This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Axiology of Environmental Ethics Normative Theories and Environmental Ethics.

À partir d’une approche anthropologique des prises en charge médicales de la tuberculose et du paludisme, ainsi que des conceptions et usages de la prévention dans des milieux urbains d’Afrique de l’Ouest , ce texte interroge la nature du métier de soignant. Après nous être penchés sur les spécificités de ce type d’étude anthropologique en milieu médical, nous nous attachons à décrypter les processus d’occultations des singularités du malade qui caractérisent les messages et discours de prévention. Dans les structures de (...) santé, sont étudiées les négociations des normes de diagnostic et de traitement à l’œuvre ; les attitudes des soignants qui oscillent entre sur- et sous-estimations des risques sanitaires ; et le hiatus entre la demande et les besoins réels de formations continues. Enfin, nous nous penchons sur la rencontre entre les soignants et les malades qui peut se trouver transformée par les spécificités de la maladie et de son traitement. On constate alors que les fondements de la professionnalisation tendent à disparaître au profit d’un mode de régulation du rapport au malade, au collègue et plus largement au savoir médical qui témoigne de l’émergence d’une culture soignante qui est, de fait, une culture organisationnelle. Elle se caractérise à la fois par la délégation des tâches à des non-professionnels, la production et la résolution des conflits mettant en évidence des réseaux clientélistes ainsi que par une routinisation des gestes.Drawing on an anthropological approach of tuberculosis and malaria care in West African cities , and on an analysis of prevention modes, this paper examines the characteristics of medical work. We first examined the conditions of an anthropological field study in health care centres. The concealment of both patients’ singularities and populations’ specificities targeted in the prevention messages were then studied. The negotiation of diagnosis and treatment standards, and the under- and over-estimations of nosocomial risks were also analysed. We also focused on the gap between demands and actual needs for training, and on the relationships between health care providers and patients, which can be modified by the specificities of the disease. We noticed a decay of professionalization, a kind of regulation of relationships between health care workers and patients, and among medical staff, which expresses an emerging medical culture, which is also an organizational culture. Its main features are the delegation of tasks to non-professionals workers, a strategy of conflict management based on clientelism, and the development of routine action. (shrink)

Coinciding with the rising development of emerging markets, sustainable consumption practices in these markets are increasingly under scrutiny. In this context, we compare empirical results from consumers in four countries (three emerging markets and one developed market) in an experimental study to uncover patterns of preferences for sustainable luxury products (i.e., products that combine sustainability and luxury characteristics). Our findings illustrate that consumers’ quality, emotional, price, and social value perceptions, as well as purchase and electronic word-of-mouth intentions, are consistently (...) higher in all three emerging markets compared to the developed market. We find that sustainability (vs. conventional) product features increase consumers’ product value perceptions and behavioral intentions, although this effect is partially stronger for the developed compared to the emerging market(s). We further show a positive sustainability effect for luxury products, this effect is stronger for mass-market products. Combining sustainability and luxury signals leads to similar effects in emerging and developed markets. Thus, emerging markets have promise in terms of scope for incorporating sustainability characteristics into luxury products. Sustainable luxury consumption can therefore be understood as a manifestation of global consumer culture. (shrink)

In Discovering Alabama Forests, ecologist-educator Doug Phillips and photographer Robert Falls celebrate the current health and diversity of Alabama woodlands while sounding a call for their wise management and protection in the future.

From a largely Western phenomenon, the “animal turn” has, in recent years, gone global. Animals and Human Society in Asia: Historical, Cultural and Ethical Perspectives is just such a timely product that testifies to this trend.But why Asia? The editors, in their very helpful overview essay, have from the outset justified the volume's focus on Asia and ensured that this is not simply a matter of lacuna filling. The reasons they set out include: the fact that Asia is the cradle (...) of early human settlement and animal domestication; Asia encompasses an extreme diversity of closely connected ecosystems and human cultures; Asia is the place where the world's major religions originated; and, as in other parts of the world, Asia's use of animals for food and other utilitarian purposes constitutes a prominent feature of its culture. All of these factors, they argue, made Asia a unique lab for the exploration of major developments in human civilization and the complexities of human-animal interactions.Based on these premises, the book is divided into four parts, each concentrating on areas that the editors consider to have paramount significance in world history: Part I, “Hunting and Domestication”; Part II “Animals as Food”; Part III “Animals at War”; and Part IV “Animals in Culture and Religion.” As many good works on animal studies do, the volume adopts a truly cross-disciplinary approach, uniting scholars from disciplines as diverse as archaeology, history, anthropology, art, religion, literature, and cultural studies. It too takes an interregional approach and covers a vast geographical area, stretching from the western edge of Asia in the Levant to Central Asia, where once roamed the horses of the nomadic pastoral tribes, to the other end of Asia, including India, China, and Japan. Temporally impressive as well, the work takes us from the deep history of the Paleolithic period up to the contemporary world, exploring the diverse roles that a wide range of animals—horses, donkeys, camels, elephants, tigers, and so forth—have played in Asia's rich and unique past and present.Strong in archaeology, Part I, “Hunting and Domestication,” responds to the much-called for “deep” or “coevolutionary” history of human-animal relations in recent years. The three chapters discuss, respectively, the roles that proboscideans have played in the diet and culture of early societies in Paleolithic China and beyond; the ways in which animals of all sizes have been increasingly integrated into the diet, daily uses, trade, and warfare in Holocene Negev; and the diversifying roles played by donkeys in the early Bronze Age in Southern Levant as a food source, a means of transport and in ritual sacrifices. Together, they demonstrate, with reference to telling archaeological evidence how the early societies in this region have been highly dependent upon the increasingly sophisticated interactions with and uses of mega-herbivores in the protracted and by no means clear-cut transition from hunting and herding towards the agricultural way of life, affirming the co-existing and co-constituting relations between humans and other animals in the deep past of Asia.The chapters in the section on “Animals at War” equally reveal the crucial roles that animals have played in the military sphere, as either a practical war technology or a show of military power. “Elephants in Mongol History” revisits the thesis of elephant-mounted troops in South and Southeast Asia as a barrier to Mongol expansion. Through its lively account of the pivotal battles in Mongolian history, especially that against India and China, it illustrates with great success the complex interactions between animals (especially elephants, horses, and humans), technology, and the geographical environment, which jointly exercised their influence on the outcome of warfare and degree of success of political rule. Turning away from the dynamic of warfare, the following two chapters explore the biopolitical question of the management of the horse as a bio-resource in the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and Syria (1250–1517) and early Ming Dynasty China, respectively. The first one places its focus on the breeding, procurement, and feeding of the horse subjects in question, while the latter concentrates on the human organization of various resources for the upkeep of government horses—a conventional area of study called “horse administration” in the institutional history of the government in China.The last section, “Animals in Culture and Religion,” examines the changing images of apex predators, such as lions and tigers, in Buddhist perceptions from South Asia to East Asia; the cult of the Horse King in late Imperial China; and the significance of animal signs in Mongolian historiography. They represent an established approach in animal studies that seeks to understand different aspects of human culture through symbolic or metaphorical animals. Instead of treating the animals discussed as mere abstractions, which has been a frequent criticism of works that adopt this approach, the relations between the symbolic animals and their prototype in the natural world were attentively explored. The essay on the cult of the Horse King, for example, closely links the wax and wane of the cult since late imperial China with the changing use and subsequent disuse of the actual horses in agriculture, transportation, commerce, and quotidian life. Yet, classic as these essays on symbolic animals are, one does feel slightly unsatiated when coming to the end of this section, which also marks the end of this volume. Having been reminded early in the introductory essay that Asia was “a major site for the emergence of moral teachings and ethical guidance on the treatment of animals” and how this legacy “still affects the lives of billions of humans to this very day,” one feels naturally rather let down that no article in this volume directly addresses this vital ethical dimension, especially since it belongs to a series on “animal ethics.”Indeed, regarding the task of placing either the nonhuman animals or the ethical relations between humans and other animals center stage, the essays in this volume achieve only varying levels of success. Some authors exhibit a more acute awareness of what “animal studies” or “animal ethics” might entail epistemically and methodically and experiment by paying closer attention to the species-specific characteristics, experience, and agency of nonhuman animals in order to cast off the deified anthropocentrism previously ruled in humanist scholarship. However, others have made no such attempt. For example, in Part II of “Animals as Food,” an essay on the production and consumption of milk in contemporary China, albeit alert to the issue of health hazards to consumers, omits any consideration of the subject from the dairy cows’ perspective under the modern intensive farming system. Moreover, otherwise superb research on the tuna-fishing industry in Japan, with its insightful discussion of the nexus between knowledge economies and imperial politics, too passes over any discussion of the fate of the tuna, whether collectively as a group of living organisms containing 15 species or individually as animals with an embodied experience. One does ponder whether these essays would fit better in a volume on the cultural history of food or on the entwining history of knowledge production, economics, and politics, which conventionally position human interests at the center of research.Taken as a whole, this is an impressive volume that directs our attention to the hitherto understudied world of Asia in animal studies. The long durée, with its interdisciplinary and interregional approach, also most powerfully presents a past in Asia that could not have been the same without the participation of animals at every level, from everyday life to the shaping of cultural values, the construction of belief systems, the building of a national identity, and even the rise and fall of regimes. Scholars and students interested in expanding the frontier of our understanding of the world with a more inclusive “we” should find a wealth of interesting subjects on which to build further research. Finally, the volume also presents a fitting occasion for all scholars committed to animal studies to consider the grave challenge confronting the field that arose alongside its growing respectability and rapid expansion: Should it be oriented toward the destabilization of our previously anthropocentric conception of the world? Or should no such perimeter be imposed, as in this volume? The overall breadth and limitations of this volume leave one pondering this issue. (shrink)

After a long and successful career in tracheal surgery and lung cancer, Paolo Macchiarini became very famous in 2008 with the transplantation of a trachea from a cadaver that then apparently used the patient’s own stem cells to supposedly regenerate new trachea, i.e., tissue-engineered tracheae. Among the nine patients that received this revolutionary treatment, using biological or artificial tracheae, under Macchiarini’s supervision, six have reportedly died. Although several critics had expressed concerns with the procedures, allegations of misconduct against Macchiarini (...) first arose in August of 2014 by four Karolinska Institutet (KI) colleagues, and an independent investigation was called for by KI based on claims made in seven published papers. Among the claims were the fact that the procedure constituted a high risk, information on the patients was incomplete and that there was no or incomplete ethical approval, thus constituting misconduct. His CV was also shown to contain inaccuracies. By September 10, 2016, most of these claims have now proved to be true, and Macchiarini was found guilty of misconduct by KI. This paper looks primarily at earlier published papers by Macchiarini and his collaborators in a search for clues to better understand the evolution of altruism, or narcissism. An assessment of the controversial papers, and of letters written by critics and skeptics like Pierre R. Delaere, indicate that insufficient experimental evidence was presented for several case studies, and that claims made about the success of the procedures exceeded what was shown by the evidence. A domino effect of personal and professional tragedies ensued, in rapid succession, between 2014 and 2016. The effect on the field of stem cell research has been chilling, and the side-effects have taken their toll, with several high-profile resignations, primarily at KI, within the Swedish education system and in the Nobel Committee. This case has mesmerized the bioethics and biomedical communities for years. (shrink)

Anthropocentrism has been claimed to be the root of the global environmental crisis. Based on a multidisciplinary (e.g. environmental philosophy, animal ethics, anthropology, law) and multilingual (English, Spanish, French, German, Japanese) literature review, this article proposes a conceptual analysis of ‘anthropocentrism’ and reconstructs the often implicit argument that links anthropocentrism to the environmental crisis. The variety of usages of the concept of ‘anthropocentrism’ described in this article reveals many underlying disagreements under the apparent unanimity of the calls to (...) reject anthropocentrism, both regarding what exactly is the root of the problem, and the nature of the possible solutions. It highlights the limitations of the argument of anthropocentrism as the scapegoat of the environmental crisis and identifies two main challenges faced by attempts to go beyond anthropocentrism: an epistemological challenge regarding knowledge and the place of sciences, and a metaethical challenge related to values and cultural pluralism. Beyond the issue of an anthropocentric point of view, the core of the problem might be an intertwinement of views and assumptions that work together to undermine attempts to protect the environment from the greed of some humans, such as the human-nature dichotomy, capitalism, consumerism, industrialism, etc. Finally, this article suggests that making the nuances and the presuppositions that underlie various versions of the anti-anthropocentric rhetoric explicit is necessary to foster constructive dialogue among different anti-anthropocentrism proponents, as well as with their detractors. (shrink)

Like most topics in aesthetics, that of genre is far from simple and for the literary critic has an uninviting air. The questions which arise from its consideration fall under two heads: first, what is a genre? and second, what does it contribute to our understanding of a work of art that we can describe it as belonging to this or that genre? A clear answer to either of these questions is not readily forthcoming: the literary critic who (...) is content to be a critic here very properly hesitates where the philosopher is perhaps inclined to go further. If he does so he will find that the two primary questions about genre have many ramifications, some of which may be suggested by a quotation from René Wellek and Austin Warren's book, Theory of Literature . They ask one question about genre and then re-phrase it: but as they re-phrase their original question it is quite transformed. (shrink)

This article discusses the encounter between virtue ethics and environmental ethics and the ways in which environmental virtue ethics confronts nonhuman axiology and the controversial theme of moral anthropocentrism. It provides a reasoned review of the relevant literature and a historical–conceptual rendition of how environmental and virtue ethics came to converge as well as the ways in which they diverge. It explains that contrary to important worries voiced by some non-anthropocentric environmental ethicists, environmental virtue ethics enables and requires a (...) rich and nuanced engagement with nonhuman values of all sorts—intrinsic as well as extrinsic, moral as well as nonmoral, anthropocentric as well as non-anthropocentric—and neither presupposes nor implies moral anthropocentrism in its normativity. Finally, the article considers the fortunes of, and some challenges for, environmental virtue ethics in its application to the ethics of climate change, an increasingly central topic in environmental ethics. This article proceeds as follows: the first section introduces virtue ethics; the second section looks at axiological and normative themes in environmental ethics; the third section discusses environmental virtue ethics; and the fourth section considers its application to climate change. The fifth section draws some conclusions. (shrink)

The anthropocentrism debate, which centers on the place and status of environmental values, has been a core issue for environmental ethics since the field’s beginning in the 1970s. Nonanthropocentrists attribute value to non-human nature directly, while anthropocentrists claim that humans hold a certain priority. While the debate has produced a wide variety of interesting philosophical positions, it has not achieved its implicit goal of cultural reform. This is not because philosophers fail to agree on a tenable position, but because the (...) debate is misconceived. Both sides of the debate assume that agreement on common values, worldviews, and substantive positions is prerequisite to cultural reform. Pragmatic criticism of this assumption, however, displays its underlying faults, while pragmatic inquiry into the field’s development displays how scholars are already generating methods more commensurate with the goal of cultural reform. Philosophers invested in changing public values should transition from debates in axiology to debating method, where axiology is just one method among others and not the one best suited to supporting cultural reform. A historical survey of the field suggests what scholars of environmental ethics are learning about methods that are both publicly engaged and culturally transformative. (shrink)

Strauss's critique of Heidegger's philosophy aims at a recovery of political philosophy, which he saw as threatened by Heidegger's radical historicism; for Strauss, philosophy as a whole could not survive without political philosophy, and his return to the classical tradition of political philosophy, while inspired by the work of Heidegger, was directed against what he saw as the nihilism that was its consequence. Here I wish to examine a dimension of Strauss's critique which, though hinted at, remains neglected or unexplored (...) by Strauss: that is, how the critique of Heideggarian historicism should naturally link with Strauss's frequent attention to the issue of the ancient 'quarrel between philosophy and poetry'. It has often been observed by other commentators that through Heidegger's work, philosophy appears liable to be supplanted by contemporary literature, whether poetry or philosophy. As some of Strauss's explicit statements extend his definition of what falls under the category of 'poetry' in the modern age to contemporary novels and poetry, this aspect of Heidegger should have commanded more of his attention. Endurance of the quarrel between philosophy and poetry becomes through the prism of Strauss's work the confrontation of political philosophy with literature, particularly the novel form. It was not so much the rise of modern, non-teleological natural science that threatened the endurance and dignity of philosophy, then, but the rise of modern literature; the critique of historicism, when viewed in the light of the enduring 'quarrel', should lead one to a consideration of a crucial issue which remained oddly neglected, or was only hinted at, by Strauss. (shrink)

In the context of a discussion of time symmetry in the quantum mechanical measurement process, Aharonov et al. (1964) derived an expression concerning probabilities for the outcomes of measurements conducted on systems which have been pre- and postselected on the basis of both preceding and succeeding measurements. Recent literature has claimed that a resulting "time-symmetrized" interpretation of quantum mechanics has significant implications for some basic issues, such as contextuality and determinateness, in elementary, nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. Bub and Brown (1986) (...) have shown that under the standard interpretation of the aforementioned expression, these claims employ ensembles which are not well defined. It is argued here that under a counterfactual interpretation of the expression, these claims may be understood as employing well-defined ensembles; it is shown, however, that such an interpretation cannot be reconciled with the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Although it is been more than a century since the appearance of Max Weber’s famous essay about the objective character of knowledge in the field of social and political sciences, it still continues to attract the interest of researchers in the various cultural sciences. There is a whole secondary literature dedicated to concepts that Weber has not defined clearly enough, such as Idealtypus [ideal type], historisches Individuum [historical individual], Wertbeziehung [value-relation] or Werturteilsfreiheit [the freedom from value- judgement]. Our contribution (...) falls into this category; since the phrase ‘axiological memory’ appears nowhere in Weber’s work, the concept itself is present, especially in his essays dedicated to methodology in the social and political sciences. As Guy Oakes noted, Weber did not always endeavour to argue his thesis rigorously, thus leaving ample room for the interpretation and development of his ideas. (shrink)

Dear Professor Heller . . . Your paper had started out superbly. It was a great aesthetic and cognitive pleasure to follow you as you guided us through the intellectual history of the main idea of Kleist's essay, from Plato through the biblical Fall of Man, to Schiller, and Kierkegaard, and Kafka. Indeed the perceptive listener's experience was so satisfying that his disappointment was doubled when he came to realize that all this erudition and beauty had been displayed only (...) in order to serve as a contrast-providing background for the sharp delineation of a reductionistic explanation which you consider to be characteristic of psychoanalysis: the interpretation of the disturbance of man's naive, unselfconscious pre-Fall state as nothing more than a portrayal of sexual impotence—the reduction of a deep existential preoccupation to a case of phimosis. I am certain that the relief I felt when you then took up Freud's demonological-neurosis paper was not an idiosyncratic response on my part but an experience shared by many open-minded listeners in your psychoanalytic audience. Let us, therefore, disregard the "text" of your sermon and consider the substantial questions that you raised after you turned to Freud; these are to my mind the most central ones that you undertook to examine in your—despite its disappointing aspects—splendid address to us. Put into my own words, your most important question was this: What is the purpose of the psychoanalyst's efforts outside the clinical setting, in particular when his contributions take the form of a pathography? That is, To what end do analysts study the psychopathology of the creators of great works? I, too, have asked myself this question, and since you read my old essay "Beyond the Bounds of the Basic Rule" , you know some of my answers. But important basic questions are hardly ever answered once and for all; and I will, therefore, under the impact of your lecture, respond as if I had heard the question for the first time. Heinz Kohut, M.D., is Professorial Lecturer in Psychiatry at the University of Chicago and a teacher and training analyst at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. His works include The Restoration of the Self, The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders—which has appeared in German, French, and Italian translations—, The Restoration of the Self and collection of his essays, Scientific Empathy and Empathic Science. His "A Reply to Margret Schaefer"" was published in the Spring 1978 issue of Critical Inquiry. See also: "Psychoanalysis and the Marionette Theater: Interpretation is Not Depreciation" by Margret Schaefer in Vol. 5, No. 1. (shrink)

In literature, the firm’s selection of dual-product strategy under cap-and-trade regulation and the optimal emission reduction decisions are not well studied, especially through an analytical approach. We develop a theoretic model to investigate the firm’s selection on three product strategies in the presence of cap-and-trade policy, including two single product strategies and a dual-product strategy, and identify two types of consumers: consumers with low-carbon preference and regular consumers. Our analysis shows that, in the absence of cap-and-trade policy, it (...) is optimal to adopt dual-product strategy, but in the presence of this policy, it is optimal to adopt dual-product strategy or low-carbon product strategy. Compared with ordinary product strategy, adopting a low-carbon product strategy or dual-product strategy benefits the firm under cap-and-trade regulation. The additional cost of producing low-carbon product has an impact on the firm’s product strategy selection under cap-and-trade regulation. When it falls below a certain threshold, it is optimal to adopt a dual-product strategy; otherwise, it is optimal to adopt a low-carbon product strategy. Our research can provide reference for firm’s decision-making and government’s policy formulation. (shrink)

The paper explicates the stages of the author’s philosophical evolution in the light of Kopnin’s ideas and heritage. Starting from Kopnin’s understanding of dialectical materialism, the author has stated that category transformations of physics has opened from conceptualization of immutability to mutability and then to interaction, evolvement and emergence. He has connected the problem of physical cognition universals with an elaboration of the specific system of tools and methods of identifying, individuating and distinguishing objects from a scientific theory domain. The (...) role of vacuum conception and the idea of existence (actual and potential, observable and nonobservable, virtual and hidden) types were analyzed. In collaboration with S.Crymski heuristic and regulative functions of categories of substance, world as a whole as well as postulates of relativity and absoluteness, and anthropic and self-development principles were singled out. Elaborating Kopnin’s view of scientific theories as a practically effective and relatively true mapping of their domains, the author in collaboration with M. Burgin have originated the unified structure-nominative reconstruction (model) of scientific theory as a knowledge system. According to it, every scientific knowledge system includes hierarchically organized and complex subsystems that partially and separately have been studied by standard, structuralist, operationalist, problem-solving, axiological and other directions of the current philosophy of science. 1) The logico-linguistic subsystem represents and normalizes by means of different, including mathematical, languages and normalizes and logical calculi the knowledge available on objects under study. 2) The model-representing subsystem comprises peculiar to the knowledge system ways of their modeling and understanding. 3) The pragmatic-procedural subsystem contains general and unique to the knowledge system operations, methods, procedures, algorithms and programs. 4) From the viewpoint of the problem-heuristic subsystem, the knowledge system is a unique way of setting and resolving questions, problems, puzzles and tasks of cognition of objects into question. It also includes various heuristics and estimations (truth, consistency, beauty, efficacy, adequacy, heuristicity etc) of components and structures of the knowledge system. 5) The subsystem of links fixes interrelations between above-mentioned components, structures and subsystems of the knowledge system. The structure-nominative reconstruction has been used in the philosophical and comparative case-studies of mathematical, physical, economic, legal, political, pedagogical, social, and sociological theories. It has enlarged the collection of knowledge structures, connected, for instance, with a multitude of theoreticity levels and with an application of numerous mathematical languages. It has deepened the comprehension of relations between the main directions of current philosophy of science. They are interpreted as dealing mainly with isolated subsystems of scientific theory. This reconstruction has disclosed a variety of undetected knowledge structures, associated also, for instance, with principles of symmetry and supersymmetry and with laws of various levels and degrees. In cooperation with the physicist Olexander Gabovich the modified structure-nominative reconstruction is in the processes of development and justification. Ideas and concepts were also in the center of Kopnin’s cognitive activity. The author has suggested and elaborated the triplet model of concepts. According to it, any scientific concept is a dependent on cognitive situation, dynamical, multifunctional state of scientist’s thinking, and available knowledge system. A concept is modeled as being consisted from three interrelated structures. 1) The concept base characterizes objects falling under a concept as well as their properties and relations. In terms of volume and content the logical modeling reveals partially only the concept base. 2) The concept representing part includes structures and means (names, statements, abstract properties, quantitative values of object properties and relations, mathematical equations and their systems, theoretical models etc.) of object representation in the appropriate knowledge system. 3) The linkage unites a structures and procedures that connect components from the abovementioned structures. The partial cases of the triplet model are logical, information, two-tired, standard, exemplar, prototype, knowledge-dependent and other concept models. It has introduced the triplet classification that comprises several hundreds of concept types. Different kinds of fuzziness are distinguished. Even the most precise and exact concepts are fuzzy in some triplet aspect. The notions of relations between real scientific concepts are essentially extended. For example, the definition and strict analysis of such relations between concepts as formalization, quantification, mathematization, generalization, fuzzification, and various kinds of identity are proposed. The concepts «PLANET» and «ELEMENTARY PARTICLE» and some of their metamorphoses were analyzed in triplet terms. The Kopnin’s methodology and epistemology of cognition was being used for creating conception of the philosophy of law as elaborating of understanding, justification, estimating and criticizing legal system. The basic information on the major directions in current Western philosophy of law (legal realism, feminism, criticism, postmodernism, economical analysis of law etc.) is firstly introduced to the Ukrainian audience. The classification of more than fifty directions in modern legal philosophy is suggested. Some results of historical, linguistic, scientometric and philosophic-legal studies of the present state of Ukrainian academic science are given. (shrink)

Anthropocentrism has been proposed as the underlying cause of modern society's environmental impact. Concomitantly, hunter-gatherers’ orientation towards nature is connected with minimal environmental change or conservation, and seen as validating the idea that ‘what people do about their ecology depends upon what they think about themselves in relation to things around them’ (White 1967: 1205). Here it is argued that the notion that orientation towards nature is instrumental in environmental impact in any generalisable way has little empirical support and, most (...) importantly, is under-theorised and conceptually flawed. Employing a strong structurationist approach, it is shown that the tendency to abstract particular values from their social and environmental context must be resisted and that a deeper conception of the ‘inner lives’ of agents is required. Such an approach is more expansive and engages with a range of other motives as well as the unintended environmental consequences of actions. (shrink)

Life is short and transient--Japanese people call this sentiment mujokan. However, what if we could sweep away the "despair" looming over the present age by proactively accepting this mujo (transience)? Perusing the thought of mujo from the perspectives of philosophy, literature, art and religion, Takeuchi delves into the view of life and death unique to the Japanese people who have shared "grief" and "pain" with each other, as well as into the very core of their underlying spirit." -- Publisher's (...) description. (shrink)

Abstract:In her 2002 essay, "Anthropocentrism, Artificial Intelligence, and Moral Network Theory: An Ecofeminist Perspective," Victoria Davion points out, utilizing Val Plumwood's ecofeminist analysis, the faulty anthropocentric, logocentric assumptions made both within the artificial intelligence (AI) community, generating serious problems in the effort to build "intelligent" machines, and in moral philosophy, its "rule-based picture of moral reasoning" (169) coming under fire from the emerging field of neural net research. Davion demonstrates prescience regarding the direction in which both disciplines eventually move, (...) as they learn important "lessons from nature": that intelligence and moral reasoning are widely distributed throughout the Biosphere and are not based upon what has been taken as paradigmatic—the reductive, linear logic, abstracted from all context, characteristic of only one possible way of approaching the world. I present updates regarding artificial intelligence, neuropsychology, and the philosophical analysis of anthropocentrism, affirming that directing open, respectful attention toward the Other in the real, living world will eventually provide us with the ontological foundation for a nonanthropocentric ethics capable of sustaining truly intelligent and moral ways of living. (shrink)

ABSTRACT As we strive for a more polyvocal history of science, historians have placed increasing emphasis on local case studies as a way to globalize the field. This tension between the local and the global extends to the practice as well as the content of the history of science, as the field has begun to pay more attention not just to local case studies, but also to local cultures of historiography. Many historians of science want multiple historiographical voices that take (...) seriously the concerns and literatures in different linguistic and national contexts. As more journals urge translation into what are perceived as the dominant languages in “global” humanities discourses and scholars are encouraged to facilitate the Englishing of their historical research, many questions remain: In what ways does it make sense to nationalize or culturally locate individual cultures of the history of science? Is translation a democratic and positive force in the discipline, and/or does it kill local difference? Will it continue to be meaningful to talk about the history of science? A collective dialogue within the field depends on finding a way to take local diversity in historiography and epistemology seriously while translating that local difference into a meaningful common conversation. This essay considers the challenges of embracing multiple ways of knowing that might fall under the purview of the history of science, while wondering what that means for the coherence of the field as we move forward into the next century of work in Isis. (shrink)

Resumen La literatura universal, se encuentra poblada de arquetípicos que comparten una condición de desamparo y marginalidad, siendo la literatura realista de la segunda mitad del siglo XIX la que constata y da cuenta de su condición. En un mismo sentido, también la Biblia presenta un sinnúmero de personajes similares, marcando un punto de inflexión al llamarlo bienaventurados. Así pues, el presente estudio bíblico-literario, se centra en el arquetipo de la “viuda pobre”, sosteniendo dicha ficción literaria es una clave interpretativa (...) de la realidad, a la luz de la teoría literaria de la Estética de la Recepción. El articulo estudia la “viuda pobre” como un imaginario cultural y estableciendo la recepción de dicho imaginario en los cuentos “El Chiflón del diablo” y “El pago” del escritor chileno Baldomero Lillo, demostrando cómo el dialogo entre cultura y Biblia representa un aporte a la comprensión de determinadas ficciones literarias como categorías antropológicas.Universal literature is crowded by archetypical characters who share abandonment and marginalization conditions, being second half 19,h century realistic literature that confirms and exposes those conditions. In that sense, The Holy Bible presents a number of those characters. Resides, it highlights a turning point, hence, The Beatitudes point out: “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven”. Thus, the following biblical-literary study, centered in the “Poor widow” archetype, aims to the establishment of literary fiction as interpretative key of reality, under Wolfgang Iser Aesthetics Reception's theory as its methodology. The objective aims to postulate “Poor Widow” as a Cultural imaginary, and finally to establish the reception of that imaginary within the stories “El Chiflón del Diablo” and “El Pago” by the chilean writer Baldomero Lillo, demonstrating that the dialog between culture and The Holy Bible represents a contribution to some literary fiction s as anthropological categories. (shrink)

Literatures of Madness: Disability Studies and Mental Health brings together scholars working in disability studies, mad studies, feminist theory, Indigenous studies, postcolonial theory, Jewish literature, queer studies, American studies, trauma studies, and comics to create an intersectional community of scholarship in literary disability studies of mental health. The collection contains essays on canonical authors and lesser known and sometimes forgotten writers, including Sylvia Plath, Louisa May Alcott, Hannah Weiner, Mary Jane Ward, Michelle Cliff, Lee Maracle, Joanne Greenberg, Ann Bannon, (...) Jerry Pinto, Persimmon Blackridge, and others. The volume addresses the under-representation of madness and psychiatric disability in the field of disability studies, which traditionally focuses on physical disability, and explores the controversies and the common ground among disability studies, anti-psychiatric discourses, mad studies, graphic medicine, and health/medical humanities. (shrink)

The language theory of Mikhail Bakhtin does not fall neatly under any single rubric - 'dialogism,' 'marxism,' 'prosaics,' 'authorship' - because the philosophic foundation of his writing rests ambivalently between phenomenology and Marxism. The theoretical tension of these positions creates philosophical impasses in Bakhtin's work, which have been neglected or ignored partly because these impasses are themselves mirrored by the problems of antifoundationalist and materialist tendencies in literary scholarship. In Mikhail Bakhtin: Between Phenomenology and Marxism Michael Bernard-Donals examines (...) various incarnations of phenomenological and materialist theory - including the work of Jauss, Fish, Rorty, Althusser, and Pecheux - and places them beside Bakhtin's work, providing a contextualised study of Bakhtin, a critique of the problems of contemporary critics, and an original contribution to literary theory. (shrink)

An interesting aspect of Ernest Sosa’s (2017) recent thinking is that enhanced performances (e.g., the performance of an athlete under the influence of a performance-enhancing drug) fall short of aptness, and this is because such enhanced performances do not issue from genuine competences on the part of the agent. In this paper, I explore in some detail the implications of such thinking in Sosa’s wider virtue epistemology, with a focus on cases of cognitive enhancement. A certain puzzle is (...) then highlighted, and the solution proposed draws from both the recent moral responsibility literature on guidance control (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Fischer 2012) as well as from work on cognitive integration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Pritchard 2010; Palermos 2014; Carter 2017). (shrink)

For Quine, the ontological commitments of a discourse are what fall under its (objectual) quantifiers. The recent literature, however, is beginning to move away from this picture. There are direct challenges to Quine's criterion, and there are also attempts to provide alternatives. Azzouni suggests that the ontological commitments of a discourse should be determined by an existence predicate instead. The availability of this alternative forces an adjudication between Qune's criterion and the predicate approach to ontological commitment. I (...) argue that to adjudicate between these criteria for ontological commitment, we need first to adjudicate between criteria for what exists. (shrink)

In ancient philosophy, there is no discipline called “logic” in the contemporary sense of “the study of formally valid arguments.” Rather, once a subfield of philosophy comes to be called “logic,” namely in Hellenistic philosophy, the field includes (among other things) epistemology, normative epistemology, philosophy of language, the theory of truth, and what we call logic today. This entry aims to examine ancient theorizing that makes contact with the contemporary conception. Thus, we will here emphasize the theories of the “syllogism” (...) in the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions. However, because the context in which these theories were developed and discussed were deeply epistemological in nature, we will also include references to the areas of epistemological theorizing that bear directly on theories of the syllogism, particularly concerning “demonstration.” Similarly, we will include literature that discusses the principles governing logic and the components that make up arguments, which are topics that might now fall under the headings of philosophy of logic or non-classical logic. This includes discussions of problems and paradoxes that connect to contemporary logic and which historically spurred developments of logical method. For example, there is great interest among ancient philosophers in the question of whether all statements have truth-values. Relevant themes here include future contingents, paradoxes of vagueness, and semantic paradoxes like the liar. We also include discussion of the paradoxes of the infinite for similar reasons, since solutions have introduced sophisticated tools of logical analysis and there are a range of related, modern philosophical concerns about the application of some logical principles in infinite domains. Our criterion excludes, however, many of the themes that Hellenistic philosophers consider part of logic, in particular, it excludes epistemology and metaphysical questions about truth. Ancient philosophers do not write treatises “On Logic,” where the topic would be what today counts as logic. Instead, arguments and theories that count as “logic” by our criterion are found in a wide range of texts. For the most part, our entry follows chronology, tracing ancient logic from its beginnings to Late Antiquity. However, some themes are discussed in several eras of ancient logic; ancient logicians engage closely with each other’s views. Accordingly, relevant publications address several authors and periods in conjunction. These contributions are listed in three thematic sections at the end of our entry. (shrink)

Examples of unsayability of the most disparate sorts are cited from literature (Shakespeare, Melville, James, Aeschylus, and others) in order to suggest the uncircumscribable diversity of motives for unsayability. The question is whether they all have anything in common. When something cannot be said because of politeness or obscenity or deceit or strategy, does this have anything to do with the metaphysical motives for unsayability? These things are not per se unsayable but only conditionally so, under certain circumstances. (...) The problem is that any way of distinguishing accidental from essential unsayability is itself circumstantial. Any essential unsayability must necessarily remain, precisely, unsayable. Therefore any determinate distinction between essential and contingent unsayability itself proves to be inarticulable. Questioned in this way as to its final purport and significance, all discourse, in effect, falls under the sway of what cannot be said. (shrink)

According to Malebranche’s occasionalism, all cases of causation in the world are due to the action of God’s will. These actions are divided into "particular volitions" and "general volitions". There has been sharp disagreement in the secondary literature concerning the nature of general volitions, for Malebranche. One side claims that general volitions are volitions of wide scope which cover a multiplicity of potential situations. The other side claims that general volitions are specific but fall under the scope (...) of broader laws of nature. I draw on the quantifier apparatus of modern predicate logic to highlight the differences between the two views, which I refer to as the Universality view and the Regularity view respectively. I also outline a third ‘Hybrid’ view that borrows elements of each. I conclude that there is a fundamental ambiguity in Malebranche’s account of general volitions which prevents any one account from fully fitting with Malebranche’s remarks. (shrink)

Art and its Objects by Richard Wollheim had a major impact on aesthetics and the philosophy of art when it was first published in 1968. Of the arguments offered in response to Wollheim’s essay, Jerrold Levinson’s intentional-historical theory of art has been one of the most enduring. Levinson was influenced by three key sections of Wollheim’s enquiry: Section 40, which considers the claim that works of art fall under a concept of art, or that we are disposed to (...) regard certain things as works of art; and Sections 60 and 61, which deal with art as a historical phenomenon, and problems arising from its identification and interpretation. To date, these claims have been raised as points of contention in the philosophy of art. This paper takes a different perspective. Wollheim’s understanding of art’s historicity draws explicitly on the literature of theoretical art history. Via Wollheim, old art-historical problems will reappear as new philosophical questions. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to determine the criticism to Mushabbiha and Mujassima on the basis of al-Faṣl fī l-milal wa-l-ahwāʾ wa-l-niḥal whose writer is Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), one of the eminent scholars of the Andalusian civilization. In this work, Ibn Ḥazm gives systematic information about the non-Islamic religions as well as the sects emerging under the Islamic roof, criticizing the views of religion and religious sects from various perspectives. In doing so, he approached the views of (...) the sects with his identity as a kalam theologian, and he made his critics in the light of classical conception of the Ahl al-Sunnah. Ibn Ḥazm pointed out that Mushbbiha and Mujassima had an anthropomorphic understanding of God, and emphasized that this understanding does not correspond with the belief in monotheism. He strongly emphasizes that God is one and nothing is equal to Him.Summary: Islamic Civilization of Andalusia was the most important representative of Islam in the West and enlightened Europe for centuries, has made important successes in science-technic, art and literature. Also made improvements on other areas such as religous and philosophical knowledge, in these eras raised important Islam scholars who made important contributions to those areas. One of those scholars undoubtedly is Ibn Ḥazm who was born in Andalusia (d. 456/1064). The aim of this paper is to analyze and determine Ibn Ḥazm’s critiques on Mushabbiha and Mujassima, based on Ibn Ḥazm’s thought found in his al-Fasl,who was one of the leading scholars of Anatolia civilization and played an important role in development of Islam thought nearly in all areas by his precious writings.Ibn Ḥazm, in his work gives systematic information on sects under Islamic thought and beliefs and religions out of Islam, their relations and differences with Islam, which he accepts as one and unchangeable, and analyzes them gives in an analytic, defensive and rejective method, puts them under critique. In other words, with his theologian identity and dialectical method, under the Sunnī classical tradition, he criticizes other sects’ thoughts. Ibn Ḥazm used a very sharp language and rough method in his critiques. This kind of attitude was symbolized by a traditional saying “Ibn Ḥazm’s language is sharper than Hajjāj’s sword”. As it very well known in the Qurʾān, oneness (tawhīd) was emphasized very much, God does not look like anything ever created, and does not have any resemblance or sameness with anything, in order to eliminate polytheist (shirk) belief. On the other hand, in some verses representations and resemblances were used that does not seem in line with oneness (tawhīd). This problem which seems to be contradiction at first sight has been subject to many debates of how that can be solved. In the center of discussion informing attributes (revealed attributes) that drive people to comparison (tajsīm) and anthropomorphism (tashbīh) that recall humanly attributes if they are understood in artificial meanings. In history of Islamic thought, in order to understand those kind of attributes, in their artificial meanings or their changed and decided meanings (ta’wīl), has been subject to discussion and to understand the attributes different methods have been used. One of these method which is the main subject of this paper is tajsīm and tashbīh method and was accepted by Mushabbiha and Mujassima. They take informing attributes artificial meanings as base and were against the changing of the meaning. As a natural conclusion of this, they resemble God to the created and asserted God has concrete parts such as hand, face, eye, leg, etc. In his work al-FaṣlIbn Ḥazm mentions ideas of Mushabbiha and Mujassima, and criticized whether it is appropriate for Sunnah or not. His critique against these sects are mostly based on the informing attributes being taken as visual attributes in nasses, where as a result the God imagination turns to be anthropormorphist imagination. According to Ibn Ḥazm, the verses “… He does not resemble anything…” (Ṣūra 42/11) and “He is not equal to anything” put forward the onlyness and soleness of God and they do not give attention to this and try to prove the attributes fall into anthropormorphism (tashbīh) and corporealisim (tajsīm). Ibn Ḥazm believes and says that their God imagination is not in line with oneness (tawhīd) understanding and puts the verses into the center. In his critiques he emphasizes God’s oneness, he does not have pair, not resemble anything, does not have equal and tried to explain how his attributes should be understood. In this respect, in qualification of God his main principle was exploitation (tanzīh) and asserts that humanly attributes (face, eye, foot) in their visual understandings cannot be attributed to God and tried to prove that names like object (jism), accident (symptoms), substance (ore) he cannot be put into qualification. Ibn Ḥazm’s consideration of nass through an exterior perspective, his criticism of Mushabbiha and Mujassima, who take visual attributes as principles, and his re-interpretation (ta’wīl) of some nass whenever necessary may be seen as a contradiction but it is consistent in his system. Because he is not definitely against re-interpretation (ta’wīl) but he rejects re-interpretation without proof, he accepts ta’wīlthat comes from nasses and rational necessity with a proof. From this perspective if there is an occasion a word’s meaning in the Qurʾān that needs understanding different from its written meaning and there is a proof for that, he sees this a requirement for re-interpretation (ta’wīl). He practically used this theory of him in informing attributes. As a result, in attributes of God, he follows the madhhab of the Salaf (predecessors), where as in informal attributes and their understanding, he uses ta’wīlmethod and takes the path of Halaf (successors). By this way, he departed from the madhhab of the Salaf and created his own method. In this context while he was criticizing anthropormorphist and corporealist methods. Also he defended that since comprehension of God is not possible without re-interpretation of these attributes, it is necessary. He explained these attributes in verses with their dictionary meanings and related verses, with appropriate Arabic grammar and God’s greatness. From that perspective Ibn Ḥazm’s Salafī and artificial understandings, we cannot say he is from Salafī which rejects rationale and explanation all together. In addition to that when necessary in informal attributes he uses ta’wīland uses reason and the function he put upon reason, shows his position against sect like Mushabbiha and Mujassima who underestimates the value of reason. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 343-347 [Access article in PDF] Mysticism and Psychosis:Descriptions and Distinctions Michael McGhee IT IS REFRESHING to read a paper that manages at once to be interdisciplinary and intercultural in its range of reference, and that also confronts a difficult and controversial question about how we are to assess the similarities and differences between psychotic and mystical experiences. Many psychiatrists have been skeptical about (...) whether there are any genuine differences, and not, mostly, because they thought that psychotics were in reality mystics. But mystical is pretty vague, as is spiritual, and that does not bode well for the enterprise of making comparisons, unless we can tie these latter terms down with some precision. How vague psychosis is I must leave others to judge, but one of the conclusions I have drawn from reading this paper is that the crucial questions turn not on agreed definitions, but on agreed judgments about what are to count as the examples or cases that fall under the definitions. I have some doubts about Caroline Brett's approach to these questions, in the first half hesitant doubts, in the second part less so. Her leading claim appears first in the Introduction:... spiritual or mystical experiences are those states in which the form of experience is altered from normal consciousness, resulting in a new understanding of the basic nature of reality, life, and the individual. Psychotic experiences are those states that also flow from alterations of the form of experience, but result in a pathological interaction between the individual and the world. Therefore, according to these definitions, phenomena occurring in a spiritual context may be identical to those traditionally viewed as symptoms of psychosis, but cannot be seen as psychotic in themselves. (Brett 2002, 322) What I was struck by in reading this passage was not so much the claim that "phenomena occurring in a spiritual context may be identical to those traditionally viewed as symptoms of psychosis, but cannot be seen as psychotic in themselves." What struck me was its implication: that psychotic experiences cannot be seen as psychotic in themselves, either. In other words, the claim is that there is a neutral core of common experience shared by psychotic and mystic alike. I do not know how controversial this is in the psychiatric literature that deals with delusion and hallucination, but I should like to explore the claim a little in what follows. Brett expands on it near the end of her paper: The pathology that differentiates the psychotic from the benign mystical state lies not in the content of beliefs, or even in the broad form of experience, but in a few interrelated commonsense factors. It consists of an inability to return to the ontological framework of consensus reality; in psychological isolation, and inability [End Page 343] to accommodate to the subjectivity of others; in a focus of interest in the mental realm and loss of practical concerns that leads to paucity of action and neglect of self-care. (Brett 2002, 336) This pushes the pathology away from the experience that might have been thought to constitute the psychosis. I wonder whether there are problems with this. The fact, if it is one, that both mystic and psychotic alike undergo "an altered state" clearly does not imply that there is a (common) altered state that they both undergo, so what are the grounds for the claim that the core or central experience is the same? What kind of experiences are claimed to be common? How are we to conceive delusion on this scenario?What makes psychotic experiences psychotic on the present pushed back view seems to be that they "result in a pathological interaction between individual and world" (my italics), which thus exonerates the experience itself of pathology, pushing it back to one possible set of consequences for someone who reacts badly to the experiential phenomena (e.g., their inability to return from it). It seems to suggest that someone can be comfortable or well adapted to their voices and visions (and surely there are such people around, for whom the boundaries... (shrink)

Assisted conception can be distinguished from assisted gestation.1 These processes have tended to be grouped together under the generic term assisted reproductive technology in the bioethical literature. According to Chloe Romanis, however, it is worth distinguishing interventions such as surrogacy, uterus transplantation, and potentially artificial placenta technology, as falling under the genus assisted gestative technologies. This is because gestation carries unique ethico-legal implications as compared with conception. The proposed genus of assisted gestative technologies is a helpful first (...) step in the endeavour to distinguish between the different ethico-legal landscapes across various ‘assisted reproductive technologies.’ I am generally in favour of adopting AGT as a term which separates various forms of gestational services from other kinds of reproductive technologies. Yet, if assisted gestative technologies can be considered a genus of assisted reproductive technologies, we might consider surrogacy, UTx, and artificial placenta technology their individual species. Between these various species of AGTs, I would argue, there remains enough ethico-legal diversity to warrant independent discussion about the descriptive and normative functions of each AGT and the relationship between gestation, genetic relatedness and legal/moral parenthood. Chloe Romanis claims that legal and social issues about attribution of parenthood and the importance that might be placed on information about gestational origins affect all forms of AGTs.1 I take it ethical ambiguities arise because the relationship between who gestates, genetic relatedness to the prospective child, and claims to legal/moral parental responsibility can be disrupted or made ambivalent with the involvement of third-party support. For many of those who do not require reproductive assistance, the gestational labour, genetic relatedness and parental responsibility would traditionally …. (shrink)

This dissertation is a philosophical contribution to the theories on trust and on risk communication. The importance of trust in risk communication has been argued for and empirically studied since the 80s. However, there is little agreement on the notion of trust and the precise function of trust. This thesis sets out to study both aspects from a philosophical point of view. The dissertation consists of five essays and an introduction. Essay I is a comment on risk perception theory and (...) the psychometric model in particular. The essay argues that sometimes individuals take risks simply because they are in a vulnerable position and have no other choice. Four factors are identified as crucial in risks from vulnerability: poor outset conditions, lack of reasonable options, hope and liability to disinformation. Essay II addresses the democratic approach to risk communication and the ideal of risk communication as a dialogue between more or less equal stakeholders. The essay develops a typology of different risk communication practices and influence distributions and concludes that the form of risk communication most commonly referred to in the literature is of the most imbalanced kind where all three types of influence falls to the same party. Essay III argues that trust can be understood as comfortable defocusing. Trust as comfortable defocusing means that when a person trusts, he or she is comfortable with letting certain things be in the hands or in the control of the trusted other. Departing from this idea a definition of trust is proposed consisting of three elements: the truster’s comfortable defocusing from the trusted person’s part of caring for X, based on a belief about the trusted person’s care for X, concerning something of concern to the truster. Essay IV explores the concept of trustworthiness and under which conditions trust can be betrayed in a morally justified way. It is argued that two aspects are essential for every reasonable notion of trustworthiness: reliability in terms of commitment to trust and predictability in terms of compliance with norms. In order to be untrustworthy in a morally justified way two major conditions need to be fulfilled: first, what is expected from the trustee needs to be either immoral or part of an ongoing immoral or unjust relationship between truster and trustee and, secondly, the trustee must not be in a position to explicitly reject trust. Essay V examines two of the most employed distinctions within the trust literature, that of trust/confidence and of trust/reliance. These distinctions are evaluated against a set of five criteria. It is argued that both these distinctions are employed to cover several distinguishing properties, thus adding to conceptual confusion. (shrink)

I soon discovered that I was quite isolated in my attempts to pursue the sociology of literature. In any case, one searched almost in vain for allies if one wanted to approach a literary text from the perspective of a critical theory of society. To be sure, there were Franz Mehring’s articles which I read with interest and profit; but despite the admirable decency and the uncompromising political radicalism of the author, his writings hardly went beyond the limits of (...) a socialist journalist who wrote in essentially the same style about literature as about political and the economy. George Lukács had not yet published his impressive series of essays on Marxist aesthetics and interpretation of literature. Of course, I was deeply touched and influenced by his fine little book, The Theory of the Novel , which I practically learned by heart. Besides Levin Schücking’s small volume on the sociology of literary taste, the only other major influence I can recall was George Brandes’ monumental work on the literary currents of the nineteenth century.Nonetheless, I had the courage, not to say hubris, to plan an ambitious, socially critical series on French, English, Spanish, and German literature, the beginning of which was to be formed by the above-mentioned studies. My attention was especially focused on the writes and literary schools which the German literary establishment either punished by total silence or raised up into the clouds of idealistic babble or relegated to quasi-folkloric anthropology .In these studies, I limited myself to the narrative forms of literature; for reasons which I hold to be sociologically and artistically valid, I believe that novels and stories represent the most significant aspect of German literature in the nineteenth century. While I in no way feel ashamed of these documents of my youth, I am conscious of their weaknesses. If I were to write them over again, I would certainly be less sure of some of the direct connections I drew between literature and writers on the one hand, and the social infrastructure on the other. In later publications I attempted to analyze with greater circumspection the mediation between substructure and superstructure, between social currents and ideologies; but my views on the social world and the necessity to combine social theory and literary analysis have not changed in any essential way. In the last decades the sociology of literature has become progressively more fashionable. The writings of my contemporaries have often amazed me because some—frequently in unnecessarily complicated and esoteric language—are so concerned with “mediation” that the connections between social being and social consciousness became almost obscured. Leo Lowenthal is professor emeritus of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. He is also professor emeritus at the University of Frankfurt in West Germany. His collected works have been published in five volumes in German and in a parallel English edition. Lowenthal’s autobiographical writings, edited by Martin jay, will appear in the fall of 1987 under the title An Unmastered Past. Lowenthal’s present studies deal with German postmodernism. Ted. R. Weeks is a graduate student at the University of California, Berkeley, specializing in imperial Russian history. (shrink)

Aesthetics: 50 Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments is a teaching-focused resource, which highlights the contributions that imaginative scenarios—paradoxes, puzzles, and thought experiments alike—have made to the development of contemporary analytic aesthetics. The book is divided into sections pertaining to art-making, ontology, aesthetic judgements, appreciation and interpretation, and ethics and value, and offers an accessible summary of ten debates falling under each section. -/- Each entry also features a detailed annotated bibliography, making it an ideal companion for courses surveying a (...) broad collection of topics and readings in aesthetics. (shrink)

In 'Ethics Without Sentience: Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness' (Kammerer, 2022), I argued that phenomenal consciousness is probably normatively insignificant, and does not play a significant normative role. In 'Preserving the Normative Significance of Sentience' (Dung, 2024), Leonard Dung challenges my reasoning and defends sentientism about value and moral status against my arguments. Here I respond to Dung's criticism, pointing out three flaws in his reply. My conclusion is that the view that phenomenal consciousness is (...) distinctively significant is still very much under threat. (shrink)

In this review, I survey theoretical accounts of exploitation in business, chiefly through the example of low wage or sweatshop labor. This labor is associated with wages that fall below a living wage standard and include long working hours. Labor of this kind is often described as self-evidently exploitative and immoral (Van Natta 1995). But for those who defend sweatshop labor as the first rung on a ladder toward greater economic development, the charge that sweatshop labor is self-evidently exploitative (...) fails adequately to explain the nature of the alleged wrongdoing. While all sides might agree that poor working conditions are unfortunate and undesirable, defenders of sweatshop labor argue that they provide the best available employment alternative for some workers and the best chance at economic development for many low and middle income countries (LMICs). Some defenders of sweatshop labor even embrace the label of exploitation. <br><br>Unless there is a clear, widely understood account by which exploitation is a moral wrong, then charging a practice as exploitative will do little to advance debates over whether and why a practice is morally problematic. A considerable body of work has been developed applying a growing literature on exploitation to sweatshop labor. While many forms of moral wrong are associated with sweatshop labor, I will focus specifically on the worry that low wages allow relatively wealthy employers wrongfully to take advantage of or gain from relatively poor workers, especially in LMICs. In particular, I will focus on instances of alleged exploitation in employment relationships that are voluntary and mutually beneficial. I have two reasons for doing so. First, by restricting this review to voluntary and mutually beneficial instances of exploitation, I can isolate the moral wrong of exploitation from other moral wrongs, especially the wrongs of coercion and outright harms to workers. Second, the focus on mutually beneficial and voluntary relationships will allow for arguments that sweatshop labor is not only not exploitative, but is a morally praiseworthy means of helping to encourage economic growth in poor areas of the world and to provide jobs that pay better and are more stable than any existing alternatives.<br><br>In this review, I aim to accomplish three goals. First, I will provide an overview of the many different uses of the charge of exploitation in business practice through an examination of the uses of the term in the literature on sweatshop labor. While it is often not clear what kind of moral wrong is assumed to take place when the charge of exploitation is used, I will demonstrate that many distinct types of exploitation, connected to distinct moral wrongs, are used in the literature on sweatshop labor and elsewhere in business ethics. Specifically, I will identify two broad categories of exploitation—exploitation as unfairness and exploitation as the mere use of others—with subgroups under each main category of exploitation. Second, I will discuss which of these senses of exploitation are defensible as identifying clear moral wrongs that take place in the context of business and, specifically, sweatshop labor. As I will argue, not all uses of the charge of exploitation are capable of persuasively identifying clear moral wrongs. Moreover, there is not a single, clear type of exploitation that takes place in business but, rather, several distinct forms. Third, I will apply the lessons learned from my exploration of exploitation in sweatshop labor to other specific areas of business. As I will argue, there are multiple viable models of exploitation in the sweatshop literature that can illuminate exploitative practices of relatively well compensated employees, customers, suppliers, and entire communities. <br><br>While discussions of theories of exploitation tend to argue for a single, correct account of this moral wrong, my review of the literature on exploitation in sweatshop labor supports the conclusion that there are multiple defensible accounts of the moral wrong of exploitation. For this reason, those who would charge that a relationship is exploitative should specify the form of exploitation that they believe is taking place. (shrink)

Argument from analogy is a common and formidable form of reasoning in law and in everyday conversation. Although there is substantial literature on the subject, according to a recent survey ( Juthe 2005) there is little fundamental agreement on what form the argument should take, or on how it should be evaluated. Th e lack of conformity, no doubt, stems from the complexity and multiplicity of forms taken by arguments that fall under the umbrella of analogical reasoning (...) in argumentation, dialectical studies, and law. Modeling arguments with argumentation schemes has proven useful in attempts to refine the analyst’s understanding of not only the logical structures that shape the backbone of the argument itself, but also the logical underpinning of strategies for evaluating it, strategies based on the semantic categories of genus and relevance. By clarifying the distinction between argument from example and argument from analogy, it is possible to advance a useful proposal for the treatment of argument from analogy in law. (shrink)

Toward Unity among Environmentalists is Bryan Norton’s most developed effort to surmount the frequently intractable debate between anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists. Norton argues that the basic axiological differences between the two positions have become irrelevant at the level of policy formation. His thesis is that the two camps converge when dealing with practical goals and aims for environmental management. I argue that Norton’s approach falls significantly short of establishing such a convergence because of the overall methodological framework for policy formation (...) that he defends. The key problem with that framework is that it fails to provide for the degree of species protection most suitable to the nonanthropocentrist position. (shrink)

GREGORY MIKKELSON | : Animal and environmental ethics should converge on the following three value judgments: natural ecosystems generally involve more good than harm; predation in nature tends to yield positive net benefits; and, at least on a global scale, livestock farming is destroying more value than it is creating. But the ecocentric criteria of environmental ethics and the sentientist criteria of animal ethics may have divergent implications for capitalism’s main effect on the world: the collapse of wild nature due (...) to explosive growth in the human economy. Sentientism risks counting this effect as a net gain, whereas ecocentrism surely rates it a massive net loss. While supporting the above claims, I show how they fit into a larger argument in favour of the broader, ecocentric value theory of environmental ethics and against the narrower, sentientist axiology of animal ethics. | : Les éthiques animale et environnementale devraient converger vers les trois jugements de valeur suivants: les écosystèmes naturels impliquent généralement plus de bien que de mal, la prédation dans la nature a tendance à produire des avantages nets positifs et, au moins à l’échelle mondiale, l’élevage animal détruit plus de valeur qu’il n’en crée. Mais les critères écocentriques de l’éthique environnementale et les critères de l’éthique animale fondés sur la sentience pourraient avoir des implications divergentes sur l’effet principal du capitalisme sur le monde: l’effondrement de la nature sauvage dû à la croissance explosive de l’économie humaine. Le sentientisme risque de considérer cet effet comme un gain net, alors que l’écocentrisme le considère sûrement comme une perte nette massive. Tout en soutenant les affirmations ci-dessus, je montre comment elles s’intègrent dans un argument plus large en faveur d’une théorie de la valeur écocentrique plus englobante propre à l’éthique environnementale et contre l’axiologie sentientiste plus étroite de l’éthique animale. (shrink)

Natura 2000 is a network of natural sites whose aim is to preserve species and habitats of relevance in the European Union. The policy underlying Natura 2000 has faced widespread opposition from land users and received extensive support from environmentalists. This paper addresses the ethical framework for Natura 2000 and the probable moral assumptions of its main stakeholders. Arguments for and against Natura 2000 were analyzed and classified according to “strong” or “weak” versions of the three main theories of environmental (...) ethics – anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. Weak (intergenerational) anthropocentrism was found to underlie the Natura 2000 network itself and the positions of environmentalists, while strong (traditional) anthropocentrism pervaded the positions of economic developers. Land users seemed to fall somewhere between weak and strong anthropocentrism. The paper discusses the relation between ethics and different attitudes towards Natura 2000, highlighting some of the implications for the network’s ongoing implementation. It is shown that Natura 2000 achieves a strong reversal of the burden of proof from conservation to economic development and land use change under anthropocentrism. It is argued that the alleged theoretical divide between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism in relation to the burden of proof does not seem to hold in practice. Finally, it is predicted that the weak versions of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism, are likely to converge extensively in respect to nature conservation policy measures. (shrink)

The text of “The Four Premises” (Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a), which began with Sadr al-Sharī‘ah (d. 747/1346), centralizes on the actions of human beings by connecting it with the problem of good and evil in the field of kalām, Islamic philosophy and logic, and fıqh. It was also commented in with incisive and critical footness by Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 791/1390). In Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a, al-Kastalī (d. 901/1496) discusses the two main issues. One of them is good/husn-evil/qubh, the other is human (...) actions. Good-evil dichotomy here is axiological, whereas the human actions are examined within an ontological structure. The quest for the origin of moral values is a husn-qubh debate. Identifying the hierarchy of human actions in ontology is another problem. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the theological discussions in the Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a which were written following the order of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror/Fatih. This text addresses the origin of moral judgment and the question of freedom and destiny in human actions linked to the problem of good and evil. Discussing these two fundamental issues, has made it necessary to thoroughly investigate perhaps all the subheadings which concern the entire paradigm that falls under the framework of understanding the God, nature, and humanity. By looking at the treatise, the main sources of the issues being discussed are mostly generated from an Islamic jurisprudence works, entitled Tawḍīḥ and Talwīḥ. It can easily be discerned that the direct quotations that were made or taken indirectly were from these two sources. References to other sources were quite seldom. However, the excerpts that were taken from primary sources were interpreted and expounded by the author and amended anew. In this article al-Kastalī’s comments will be analyzed. He’s work Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a will be analyzed in depth and will be published for the first time with a critical edition. Text of Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a is a product of a culture of criticism and critical thinking has two foundations: Disproval and verification. Critical thinking is then bidirectional. It is wrong to carry out the criticism activity in only one direction. It is insufficient to simply refute the opposing idea. It is not enough to show the wrong. The so-called right idea also needs to be justified. In the Tawdīh, Sadr al-Sharī‘ah criticizes al-Ashʿarī in the issues of husn-qubh and human actions. According to this criticism, good and evil should be based on the reason. On the other hand, human is free in his actions. As it is known, goodness and badness was based on religion according to al-Ashʿarī. Acquisition (kasb) given to man was unclear. It is al-Taftāzānī who wrote an annotation on Tawḍīḥ with the name of Talwīḥ. He’s comments are successful in terms of theology. However, these interpretations do not mean that he accepted the Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a. In terms of al-Taftāzānī, proofs of Sadr al-Sharī‘ah is weak. The theological disputes in Tawḍīḥ and Talwīḥ have reached the level of tension in the following works. The origins of the divergence are based on the differentiation between the schools of al-Māturīdi and al-Ashʿarī. In fact, these schools are not different from each other in terms of the method they use. Although the roads walked were the same, the results achieved were different. The main reason for this is that the issue is ambiguous and the problem of good and evil is multidimensional. It is directly related to God and human. It is also connected with ontology and epistemology together. The position on the husn-qubh issue is also decisive for other theological problems. The root of the evil problem or theodicy is mostly based on this problem in Islamic thought. The actions of God and human are questioned here. The value judgments that actions will take are examined. Which action is more moral and better? Another major problem discussed in this article is human actions. It is a matter of freedom of human volition. The volition of man before the absolute God is a problem. Because God has absolute power, will and knowledge. On the other hand, God imposes responsibility on man. But what are the limits of this responsibility? Al-Kastalī discusses all these problems in the context of Sadr al-Sharī‘ah and al-Taftāzānī. In the big picture there are representatives of the schools of al-Māturīdi and al-Ashʿarī. Al-Kastalī doesn’t paint a new picture, rather makes the lines in the picture clear. In this article, the texts will be analyzed mutually. The content and uses of the concepts will be given importance. Ideas will be discussed from their main sources and the roots and different reach of the issues will be touched. The interactions of different schools of thought will also be included. (shrink)

Hefty and serious—that is how this book feels when you pick it up. That was my subjective aesthetic experience anyway. Aesthetic judgment is, after all, one key to assessing our thoughts and perceptions. More on that soon, as you might expect.Hefty and serious also describes the questions with which the volume grapples: Is there, or can there be, a clear American Aesthetics, not merely aesthetics practiced by Americans? What would that look like? How would such a process affect the minds (...) and actions of Americans?The answers? It's complicated.The twenty essays in this volume trace the possibility of an American Aesthetics from foundational ideas of the past to the contemporary landscape. The goal is not only articulating an aesthetics that is distinctively American—aesthetics as a method for examining the arts and the artful—but also the possibility of aesthetics as a dynamic tool for pursuing a flourishing life within our hyper-capitalist, consumerist culture.Constant amongst the scholars gathered here is the assertion that aesthetics is not an abstract academic pursuit interesting only to the privileged and interested few but rather that aesthetics is the key element in the human pursuit of meaning and purpose in our lives. Aristotle would approve!Speaking of ancestors, the scholars here trace the work of grandparents such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Charles Pierce, and William James, and parents such as the pragmatist John Dewey and the process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. (Whitehead is from the UK but “American” in that he died in the US after a long career at Harvard and wrote his magnum opus, Process and Reality, in the US.) From these ancestors, the scholars gathered in this volume see a path forward: Art as conscious experience, as Dewey posited, and/or art as committed immersion in the process, as Whitehead claimed.Whitehead's process approach—process aesthetics—reminds us that each moment of our experience in this at once mundane and amazing world is an occasion of beauty and a telos—each moment is in the larger process of reality quite literally our last.William James attempted to map how we might free ourselves from the everyday and from everyday-ness: “We are stuffed with abstract conceptions, and glib verbalities and verbosities and in the culture of these higher functions the peculiar sources of joy connected with our simpler functions often dry up” (109). Yet, according to James, there is hope due to the fact that we human beings seek art and do art first and foremost because we enjoy it.Enjoyment was not the angle from which John Dewey approached the subject. According to Dewey our aesthetic reactions and interactions create the experience of art (and life) that re-accesses “an underlying harmony... that we vaguely remember” (112). For pragmatists, noticing a “thing” is entering a relationship with that thing, what David Strong terms in his essay, “correlational coexistence” (371).From these building blocks the scholars assembled propose ways to change US culture from one prone to ask, “What does it do?” into one in which it is increasingly possible to ask, “What does it mean?” This would be a fundamental shift in the dominant paradigms in US culture.How to get there? Randall E. Auxier offers a concise definition of “bad”—bad is something that is “lifeless and too much indebted to the actual.” My attempts at singing fall into that category, as do many American experiences conceived in the mode of what they do, not what they mean.That works of art escape or repel descriptions of their constitutive elements has proven to be a persistent philosophical conundrum through the centuries, as has the question of whether human feelings create an object or an object creates feelings, or both/and—Dewey's interaction of “organism and environment.” From whichever philosophical direction we approach this crux, aesthetic thinking can lead us to recognize and experience the inwardness of what we view as things—objects—and this examination can realign our personal axiology—our personal valuation of reality—the “ten thousand things” of ancient Chinese philosophy.Several authors cite Suzanne Langer's theory of symbol, broadening the scope of “art” well beyond Art with a capital A into the aesthetic and the ritualistic.The scholars gathered here are optimistic that aesthetic examination can create more of those rare moments (moments art can reliably create) in which our very being adjusts to the reality of existence, and we feel exhilarated and a part of the whole process of existence. We call this “nirvana” or “enlightenment.”That is another thing that feels hefty about this volume: the persistent optimism among the scholars that psychic wholeness and human flourishing are possible for more Americans. Robert S. Corrington terms this the “selving process,” roughly what Carl Jung termed “individuation.” This collection adds up to much more than the sum of its parts, as one idea inflected in a particular way by one author sparks off the same idea approached from a different perspective in another. This collection contains scholars on the cutting edge of process theology, pragmatism, aesthetics, and religion, many of whom are adept at crossing the traditional fences between academic fields. The US needs an American Aesthetics. As American poet William Carlos Williams wrote,It is difficultto get the news from poems yet men die miserably every day for lackof what is found there. (shrink)

An interesting aspect of Ernest Sosa's (2017) recent thinking is that enhanced performances (for example, the performance of an athlete under the influence of a performance‐enhancing drug) fall short of aptness, and this is because such enhanced performances do not issue from genuine competences on the part of the agent. This paper explores in some detail the implications of such thinking in Sosa's wider virtue epistemology, with a focus on cases of cognitive enhancement. A certain puzzle is then (...) highlighted, and the solution proposed draws both from the recent moral responsibility literature on guidance control (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Fischer 2012) and from work on cognitive integration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Pritchard 2010; Palermos 2014; and Carter 2017). (shrink)

When it comes to specifying the moral duties we bear towards future generations, most political philosophers position themselves on what could be regarded as a safe ground. A variant of the Lockean proviso is commonplace in the literature on intergenerational justice, taking the form of an obligation to bestow upon future people a minimum of goods necessary for reaching a certain threshold of well-being (Meyer, 2017). Furthermore, even this minimum is often frowned upon, given the non-identity problem and the (...) challenges this presents to the topic of justice between generations. Additional issues are raised at the level of non-ideal theory, the most significant being the problem of non-compliance (Gosseries and Meyer, 2009).In this paper I intend to probe the limits of “practical political possibility” (Rawls 1999), by inquiring whether embracing the sufficiency view (Frankfurt, 1987; Crisp, 2003; Benbaji, 2005) as a distributive pattern and capabilities as a metric can lead to more burdensome obligations for present generations. More specifically, I try to show that we have a duty to invest in research that aims at prolonging the lifespan of humans (the idea can already be found in the sufficientarian literature, for instance in Farrelly, 2007). Moreover, given the Earth’s limited resources, we ought to encourage the terraforming of other planets in order to make them inhabitable for (future) people.I argue that these two seemingly far-fetched projects are in fact worthwhile goals to pursue on the one hand, and moral obligations on the other hand. Nonetheless, they are not the only ones we ought to take on; for instance, we must simultaneously pursue them and try to improve the prospects of those who fall under a sufficiency threshold here and now. That is, specifying these (prima facie) duties towards future generations is connected with stronger obligations towards the current generation.Towards the end of the paper I engage in a discussion regarding the role of the feasibility constraint in a theory of justice, as rationales pertaining to feasibility are perhaps going to be the most recurrent criticisms raised against my proposal. To that end, I defend limitarian policies, which aim at setting an upper limit to how much money individuals are allowed to possess (Robeyns, 2017; Volacu and Dumitru, 2019). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Richard Eldridge SELF-UNDERSTANDING AND COMMUNITY IN WORDSWORTH'S POETRY Prior to die rise of modern science in die seventeenth century, to understand oneself was to know one's place in a ideologically organized universe. Human actions, together with natural events in general, were intelligible as aiming at the realization of given purposes or ends. To be a human person was to have a particular sort ofend: intellectual contemplation, according to Aristotle, (...) or oneness with God, according to Augustine. Self-knowledge becomes problematic, however, once events in nature are conceived in terms of the new physics to be only materially caused, not purposive. Given that human actions are events in nature, physical explanations then seem to be both necessary and sufficient for understanding them. It then becomes no longer possible to understand and explain one's actions as grounded in a partial grasp of an intelligible order of things. The self, it seems, is not real; bits of matter are, and their motions are mechanical, not plotted in a divinely ordered book ofnature. Thus the self or the person as a locus ofautonomous agency and understanding tends to come to be regarded as a fiction, not a physical something and not effective in the occurrence of events, so not a something at all. Human actions tend no longer to be seen as stemming from persons who can alter and are responsible for diem, but instead as complex events falling under physical laws. Yet despite the revolutionary revisions in the explanation of human action and die account of personhood seemingly forced by the new physics, self-knowledge is not something easily abandoned in favor ofknowledge of matter. It is not easy to conceive of one's actions as nonpurposive and of oneself as an unreal playdiing of fortune. Determinism seems incompatible with individual responsibility and hence with morality. Determinists make claims, investigate things, and regard diese activities as significant 273 274Philosophy and Literature and under their control, yet it is hard to see how this could be ifphysicalist determinism were true. Even within modern scientific understanding, autonomous creativity and human understanding are generally allotted roles in experimentation as well as in the rest of life. Yet this acknowledgment of human autonomy is seemingly in fundamental conflict with the commitment to the explanation of all events under physical laws that is characteristic of the modern scientific attitude.1 In the absence, however, of a well worked out description of how we can autonomously generate partial understandings of our proper ends as persons, understandings to which we then give expression in action, these objections will seem hollow, and the sense diat it must be possible to explain our actions fully under physical laws will press upon us. Ifwe cannot say how we can understand ourselves and our end in ways that inform our actions, then it will seem wise to abandon trying to understand agentive persons and to try instead to formulate the physical explanations of the motions of our bodies that are seemingly in order. Here Wordsworth's poetry can be of special value, for one of Wordsworth 's chief poetic concerns was to diagnose and locate skepticism about the possibility of self-understanding as a natural but temporary stage in the lives of persons who can grasp their proper end. Skepticism about action-guiding self-understanding, on his showing, is a plight of mind to which self-conscious end-directed beings succumb just as they most fully assert their particularity and separateness from others. Recovery from this plight occurs naturally when they come both to see that genuine autonomy requires community with others in a particular sort of expressive activity and to find themselves already so engaged. Further self-conscious and effective engagement in this expressive activity then emerges as the proper end of persons and as an end that is to be achieved communally. The scandal of philosophy, as Wordsworth would have it, is diat this natural development of die mind, a development Wordsworth traces throughout his own career, should be ignored in favor ofdie pursuit ofoverly abstract, narrow, and impoverishing causal explanations of our behavior. Wordsworth thus offers us a detailed and comprehensive description of how action-guiding self... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.4 (2001) 651-664 [Access article in PDF] Walter Charleton and Early Modern Eclecticism Eric Lewis The publication of Michael Albrecht's Eklektik (1994) revived a small amount of scholarly interest in an early modern "movement" with a lineage that can be traced back to Clement of Alexandria, who described a method of constructing a philosophical system by selecting among different philosophical sects. 1 Not (...) surprisingly, the reception of Albrecht's work demonstrated the complexities associated with identifying the "movement" and categorizing those who labeled themselves "eclectic" philosophers; that is, those who seemed to expound a system of philosophy assimilated from ancient and modern sources. The difficulties involved with defining "eclecticism" and applying the term to early modern natural science is further complicated by the tendency for "eclectics" to categorize their contemporaries in ways that are counterintuitive to our modern sensibilities. 2 Nevertheless, the proponents of this patchwork style of natural science are interesting precisely because they give us a glimpse into their interpretation of the state of philosophy and its relation to history during a time when the authority of The Philosopher was falling under ever increasing scrutiny.The recent literature on philosophic eclecticism largely ignored the English context where rising sentiment against sectarianism influenced the formation of the Royal Society. 3 The perceived chaos of a nation divided and redivided by the multiplication of religious associations produced a plethora of proposals for the restoration and maintenance of intellectual and social order. In particular the problems of religious and political order motivated certain members of the [End Page 651] "Newcastle Circle" (largely Royalists) to construct philosophical methodologies at least congruent with their ideological commitments to social stability. Thomas Hobbes, Margaret Cavendish, and her close friend the physician Walter Charleton each offered his and her own style of natural science. 4 Both Hobbes and the Duchess of Newcastle were excluded from participating in the community of natural philosophers formed in 1660; yet Charleton became a founding member of the Royal Society that year. Despite relative neglect, Charleton's importance to understanding the development of modern natural science in England should not be overlooked; and particularly his prescribed method of doing natural philosophy needs more attention. 5 Like the radically different methods developed by Margaret Cavendish and Thomas Hobbes, Charleton's eclecticism should be viewed as an exhaustive effort to prescribe a remedy to the perceived threat of rampant sectarianism. 6 Unlike Hobbes and Cavendish, however, Charleton saw authoritarianism and dogmatism as the greatest challenge to order, and found the solution to that challenge in mitigated skepticism and a style of philosophy that did not make an epistemic differentiation between the novel philosophies of his day and those of the ancients.Despite being a prolific writer, having a considerable reputation as a physician and placing himself in the center of the English community of natural scientists, Walter Charleton has been mostly ignored by modern scholars. In part this lack of attention can be attributed to the common view that he never developed a comprehensive philosophy nor maintained consistent metaphysical commitments. References to him claim that he was an "intellectual barometer of the age," 7 and his work has been described as "important as a case study in the reception of a mechanical philosophy." 8 His name is virtually absent from discussions concerning scientific methodology, though he is often described as a Renaissance [End Page 652] alchemical philosopher who fell under the influence of mechanistic atomism and the experimental agenda of a fledgling society of natural philosophers. Most accounts simply portray Charleton as a converted follower of the novel philosophy rather than as a novel thinker.The failure to see Charleton as more than a converted empiricist and mechanist likely results from the opinion that eclecticism does not constitute a philosophical method as much as it constitutes the last refuge for scholars during periods of intellectual crisis. The article on eclecticism in Encyclopedia Britannica (fourteenth edition) states: Eclecticism always tends to spring up after a period of vigorous constructive speculation, especially in the later stages of a controversy between... (shrink)