Les causes sont d'abord les raisons (suffisantes) des effets, en quoi elles les expliquent" (199-200). Moreover, with Descartes we find a universal application of the principle of causality to all things, even to those that previously either were not regarded as sufficiently real to need a cause (the objective reality of ideas) or were regarded as standing outside the domain of causality altogether (God). It is not that God is a caused being for Descartes. Rather, the important thing is that God is, like all existing things, subject to the causal question. That is, it is legitimate to ask why God does not need a cause. And, in Carraud's account, this is where ratio comes in to its own. God is not a caused being, but there is a reason (in God's immense power) why God does not require a cause. Moreover, the only analogy we have for thinking of the way in which God's immensity forestalls God needing a cause is in terms of efficient causality itself... (shrink)

En el contexto político global contemporáneo, las diversas luchas sociales se están alienando entre sí hasta elpunto de que la ilusión del capitalismo como único sistema socioeconómico posible está difuminando todos los horizontesdel cambio social. En este artículo, trataremos de redefinir las causas comunes de las luchas sociales, demostrando su interseccionalidad e interdependencia. Para ello, nos ocuparemos de una serie de conceptos de la filosofía de Marx. En la introducción, examinaremos la noción de valor, afirmando que la teoría del valor (...) de Marx no es simplemente una teoría laboral del valor, sino que más bien refleja la estructura paralela de la producción y la circulación, cristalizada en la forma de valor última del dinero. Una vez obtenidas estas ideas preliminares, volveremos al fenómeno del trabajo en el capitalismo, para reinterpretar, en la primera sección del artículo, la distinción marxiana entre trabajo productivo e improductivo. A partir de ahí, se darán los primeros ejemplos concretos de la interseccionalidad de las luchas sociales contra la abstracción del capital: a saber, mostrar que las luchas de género y las raciales tienen ciertas causas comunes, enraizadas en la hegemonía gramsciana. En la segunda sección, examinaremos la distinción que Marx establece entre la subsunción formal y la real. Esta última, afirmaremos, es decisiva para entender cómo el capital estructura la cuasi-totalidad de nuestras relaciones sociales. Tras una interpretación de la película Toni Erdmann de Maren Ade, propondremos algunos medios posibles de lucha interseccional contra la subsunción real, que encontrarán su respaldo teórico en el concepto de universales subversivos. Las observaciones finales abordarán la lógica nuclear de la distribución y la acumulación del capital, un síntoma que pervive a lo largo de la historia preservado e impulsado por la omnipresencia de la ideología, y subrayarán de nuevo implícitamente la importancia de la lucha común en el descongelamiento de la emergencia de un nuevo sujeto revolucionario. (shrink)

Las explicaciones causalistas de Polo son compatibles con los actuales paradigmas de la biología teórica. Los procesos epigenéticos (entendidos como actualizaciones de la potencia vital de los organismos vivos) y los procesos evolutivos pueden ser explicados si se entiende a las praxis vitales como concausalidades morfotélicas, porque la causa formal en concausalidad con el fin es susceptible de ampliación formal. Así, la causa final es responsable de promover indefinidamente la morfogénesis de causas formales intracósmicas. En la (...) unidad de orden del universo ocurre una multitud de especies vivas, cuya diferencia es jerárquica. Todos los vivientes están finalizados por su especie, con excepción del ser humano. El hombre es un ser singular: la perfección del hombre es inherente a cada hombre. (shrink)

Some recent scholars have argued that Spinoza's conception of causation should be understood in terms of the Aristotelian notion of a formal cause. I argue that while they are right to identify causation in Spinoza as a relation of entailment from an essence, they are mistaken about its philosophical pedigree. I examine three suggested lines of influence: (a) the late scholastic conception of emanation; (b) early modern philosophy of mathematics; and (c) Descartes's notion of the causa sui. In (...) each case, the evidence indicates that causation in Spinoza should be categorized in Aristotelian terms as efficient and not formal. (shrink)

Resumen: En Metafísica E 2 y 3 Aristóteles discute el problema de lo que es por accidente y sus causas, con el fin último de examinar si esto puede ser objeto de la filosofía primera. El resultado de esta discusión es, en este sentido, negativo. Sin embargo, la filosofía primera tiene algo que decir acerca del accidente, aunque solo sea mediante un discurso de segundo orden. La naturaleza de lo accidental es así explorada en estas páginas de la Metafísica para (...) confirmar la imposibilidad de un estudio científico acerca de esta forma de ser y sus causas. La parte central de este artículo discute el complejo pasaje E 2, 1026b27-1027a15, donde Aristóteles presenta las causas de lo que es por accidente. Procuraré mostrar que las tres causas allí presentadas son no solo compatibles, sino también relevantes para la completa caracterización de lo accidental, en la medida en que pueden entenderse como la causa formal, eficiente y material de lo que es por accidente.: Aristotle’s Metaphysics E 2 and 3 are devoted to the discussion about accidental being and its causes, with the aim of assessing its credentials as a possible object of first philosophy. The result of this discussion is, in this sense, negative. However, first philosophy has something to say about accidental being, if only through a second order speech. The nature of the accidental is thus explored in these pages of Metaphysics, with the ultimate aim of confirming the impossibility of a scientific study about this way of being and its causes. The central part of this paper deals with E 2, 1026b27-1027a15, where Aristotle introduces the causes of accidental being. I endeavor to show that each of the three causes presented in these lines are compatible and relevant, as they can be understood, respectively, as the formal, efficient and material cause of what happens by accident. (shrink)

Reunimos alguns argumentos com base no Novo Testamento e em documentos pontifícios para debater a pertinência da noção filosófica de causa formal no discurso teológico sobre a fundação e a constituição da Igreja. En este artículo hemos compilado algunos argumentos basados en el Nuevo Testamento y en los documentos pontificios para discutir la relevancia de la noción filosófica de causa formal en el discurso teológico sobre la fundación y la constitución de la Iglesia. In this paper (...) we gathered some arguments based on the New Testament and pontifical documents to discuss the relevance of philosophical notion of formal cause for theological discourse on the foundation and the constitution of the Church. (shrink)

RESUMEN La interpretación habitual de Descartes sostiene que la nueva ciencia cartesiana es resultado del remplazo, en las explicaciones científicas, de las causas finales y formales por las causas eficientes. Si bien dicha afirmación en líneas generales es correcta, se ha tendido a asumir que las causas eficientes no entrañan problema alguno. Este artículo desea cuestionar dicha asunción, poniendo de manifiesto una serie de problemáticas concernientes a la cognoscibilidad de las causas eficientes. ABSTRACT The common interpretation of Descartes argues that (...) the new science is a result of Cartesian replacement, in scientific explanations, of the final and formal causes by the efficient causes. While this statement is broadly correct, it has tended to assume that efficient causes do not imply any problem. This paper wishes to question this assumption, showing a number of problems concerning the knowability of efficient causes. (shrink)

En este artículo se pretende explicar cómo debe ser comprendida la relación entre la causalidad formal y del esse en las etapas de constitución del ente según el pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino. Forma y esse, que son acto en su respectivo orden, se relacionan como acto y potencia, lo cual obliga a un detallado análisis que explique cómo es esta relación y cómo su interpretación condiciona el modo de entender la constitución metafísica del ente. Llevaremos a cabo este (...) propósito dividiendo el artículo en dos grandes apartados: En el primero abordaremos la relación entre forma y esse tal como el Aquinate lo expone en el capítulo cincuenta y cuatro del segundo libro de la Summa contra gentiles. En la segunda intentaremos articular la relación causal entre forma y esse desde el punto de vista metafísico a partir de las enseñanzas obtenidas en el apartado anterior. Nuestro objetivo es proporcionar una respuesta que medie entre las dos posiciones tradicionales que han interpretado la filosofía tomista, bien acentuando el papel del esse sobre la forma o bien al contrario la forma sobre el esse. Este trabajo entra en uno de los aspectos más debatidos en el tomismo contemporáneo, que es la comprensión de la causalidad del esse respecto al ente y la forma. Lo primero que defiende es que el esse es verdadera causa, algo que sólo tímidamente ha puesto en evidencia Cornelio Fabro. Seguidamente, después de justificar esta tesis mayor, propone concretamente el modo en que debe ser comprendida esta causalidad, especialmente respecto a la forma. En definitiva, se trata de una articulación entre ambos tipos de causalidad, de forma y esse, salvando la primacía que el Aquinate da al segundo. (shrink)

Descartes is often identified as having fired one of the opening shots of the scientific revolution: rejecting the four Aristotelian causes in favor of the efficient causes characteristic of mechanistic science. Scholars often write as if Cartesian science and corporeal metaphysics is best understood as a rejection of all causal notions other than the efficient. I argue that this is a mistake. On the contrary, Descartes endorses an avowedly Aristotelian notion of formal causality, inherited from Suárez, and this notion (...) is central to his physics and corporeal metaphysics. -/- I begin by tracing the history of the formal cause from Aristotle to Aquinas and Suárez. My main thesis here is that the Aristotelian notion of formal causation picks out two distinct explanatory modes. The first is linked to hylomorphic ontology, and so by rejecting hylomorphism Descartes rejects one sort of formal causation. Crucially, however, the Aristotelians also identify explanations from essence as a species of formal causality. Now, Descartes’s entire philosophical project is built upon the intellectual perception of the essences of God, mind, and matter; the uncovering and exercise of this broadly Platonic intellectual capacity is, as Descartes explained to Hobbes, a key raison d’être for project of the Meditations. So we might expect Descartes to embrace formal causal explanations from essence, which harmonize so thoroughly with his philosophical project. And indeed, this is what we find. This is most obvious in the case of the ontological argument. In the course of defending the claim that God is causa sui, Descartes explicitly appeals to formal causation and claims to be only be “following in the footsteps” of Aristotle. Thus, there is a Cartesian notion of formal causation that is both continuous with and distinct from its Aristotelian predecessors. -/- Other cases are less obvious, but no less important. For example, one of the most strikingly “modern” aspects of Cartesian physics is its emphasis on quantitative laws. Yet Descartes’s official account of how these laws explain particular phenomena is puzzling: He claims that the laws are causes. This, however, is prima facie absurd; Descartes seems to claim that the law of inertia is literally pushing the moon forward along its orbital path. I argue that this is not and cannot be what Descartes means. On the contrary, he clearly takes the laws of physics to follow from the divine essence, especially immutability and simplicity. The laws are true and epistemically accessible to us because they follow from the divine essence. In other words, Descartes thinks nomological explanation in physics is formal causal explanation from (the divine) essence. -/- Another central issue is the impenetrability, or solidity, of matter. I offer a close reading and reconstruction of Descartes’s argument that matter is necessarily but not essentially impenetrable, and I show how Descartes accounts for impenetrability without compromising his mathematical conception of the corporeal. Descartes argues that impenetrability follows from the nature of matter as geometrical extension, thereby reducing a paradigmatic quality of matter (its solidity) to quantity (extension). Note that the explanatory bite throughout is from essence. Thus, while solidity is not a genuine corporeal causal power, it does give bodies an ineliminable causal role in Cartesian physics and corporeal metaphysics. This role is as a formal cause, since every explanation from impenetrability is ipso facto an explanation from the corporeal essence, geometrical extension. This, in turn, shows that Descartes has a principled response to idealists, like Berkeley, who claim that matter’s lack of efficient causal power implies idealism; Berkeley’s mistake, Descartes would argue, lies in equating efficient causality with causality simpliciter. -/- Thus, I argue that formal causal explanation from essence is both well-attested textually in Descartes and is consonant with some of his deepest projects and commitments, including his Platonic intellectualism and mathematization of the corporeal. All this in mind, it is shocking how little attention has been paid to formal causation in Descartes’s metaphysics. If I am right, a thorough re-thinking of Descartes’s physics and metaphysics is long overdue. (shrink)

The concepts of atoms and bonds in molecules which appeared in chemistry during the nineteenth century are unavoidable to explain the structure and the reactivity of the matter at a chemical level of understanding. Although they can be criticized from a strict reductionist point of view, because neither atoms nor bonds are observable in the sense of quantum mechanics, the topological and statistical interpretative approaches of quantum chemistry (quantum theory of atoms in molecules, electron localization function and maximum probability domain) (...) provide consistent definitions which accommodate chemistry and quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Este artículo trata el concepto aristotélico de azar, tal como se lo presenta en Física II 4-6. La sección central del artículo se concentra en el análisis de la definición aristotélica de azar y sus peculiaridades esenciales: el hecho de ser una causa accidental y el hecho de existir en el dominio de lo que es en vista de un fin. Según Rossi, ambas características corresponderían a un aspecto causal y a un aspecto no causal del azar. Por último, (...) la autora también trata de mostrar la conexión estructural entre los aspectos antes mencionados, tomando como hecho clave la tesis de la coincidencia entre las causas formal, final y eficiente. (shrink)

Dalam filsafat pikiran, Fisikalisme Nonreduktif sebagai sebuah posisi filosofis mempunyai beberapa problem akibat komitmen ontologisnya terhadap fisikalisme. Hilomorfisme Thomistik memberikan jalan keluar dari problem yang muncul dari perspektif Fisikalisme Nonreduktif dengan mengacu pada dua prinsip metafisik yakni materi prima dan forma substansial. Yang pertama menunjukkan pentingnya materi bagi sebuah sistem material atau organisme, sedangkan yang kedua menunjukkan pentingnya eksistensi causa formal dan final selain causa efisien. Dengan konsep forma substansial, Hilomorfisme Thomistik memberikan solusi atas masalah-masalah dalam perspektif (...) Fisikalisme Nonreduktif. (shrink)

Para Polo, el cuerpo es un tema oscuro pero decisivo para la antropología. Del modo en que comprendemos su lugar en el ser humano y la mortalidad que su condición introduce depende nuestra visión de la persona humana. Polo acepta la tesis de Tomás de Aquino de que el alma intelectual es causa formal del cuerpo, pero la piensa de nuevo y evita algunas de sus dificultades ampliándola a la luz de su antropología trascendental.

What is life? What does it mean when we say that something is alive? What makes something alive? Biology answers the questions with a lot of answers but the answers to the question “what is life?” always have its limitation because its status as an empirical science which starts from the diversity of living things on the Earth. In other words, the answers are not sufficient although they are necessary for us to know what life is. Biology needs a metaphysical (...) explanation to understand more completely the question “what is life?” Metaphysic through the concept of “substantial form” of the Aristotelian-Thomistic thought can contribute an understanding that complements biology to understand “what is life?” with its immanent cause. Keywords: Substantial form, immanent cause, formal cause. Abstrak: Apakah itu kehidupan? Apa artinya ketika kita mengatakan sesuatu sebagai “yang hidup?” Apa yang membuat sesuatu hidup? Biologi menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut dengan berbagai macam jawaban namun jawaban-jawaban biologi terhadap pertanyaan “apakah itu kehidupan?” selalu memiliki keterbatasan karena statusnya sebagai ilmu empiris yang berangkat dari keanekaragaman hayati yang ada di bumi ini. Dengan kata lain, jawaban-jawaban biologi tidak mencukupi walau merupakan hal yang mutlak perlu untuk mengetahui apa yang dimaksud dengan kehidupan. Biologi memerlukan penjelasan metafisis untuk bisa mendapatkan pemahaman yang lebih lengkap akan pertanyaan “apakah itu kehidupan?” Metafisika melalui konsep “forma substansial” Aristotelian-Thomistik dapat menyumbangkan pemahaman yang melengkapi biologi untuk memahami “apakah itu kehidupan?” dengan Causa imanennya. Kata-kata Kunci: Forma substansial, causa imanen, causa formal. (shrink)

Este artículo explica la comprensión de Averroes sobre el entendimiento humano y la abstracción en estos tres comentarios al De Anima de Aristóteles. Mientras que las visiones de Averroes sobre la naturaleza del intelecto material humano cambian a través de tres comentarios hasta que alcanza su famosa visión de la unidad del intelecto material como uno para todos los seres humanos, su visión del intelecto agente como 'forma para nosotros' se sostiene a través de estas obras. En su Gran comentario (...) al De Anima revela su dependencia ante Al Farabi por esta noción y provee una crítica detallada de la noción farabiana que sostiene que el intelecto agente es 'forma para nosotros' sólo como causa agente, no como verdadera causa formal. Aunque Averroes sostiene que el intelecto agente debe, de alguna manera, ser intrínseco a nosotros como nuestra forma, ya que los humanos son racionales per se y emprenden actos de conocimiento por voluntad, se muestra que su visión se funda en un uso equívoco de la noción de causa formal. El intelecto agente no puede ser propiamente nuestro principio intrínseco formal mientras permanezca ontológicamente separable. (shrink)

We provide a formally rigorous framework for integrating singular causation, as understood by Nuel Belnap's theory of causae causantes, and objective single case probabilities. The central notion is that of a causal probability space whose sample space consists of causal alternatives. Such a probability space is generally not isomorphic to a product space. We give a causally motivated statement of the Markov condition and an analysis of the concept of screening-off. 1. Causal dependencies and probabilities1.1Background: causation in branching space-times1.2What are (...) probabilities defined for?2. Basic transitions2.1Basics of basic transitions2.2Sets of basic transitions3. Causal probability theory3.1Some simple cases3.2General causal probabilities3.3Application: probability of suprema of a chain. (shrink)

La comprensión moderna del movimiento físico resulta insuficiente para tematizar la incidencia en él de la causalidad final. La confusión de la finalidad física con algún tipo de noción formal lastra incluso la física filosófica de Aristóteles. Se propone entender la causa final física como un principio real, no mental, que guía "induce o atrae" la variación formal, sólo actuante junto con las otras causas que el Estagirita sienta, y cuya influencia en las tricausalidades cinéticas es la (...) razón última del despliegue evolutivo de éstas dentro del cosmos. (shrink)

La comprensión moderna del movimiento físico resulta insuficiente para tematizar la incidencia en él de la causalidad final. La confusión de la finalidad física con algún tipo de noción formal lastra incluso la física filosófica de Aristóteles. Se propone entender la causa final física como un principio real, no mental, que guía —induce o atrae— la variación formal, sólo actuante junto con las otras causas que el Estagirita sienta, y cuya influencia en las tricausalidades cinéticas es la (...) razón última del despliegue evolutivo de éstas dentro del cosmos. (shrink)

El proyecto del ‘Darwinismo Formal’ de Alan Grafen propone una formulación matemática de la teoría de Darwin que pretende demostrar que la selección natural moldea los rasgos fenotípicos a través de la maximización de la eficacia. El proyecto de Grafen reposa sobre tres premisas: la selección natural es la única fuerza que moldea los fenotipos; la eficacia es la única medida de le evolución; y el diseño biológico surge como resultado de un proceso de optimización selectiva. En este trabajo (...) argumentamos que estas tres premisas limitan la aplicabilidad del modelo a los hechos evolutivos más simples. Esto se debe a que Grafen implícitamente presupone un concepto de eficacia que es a la vez causa y efecto de las novedades fenotípicas; lo que, por un lado, vacía la teoría de Darwin de poder explicativo y, por el otro, lleva a ignorar la potencial contribución de fuerzas evolutivas no selectivas en la configuración de la complejidad biológica. Para superar estos escollos del proyecto de del Darwinismo Formal - que son además comunes a todos los modelos formales adaptacionistas - proponemos sustituir el concepto causal de eficacia por el de robustez, definiendo así el diseño biológico como forma y función en lugar de como maximización de la eficacia. (shrink)

At first glance, Schopenhauer’s account of human freedom looks strikingly similar to Schelling’s account of formal freedom in the Freiheitsschrift. Despite the clear similarities, I argue that there is a decisive difference between the two accounts—a difference that has to do with the ultimate grounding of freedom. For Schelling, the intelligible deed is a radical self-grounding of the eternal essence of the human being. For Schopenhauer, the eternal essence of the human being is groundless. Moreover, I argue that this (...) difference has decisive consequences for two sets of issues. On the one hand, Schelling’s concept of self-grounding allows him to preserve the universal application of the principle of ground. On the other hand, self-grounding is the only way that human beings can be responsible for who they are. Schelling thus anticipates a key insight of Galen Strawson: ultimate moral responsibility is only possible for a causa sui. (shrink)

The first two sections of this paper investigate what Newton could have meant in a now famous passage from “De Graviatione” (hereafter “DeGrav”) that “space is as it were an emanative effect of God.” First it offers a careful examination of the four key passages within DeGrav that bear on this. The paper shows that the internal logic of Newton’s argument permits several interpretations. In doing so, the paper calls attention to a Spinozistic strain in Newton’s thought. Second it sketches (...) four interpretive options: (i) one approach is generic neo-Platonic; (ii) another approach is associated with the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More; a variant on this (ii*) emphasizes that Newton mixes Platonist and Epicurean themes; (iii) a necessitarian approach; (iv) an approach connected with Bacon’s efforts to reformulate a useful notion of form and laws of nature. Hitherto only the second and third options have received scholarly attention in scholarship on DeGrav. The paper offers new arguments to treat Newtonian emanation as a species of Baconian formal causation as articulated, especially, in the first few aphorisms of part two of Bacon’s New Organon. If we treat Newtonian emanation as a species of formal causation then the necessitarian reading can be combined with most of the Platonist elements that others have discerned in DeGrav, especially Newton’s commitment to doctrines of different degrees of reality as well as the manner in which the first existing being ‘transfers’ its qualities to space (as a kind of causa-sui). This can clarify the conceptual relationship between space and its formal cause in Newton as well as Newton’s commitment to the spatial extended-ness of all existing beings. While the first two sections of this paper engage with existing scholarly controversies, in the final section the paper argues that the recent focus on emanation has obscured the importance of Newton’s very interesting claims about existence and measurement in “DeGrav”. The paper argues that according to Newton God and other entities have the same kind of quantities of existence; Newton is concerned with how measurement clarifies the way of being of entities. Newton is not claiming that measurement reveals all aspects of an entity. But if we measure something then it exists as a magnitude in space and as a magnitude in time. This is why in DeGrav Newton’s conception of existence really helps to “lay truer foundations of the mechanical sciences.”. (shrink)

On 6 January 1795, the twenty-year-old Schelling—still a student at the Tübinger Stift—wrote to his friend and former roommate, Hegel: “Now I am working on an Ethics à la Spinoza. It is designed to establish the highest principles of all philosophy, in which theoretical and practical reason are united”. A month later, he announced in another letter to Hegel: “I have become a Spinozist! Don’t be astonished. You will soon hear how”. At this period in his philosophical development, Schelling had (...) been deeply under the spell of Fichte’s new philosophy and the Wissenschaftslehre. The text Schelling was writing at the time was the early Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie, though his characterization of this text would much better fit the somewhat later work which is the focus of the current paper: Schelling’s 1801 Darstellung meines System der Philosophie (hereafter: Presentation). The Presentation is a text written more geometrico, following the style of Spinoza’s Ethics. While Spinoza’s influence and inspiration is stated explicitly and unmistakably in Schelling’s preface, the content of this composition might seem quite foreign to Spinoza’s philosophy, so much so, in fact, that Michael Vater—the astute translator and editor of the recent English translation of the text—has contended that “despite the formal similarities between Spinoza’s geometrical method and Schelling’s numbered mathematical-geometrical constructions, Schelling’s direct debts to Spinoza are few”. The Presentation is an extremely dense and difficult text, and while I agree that at first glance Schelling’s engagement with the concept of reason (Vernunft) and the identity formula ‘A=A’ seems to have little if anything to do with Spinoza (especially since Spinoza’s key terminology of ‘God’, ‘causa sui’, ‘substance’, ‘attribute’, and ‘mode’ is barely mentioned in the Presentation), I suspect that at a deeper level Schelling is attempting to transform Spinoza’s system by replacing God, Spinoza’s ultimate reality, with reason. Though this might at first seem bizarre, I believe it can be profitably motivated and explained upon further reflection. It is this transformation of Spinoza’s God into (the early) Schelling’s reason that is the primary subject of this study. I develop this paper in the following order. In the first part I provide a very brief overview of Schelling’s lifelong engagement with Spinoza’s philosophy, which will prepare us for my study of the 1801 Presentation. In the second part, I consider the formal structure and rhetoric of the Presentation against the background of Spinoza’s Ethics, and show how Schelling regularly imitates Spinoza’s tiniest rhetorical gestures. In the third and final part I turn to the opening of the Presentation, and argue that Schelling attempts there to distance himself from Fichte by developing a conception of reason as the absolute, or the identity of the subject and object, just as the thinking substance and the extended substance are identified in Spinoza’s God. (shrink)

Ante ciertos modelos causales del agente libre inspirados en Tomás de Aquino, resulta interesante atender al modelo causal presentado por Tomás mismo, especialmente en un texto a partir del cual se puede rastrear la exposición de la acción libre como el efecto de los cuatro sentidos causales aristotélicos. Se trata de la cuestión sobre los actos imperados (ST I–II, q. 17); en cuyos primeros cuatro artículos –y en sus textos paralelos– determina que la voluntad es causa agente; la razón (...) práctica, causa ordenadora; y el imperium de ambas (razón y voluntad) se relaciona con el acto imperado como lo formal con lo material. (shrink)

La termodinámica, se desarrolló en gran medida bajo el impulso de la Revolución Industrial, que ayudó a afianzar metodológicamente las seculares investigaciones sobre el calor y la temperatura. Como tal desarrollo se produjo a la sombra de la triunfante mecánica clásica —cuyos referentes físicos son notablemente distintos— y a causa de la carencia de herramientas formales adecuadas, durante mucho tiempo se admitió sin discusión que esta ciencia había de limitarse a los sistemas en equilibrio o muy cercanos a él. (...) En el presente artículo se exponen tanto el desarrollo histórico como las premisas intelectuales de semejante opción epistemológica, señalando el cambio de perspectiva ocurrido en la segunda mitad del siglo XX. (shrink)

Este estudio parte de la cuestión formal sobre la estética; para atender, posteriormente, a una posible teoría de la belleza. Se señala, en primer lugar, la falta de obra estética en Aristóteles y se indaga; después, en las alusiones a la belleza y al arte que encontramos en diversas obras de este autor. Se aborda la unión de belleza y bien; en su aspecto de placer, en su aspecto intelectivo y también en su identificación con el motor inmóvil y (...) la causa final. (shrink)

Discutamos el principio de la acción mínima (PMA) y su conexión con el axioma tomista operari sequitur esse. El PMA se llama uno de los principios más profundos de la naturaleza. Después de una exposición breve del principio, pasemos a investigar esto en tres etapas aporéticas. La primera etapa involucra una pregunta de prioridad: ¿el PMA—es una causa o un efecto? En la segunda etapa analizamos la conexión entre un comportamiento global y los individuos a escala local: ¿es el (...) PMA una característica verdadera debido a lo que es cierto acerca de las naturalezas de las sustancias? En la etapa final, relacionamos el PMA al axioma tomista operari sequitur esse. La idea clave es que las formas de los objetos físicos no son simplemente determinaciones intrínsecas sino que también establecen de manera extrínseca varias relaciones. Las formas de los individuos son, a través de estas relaciones esenciales, extrínsecas y determinables, partes formales de un todo cósmico. Esto concuerda con la idea tomista de que la forma del universo—el tipo natural del mundo—es su misma unidad de orden. (shrink)

Some commentators have worried that Descartes‘s ontological proof is a kind ofafterthought, redundancy, or even embarrassment. Descartes has everythingneeded to establish God as the ground of certainty by Meditation Three, so whybother with yet another proof in Meditation Five? Some have even gone so far asto doubt his sincerity.1Past literature on this topic is of daunting variety andmagnitude, dating back to the seventeenth century.2The current discussion hasfocused on Descartes‘s premises in relation to the coherence of his concept ofGod.3I wish to (...) take up this issue from a somewhat different tack, showing that Descartes‘s ontological proof actually involves a subtle change in the direction ofhis argument from a reflective to a recollective theory of innateness. In the FifthMeditation, Descartes does not simply expand on his previous discussion of God,which arose out of reflection on his self; rather, the ontological proof depends ona kind of recollection of God‘s being that could only be based on the causalpositivity, or ―power,‖ of His existence. God is the structural cause of our idea ofhim and thereby restricts the way in which we may think of Him, in the sameway as the essence of a triangle structurally determines the ways we must thinkof it.4We are not free to construct such ideas in any way we want, so there mustbe a cause, or a reason, that restricts such construction.The specific argument of Meditation Five, however, must be understoodin its larger context, for part of the structurally determined idea of God containsnecessary existence, which Descartes interprets in terms of causal power. In theprocess of explaining this causal power, first to Caterus and, later to Arnauld,Descartes develops a way of interpreting God‘s causal relationship to himself, interms of a scholastic distinction between God as causa sui and ens a se, whichpreserves the universality of the causal principle and allows us to understand whyGod can be considered as the formal cause of His own being—the self-groundingground of all existence—an idea of subsequent importance to Malebranche andSpinoza, among others. Understanding this position on God and cause allows usto see a complementarity between Mediations III and V that has previously beenoverlooked.5While the principle of eminent causality found in Meditation Threeis central to the structural causation argument of Meditation Five, it is God‘spower, the positivity of His causal relationship to himself, that allows theargument from his effects to his existence in the first place.The dualistic structure to Descartes‘s arguments for God‘s existence inMeditations Three and Five mirrors Anselm‘s approach in the Monologion andthe Proslogion. Appreciating this stylistic debt is crucial for understandingDescartes‘s attempts to improve on Anselm‘s arguments, as well as his attempt totruly ground all knowledge in the certainty of God‘s existence. Yet whileAnselm‘s dual argument is ultimately based on a negative intuition of God‘sbeing, described in the Monologion as that without which the world cannot be,Descartes‘s dual argument in Meditations Three and Five is based on a positiveintuition or recollection of God‘s being as a necessary structural restriction on our concepts of the world. The ontological proof is primarily based on thisrecollective theory of innateness. It is God as causa sui, recollected as thenecessary ground of all things, that is the sole efficient cause of the existence ofevery finite, limited thing—especially human beings and their clear and distinctideas. (shrink)

Suvremena multikulturna društva velikim se dijelom okviruju u smislu proceduralne prije nego supstantivne etike, naglašavajući ispravnost umjesto dobrote, te uzdižu toleranciju kao ključnu vrijednost. No to ne može sâmo zamijeniti supstantivnu i motivacijsku normu dobroga života te se može iskusiti kao gubitak, otuđenje građana. Isto tako neće uspjeti suočiti se s granicama prihvatljivog djelovanja, neuvjetovanošću povezanom s moralnim gledištem. Klasična tradicija u etici, koja predlaže normu ljudskog blagostanja, može se ponovno izraziti kako bi iznijela na vidjelo ovu neuvjetovanost. Ukazat ću (...) na korisnost suprotne tradicije etičkog rasuđivanja u vidu proporcionalnosti, primjerice u slučaju ratne etike, te razmotriti alternativni koncept demokracije ne pod vidom formalnih i supstantivnih prava, nego etike participacije.Contemporary multicultural societies for the most part frame themselves in terms of a procedural rather than substantive ethics, by emphasizing rightness rather than goodness, and elevate tolerance to key value. But this cannot of itself replace a substantive and motivating norm of the good life and can be experienced as a loss, disaffecting citizens. It will also fail to confront the limits of acceptable action, the unconditionality associated with the moral point of view. The classical tradition in ethics, proposing a norm of human flourishing, can be re-expressed to bring out this unconditionality. I point to the counter tradition of ethical reasoning in terms of proportionality, exampled in the case of war ethics, as useful and draw on an alternative concept of democracy in terms not of formal or substantive rights but of an ethic of participation.Gegenwärtige multikulturelle Gesellschaften gestalten sich zumeist unter dem Aspekt der eher prozeduralen als materialen Ethik, indem sie die Richtigkeit anstelle der Güte herausheben, und werten die Toleranz zum Schlüsselwert auf. Dies per se vermag es immerhin nicht, die materiale und motivierende Norm des guten Lebens zu ersetzen, dagegen kann es als Verlust, als Bürgerentfremdung verspürt werden. Es versagt desgleichen in der Konfrontierung mit den Limits des akzeptablen Handelns, mit der moralitätsbetreffenden Bedingungslosigkeit. Die klassische Gepflogenheit in der Ethik, welche einen Maßstab der Menschheitsblüte nahelegt, kann wieder dargetan werden, um auf diese Bedingungslosigkeit Nachdruck zu legen. Ich deute auf die Nützlichkeit einer Gegentradition der ethischen Erwägung hin, aus der Perspektive der Proportionalität, exempli causa in der Angelegenheit der Kriegsethik, und stelle ein alternatives Demokratieschema auf, nicht im Sinne der formalen bzw. substantiven Rechte, sondern von der Ethik der Partizipation her. (shrink)

The essay explores the systematic relationship in the work of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) between his monadology, his metaphysics as presented in works such as De la causa, principio et uno, the mythopoeic cosmology of Lo spaccio de la bestia trionfante, and practical works like De vinculis in genere. Bruno subverts the conceptual regime of the Aristotelian substantial forms and its accompanying cosmology with a metaphysics of individuality that privileges individual unity (singularity) over formal unity and particulars over substantial (...) forms without sacrificing a metaphysical perspective on the cosmos. The particular is individuated as a unique site of desire, continually transforming but able to entrain itself and others through phantasmatic ‘bonding’, the new source of regularity in Bruno’s polycentric universe. Bruno thus tries to do justice to the demands of intelligibility as well as transformative eros. The essay concludes with a note on Bruno’s geometry as it relates to his general conception of form. (shrink)

Over the past fi fty years or so analytic philosophers have developed accounts of the nature of material objects that can plausibly be described as neo-Aristotelian. We argue that what we term non-robust neo-Aristotelian accounts of hylomorphism fail: if hylomorphism is true, then some species of robust hylomorphism is true. In Section 2 we explain what we take non-robust and robust hylomorphism to be and distinguish two species of non-robust hylomorphism. In Section 3 we examine Aquinas’s definition of substance. It (...) has much to recommend it, but precludes any sort of non-robust hylomorphism. So we consider whether there is an alternative definition of substance that might be employed in defense of non-robust hylomorphism. The only promising alternative, we suggest, is one inspired by Udayana, the great 10ᵗʰ-century Vaiśeṣika metaphysician, a definition that relies on the concept of inherence. In Section 4 we argue that formal non-robust hylomorphism is false under the alternative defi nition of substance, and that substantial non-robust hylomorphism, too, is false under that definition. And in Section 5 we offer a few final remarks, including a word of thanks to the neo-Aristotelians we so strongly criticize, for their work has signifi cantly benefitted those who, like us, favor a more traditional form of hylomorphism.Philosophi, ut aiunt, analytici, postremis quinquaginta annis explicationem rerum materialium naturae, quae rite Neoaristotelica nuncupari potest, elaborant. Arguunt vero huius tractationis auctores, Neoaristotelicas hylemorphismi explicationes, quas ipsi “mitigatas” nominant, parum succedere: si hyle mor phismus verus sit, aliquam hylemorphismi non mitigati speciem veram esse debere. In sectione 2 auctores rationes hylemorphismi mitigati et non mitigati explicant duasque hyle morphismi mitigati species distinguunt: “ formalem” scil. et “substantialem”. In sectione 3 auctores substantiae defi nitionem examinant a S. Thoma propositam. Quae defi nitio nonnullis praestat virtutibus, hylemorphismum vero mitigatum omnino excludit. Hac de causa auctores aliam substantiae defi nitionem quaerunt, qua accepta hylemorphismus mitigatus vindicari possit. Non tamen videtur ulla posse inveniri nisi elaboratio aliqua defi nitionis quam Udayana proposuit : quae defi nitio inhaerentiae conceptui innixa est. In sectione 4 auctores arguunt, hylemorphismum mitigatum tam formalem quam substantialem esse falsum hac altera substantiae defi nitione posita. In sectione 5 auctores paucis quibusdam notulis tractationem concludunt, gratias quoque agentes philosophis Neoaristotelicis, quos ipsi impugnaverunt: eorum enim labore auctores magis traditionali hylemorphismi faventes speciei, multum profecerunt. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy: 1637–1739J. A. CoverKenneth Clatterbaugh. The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy: 1637–1739. New York and London: Routledge, 1999. Pp. xi + 239. Cloth, $75.00. Paper, $21.00.Over the scholastics and earliest moderns, Hume had an advantage of hindsight in declaring that "There is no question, which on account of its importance, as well as difficulty, has caus'd more disputes both among ancients and modern (...) philosophers, than this concerning the efficacy of causes, or that quality which made them be followed by their effects" (Treatise I.iii.14). Between the scholastics and Hume fell (i) Descartes, (ii) classical mechanists such as Hobbes and Gassendi, (iii) the Cartesians Le Grand and Malebranche, (iv) the explanatory rationalists Spinoza and Leibniz, (v) later experimental mechanists such as Boyle, Rohault and Newton, and (vi) the so-called empiricists Locke and Berkeley. This book presents an accessible and admirably broad overview of the modern debate about causation, without sacrificing serious attention to textual details. With two chapters on (i) and one apiece on (ii) - (vi), Clatterbaugh earns for himself and his reader a helpfully synoptic picture of philosophical shifts in the causation debate in the hundred years separating Descartes' Discourse and Hume's Treatise. By the end of the (modern) day, (1) the four-fold causes of Aristotelian-Scholasticism have given way to efficient causation alone; (2) no pre-existing forms in efficient causes are to be found, nor indeed any substantial active powers whatever; (3) there is no deep sense in which causes communicate reality to effects; (4) necessary connection has gone by the board; (5) divine causation has no place in a natural philosophy of causation. No surprises there, but Clatterbaugh's effort reminds us afresh of the varied and torturous routes to such shifts, helping advanced students better (or newly) appreciate them in the comfortable space of 200 pages.Of those pages, a third are devoted to Descartes and the Cartesians. That's not inappropriate, given the importance and difficulty of Descartes's response to Aristotelian-Scholastic accounts of causation, and its influence on occasionalist sentiments on the Continent. The tenor and value of this book may be illustrated by reflecting on the first of these—a rich and frustrating business, both in Descartes's texts and in Clatterbaugh's book. Suppose we grant Descartes the back of his hand to substantial forms and active formal causes as at best "unexplanatory" (counseling Regius): his "at-least-as-much-reality-in-the-cause-as-in-the-effect" principle might be treated as the basis of "an alternative" metaphysical account of causation (19-32). Well, it might be so-treated: but three versions of the principle later, the reader will be excused for judging it little more than a necessary condition for some event-pair x,y counting as a cause-effect pair. If the scholastic appeal to active forms is unexplanatory, then Descartes's [End Page 600] principle—which isn't Descartes's principle at all but a scholastic commonplace—can scarcely fill the explanatory gap. Glossed as a predictable consequence of some strong form of influxus physicus, it is embarrassed by Foucher's objection (that mind bears no likeness to body) and by the weight of texts urging that accidents are individual to their bearers. Having offered us no deep metaphysical story about what in the world answers to 'vis,' Descartes is at best a bungling "interactionist" (here appropriating Clatterbaugh's word for someone whose apparent talk of secondary causes we are asked to respect as expressing a strict and considered philosophical commitment). One can only side with Voetius in reckoning Descartes's replacement of forms by purely quantitative, mechanical principles of motion as expressing a mere "disposition of the movable to move... not an activity of an efficient cause, but merely a necessary condition and a causa sine qua non" (my emphasis: Selectarum Disputationum I [1648-59], 873). Descartes has no deep theory about the nature of causation.Is that too harsh? Had this book a different target, one could fairly complain that the author too infrequently steps away from the texts and commentators to offer and defend a... (shrink)

Educar, elaborar o passado, desnazificar: Memória histórica e neonazifascismo no início do século XXI Resumo: Apesar de o nazismo e o fascismo terem sido aparentemente “enterrados” após a 2ª Guerra Mundial, atualmente o avanço do nazifascismo causa preocupação em nível mundial. Este artigo trata do conceito de elaboração do passado – negação determinada do objeto – e busca responder como, quando, por que, quanto tempo durou e as principais características do Programa de Desnazificação na Alemanha do pós-guerra. Foi uma (...) política pública bem-sucedida? Como se deu a participação da educação formal, nesse PDA? As respostas decorrem da análise mediada por uma hermenêutica histórico-filosófica fundamentada na teoria e em aspectos da filosofia da educação de T. Adorno, que visa apreender as razões pelas quais o nazifascismo sempre foi uma ideologia política presente, desde o Zeitgeist que o inaugurou, no início do século XX, até os dias atuais. Palavras-chave: Elaboração do passado. Negação determinada. Memória histórica. Desnazificação. Neonazifascismo. Apoio: CAPES/UFES Educate, Working Through the Past, Denazificate: Historical memoy and neonazifascism in the begin of 21st century: Although Nazifascism was apparently “buried” after World War II, its advance is currently causing worldwide concern. This article deals with the concept of working through the past – a specific negation of the object – and it aims to answer how, when, why, how long it lasted and the main features of the postwar German Denazification Program ; was it a successful public policy? How did formal education participate in this DP? The answers derive from the analysis mediated by a historical-philosophical hermeneutics based on the theory and aspects of T. Adorno´s philosophy of education, which aims to apprehend the reasons why Nazifascism was ever a present ideology, since the Zeitgeist in which it was opened – at the beginning of the 20th century –, to the present day. Keywords: Elaboration of the past. Specific denial. Historical memory. Desnazification. Neonazifascism. Éduquer, Travailler à travers le passé “dénazifier”: Mémoire historique et néonazifascime au début du 21e siècle Résumé: Bien qu’apparemment "enterré" après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l’avancée du nazifascisme suscite des inquiétudes au niveau mondial. Cet article traite du concept d'élaboration du passé - une négation spécifique de l'objet - et cherche à expliquer comment, quand, pourquoi, combien de temps il dura et les principales caractéristiques du Programme de Dénazification de l'Allemagne d'après-guerre. Était-ce une politique publique réussie? Comment l'éducation formelle a-t-elle participé à ce PDA? Les réponses proviennent de l'analyse médiée par une herméneutique historico-philosophique basée sur la théorie et les aspects de la philosophie de l'éducation de T. Adorno, qui vise à appréhender les raisons pour les quelles le nazifascisme a toujours été une idéologie actuelle, depuis que le Zeitgeist l’a inauguré, au début du XXe siècle, jusqu’à nos jours. Mots-clés: Elaboration du passé. Déni spécifique. Mémoire historique. Dénazification. Néonazifascisme. Data de registro: 03/06/2019 Data de aceite: 23/04/2020. (shrink)

Este trabajo estudia el pensamiento teológico y filosófico de Francisco Suárez sobre la libertad. El problema de la Concordia entre gracia y libertad, suprime el concepto de naturaleza como quicio del pensamiento filosófico cristiano. La libertad se sitúa como causa metafísica formal en Suárez, no como fundamento a la manera moderna de un Yo afincado en sus solas fuerzas, sino como principio heurístico y creador de un ser lleno de posibilidades cuya afirmación: “soy libre”, sintetiza la filosofía suareciana, (...) y hace inteligibles las realidades dadas por la experiencia concreta para obtener una comprensión superior.Palabras llave: Francisco Suárez; teología neoescolástica; filosofía neoescolástica.This work studies Francisco Suárez’s theological and philosophical thought about freedom. The problem of agreement between grace and freedom suppresses the concept of nature as physis and its ethiology, as a referential shelf for Christian philosophical thought. In Suárez, freedom is placed as a formal metaphysical cause, not as a foundation in the modern manner of an “I” based on its sole forces, but as heuristic principle that creates a being full of possibilities, whose statement: “I am free”, synthesizes Suárez’s philosophy and makes intelligible the realities given by concrete experience in order to obtain a superior understanding.Palabras llave: Francisco Suárez; theology; liberty. (shrink)

Nosso objetivo é responder a uma questão proposta por Richard Heck no artigo “Formal Arithmetic Before Grundgesetze”. Heck indaga a respeito das razões pelas quais Frege levou quase oito anos para honrar suas promessas de concluir seu grandioso projeto de fundamentar a matemática na lógica. Embora Heck tenha fornecido algumas respostas, pensamos que uma discussão filosófica mais adequada ainda pode ser oferecida. Este artigo tentará preencher essa lacuna apresentando o que entendemos ser o problema central enfrentado por Frege em (...) _Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik_: a falta de um critério unificado para fixar o significado das proposições de identidade da matemática. Acreditamos que o filósofo alemão finalmente tenha decidido preencher essa lacuna, fornecendo uma nova interpretação para o conceito de “extensão”, uma que acrescentasse alguns refinamentos importantes a sua concepção anterior. O novo conceito assim construído permitiu a Frege unificar seu tratamento das proposições de identidade, incluindo em seu sistema um critério universal para decidir a verdade de qualquer proposição de identidade apoiado por sua famosa lei básica V. Assim, nossa alegação será que a resistência de Frege e as dúvidas sobre a inclusão do axioma V como uma lei lógica em seu sistema foram a causa primária desse atraso. (shrink)

El objetivo del trabajo es precisar el valor mediático de la revolución zapatista de las comunidades indígenas de Chiapas en el proceso de conquista de su autonomía política asentada sobre las bases de una democracia asamblearia contrapuesta a la democracia formal y representativa del Estado mexicano. De ahí que el título del trabajo responda a la construcción mediática de la democracia del zapatismo. Apartados del trabajo son: a) la descripción de los caracteres de la citada revolución insistiendo en su (...) valor mediático, b) la explicación de los espacios mediáticos que cubre la revolución, c) las causas y los factores que explican el éxito mediático de la revolución, d) la función mediática que desarrolla el subcomandante Marcos, portavoz y jefe militar de de la revolución, y e) la estrategia de la indef inición política del zapatismo, con la finalidad de allegar a sus filas al mayor número de propagadores y colaboradores en el éxito de los objetivos revolucionarios. (shrink)

O presente artigo é voltado à recepção da questão matemática na filosofia aristotélica de Tomás de Aquino. O _Comentário ao tratado da Trindade de Boécio_ é o texto de Tomás que permite uma maior reflexão deste tema. Particularmente, a geometria era o paradigma de prática matemática. Ora, tanto na demonstração quanto na definição matemática, o conceito de forma é central, daí a denominação abstração da forma. A tese principal do artigo é que a abstração matemática necessita produzir uma definição claramente (...) expressa, diferentemente da definição natural, que admite uma etapa confusa de apreensão conceitual. O conceito de forma é patente em função da chamada demonstração por causalidade formal, processo demonstrativo próprio da ciência matemática e dependente da definição claramente produzida. Por outro lado, a demonstração própria da ciência natural pressupõe a relação móvel de causa e efeito, podendo se basear em conceitos mais confusos. Por fim, abordo os conceitos de abstração da forma e de matéria inteligível à luz dessa análise do uso do conceito de forma. (shrink)

Em Aristóteles, o processo de constituição dos seres naturais envolve um conjunto de causas, delimitadas de acordo com a teoria da matéria e forma. A matéria é causa enquanto suporte composicional pelo qual os seres são gerados; e a forma é causa enquanto fator responsável pelas características essenciais do ente natural, bem como por originar uma série de movimentos coordenados, que irá resultar na composição substancial. Neste artigo, pretento, em um primeiro momento, argumenar no sentido de que entre (...) os dois tipos de causalidades fundamentais, isto é, por um lado, aquele associado à natureza material, e, por outro, à natureza formal, haveria uma primazia explanatória relativamente ao segundo, pois em uma explicação mais completa, envolvendo esses dois aspectos causais, a causalidade material seria subordinada e subsumida pela causalidade em termos formal-finais. Em um segundo momento, procurarei estabelecer um contraste entre as causas naturais e a causa espontânea, examinando aos casos nos quais as relações causais não ocorrem devido a uma determinação teleológica, mas por uma mera conjunção de fatores concomitantes. A geração espontânea é um exemplo de eventos como este, pois, neste caso, a constituição do organismo não seria presidida por uma causalidade de tipo formal-final, a qual administrasse um conjunto de séries causais, interdependentemente relacionadas entre si. (shrink)